The evolution of trade theory: an exercise in the construction of surrogate or substitute worlds? by Murphy, Eithne
 
 
 
Murphy, Eithne (2013) The evolution of trade theory: an exercise in the construction of 
surrogate or substitute worlds?. PhD Thesis. SOAS, University of London 
http://eprints.soas.ac.uk/18066 
Copyright © and Moral Rights for this thesis are retained by the author and/or other 
copyright owners.  
A copy can be downloaded for personal non‐commercial research or study, without prior 
permission or charge.  
This thesis cannot be reproduced or quoted extensively from without first obtaining 
permission in writing from the copyright holder/s.  
The content must not be changed in any way or sold commercially in any format or 
medium without the formal permission of the copyright holders. 
When referring to this thesis, full bibliographic details including the author, title, awarding 
institution and date of the thesis must be given e.g. AUTHOR (year of submission) "Full 
thesis title", name of the School or Department, PhD Thesis, pagination. 
 1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Evolution of Trade Theory:  
An Exercise in the Construction of Surrogate or 
Substitute Worlds? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Eithne Murphy 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Thesis submitted for the degree of PhD in 2013 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Supervisor: 
 
Professor Ben Fine 
 
 
 
 
 
Department of Economics 
SOAS, University of London 
 2 
Declaration for PhD thesis 
 
I have read and understood regulation 17.9 of the Regulations for students of 
the SOAS, University of London concerning plagiarism. I undertake that all the 
material presented for examination is my own work and has not been written for 
me, in whole or in part, by any other person. I also undertake that any quotation 
or paraphrase from the published or unpublished work of another person has been 
duly acknowledged in the work which I present for examination. 
 
 
 
 
 
Signed: ______________________________  Date: _________________ 
 
 3 
Acknowledgements 
 
 
I would like to thank my supervisor Ben Fine for his insights, encouragement and, 
above all, patience in what was a very stop-go exercise. Without his support, I would 
not have completed. 
 
 
I would also like to express my gratitude to my work colleague Claire Noone, who 
has been so helpful over the years, but never more so than in these last few months. 
 
 
Finally, I would like to dedicate this work to the memory of my deceased friend and 
colleague Eoghan Garvey, who always encouraged me to trust my instincts and who 
inspired by example. 
 4 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
This thesis interrogates the nature of neoclassical economics through the prism of the 
evolution of international trade theory. A unique feature of trade theory has been the 
successful transformation of the core hegemonic model of comparative advantage 
from its roots in classical political economy into forms compatible with neoclassical 
thought.  This continuity serves to convey an image of progress in economic thought. 
Moreover, the type of abstraction associated with the comparative advantage model of 
trade, and the counter-intuitive insights that derive from it, have been frequently cited 
by economists as proof of the scientific nature of orthodox economic theorising. It is 
therefore important to appraise the epistemic nature of trade theorising, especially 
given the paucity (until relatively recently) of empirical work.  
 
It is the contention of this thesis that the development of trade theory was 
characterised by a retreat from social realism. Model development was increasingly 
driven by tractability considerations as opposed to ontological ones. Initially, this 
necessitated describing the social environment in an unrealistic, idealised way. The 
narrowing associated with this process reached its culmination when trade theory was 
successfully subsumed as part of general equilibrium analysis. Latterly, this process 
of narrowing has been reversed, with trade modelling allowing for various forms of 
imperfect markets. This thesis attempts to show that the process of narrowing and 
subsequent broadening was driven, primarily, by internal, discipline-specific 
considerations of tool development and not by concerns with empirical adequacy. 
This assertion is bolstered by considering the multifarious stratagems used by 
mainstream theorists to defend core trade propositions from various empirical 
challenges during the period of mainstream model construction. The ultimate effect of 
these theoretical endeavours has been the creation of “substitute worlds” that do little 
to facilitate a deeper understanding of causal reality, possibly because that is not their 
purpose.  
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Chapter 1. Introduction 
 
1.1 Preamble 
 
This thesis is a critical analysis of the history of international trade theory from 
its classical political economy roots to its current neoclassical expressions. The 
over-arching aim of the work is to use the subject matter of international trade 
to cast some light on the nature of neoclassical economic theorising. Theorising 
in the domain of international trade has not been static and understanding the 
forces driving its change is central to appreciating the methodological 
commitments of neoclassical theory. The central issue at stake is whether 
economics as currently practised is a rigorous, vibrant discipline that casts light 
on social reality in a useful way or whether it is a degenerate scholastic exercise 
whose methodological commitments hinder rather than help our understanding 
of economic and social processes. A related and equally important issue is to 
address whether there are natural limits to the scientific aspirations of a subject 
like economics (given the social material that is its essence) and whether current 
practices strain at those limits or whether there is scope for improvement? 
Before explaining why the history of international trade theory was the chosen 
subject matter of this work, and the hoped for contribution of this exercise, 
presentation of some disciplinary context is in order so as to contextualise the 
debate and highlight the particular cognitive challenges raised by the subject 
matter of economics.  
 
1.2 Disciplinary Context 
 
The ambiguous status of economics as a science is partly revealed by its status 
at the annual Nobel awards in recognition of scientific and cultural advances. 
Economics became what could be best described as an associate member of the 
club sixty seven years after the awarding of the first Nobel prizes, with the 
establishment of the Sveriges Riksbank Prize in Economic Sciences in Memory 
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of Alfred Nobel. Yet, it is the only social science discipline so honoured.  
Moreover, in recent times, the distinction between it and the other sciences 
appears blurred, to the extent that all winners (excluding the Peace prize) are 
honoured at the same ceremony. Furthermore, it is commonplace to refer to the 
honour as the Nobel Prize in Economics.  
 
The peculiar nature of economics was further on display at a roundtable 
discussion of the 2008 winners late that year (Nobel Media AB/BBC World 
2008). 2008 was the year that Paul Krugman won the economics prize for his 
work on international trade. As international trade is the subject matter of this 
thesis (in which Krugman’s work and views figure prominently) and, given the 
timing of the meeting (just a few months after the economic and social world 
was rocked by the collapse of Lehman Brothers), there is a certain piquancy to 
the discussion that ensued. When invited to discuss the nature of their work, the 
prize winner in literature, Jean-Marie Le Clezio, demarcated his work from that 
of the scientists, saying that it was a different creative process, insofar as 
science reflects a belief in progress and the future.1 The achievements that the 
(natural) scientists in their respective disciplines recounted ranged from: the 
discovery of the HIV virus; the discovery of a protein that changes colours 
when injected into animal cells, thus allowing researchers to study cell 
processes that were previously invisible; and the discovery of the mechanism of 
broken symmetry in subatomic physics that can aid our understanding of the 
asymmetry between matter and anti-matter in the universe. When it was 
Krugman’s turn, he said that his work showed why similar countries often 
produce similar goods but still beneficially trade with one another. If Krugman 
felt any embarrassment about using the term “scientific discovery” in the same 
company as the natural scientists (not to speak of appropriating the term to 
describe what, arguably, the informed punter in the street might already know), 
nothing in his demeanour revealed any such discomfiture. In  
a separate documentary recounting what it was that he did, Krugman referred to 
the reception of his work by his relatives, for whom his insights appeared to be 
obvious. His reaction was that it took a lot of work to make these obvious 
                                                
1 Interestingly, at the end of the hour long discussion, he alluded to a previously unseen link between 
literature and science, which he defined as the coherence of humanity in all its diversity.  
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insights clear. In the same documentary clip, fellow economist (also his spouse) 
Robin Wells spoke of how good one has to be to be as simple in one’s 
theorising as Krugman, while an earlier recipient of the Nobel distinction, 
Joseph Stiglitz, applauded the commonsense aspect of Krugman’s work with the 
aphorism that commonsense can be quite uncommon (Nobel Media AB 2008).  
  
However, what the 2008 roundtable discussion did underline very starkly was 
that economics as a discipline is undoubtedly important, to the extent that it 
allows us to understand economic processes and to take measures to avert or 
mitigate adverse economic events. All the winners present spoke of the 
expected impact on the funding of their various research projects as a result of 
the recently erupted global financial and economic crisis. According to 
Krugman (and few would dispute his diagnosis), this was the most serious 
economic crisis since the great depression of the 1930s, but he averred that it 
could have been much worse, but for the advances that had been made in 
economic science in the interim. For him, improved economic knowledge is our 
only defence (Nobel Media AB/BBC World 2008). 
 
Yet, there was an element of double-speak about Krugman’s discourse. He 
asserted that better economic data is for economists, what the Hadron collider is 
for physicists. This, from a man whose work has been distinctly unempirical, in 
the sense of studying and explaining the data on actual evolving patterns of 
economic activity and trade! Nevertheless, Krugman’s work is considered to be 
so impactful within trade theory that, according to Stiglitz, it is appropriate to 
talk of trade theory before and after Krugman (Nobel Media AB 2008). Some 
economists and historians of trade allege that what he helped to initiate was 
nothing less than a paradigm shift or a new scientific research programme (see 
Greenaway and Milner, 1987; Bensel and Elmsie, 1992; Maneschi, 2002). 
Given the subject matter of this thesis, this is an issue to which we will return. 
Suffice it to say what is at issue is the cognitive status of the type of work for 
which Krugman has gained so much renown within the economics fraternity,  a 
distinction that, arguably, evokes some bewilderment at both ends of the 
scientific spectrum, among lay people and possibly even the natural scientists.  
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Before proceeding, I wish reveal my own position, which is that of the optimist, 
in the sense of believing that the material that economics should aim to 
understand is worthy of the designation science and that, therefore, it is 
appropriate to ask whether or not, there has been progress? One can subscribe to 
the view that economics is a science and yet despair at the practices of 
economists. This was the perspective of the historian of economic thought and 
methodologist, Mark Blaug, for whom neoclassical economics was 
insufficiently empirical and suffused with “the disease of formalism” (Blaug, 
2002, p. 34). By contrast, for fellow methodologist Uskali Maki, formalism in 
economics (by which both he and Blaug mean model building) is, potentially, 
entirely respectable and scientifically useful, given the nature of the subject 
matter of economics, where controlled experiments are difficult to conduct. But 
while Maki may defend economic modelling as a scientifically useful thought 
experiment, he does so, only to the extent that the models constructed are 
“representative systems” which have the capacity to resemble real world social 
systems in some useful way (Maki, 2009, pp. 74-75). Maki also distinguishes 
between the, by and large, observable social material that the economist deals 
with (which he designates “commonsensibles”) and the unobservable material 
that is the domain of natural scientists (such as quarks, photons, magnetic 
fields), which place different ontological constraints on respective scientific 
practitioners (Maki, 2009, pp. 87-88). For him, economic theorising in model 
form amounts to the re-arranging of these commonsensibles, which, if done 
right, will permit the commonsense picture to be replaced by a scientific one in 
such a way as to reveal the unexpected and paradoxical, such as “arguments for 
trade [and] against protectionism” (p. 88). All of which brings us to the 
commonsense material that Krugman works with, the model building that has 
been his forte and, the often paradoxical and counter-intuitive insights that can 
ensue from such theorising.  
 
1.3 Why International Trade? 
 
The choice of trade theory (and how it has evolved historically from its classical 
roots into neoclassical forms) as the subject matter through which to evaluate 
neoclassical economics, has been partly accidental and partly historical (in a 
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personal sense). I had originally intended to address trade and labour issues but 
two constraints emerged. First, the thesis would have exceeded the requisite 
length and, second, from the work that I did do on labour, it seemed that there is 
a degree of methodological heterogeneity between labour and trade. Research in 
labour economics appears to be more empirically oriented than that in trade, 
which has been heavily biased in favour of theorising, until relatively recently. 
Saying that, neoclassical work in labour economics is also very revealing of the 
methodological commitments of neoclassical economics, but that is another 
day’s work. The other reason for adopting international trade as my subject 
material is due to previously abortive attempts to try to incorporate 
“commonsense assumptions” into trade models in order to render trade 
theorising more “real” or, as Maki might say, in order to get more resemblance 
between models and social reality. This proved to be a very difficult, if 
revealing task. At every turn, I was stymied by the methods to which I was 
committed by virtue of my training. In order to incorporate unemployment into 
trade models, I had to explain it in terms of factor market imperfections. In 
order to make such imperfections endogenous (and not amenable to elimination 
by removing the source of the imperfection) I had to start down the road of 
looking at efficiency wages. The model was quickly spiralling into unwieldy 
obfuscatory complexity. Or, to explain why the dynamic effects of trade might 
differ to the static effects, I felt compelled to construct a non-traded human 
capital formation sector (more commonly referred to as education) into the 
standard trade model as well as slip in external effects on offspring from 
parental education that impacted on the human capital formation process. 
Looking at the impact of multinationals on host country welfare looked more 
promising. Here, tools of game theory could be applied. But, as I quickly 
discovered, game theory imposes its own constraints, not least, the focus on 
bilateral games, often with singular strategic variables but, most restrictive of 
all, the commitment to hyper-rationality and equilibrium outcomes. In short, I 
discovered the hard way, the price one pays for adopting mainstream tools, even 
if one’s intention is to use the tools to question the articles of faith of the 
mainstream.2 
                                                
2 I was reminded of this rather forcefully in the fourth chapter of this thesis; that is to say, the technical 
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One reason why trade theory is a useful template by which to evaluate the 
nature of neoclassical theorising is because of its unique position (among the 
various economic sub-disciplines) of exhibiting a seeming continuity between 
its classical and neoclassical expression. The hegemonic version of comparative 
advantage to which most neoclassical economists pay tribute was that expressed 
in labour input terms by the classical economist David Ricardo.3 It is this 
version that was successfully transformed into forms compatible with 
neoclassical commitments, such as those that underpin general equilibrium 
analysis.4 Superficially at any rate, such continuity and development confer an 
aura of scientific advance, where a more general theory subsumes a more 
particular one. In addition, trade theory commands a lot of respect among 
practising economists and historians of economic thought, especially historians 
of international trade. While the views of practising economists will be cited 
later in the thesis, the following is reflective of the assessment of those 
(admittedly very few) historians of economic thought who have focused their 
intellectual energies exclusively on international trade. “economists are at their 
best when they speak out on international trade … they speak with the almost 
unanimous backing of professional opinion” (Gomes, 1990, p. vii). For 
Maneschi, “The concept [comparative advantage] … continues to receive 
plaudits” (Maneschi, 1998, p.1), while, in a later work when addressing whether 
there has been progress in international trade theory, his answer was “a qualified 
yes” (Maneschi, 2002, p. 251). Irwin concluded “Free trade … remains as sound 
as any proposition in economic theory which purports to have implications for 
economic policy is ever likely to be” (Irwin, 1996, p. 8). Years later, his 
                                                                                                                                       
challenges one has to overcome just to read the work. While that may, in part, reflect on the cognitive 
capacity of the reader, it also says something about the nature of the theorising, which often seems to 
be unduly complex given the meagre insights yielded by that complexity.  
3 There is debate as to whether the concept of comparative advantage should be attributed to Ricardo or 
Robert Torrens (or even James Mill).  See Ruffin (2002, 2005) and Aldrich (2004) for more on the 
question of precedence. Ricardo is the figure focused upon in this thesis as it was his exposition that 
influenced John Stuart Mill and through him early neoclassical economists like Alfred Marshall and 
Francis Edgeworth.  
4 This version of international trade theory is predicated on the assumption of international resource 
immobility. This is one reason why trade and foreign direct investment (FDI) is not addressed in this 
thesis, since the latter did not form part of mainstream theory. Also, when theories of FDI started to 
emerge in the 1960s, they were developed by business school professors, not economists. Only with the 
development of new trade theory was FDI incorporated into mainstream scholarship, though arguably 
it still occupies a peripheral position, as a cursory scan of any mainstream international economics 
textbook will reveal.  
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conviction as to the soundness of the free trade policy stance had not abated, 
even as his bemusement as to why such a policy stance continued to generate 
controversy remained, “free trade is always under attack” (Irwin, 2009, p. xiii). 
This he can only attribute to “misconception” which he finds incongruous in the 
light of “its palpable benefits” (p.7).  
 
A final reason why international trade is such a fascinating case study is because 
it underwent what many consider to be a seismic shift in the nature of its 
research programme in the 1980s, under the influence of, amongst others, Paul 
Krugman. This was reflected in the new heuristic of modelling trade in 
imperfectly competitive markets. The perfectly competitive market framework, 
that had appeared such an inviolable construct of neoclassical trade theorising 
for much of the twentieth century, was blithely abandoned. Even more 
astounding was the abandonment of general equilibrium in many instances, as 
occurred with the emergence of the very popular oligopolistic trade models. 
Such a change in direction begs the question of why it happened when it did, 
what were the forces driving such change, and whether the change could be 
considered progressive. If the latter, then it would seem to justify what 
economists do and the methods that they deploy, since it would appear to show 
that ontological considerations are never completely sidelined by issues of 
tractability, but merely represent a temporary holding phase until such time as 
economists have developed the tools to incorporate more complex aspects of 
social reality into their models. Whether the emergence of new trade theory 
(which is how trade in imperfect markets was designated) is progressive or not 
depends in part on the forces driving the change in trade theory, and that 
question is the leitmotif of this thesis.  
 
1.4 The Fundamental Question 
 
To my mind, the fundamental questions in economics generally and, in the 
context of this thesis, in international trade in particular, are more normative 
than positive. Standard economic analysis likes to distinguish between the two, 
claiming that the domain of the economist lies in positive analysis, what will 
happen if, while it is up to policymakers to decide on normative objectives. But 
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the positive invariably has implications for the normative. The appeal of the 
comparative advantage theory of trade (which will be discussed in more detail 
later) resides in its normative implications; that is to say, its unambiguous 
conclusion that all countries, regardless of their level of economic and/or 
technological development, can engage in free commerce with more advanced 
countries and be better off than they would have been if such commercial 
intercourse had been restricted in some way. Or, if one looks at how Krugman 
describes his work, that of showing why similar countries producing similar 
goods can still beneficially trade, it is both a positive and normative statement. 
The normative standard I adopt to evaluate the impact of trade in this study is a 
conservative one. A country is considered to have benefited from international 
trade if it results in increased economic efficiency that translates into higher 
aggregate levels of national consumption (and income).5  
 
While it may be uncontroversial to designate the material that economic 
theorists deal with as commonsensible, in that most people understand what it 
represents, very often, there is nothing remotely commonsensible about the 
positive and, especially the normative, conclusions of these theories. Indeed, the 
process of theorising (what Maki refers to as the re-arrangement of 
commonsensibles) routinely gives rise to outcomes that are not at all intuitive. 
Rather than be dismayed by the layperson’s mystification and inability to 
comprehend the deeper insights of economic theory, it has been my impression 
that, on the contrary, many economists delight in the non-accessibility of their 
work and the paradoxical, counter-intuitive conclusions that may arise from it. 
One can speculate why this is the case, but a not too outlandish explanation may 
be that it justifies what they do. If the answers were obvious and intuitive, then 
the status of economics as a specialist discipline might be called into question. 
This is not to say that just because outcomes are counter-intuitive that they are 
necessarily wrong, or that economists are acting in bad faith, but it is worthy of 
note how neoclassical economic models frequently ignore those very 
commonsensibles which, if incorporated into their models, might give rise to 
                                                
5 This is not to minimise the importance of distributional issues or non-income issues such as human 
rights and the environment and how they fare under different trading regimes. It is simply to see 
whether the claims that are made for trade and trade policy satisfy the efficiency claims as routinely 
alleged.  
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more ambiguous normative conclusions. Also, worthy of (sociological) study is 
what happens to the commonsense intuition of students as they proceed with 
their economic studies. I am assuming (possibly presumptuously) that most 
students who opt to study economics do so because they want answers to the big 
questions. The most obvious of these relate to poverty and growth and, in 
particular, how some societies successfully transitioned from being 
economically poor to being economically prosperous and, most importantly, 
whether their economic achievements are replicable?6 
 
1.5 A Parable on how an Economics Education can exorcise Commonsense 
 
The purpose of this section is, as indicated in the heading, to relay some of the 
commonsense concerns that students have about the positive and normative 
conclusions of textbook international trade theory, and how these concerns are 
typically addressed by academic economists. While the tone adopted may seem 
tongue in cheek, the substantive issues are valid and the typical academic 
responses are representative of the position of most neoclassical trade 
economists.  
 
An early encounter that students have with trade policy issues (often in an 
introductory principles course) is via the not too complicated partial equilibrium 
diagram, generally (and erroneously) attributed to Alfred Marshall. This 
serviceable vehicle is used to show the positive and normative effects of trade. 
The effect of the removal of tariffs, import quotas or other forms of trade 
interference, are revealed through their impact on domestic price, domestic 
                                                
6 Other less obvious but even more challenging subjects that may engage the curious student are the 
environmental limits to growth and/or whether an alternative economic model of society is conceivable 
that is not dependent on the growth imperative. It is worthy of note that fundamental questions of this 
nature were raised by bourgeois economists such as John Stuart Mill and John Maynard Keynes. Mill 
was wedded to the classical Ricardian view that growth would eventually cease but did not consider 
such an outcome to be necessarily a bad thing, provided that output per capita was sufficient in some 
material sense (Mill, 2004 [1848], pp. 690-692). For Keynes, the lure of technological progress lay in 
its potential to reduce the length of the working week, hence freeing workers to pursue other non-
material, but presumably enriching, pursuits (Keynes, 1963 [1930], p. 369). In a strange twist of social 
fate, topics such as the necessity of growth and/or how to harness technological progress in a socially 
beneficial way, are further removed from the discussion agenda today than they were in past periods 
when output per capita was considerably lower than it is currently. We have ceased to ask why, with all 
our economic progress, output is so unequally distributed (and becoming more so), and why so many 
workers are currently so time poor, contrary to Keynes’s benign expectations?  
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production, domestic consumption and trade, as represented by demand and 
supply schedules in that particular market.  
This form of representation does not do too much violence to any commonsense 
notion that the student may harbour. Doubt usually only starts to emerge when 
the professor moves on to discussing the normative or welfare aspects of the 
policy decision. The standard representation of the gains from trade 
liberalisation is via the euphemistically named consumer and producer welfare 
triangles. If the diagram is representative of an import-competing sector, it is 
not unusual for the student to inquire as to what happens to those who lose their 
jobs as a result of trade liberalisation. The standard response is to be told that 
unemployment does not exist in these models. The resources released from the 
contracting import-competing sector will be more profitably employed in 
alternative expanding sectors to which their capacities are better suited. If the 
student persists asking how can the professor be so sure, he/she will be told that 
this trade model represents long-run equilibrium and that in the long run all 
resources will be efficiently employed because that is how markets work (if 
allowed) and, in any case, unemployment would not be rational. Certainly, 
unemployment may be a short-run phenomenon due to the frictions associated 
with resource re-allocation, but short-run hitches should not be allowed to deter 
policy initiatives that are ultimately beneficial.  
 
This explanation may or may not satisfy the new student to economics. 
Typically, those for whom such a model makes no sense, since it appears to 
assumes what needs to be empirically proven, may at this juncture abandon their 
economic studies, on the grounds that the discipline is not answering the 
questions which were the reason for them studying economics in the first place. 
The more persistent and hardier souls may believe it is only right to give the 
discipline the benefit of the doubt in the hope that, once they have mastered its 
tools, they too will be privy to the insights that come from studying economics. 
The next challenge to their undeveloped commonsense notions of how 
economies work may come when they study international trade as a separate 
sub-discipline in its own right. Here, they will encounter the doctrine of 
comparative advantage and be told, in no uncertain terms, that technological and 
economic backwardness is never a reason not to adopt a liberal trade policy. 
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But, burdened with their commonsense shackles, they may proceed to inquire 
how exactly the economically-backward country is meant to compete with its 
more economically-advanced rivals. In response, they will be patiently told that 
there are two aspects to sectoral competitiveness: the productivity of resources 
used; and the cost of those resources. Since the cost of resources should reflect 
their aggregate productivity in the country as a whole, then the technologically 
challenged country will have no difficulty in competing in sectors where it has a 
comparative advantage, as its productivity disadvantage is more than 
compensated for by the relative cheapness of its resources. Moreover, those 
same collective resources will earn more in a real sense when exposed to the 
imperatives of international competition, since they will be more rationally 
deployed and, moreover, some goods can now be purchased more cheaply than 
heretofore from international sources. In case the force of the message does not 
fully permeate the student’s commonsense defences, he/she will be informed 
that it gets even better, in that the trade policy prescription for national 
economic betterment in no way depends on the vagaries of international 
economic relations. So regardless of what policymakers in other countries 
decide to do, a given country can increase its national income by unilaterally 
removing the barriers to trade in its domestic market.  
 
At this point, a certain amount of bemused head scratching may be the student’s 
response, in particular if he/she has any awareness of the reality of international 
trade politics. How then does one make sense of trade wars? Why, to cite a 
recent example, does the European Union (EU) think it is punishing the Chinese 
by imposing a duty on their exports of solar panels to the EU, and why have the 
Chinese responded with a duty on EU wine exports to China? If the Chinese are 
foolish enough to dump (or sell at an artificially-reduced price) their solar 
panels in the EU market, why not accept the gift, as the economically literate 
professor would surely recommend. At this juncture, the professor must make a 
partial concession to realpolitik and explain such economically irrational 
behaviour by pointing to failures in the policy formation process. Such irrational 
mercantilist hokum pokum exists because policy-making is subject to political 
pressures and the rational response of a re-election conscious politician to 
organised lobby groups is to adopt a mercantilist approach to trade policy, 
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where the power of import-competing lobbies is balanced by the power of 
exporter-led lobbies. This translates into the maxim: access to foreign markets 
for domestic goods is a positive, access to the domestic market for foreign 
goods is a concession.  
 
A final example of a frequent commonsense notion that the socially and 
historically aware student might harbour is that it can make economic sense for 
governments to protect certain sectors of the economy, in order to assist in its 
transformation. To the student’s eyes, it seems obvious that more prosperous 
countries have always been those that have produced more elaborated or higher 
value added goods. The nature of higher value added goods may have changed 
historically, but the principle remains: national economic prosperity is rarely 
associated with the production of primary commodities. The professor’s 
response to this particular commonsensible will depend on where he/she is on 
the perfect-imperfect market spectrum. If more disposed to thinking of markets 
as perfect (or at least perfectible), the response will be that if countries were 
meant to produce higher value added goods, it would have happened. One has to 
trust the desire for gain of the profit-maximising capitalist. The cost of the 
investment or length of time before profit would be realised are not legitimate 
reasons not to have confidence in private sector initiative. What is meant to be 
will be and vice-versa. Markets know best. By contrast with this economically 
fatalistic view, the professor, who does not feel confident enough to deny the 
existence of imperfect markets, is forced in logic to acknowledge (at least in 
principle) the case for protection. But it is generally the case that even this self-
designated liberal will do so reluctantly. He/she will underline that the nature of 
the intervention depends on the nature of the imperfection and its empirical 
significance. Besides, even if all these boxes are ticked, there are still a host of 
other non-economic reasons to be hesitant about the desirability of intervention. 
That, the student will be told, is why most trade economists, even those who 
develop models acknowledging the imperfect nature of markets, are realistic 
free traders.  
 
At this point, the student either definitively walks away from this strange 
discipline whose commonsensibles suitably re-arranged seem to yield such 
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strange, counterintuitive economic conclusions or else they succumb to the 
doctrine. The latter is more likely if he/she discovers in themselves an aptitude 
for logical puzzles and if this aptitude is increasingly academically-rewarded in 
their new social environment. A feature of the surrender is that certain empirical 
commonsensibles (such as unemployment, differential sectoral productivity of 
resources, economies of large scale production) either feature less on their 
emerging theoretical landscape or, if they do make an appearance, they do in a 
distinct way that allows them to integrate successfully with the main corpus of 
theory. This tendency of mainstream theory to ignore what many believe are 
socially relevant commonsensibles may explain why such commonsense 
concerns have been the focus of critics of orthodox economics (whether 
expressed against the dictates of classical political economy or neoclassical 
economics). It may also explain why these issues never go away completely and 
are, instead, subject to periodic resurrection. What does change, however, is 
how the mainstream responds to such episodes of periodic reappearance.  
 
1.6 Objectives and Contribution 
 
This thesis traces the evolution of international trade theory, starting with the 
contribution of classical political economy to the debate on the determinants of 
trade flows and the relationship between international trade and national 
economic prosperity, and culminating with contemporary research on 
essentially the same questions (albeit in a more complex social and economic 
world).  It is not an exhaustive, comprehensive review, especially of classical 
political economists’ theorising on international commerce. The focus is on 
those writers who are routinely cited as forebears of the neoclassical tradition, 
namely Adam Smith, David Ricardo and John Stuart Mill. Also, I do not 
address heterodox theories, be they neo-Ricardian or radical. So the primary 
focus is on neoclassical theory, what it appropriated from the classical political 
economy tradition and how it changed and evolved, with a view to 
understanding better the nature of neoclassical theorising.  
 
In addition, this work is not unique in examining the historical evolution of 
international trade theory. While international trade gets scant coverage in most 
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histories of economic thought (a surprising phenomenon when one considers 
that early mercantilist writing on economic matters invariably dealt with 
international commerce), there are three such reviews by: Douglas Irwin (1996); 
Andrea Maneschi (1998); and Leonard Gomes (2003). I am indebted to all 
three, primarily for pointing me in the direction of some of the primary 
literature. The differences between this study and the works of the authors just 
cited are: in the interpretation of the primary material; in my understanding of 
the principal forces driving the evolution of neoclassical trade theory; in the 
assessment of the nature of that change; and in the focus on methodological 
issues. The latter comes to the fore particularly in disputes between mainstream 
theorists and their critics. What is noteworthy is what unifies the various critics 
- how similar criticisms arise at different points in time and the manner in which 
neoclassical theorists have responded to such challenges. There is also an 
interesting temporal dimension to these responses, which reflect where 
neoclassical economics was at that time; that is to say, what were its core 
inviolable concepts that had to be protected at all costs. As we shall see, the 
hard core of neoclassical economics (and neoclassical trade) has not remained 
static, which is why concessions that were inconceivable at certain times were 
readily accepted subsequently. This raises questions over the possible future 
direction of neoclassical theorising.  
 
The central claim of this thesis is that theorising in international trade has been 
characterised by a retreat from social realism. On the face of it, this may seem a 
contentious claim, especially in light of the alleged paradigm shift that occurred 
in international trade in the early 1980s. Nevertheless, evidence will be 
marshalled to support this claim. Superficially, neoclassical theorising in trade 
up to the late 1970s was characterised by a process of narrowing. This was 
necessitated by the demands of translating the hegemonic, classical political 
economy concept of comparative advantage into forms compatible with core 
concepts in neoclassical economics. Such a transformation necessitated 
describing the economic and technological environment in an increasingly 
restrictive way. This restrictiveness was primarily a function of the commitment 
to mathematical formalism of neoclassical theory. Formalism in this instance 
took the form of representative hyper-rational agents with omniscient foresight 
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making the best use of their scarce resources in a price-taking environment, 
where all actions were subject to diminishing net returns. It was a form of 
theorising that reached its apotheosis when international trade theory was 
subsumed as part of general equilibrium theory, where the free trade 
equilibrium could be compared with restricted trade (or autarky) equilibrium. 
Despite the narrow environmental and technological restrictions imposed on 
international trade theory, comparative advantage was still a concept that had 
sufficient flexibility to allow for various determinants, such as international 
differences in technology, international differences in factor endowments or 
even international differences in preferences. The common element in these 
explanations was the view that difference is the reason for international trade. 
Moreover, regardless of its determinants, its policy implications remained 
unchanged; that is to say, that trade liberalisation is presumed to enhance 
unambiguously economic efficiency in the liberalising country.  
 
A new heuristic developed in international trade theorising around 1980. The 
environmental and technological restrictions of the earlier period were 
abandoned with the acceptance of various kinds of product market 
imperfections and variable returns to scale at firm level.  Superficially, these 
theoretical developments seem progressive, to the extent that there was less 
dissonance than before between the empirical reality of who trades what with 
whom and what theory seeks to explain. Furthermore, this new type of trade 
theorising was (in some manifestations) successfully integrated with a version 
of the comparative advantage story, so it appeared to supplement rather than 
supplant traditional neoclassical trade theory.7 But the crucial question remained 
and that was of the normative significance of such theories and their policy 
implications, especially for developing countries? To get an understanding of 
these issues, it is necessary to appraise just how different was this new form of 
theorising and what led to its emergence?  
 
Just like its older relative, new trade theory is formalistic in its expression. 
Markets may exhibit multifarious imperfections, but economic outcomes are 
                                                
7 Trade in monopolistically competitive markets was reconciled with the factor endowments 
explanation of comparative advantage (see Helpman and Krugman, 1985).  
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still rationalised as being the equilibrium consequence of the behaviour of 
hyper-rational, self-regarding decision makers. Formally, the commitment to 
optimisation that characterised old trade theory continued to characterise new 
trade theory. It will also be argued that the impetus for change came less from 
the patent inadequacies of traditional neoclassical trade theory and more 
because it had run out of steam. Trade theory has been an exercise in deductive 
logic. The perfectly competitive, general equilibrium model had exhausted its 
possibilities. By contrast, relaxing the environmental constraints opened up a 
whole new vista of theoretical possibilities, especially as markets can be 
imperfect in so many different ways. But, and this is the fundamental caveat, a 
commitment to formalism of the sort that characterises trade theory (and 
possibly any type of mathematical formalism) constrains the manner in which 
social reality is described.  
 
An early critic of formalisation was Allyn Young (1928). In prophetic fashion 
(given that he was writing before mathematical formalisation of economic 
theory really took off), he warned that the apparatus that economists were 
developing was standing in the way of a clear view of economic phenomena and 
was patently inadequate to the task of explaining economic change. There is a 
certain irony in realising that the object of his opprobrium was Alfred 
Marshall’s partial equilibrium engine of discovery, which many would defend 
as having some claim to descriptive adequacy, by contrast with the virtual 
economy world of general equilibrium theorising. But his essential point still 
applies, even to the brave new world of new trade theory with its imperfect 
markets and occasional dynamics. It is evident in the full employment 
assumption that still applies in monopolistically competitive trade models (an 
assumption, along with zero economic rent, that is necessary to ensure “model 
closure”). It is apparent in partial equilibrium, oligopolistic, trade models where, 
despite allowing for barriers to market entry, economic rents and strategic 
behaviour, agents are constrained to strategise in a particular way, usually with 
an emphasis on bilateral games and singular strategic variables. It is patent in 
dynamic trade theory, where growth can only occur as a result of social effects 
that were not privately anticipated or considered by the relevant decision maker. 
Yes, market imperfections may be permissible now, but mainstream methods 
 25 
still force reality into formal boxes, the better to apply the tools that continue to 
define neoclassical economics. What this thesis contests is the claim that this 
form of theorising leads to a better understanding of actual market processes. 
Additionally, even if enhanced understanding was a partial consequence of the 
deployment of neoclassical tools, it can at best be considered a random bonus 
since such justification is not strictly necessary. What has driven theory is the 
scope it offers for the application of the tools that neoclassical economics holds 
dear. If the tools are sufficient, great, if they are inadequate to the task, they are 
not abandoned, but rather the intransigent aspects of reality get ignored until 
such time (if ever) as they can be dealt with formally.  
 
This obduracy of method imposes very high costs, since not only can it lead to 
the conscious exclusion of aspects of reality that the models cannot 
accommodate or accommodation in a way that is not particularly enlightening, 
it can also cloud perception of reality. For example, case studies revealing 
successful incidence of trade protection as part of a broader state-led economic 
strategy, have been acknowledged by orthodox trade theorists only very 
reluctantly and decidedly belatedly. One reason is because this form of evidence 
(historical or case studies) is not recognised as being sufficiently scientific by 
neoclassical practitioners. (The rigidity of formalism in theorising has been 
matched by a similar rigidity when it comes to empirical evidence). Irwin, in his 
honest (or naïve) fashion, said most economists are “suspicious of historical 
analysis” since “under ideal circumstances the implications of economic theory 
did not depend on historical circumstances” (Irwin, 1996, pp. 127-128). Even 
when the evidence could no longer be ignored, economists continued to cast 
doubt on the veracity of the mechanisms at play. For example, Paul Krugman in 
the latest edition of his very successful international economics textbook makes 
reference to pseudo-infant industries, claiming that some protected industries 
may have become competitive for reasons that have nothing to do with 
protection (Krugman et al, 2012, p. 188). Other economists have been known to 
claim that successful developing countries have succeeded despite their 
protectionist and mercantilist policies.   
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It is surely correct to be concerned with a discipline whose principal form of 
theorising and empirical engagement can lead to such blindness when it comes 
to social reality, and intolerance when it comes to forms of evidence, even if 
one does not go as far as Michael Hudson for whom, such blinkered, near-
sightedness is the whole point of the exercise. He alleges that formalism serves 
to distract and obfuscate by expunging economic history, history of economic 
thought or anything that facilitates broad understanding or an awareness of 
alternatives (Hudson, 2000, p. 301). An objective of this thesis is to show that 
this need not be the case, nor was it always the case. Classical political economy 
writing on international trade was more variegated than is generally perceived 
from international economics text books. Likewise, early neoclassical 
economists were keenly aware of the social material that was the basis of their 
theorising and the manner in which the comparative advantage case for trade 
could be qualified. In addition, what united the different overt critics of liberal 
trade theory was a claim to be more empirically engaged. (The latter also 
frequently rejected methodological individualism and had a broader conception 
of significant causal forces). Resurrecting these debates is, in my view, a 
valuable exercise since, as Dow alleges, controversies reveal a range of ways of 
theorising about the economy (Dow, 2001). Showing what has been lost as trade 
theory became ever more fomalised and engaging with the arguments of the 
critics of mainstream theory, therefore serves an important epistemological 
function of turning our gazes to methodological issues. This develops capacity 
for judgment on how best to develop theory to address future contexts (Dow, 
2001). 
 
The layout of this thesis is as follows. Chapter 2 traces the development of 
neoclassical trade theory from its roots in classical political economy to its 
ultimate incorporation into general equilibrium theory. It challenges the view 
that this development was progressive, arguing that, on the contrary, it was 
increasingly characterised by a retreat from social realism. It aims to show that 
not only were the classical economists who theorised about international trade 
ontologically engaged but the same is true for early neoclassical trade theorists. 
The qualitative change in theorising occurred as a result of the professions’ 
increasing obsession with formalism, which changed the nature of the truth that 
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economists sought. Formalistic restrictions during this period of theory 
development necessitated designating the social and technological environment 
in an increasingly narrow way. It also expunged dynamic considerations since 
the formal apparatus constructed around optimising agents in perfectly 
competitive markets was insufficient to the task of describing change and 
growth.  
 
Chapter 3 resurrects challenges to the benign comparative advantage parable 
that all countries can benefit from a liberal trading regime. What is striking 
about the challenges is how they appeal to commonsense. So, for example, a 
liberal trading regime is questioned if there are fears that it could lead to 
increased unemployment, or a restructuring of the economy in a way that results 
in resources being less productively employed on average. These caveats were 
raised by different economists, in different ways, at historically different periods 
of time. Accordingly, they have been responded to in very different ways 
depending on their intellectual climate. Cournot (1971 [1838]) developed a 
theory of trade that implicitly assumes variable employment. Schuller (1921 
[1905]) explicitly challenged the assumption that “the total productive activity 
of every State represents a fixed quantity” (p. 377), while Keynes’s defence of 
mercantilism in chapter 23 of The General Theory was predicated on the 
assumption that the level of economic activity in a country is variable. Graham 
(1923) defends protectionism if it leads to the expansion of sectors where 
technology exhibits increasing returns to scale at the expense of sectors where 
decreasing returns to scale prevail. He made the argument that in such instances 
of varying returns to scale, protectionism, correctly applied, would lead to 
increased productivity of domestic resources. Manoilescu (1931) made a similar 
case, although his starting point was the heterogeneity of resource productivity 
across sectors of an economy, which he asserted as an empirical fact. Given this 
reality, he argued for commercial policy measures to stimulate those sectors 
where resources could be most productively employed. In addition to what 
could be considered static considerations, some of the most vociferous critics of 
a liberal trading regime, especially for developing countries, rested their case on 
dynamic or longer-run considerations. The infant industry case for protection, as 
articulated by Hamilton (1827 [1791]), Rae (1964 [1834] and List (2005 
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[1841]), is that there is a discrepancy between policies that may be in a 
country’s short-term interest (assuming unemployment and productivity are not 
adversely affected by trade liberalisation) and its long-term interest. 
Protectionism may be desirable if it leads to the development of a country’s 
productive power.  
 
It will be shown that none of these eminently sensible arguments against free 
trade had any impact on neoclassical trade theory, especially in the period when 
it was being developed as part of general equilibrium analysis. Furthermore, the 
strategies deployed by neoclassical practitioners to address these foundational 
challenges are very revealing of the predilections of mainstream theoretical 
analysis. Cournot’s trade theory is not generally known, despite the widespread 
use of his tools of analysis. Bickerdike (1905) and Haberler (1936) responded to 
Schuller’s thesis by claiming that variable employment is either not possible or, 
if possible, must be optimal because all individuals behave rationally in their 
economic affairs. When Keynes went on to show that unemployment could 
exist and persist, notwithstanding rational behaviour, it was deemed a 
macroeconomic and not a trade issue. Graham’s thesis was dismissed as not 
being compatible with competitive markets, unless such economies are external 
to the firm, and the latter possibility was deemed empirically unlikely. His main 
combatants were Knight (1924, 1925), Haberler (1936) and Viner (1964 
[1937]). Manoilescu’s thesis was subjected to reinterpretation by Ohlin (1931) 
as a case of inter-industry wage differentials and subsequently diminished by 
claims that such differentials were more speculative than real (Haberler, 1936). 
Finally, the infant industry argument, as made respectable by Mill (2004 
[1848]), was accepted as the one true exception to the comparative advantage 
parable. Despite its exceptional status, it had no impact on neoclassical trade 
theory which developed along static lines without increasing returns. 
Subsequently, it was resurrected by Meade (1955), Kemp (1960) and Baldwin 
(1969) as a particular kind of market imperfection that was not very amenable to 
correction through the policy of trade protection.  
 
So, effectively, neoclassical trade theory protected itself from dissonant 
challenges by a combination of measures that included: amnesia; dismissal of 
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the case due to its incompatibility with core theoretical claims (rationality and 
competitive markets); consignment of the issue to another sub-discipline in 
economics; misrepresentation and innocuous acceptance. This all goes to show 
that neoclassical economics fails to practise what it preaches, namely logical 
consistency and submission to the court of evidence, as alleged by Dow (2000, 
p. 169).  
 
Chapter 4 addresses the broadening of the social canvas that occurred once the 
perfectly competitive market construct was abandoned and technology was 
permitted more multifarious forms in the sense of variable returns to scale. As 
already alluded to, some commentators allege that trade theorising when 
product markets exhibit various kinds of imperfections, was nothing less than a 
paradigm shift in theoretical outlook. Others assert that it was empirical 
considerations that led to a change in the nature of theorising (Maneschi, 2002, 
p. 241). All practitioners of the new art consider international trade theory to be 
enriched by the new paradigm, while Maki believes that recent developments in 
trade theory (and growth) were at least partly motivated by ontological 
considerations. “I believe the tension between tractability conventions and 
ontological convictions is one of the driving forces of progress in economics” 
(Maki, 2009, p. 82, his emphasis). In this chapter, as well as recounting the 
various new directions in economic modelling, I contest the assertion that the 
new heuristic was driven primarily by ontological considerations, claiming 
instead that it was internally generated by opportunities it afforded to deploy 
technical tools. Krugman admits as much saying that what made the difference 
was “the revolution in industrial organization theory during the 1970s” and that 
“the idea of applying these models to international trade was bound to occur to 
somebody” and that “the theory of international trade followed the perceived 
line of least mathematical resistance” (Krugman, 1990, p. 4). I also question 
how much light this new form of theorising has shed on understanding the 
relationship between international trade and economic development, especially 
with a view to informing policy.  
 
Chapter 5 concludes with reflections on why trade theory has evolved as it has 
and whether this evolution can be considered progressive in the sense of 
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supplying constructive insights into trade policy issues. I suggest that this is not 
the case and that trade theory has become more fragmented as opposed to 
pluralistic and that its fragmentation is no more conducive to useful policy 
insights than was its previous monolithic structure. I intimate that the reason for 
this is that, even now, trade theory is constructed on foundations that are not 
adequate to empirical reality, and that this is because it is constrained by the 
nature of the theoretical tools that it uses. These are the tools that define 
neoclassical economics, tools that give the illusion of rigour but that act as a 
cover for narrow dogmatism when it comes to method. I suggest that the current 
unsatisfactory state of affairs in mainstream economic research will only change 
if practitioners recognise the constraints imposed by the unique social material 
with which they work. Such recognition should encourage greater openness 
when it comes to methods of economic and social investigation. While I am not 
optimistic that neoclassical practitioners are ready (or indeed equipped) to 
abandon their idealised substitute worlds in order to engage with messier 
imperfect reality, the current economic crisis presents a unique opportunity for 
other heterodox voices to be heard. This is the silver lining to the otherwise 
gloomy economic cloud and it is this occasion that needs to be grasped.  
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Chapter 2.  Trade I: The Evolution of International Trade 
Theory: A Progressive Research Programme? 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
International trade theory has always had unquestioned status within economics. 
One central reason for its standing among the economics fraternity is that the 
central propositions of international trade theory have been the standard bearer 
for the discipline’s claim to scientific rank. The core proposition in the theory of 
international trade is that of comparative advantage. That the weight of 
scientific aspiration should be so heavily dependent on a single theory in a 
specialised area of economics is due to a number of factors. First, it is a theory 
with a relatively old (in terms of economics) lineage, having its origins in 
classical political economy but undergoing successful and successive 
transformation to render it compatible with neoclassical concepts. To the extent 
that durability gives, at a minimum, the impression that a theory has not yet 
been falsified, it confers on it a scientific aura. Second, the theory of 
comparative advantage is counter-intuitive and not amenable to commonsense 
logic. This confers on it a superficial similarity with the physical sciences, 
which most economists gleefully seize on to show that economics is not simply 
commonsense dressed up in fancy mathematical language but, rather, a 
discipline whose insights can only be divined by those with specialist training in 
the appropriate techniques. Furthermore, international trade theory generally has 
been among the most technically demanding fields of economics that has 
historically attracted the more mathematically-oriented. Given the centrality of 
certain mathematical techniques to the theoretical endeavours of the discipline, 
the harder the maths, the greater the social esteem for the scientific capabilities 
of its practitioners. Third (and most importantly), it is claimed that comparative 
advantage has universal applicability. According to the theory of comparative 
advantage, all countries, regardless of their level of economic development, will 
increase their aggregate wealth by engaging in free and unfettered trade. It is 
this claim, that free trade is a universally applicable policy independent of 
historical and social circumstances that, for economics, signals its distance from 
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the rest of the social sciences and its kinship with the natural sciences with their 
immutable laws of cause and effect.  
 
The purpose of this chapter is to interrogate critically the standard view of the 
historical development of international trade theory. Orthodox accounts show 
theory developing in a relatively seamless way, as neoclassical theory refined 
the tools of analysis without (critically) losing the key normative insight as 
propounded by the early classical economists. The claim of continuity is all the 
more amazing when one considers that classical political economy was 
primarily dynamic, had an objective theory of value, and the focus of theoretical 
endeavours was to explain distributional shares in the context of conflicting 
social class interests. This contrasts starkly with the static, individualistic, 
harmonious world view of neoclassical theorising. As far as trade theory is 
concerned, the central assertion of this chapter is that while classical theorising 
was motivated by ontic concerns – that  is a desire to understand and explain 
social reality – neoclassical theorising, especially by the 1930’s, was primarily 
tool-driven with scant regard to the social material that the models were 
supposed to be representing. We assert that the defining period in which there 
was a retreat from ontic concerns in the interests of tool ascendancy was in the 
early neoclassical period, the age of Marshall. This is despite these early 
neoclassical economists being also keenly aware of the social material of their 
theorising and indeed much of their trade theorising produced uncomfortable 
results at variance with the central claims of orthodox theory. However, many 
of these early neoclassical economists (especially in Britain) were also anxious 
to establish the academic credentials of the emerging discipline of economics. 
This required an absence of academic dissent, the creation of a unified body of 
knowledge and consensus around core concepts and techniques. As a result, 
their more dissident conclusions were simply ignored and written out of the 
general history of the discipline. The sidelining of ontic concerns and the 
preoccupation of economists with tool refinement (a development that was to 
distinguish economics within the social sciences) led to a qualitative change in 
the nature of theorising. What Morgan says about economic theorising 
generally, applies with equal (if not greater) force to trade theory; that is to say, 
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that “Mathematical theorising changed the objects of study in economics and 
the kind of truth that economists sought” (Morgan, 2001, p. 14).  
 
The rest of this chapter is organised as follows: section 2.2 sets the background 
by recounting the opinions of leading trade theorists, with a view to illustrating 
the role that international trade theory has traditionally played in bolstering the 
scientific claims of the discipline of economics generally, and the economist’s 
claim to authority. Section 2.3 looks at the treatment of international trade in 
general histories of thought and in specialised histories of trade. Section 2.4 
presents the Whig view of the international trade theories of classical political 
economy. Here the emphasis is on the static theories of the key figures of the 
classical political economy era, which is the acquaintance that most 
contemporary students of international trade have with the writings of these 
economists in this field. Section 2.5 keeps with the theme of seeming continuity 
in theoretical developments by showing the extent to which the early 
neoclassical economists developed and refined the tools of analysis without 
adding to the classical model in any substantive sense. Section 2.6, by contrast, 
attempts to show that the position of classical political economists was not as 
simple and uncomplicated as their static theories imply. Their dynamic, 
ontically motivated theories resulted in more ambiguous conclusions regarding 
policy than emerges from their more famous static models. Also, it will be 
shown that these economists were far from being dogmatic free traders, which is 
how they are usually presented to students. Their position was typically 
nuanced. In a similar vein, section 2.7 focuses on the less well- known results of 
early neoclassical trade theory and how they were written out of the history of 
the discipline. Section 2.8 addresses the final transformation of comparative 
advantage into neoclassical form with the integration of neoclassical production 
theory, while section 2.9 shows how, after Samuelson, theoretical developments 
were completely tool-driven. This section critically assesses the utility of later 
neoclassical theorising in terms of its contribution to understanding the role of 
trade policy in economic development. Section 2.10 concludes.  
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2.2 The Scientific Claims of International Trade Theory 
 
When neoclassical economics was still in its infancy and had yet to evolve into 
the highly abstract abstruse adult that it subsequently became, the intimations 
were there of its future development. The statistician Robert Giffen thought the 
case for free trade was uncontested when he wrote ‘The argument for free trade 
generally, as expounded by the great authorities from Adam Smith downwards, 
appears to me complete both theoretically and experimentally.” (Giffen, 1904 as 
cited in Price, 1904, p. 372). Furthermore, the economist William Smart 
invoked the authority of the profession when he said “free trade was the 
economist’s policy” and “Economists … if they speak in favour of protection, 
they lose their scientific reputation” (cited in Price, 1904, pp. 373-74).   
 
Three-quarters of a century later, similar claims were being made for 
international trade theory and its policy implications by its most renowned 
practitioners. It is a view that is shared by historians of international trade as the 
following sample of quotes taken from the three most recent histories of the 
subject reveal. Regarding the principle of comparative advantage, Nobel prize 
winner Paul Samuelson says “Comparative Advantage is both true and non 
trivial” (Samuelson, 1969, p. 9, in Maneschi, 1998, p. 1), while for leading trade 
theorist Ronald Findlay it is “the deepest and most beautiful result in all of 
economics” (Findlay 1987, p. 514, in Maneschi, 1998, p. 1). These are very 
strong claims, here is a core economic proposition that, it is claimed, is true, 
relevant and, as if that was not sufficient to ensure its scientific status, it is also 
aesthetic. Its relevance lies in its policy implications as noted by Johnson who 
asserts “the proposition that freedom of trade is on the whole more beneficial 
than protection is one of the most fundamental propositions economic theory 
has to offer for the guidance of policy” (Johnson, 1971, cited in Irwin, 1996, p. 
3). Small wonder then that international trade theory has such rank within a 
discipline like economics that has, especially in its neoclassical form, insisted to 
all and sundry, that unlike other disciplines in the social sciences, it is truly 
scientific. One cannot question the sincerity of Samuelson (whatever his 
objectivity) for whom “International  trade theory has always been the queen 
realm of economic theory” (Samuleson, 1981, p. 150, in Gomes, 2003, p. 3), 
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while the economic historian and methodologist McCloskey must surely 
reinforce the inflated self-regard of these eminent scientists with the remark that 
“Since the inception of the discipline its best minds (many of them British) have 
put commercial policy at the centre of their thinking” (McCloskey, 1980 in 
Gomes, 2003, p. 3).  
 
It is difficult to speak out against authority. In doing so one invariably runs the 
risk of being accused of either bad faith or simply inadequate understanding. An 
extreme example of the ferocity of the backlash that a questioning stance can 
evoke is that of Paul Krugman. He lambasted critics of comparative advantage, 
accusing some of being vulgar anti-intellectuals on a par with creationists and 
others of trying to be intellectually fashionable by attacking an idea that has 
iconic status among economists. However, his principal explanation for the 
ignorance displayed by critics of comparative advantage, is that the idea is a 
hard concept to grasp, precisely because it is a scientific one, and therefore not 
readily accessible to the untrained mind. (Krugman, 1998a, pp. 22-23). A less 
strident expression of essentially the same position is contained in the most 
recent book on the history of trade theory, by Leonard Gomes (2003). This book 
contains a wealth of detail not ordinarily found in histories of economic thought 
(or international trade), not just of doctrinal history, but also of the social 
context in which the debate over free trade has taken place in the last two 
centuries. Moreover, Gomes is a particularly unstrident, tentative writer when it 
comes to expressing his views. Nonetheless, when talking of comparative 
advantage, even he felt secure enough to echo the conventional view in 
economics about the status of comparative advantage and the intellectual 
capacity of its critics, saying that:  
 
It is … one of the few propositions in economics (perhaps the only one) that is 
both true and non-trivial – in the formal logic sense. It has been hailed as one 
of the truly great discoveries of economic analysis – a triumph of economic 
logic … it [the latter] requires not only reflection but some economic 
sophistication as well ... Perhaps it is true today, as some experts ruefully 
complain, that it cannot be assumed that the principle is fully understood by 
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businessmen, or even for that matter, by all those charged with the conduct of 
international trade negotiations (Gomes, 2003, p. 40).8 
 
It is salutary therefore to read what L. L. Price (the only economic theorist to 
side with the economic historians in the tariff reform debate of 1903) had to say 
about the appeal to authority to stifle debate. He called it despotic, profoundly 
unscientific and simply an “odium theologicum” (Price, 1904, p. 374). Rather 
ominously he predicted that the success of such authority would come at a 
heavy price for the study of economics. If the evolution of trade theory in the 
twentieth century is anything to go by, his fears have been vindicated.  
 
2.3 The Treatment of International Trade in the History of Economic 
Thought 
 
What emerges from general histories of economic thought is the sparse 
treatment of international trade, especially post mercantilist literature. In fact, 
there are many general histories of economic thought that completely exclude 
international trade theory. Examples of same are Hutchison (1953), Roll (1992), 
Ekelund and Herbert (1997) and Screpanti and Zamagni (2005). This is 
surprising given the claims that have been made for the status of trade theory 
within economics.  
 
Other general histories are also sparing of ink when it comes to international 
trade and all tend to focus on the static version of classical trade theory. For 
example, Robbins (1998) quickly skips over Adam Smith’s case for trade, 
calling his example of the disadvantages of grape growing in Scotland “homely” 
and devotes most of the relevant chapter to an account of the comparative cost 
example of David Ricardo and its subsequent refinement by Mill. He says 
nothing of the main twentieth century version of comparative advantage, the 
                                                
8 The irony of this rare expression of opinion by Gomes is that in the next sentence he incorrectly 
distinguishes between competitive advantage and comparative advantage, saying that, contrary to the 
view of businessmen or trade negotiators, the ability to produce goods at lower costs (than international 
competition) is not the same thing as comparative advantage (p.40). In fact if markets work the way the 
defenders of comparative advantage claim that they work (or can be made to work), then comparative 
advantage will always get revealed as competitive advantage; that is to say, the ability to sell at lower 
costs than the competition. What comparative advantage is not, is proof of superior productivity of 
resources.  
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Hecskcher-Ohlin explanation. Blaug (1996) gives an account of Ricardian trade 
theory that is similar to Robbins, with numerical examples illustrating the 
principle of comparative advantage but he goes further than Robbins in that he 
mentions (briefly) how the pure theory of trade was reformulated by Heckscher 
and Ohlin in factor endowment and factor intensity terms. Backhouse (1985) is 
more detailed, in that he deals with international trade theory as it was in 
distinct eras, pre-1870, post-1890 and post-1939 but, like Robbins and Blaug, 
his is a didactic relatively uncritical account that presents neoclassical trade as a 
variation on classical trade theory. None of these accounts explores the dynamic 
aspects of classical trade theory and its policy implications. Neither do they 
interrogate the most important critique of classical trade theory, the infant 
industry argument for protection (primarily associated with the name of 
Friedrich List). Robbins (1998, p. 240) says that it was a powerful case that was 
accepted by John Stuart Mill (and Alfred Marshall) but that Mill came to regret 
his acknowledgement of the infant industry case for protection, a view that is 
echoed by Blaug (1996, p. 208). For Backhouse (1985, p. 58), the infant 
industry argument is accepted and not inconsistent with classical theory. This is 
in line with one (and not the only one) view expressed by Schumpeter who said 
“List’s argument about protection issues into the free trade argument … Mill 
accepted the infant industry theory, evidently realising that it ran within free 
trade logic” (Schumpeter, 1994 [1954], p. 505). The idea that the infant industry 
argument is compatible with free trade logic will be challenged in the next 
chapter. Suffice it to say for now that even Schumpeter is not always consistent 
in his utterances on the topic of trade. For example when talking about what he 
viewed as an early glimpse of a general equilibrium type theory of optimal 
resource allocation, he says that “[it] cannot tell against any of those 
protectionist arguments, such as the infant industry or the underemployment 
argument, which visualise conditions in which that theorem does not apply.” (p. 
376). However, Schumpeter does not delve into trade theory at any great length 
or depth but this may be because he felt that “free trade is but an element of a 
comprehensive system of policy and should never be discussed in isolation.”(p. 
398). He also introduces a note of scepticism by reminding readers that 
advocacy of free trade policies was the main practical purpose of the classical 
writers and that this may have imparted a bias to their arguments (pp. 609-610), 
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just as he had previously asserted that it was probably England’s historical 
situation that had prompted a conversion to free trade in the nineteenth century, 
despite the arguments for the generality of the case (p. 397).  
 
In short, none of the above cited general histories of thought tells a very 
interesting, informed or fluid story about the development of trade theory. Some 
address elements in Adam Smith that were less amenable to subsequent 
neoclassical theorising, such as increasing returns and vent for surplus, while 
none addresses Ricardo’s dynamic theory. Their accounts by and large recount 
the static version of comparative advantage, and few refer to the varied 
criticisms that have been historically levelled against the theory and its policy 
implications.   
 
There are however a number of histories that deal exclusively with international 
trade, and these have the space to address the contribution of the lesser known 
writers as well as the various counterarguments made against the dominant 
theory. Irwin (1996) first attends to pre-classical and classical theories (but not 
neoclassical versions) and then proceeds to examine the various arguments used 
to challenge free trade is best conclusion of the classical economists. His 
position is clear from the outset, the purpose of the book is to show how free 
trade came to occupy such a commanding position in economics, and how free 
trade as a doctrine has maintained its intellectual strength. His position is very 
much the orthodox account of the subject, saying that it was Adam Smith who 
first established the strong presumption in favour of free trade and classical 
economists who solidified the case with the theory of comparative advantage, 
the bedrock on which it stands. He concludes that almost all of the attempts to 
critique the free trade argument fail to overthrow the general presumption in 
favour of free trade and that it remains one of the most durable and robust 
propositions that economic analysis has to offer for the conduct of economic 
policy. That Irwin is reductionist in his accounts of the various critiques and too 
quick to dismiss them is something that I will return to in subsequent chapters. 
His Whig approach is also criticised by Magnusson (2004, p. 8) on the grounds 
that ignoring a more historical approach is unlikely to yield increased 
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knowledge of how the free trade doctrine came to occupy its commanding 
position in economics.  
 
Likewise, the approach taken by Maneschi (1998) is to judge historical accounts 
of the free trade doctrine from the perspective of modern theory. He 
concentrates on the origins and evolution of comparative advantage up to the 
present (though he does talk about new trade theory near the end of the book). 
He claims that one of the leitmotifs for the book is the dynamic interpretation of 
comparative advantage. While this might lead one to expect a much more 
nuanced and critical account of the policy implications of trade theory, and the 
book addresses at some length both Ricardo’s dynamic theory and infant 
industry arguments for public intervention, the message of the book is 
incoherent, apart from his view that “Comparative advantage is a many-
splendored thing that has (almost) general validity” (Maneschi, 1998, p. 230). 
For him [Ricardo’s] dynamic view of comparative advantage goes hand in hand 
with his belief in dynamic gains from trade, which hold pride of place over 
static ones” (p. 215). He has one paragraph acknowledging that Ricardo’s 
attention was focused on Britain and that in his scheme the agricultural country 
would suffer a dynamic loss (p. 72). So enthralled is Maneschi with 
comparative advantage, that he calls the infant industry argument an 
exceptionally dynamic view of comparative advantage, giving policy makers 
the freedom to create it (p. 9). Yet he sounds a sceptical note when he says that 
it is only in recent times that economists have provided rigorous criteria for 
protection, by which he means specifying the appropriate market failure (p. 
121). In his conclusion he says that new trade theory, far from disqualifying 
comparative advantage, has, on the contrary, reinvigorated and given new 
meaning to the concept (p. 224). Yet in his introductory chapter, he says that 
economies of scale (a key element of much new trade theory) are inconsistent 
with comparative advantage (p. 24). At another juncture he says that 
comparative advantage is influenced by market distortions as well as by 
fundamental economic circumstances such as given technology or factor 
endowments (p. 230).  
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It is difficult to know what conclusions can be drawn from Maneschi’s 
exhaustive account. Even if one takes a charitable view in assuming that the 
focus of his analysis is on positive (as opposed to normative) issues, such as the 
determination of trade flows, what is one to conclude? That countries will 
export the goods that they can produce at lowest relative cost? Obviously not, if 
their comparative advantage is in the future and has yet to be realised and may 
not be unless they depart from free trade orthodoxy. He does admit that there is 
no agreement about the term, closing his introductory chapter with the statement 
that “While economists have used and continued to use the term comparative 
advantage in different and often incompatible ways, it still remains an almost 
generally valid concept of the theory of international trade.” (p. 9). He says that 
for some it means simply having lower autarky prices than one’s trading 
partners while for others it means a positive correlation between lower autarky 
prices and net exports. He says that some interpret it in the old Ricardian sense 
of exogenously given technology, while others allow it to change over time or 
to be created (pp. 230-231). However it is not clear how a concept that has so 
many different and incompatible meanings could be almost generally valid? 
Valid in what sense? One may as well conclude with the tautology that 
whatever makes a country competitive makes it competitive, be it nature’s 
endowments, climate, technology, historical accident or deliberate policy 
decisions taken at an earlier time. A country can successfully export goods that 
it can produce at lower cost than other countries. The question is do we need a 
theory (whatever name we give to it) to tell us this? What Maneschi does not 
clarify are the underlying common principles underpinning his analysis and, 
more pertinently, what policy implications derive from it. In this his book is at 
variance with that of Irwin (1996). The latter is very clear and unambiguous as 
to what makes economic theory scientific, and that is its universal reach and 
independence of historical contingency. His book attempted to dispense with all 
the arguments that undermined comparative advantage. By contrast, it seems 
like Maneschi attempts to embrace all the arguments and claim that they merely 
enhance comparative advantage. Maneschi’s book, though incredibly detailed 
and comprehensive about the evolution of trade theory, contains at its heart a 
profound illogicality and as such fails to explain how trade theory came to 
occupy for so long such an eminent position in economics.  
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Gomes (2003) undoubtedly gives the most exhaustive and comprehensive 
account of how trade theory developed and attempts to contextualise 
developments with an account of historical and contemporary debates over the 
issue of free trade versus interference. However, while Irwin was narrow but 
clear in his analysis and Maneschi broader but incoherent, the impression that 
Gomes gives is of a reluctance to express his views. He appears to be hampered 
by a reverence for trade theory as traditionally interpreted, while at the same 
time claiming that classical trade theory was more nuanced than the way it is 
generally presented. So he quotes Blaug on the anti-landed class motivation of 
Ricardo’s trade theory while agreeing with him that it has survived the removal 
of his prejudices (Gomes, 2003, p. 45). His account is also very Whiggish, when 
he speaks of how Ricardo’s trade theory was not wedded to a labour theory of 
value, which was why its restrictive assumptions could be easily dispensed of in 
favour a more general theory of production without having to discard the results 
obtained from it (p. 51). He makes a strange point saying that “while the 
classical model is static the theory is dynamic” (p 83). Gomes seems to be 
saying that classical trade theory has been sold short and, like Maneschi, he 
does examine the dynamic elements of classical theories. However, his account 
is very confused and contradictory, though seemingly motivated by a desire to 
show that dynamic theories merely reinforce the static case for free trade. (The 
contradictions in his account of Ricardo’s dynamic theory of trade will be 
addressed in section 2.6). He also looks at the infant industry argument for 
protection, concentrating very much on what List has to say, and accusing the 
latter of being selective in his criticism of Adam Smith. As I will attempt to 
show in the next chapter, Gomes’s critique of List is selective and seems to miss 
his central point that Smith conceived of capital too narrowly by focusing on 
material capital. Furthermore, he attempts gratuitously to undermine List’s case 
for industrialisation as the road to economic development by citing that the 
latter saw no industrial future for developing countries. For all Gomes’s attempt 
to show that classical and early neoclassical economists like Mill and Marshall 
perceived the case for free trade within a dynamic framework, he shirks from 
the logical conclusion that once one introduces dynamic elements, the welfare 
implications of trade are ambiguous. He also fails to ask the interesting question 
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as to why it was that neoclassical theory became so narrow and static in its 
orientation and why the dynamic insights of List were shunted from mainstream 
trade theory to the low status periphery of development economics.  
 
As already mentioned, it is hard to get a clear sense of Gomes’s position 
especially on policy issues. When speaking of comparative advantage in the 
static sense, he is deferential. Yet when talking of the implications of imperfect 
markets for trade policy he says “trade theory has taken a leap into the concerns 
of the real world. It is now dealing with issues that are relevant to those actually 
engaged in and directly affected by new trends in trade policy. In this sense, the 
rethinking of the analytical bases of trade policy is a very useful step forward – 
not a walk on the wild side.” (p. 165). This is not exactly a siren call to 
intervene and it is not easy to know how to reconcile it with his earlier rueful 
suggestion that the law of comparative advantage may not be fully understood 
by those charged with the conduct of international trade negotiations. If 
comparative advantage holds, then the best trade policy is no policy, in the 
sense of unilateral trade barrier dismantlement, regardless of the policy stances 
of other countries. That this is not a feature of international trade negotiations 
either means that national negotiators are ignorant of the national interest or that 
they are not interested in furthering the national interest (the public choice/rent 
seeking view of public policy) or that the comparative advantage model is at 
best incomplete or at worst wrong. On the other hand, the mercantilist 
orientation of most international trade negotiators makes perfect sense if 
markets are imperfect. The same ambiguity can be seen in Gomes’s final 
chapter on globalisation. He talks of free trade being part of the solution to the 
slow pace of poverty reduction in the developing world, while admitting that it 
is a question of what kind of free trade. When he says that countries must 
change the structure of their economies before foreign trade will contribute to 
their development and that forcing them to conform to a free trade free market 
orthodoxy is no way to assist them to reach that later outward oriented stage, he 
could be invoking the spirit of List. The measures he recommends, however, are 
all very orthodox: free trade to import capital equipment and technology; access 
to developed country markets for the products of developing countries; the 
ceasing by developed countries of the subsidisation of agriculture; and more 
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free trade among developing countries themselves. There is no explicit mention 
here of allowing developing countries to protect their markets against more 
competitive products from developed countries. His final paragraph is a good 
metaphor for his whole stance on policy issues. He quotes someone who 
believes that economic policies and institutions around the world will continue 
to move in a liberal direction and that we are on our way to something better. 
His response is “One can only say Amen to such expressions of optimism” (p. 
327). So one is left wondering does he hope that this liberal nirvana will come 
to pass or is he simply saying that he hopes if it does come to pass that it will 
deliver something better by way of positive social effects? With Gomes it is 
hard to know.  
 
2.4 The Orthodox Version of Classical Trade Theory: The Static Model 
 
2.4.1 Adam Smith, the warm-up act 
The standard approach adopted in most textbooks is to start with Adam Smith’s 
static analysis of the gains from international trade, otherwise known as the 
theory of absolute advantage. For Smith, the benefits of international trade are 
similar in nature to the benefits of exchange between two individuals or two 
regions. If one can obtain goods at a lower price than it costs to make them, then 
material welfare is enhanced by allowing for such exchange. This means that in 
a world with unimpeded exchange, countries will export those goods that they 
can produce at lower real costs at home than abroad and import those goods that 
can be produced at lower real costs abroad. Thus the gains from trade, of 
whatever nature, are that it allows for the efficient allocation of resources and, 
therefore, the achievements of material well-being at lower real cost. “If a 
foreign country can supply us with a commodity cheaper than we ourselves can 
make it, better buy it of them with some part of the produce of our own industry 
employed in a way in which we have some advantage” (Smith, 1999 [1776], p. 
33). 
 
Smith implicitly assumes that a country will have an absolute advantage in the 
production of some good and the reasons for same are due to differences in 
climate, soil, natural or acquired advantages between countries. Moreover, 
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Smith appears to be laying stress on the short-term static benefits of exchange 
when he argues in favour of buying in the cheapest market regardless of 
whether the basis of a country’s advantage is natural (and therefore immutable) 
or acquired (hence subject to change).  “Whether the advantages which one 
country has over another, be natural or acquired, is in this respect of no 
consequence. As long as the one country has those advantages and the other 
wants them, it will always be more advantageous for the latter, rather to buy of 
the former than to make” (Smith, 1999 [1776], p. 35).  
 
Unlike his successors, Smith does not distinguish between domestic trade and 
international trade on the basis of differences in the mobility of resources 
domestically and internationally. Neither does he have an international 
adjustment mechanism that translates real costs into money costs. Finally he 
fails to see that sometimes it can pay a country to import goods notwithstanding 
its own absolute advantage when it comes to the production of those goods. For 
this reason, his contribution to the pure theory of international trade is generally 
viewed as little more than a warm-up act for what came later, while his general 
advocacy in favour of free trade is acknowledged as the following statement by 
Bastable reveals. “Adam Smith, however, if he did not develop a definite 
theory, at least disposed for ever of the mercantilist doctrines and thus left a 
clear field for a new and more positive construction.” (Bastable, 1903, p. 169). 
 
2.4.2 Ricardo and his 4 magic numbers 
David Ricardo’s static theory of comparative advantage is hailed by many as his 
single most important contribution to economic theory, for all the reasons 
alluded to in the first section. It is a concept that survived the transformation of 
classical political economy into neoclassical economics, it is counterintuitive 
and it has clear unambiguous policy implications. The version of it that has 
educated many generations of students of international trade is expressed in a 
few pages of his famous chapter 7 on foreign trade (see Ricardo, 1996 [1817], 
pp. 94-98). The first thing Ricardo does is to distinguish between domestic and 
international trade on the basis of the presumed immobility of factors of 
production internationally (pp. 93-94). He then proceeds to elaborate the gains 
from specialisation and trade on the basis of a simple 2 sector, 2 country model 
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where labour is the only factor of production and is presumed to be mobile 
between sectors domestically but immobile internationally. The two countries 
cited are England and Portugal and the two goods are wine and cloth. Rather 
disingenuously, he assumes that England is the less productive of the two 
countries in the production of both goods. Less productive England can produce 
cloth and wine with the labour of 100 and 120 men, respectively, for one year, 
whereas the comparable figures for Portugal are 90 and 80 men (p. 94). In other 
words, the opportunity cost to England of producing one unit of cloth is 0.83 of 
wine foregone, which is less than it is for Portugal, where it is 1.125. The 
corollary to this is that the opportunity cost of wine production in Portugal (0.88 
units of cloth) is less than it is in England (1.2). He then proceeded to show that 
if England produced only cloth and Portugal only wine and both engaged in 
trade on terms that differed from the domestic opportunity cost of labour, then 
both could gain, in the sense of being able to consume higher levels of both 
products than would be possible without trade. This example is what has 
become known as the theory of comparative advantage. Its policy implications 
are very clear. All countries, regardless of their level of development (as 
reflected in the productivity of their resources) can increase their wealth by 
specialising in the production and export of goods that they can produce at 
lower relative cost (in terms of output of other goods foregone) in exchange for 
goods that they can only produce at higher relative cost. Unlike Smith’s static 
theory, absolute advantage is not a necessary criterion for a country to trade 
successfully.  
  
2.4.3 Translating comparative advantage into competitiveness 
The next thing that Ricardo needed to demonstrate was that his highly stylized 
barter example would carry over into a money economy. He does this by 
invoking Hume’s specie flow; that is by assuming that a specie currency (like 
gold) would be distributed among countries in such a way as to allow trade to 
take place as it would under conditions of barter. So if less productive England 
were to pay labour the same as it is paid in Portugal, this would render the 
former uncompetitive and lead to the importation of cloth and wine from 
Portugal in exchange for specie. The subsequent redistribution of specie from 
England to Portugal would depress prices in the former country and increase 
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them in the latter. Eventually, in equilibrium, England would be able to export 
successfully cloth in exchange for Portuguese wine, while wages in Portugal 
would be higher than in England, reflecting its greater absolute productivity in 
the production of both goods (pp. 95-98). Effectively Portuguese wages relative 
to English wages could not be less than 1.11 (Portugal’s absolute productivity 
advantage over England in cloth) or more than 1.5 (its absolute advantage over 
England in wine). Anywhere in this range and England will be able to undercut 
Portugal in the price of cloth whereas Portugal will be able to undercut England 
in the price of wine. Obviously, the closer it is to 1.5, the more trade benefits 
Portugal and vice versa if it is closer to 1.11. Anything outside this range 
however and one of the countries cannot compete and therefore foregoes all 
gains from trade.  
 
This issue of the determination of relative wages gets more complicated when 
one extends the analysis to a multi-commodity world. Senior claimed that it was 
relative wages in the export sector that determined the general level of wages in 
a country, which in turn depended on the comparative prices of its export goods. 
According to Viner (1964 [1937], p. 456), this left unanswered the question of 
what commodities became export commodities in a multicommodity world, 
since the latter depended on general wages and general wages depended on 
export wages, so the whole argument was circular. It was Longfield who most 
clearly explained the direction of trade in a multi-commodity two country 
world. A country would export a good if its productivity advantage 
(disadvantage) over the other country was greater (less) than the relative wage 
rate of the first country to the second and import it if the contrary conditions 
held. Of course in a monetary economy productivity is measured in common 
money, so the higher the prices that the goods command in the international 
market, the higher will be the measured productivity. (See Maneschi, 1998, pp. 
122-123 for a further elaboration of Longfield’s contribution).  
 
The contemporary analogue to Ricardo’s invocation of Hume’s specie flow and 
subsequent analysis of Senior and Longfield, is the assumption that, in a world 
of flexible exchange rates, the equilibrium rate will ensure long-term trade 
balance. At this equilibrium rate, comparative advantage will be expressed in 
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absolute competitiveness and international wage differences will reflect 
international differences in the productivity of labour.9  
 
2.4.4  Mill and the division of the gains from trade 
The last part of the classical structure was provided by John Stuart Mill on the 
determination of international values and the division between the trading 
countries of the gains from trade. Mill first addressed the issue in a series of 
essays written in 1829 and 1830 and published in 1844. After praising Ricardo’s 
innovation in showing that the advantage of exchange between countries was 
determined by differences in comparative costs, he then alerts his readers to an 
error in Ricardo relating to the division of gains:  
 
Mr. Ricardo, while intending to go no further into the question of the 
advantage of foreign trade than to show what it consisted of, and under what 
circumstances it arose, unguardedly expressed himself as if each of the two 
countries making the exchange separately gained the whole of the difference 
between the comparative costs of the two commodities in one country and in 
the other … the two countries taken together gain no more than this 
difference: and if either country gains the whole of it, the other country derives 
no advantage from the trade (Mill, 1844, pp. 5-6).  
 
Mill explicitly differentiates between the determination of exchange values 
within a country and their determination in international exchange, on the 
grounds that in the latter instance, resources being immobile, value cannot be 
proportional to cost of production. Instead he reverts to what he calls the 
anterior principle of demand and supply (p. 8). He then proceeds by way of 
numerical example to explain equilibrium conditions, whereby the supply of 
goods for export by one country must equal its demand by the other and to 
discuss the division of gains between the two trading countries. He stresses that 
                                                
9 Krugman, in a scathing article attacking the concept of unfair or exploitative trade, explained the 
international wage differential by reference to the average productivity of labour in countries. "if they 
achieve Western productivity, they will be paid Western wages … But to the non-economist this 
conclusion is neither natural nor plausible … missing the distinction between factory-level and 
national-level productivity” (Krugman , 1998, p. 30). 
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international values must be bound by relative cost conditions in both countries. 
He elaborates his analysis in chapter 18 of Principles and explains at great 
length the conditions determining international exchange values and the division 
of gains between trading countries. He concludes: 
 
The values at which a country exchanges its produce with foreign countries 
depend on two things: first, on the amount and extensibility of their demand 
for its commodities compared to its demand for theirs; and secondly, on the 
capital which it has to spare from the production of domestic commodities for 
its own consumption. The more the foreign demand for its commodities 
exceeds its demand for foreign commodities, and the less capital it can spare 
to produce for foreign markets, compared to what foreigners spare to produce 
for its markets, the more favourable to it will be the terms of interchange. 
(Mill, 2004 [1848], p. 562). 
 
So the more a country wants a product, the worse will be its terms of exchange 
and likewise if it could supply its own export good with relative ease. Mill also 
spoke at length of the inverse relationship between price and demand and the 
positive relationship between price and supply. Thus he disposed of the problem 
of balanced trade by claiming that prices will adjust according to the demands 
of consumers in both countries in such a manner as to clear markets. One of his 
elaborations was on the impact of a productivity improvement on the division of 
gains between countries. He expanded on the importance of price elasticity of 
demand (without using that term) and concluded that since demand was more 
likely to be inelastic, most of the gains from an increase in productivity in the 
production of an exportable good would accrue to the importer (pp. 555-556). 
He also raised the possibility of multiple equilibria, claiming that different 
international values could be compatible with balanced trade. Rather 
paradoxically, he claimed that it was the richest countries who gained the least 
by a given amount of foreign commerce by virtue of their greater demand for 
imports, though he mitigates this statement by stating that in the aggregate they 
probably gain most by virtue of the sheer volume of their trade. (p. 563).  
 
The Ricardo-Mill analysis of comparative advantage, the determination of 
international values and the division of the gains from trade between two 
countries, is still standard fare for current students of international economics.  
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2.5 Early Neoclassicals and the Refinement of Trade Tools 
 
The general consensus is that early neoclassical writers added little to the 
Ricardo-Mill model in terms of fundamentals. What Alfred Marshall did was to 
express Mill’s idea of reciprocal demand in geometric form through the concept 
of the offer curve (see Viner, 1964 [1937], p. 541, Schumpeter, 1994 [1954], p. 
609, Blaug, 1996, p. 197). This is unsurprising in that Marshall admitted that he 
came to economics by translating Mill’s version of Ricardo or Smith’s doctrines 
into mathematics (Whitaker, 1975a p. 37). These curves showed at different 
relative prices a country’s export supply and import demand. Underlying these 
curves were domestic demand and supply conditions at each relative price. In 
other words, the offer curves represented a country’s excess supply (of the 
export good) and excess demand (for the import good), and each point on the 
offer curve represented internal market equilibrium. The advantage of the offer 
curve approach is that it could deal with two countries’ reciprocal demand for 
the products of the other in symmetrical form. Each offer curve is presumed 
convex with respect to the axis representing its export supply, implying that if 
the relative price of the imported good falls, more of that good will be 
demanded. The intersection of the two countries’ offer curves represents 
equilibrium, where each country’s export supply exactly matches the other’s 
import demand and the slope of the line from the origin through the point where 
the curves intersect represents equilibrium terms of trade. As long as the curves 
are positively sloped, demand is elastic, meaning that lower priced imports will 
result in greater overall expenditure on imports in the form of total exports 
offered by the other country. Inelastic demand is represented by the offer curves 
turning backwards (or downwards). In this instance lower priced imports result 
in lower overall expenditure on the imported good. Once one allows for offer 
curves to be inelastic, multiple trading equilibria can exist and there is scope for 
countries to use trade taxes to improve the terms on which they trade. At his 
own admission Marshall’s curves are so complex that in practice their 
applicability to practical issues of policy and other developments is restricted 
(cited in Haberler, 1936, pp. 155). However he did use them principally to 
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address stability of trade equilibrium as well as the effects of changes in 
demand, technological improvements and trade taxes on terms of trade and 
trade equilibrium (see Whitaker, 1975b, Part III.5).  
 
On the issue of gains from trade, Marshall (true to the spirit of Mill) claimed 
that technological advances in developed countries would also favour 
developing countries through improvements in the latter’s terms of trade. 
Developed countries might produce more manufactured goods and develop new 
ones but market forces would ensure that increased global supply would reduce 
their relative price (increasing the relative price of agricultural goods) and, 
ultimately, also benefit stagnant agricultural exporters.  
 
Marshall’s Pure Theory of Foreign Trade was printed privately by Henry 
Sidgwick in 1879 but it was only in 1923 that it was printed under his own 
name in Money, Credit and Commerce (Marshall, 2003 [1923]). However his 
foreign trade ideas were known to his contemporaries and influenced the 
writings of Francis Edgeworth and Pantaleoni (see Whitaker, 1975b, p. 114). 
Edgeworth (1894a, 1894b, 1894c) adopted (with attribution) the offer curves of 
Marshall but, unlike the latter, he attempted to take into account the theory of 
comparative advantage. He does this by asserting that the slope of a country’s 
offer curve at the origin represents its comparative costs in autarky. Any 
international prices different to autarky comparative costs lead to international 
trade and the implication is that such trade is beneficial. This conclusion is 
based on the tacit assumption that the curves in his diagram represent the 
behaviour of typical individuals, so that every point on a country’s offer curve 
therefore signifies the utility maximising level of trade for given terms of trade. 
Since the representative individual/country will only trade if it leads to a better 
situation than the no trade case, any trade must therefore be better than no 
trade.10 According to Jha (1973, p. 35), Edgeworth’s use of demand and supply 
                                                
10 Samuelson (1938) addressed the normative aspects of trade using essentially the same approach 
(though unlike Edgeworth he defined welfare in an ordinal sense) and claimed to have shown 
conclusively (and rigorously) that some trade is preferable to no trade. Samuelson euphemistically 
refers to his analogous two person example as a strong and ideal case, such as would exist if countries 
were populated by identical, representative individuals or if perfect social solidarity existed within 
countries. Samuelson (1939) claimed to show that it was sufficient for international trade to raise the 
value of national output in order to show that every individual could be made better off as a result.  
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in the determination of international values was not the most original but it was 
the best, not least because it facilitated the application of the various concepts 
and methods of economic statics to all subsequent theoretical analysis of 
international trade. This was very much in the tradition of the marginal 
revolution with its rejection of cost explanations of exchange value.  
 
The most troublesome aspect of the classical theory of comparative advantage 
as expressed by Ricardo was undoubtedly the labour theory of value. If value is 
only created by labour, then the implication is that income from all other 
sources is unmerited. According to Viner (1964 [1937], p. 490), many classical 
economists dissociated themselves from the labour cost theory. Senior and 
Cairnes spoke of real costs in terms of labour and abstinence or labour and 
capital, while early neoclassical writers like Bastable and Edgeworth substituted 
units of productive power for quantities of labour, when expounding the 
doctrine of comparative advantage. Marshall made an attempt to introduce 
capital in addition to labour as a productive agency, via the device of his 
representative bale, and to explain the gains from trade on this combined basis. 
However the most novel approach to comparative costs and the one most 
consistent with the neoclassical emphasis on marginal utility was that of Pareto. 
He objected to the aggregation of labour and abstinence as if they were 
homogenous quantities capable of summation. Instead he reformulated 
comparative costs in terms of his own work on utility (what he called 
optimality) and general equilibrium. For Pareto, the price ratios between two 
commodities must equal the ratio of elementary optimalities (or marginal 
utility) of each individual consuming them or the ratio of optimality costs that 
the individual must sacrifice in order to obtain the goods. Moreover, he 
challenged the idea that one could apply the concept of subjective disutility to a 
metaphysical construct such as society, saying that it is individuals who in the 
course of production suffer disutility and that it is meaningless to sum their 
disutilities in order to arrive at some measure of the cost to society. Also, the 
concept of subjective disutility was clearly meaningless as far as a factor of 
production like land was concerned. What mattered was the quantity of goods 
that one could obtain from the land in its different uses (clearly some notion of 
opportunity cost). However, after setting out his comparative cost theory in 
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terms of individual optimalities, Pareto then decided that he could not use it for 
operational purposes (see Maneschi, 1998, pp. 140-141). While Pareto’s 
contribution to international trade theory appears to have been overlooked in 
retrospective accounts of the development of international trade theory, it was 
acknowledged by the two most significant neoclassical reformulators of 
comparative advantage, namely Bertil Ohlin and Gottfried Haberler.11 
 
2.6 The Ontic Concerns of the Classical Economists and their Dynamic 
Models 
 
2.6.1 Smith and his mixed messages 
Adam Smith is generally presented to students as a doctrinaire free trader. 
According to Irwin, “Smith unequivocally supported free trade” (Irwin, 1996, p. 
75). Moreover Irwin concludes his chapter on Smith’s case for trade with the 
statement that Smith’s policy of free trade applied to all countries regardless of 
their state of economic development (p. 86). When discussing Smith’s case for 
trade, Irwin is at pains to state that his case for trade did not rest upon his case 
for laissez-faire. That Irwin should make this distinction is unsurprising given 
the many areas of economic activity where Smith saw a necessary role for 
government. Backhouse (2002, pp. 127-129) also states that Smith was not a 
dogmatic exponent of laissez-faire, without extending the same flexible 
interpretation to his position on free trade. He merely adds that he was very 
critical of mercantilist practices though he did support the Navigation Acts (on 
the grounds that defence was more important than opulence). This view of 
Smith has been contested. As noted by Roll, there has been a tendency that tries 
to make a doctrinaire ideology of Adam Smith’s general preference for absence 
of government intervention in economic matters (Roll, 1992, p. 134). This view 
has been echoed more recently by Magnusson (2004) who claims that it was the 
nineteenth century British followers of Smith who invented a tradition of free 
trade by creating an unduly stark dichotomy between free trade and 
                                                
11 An example of this dismissal of Pareto is Roger Backhouse’s account of his contribution, where he 
says that Pareto applied to international trade the Walrasian general equilibrium system but that he did 
not add anything beyond equation counting. (Backhouse, 1985, p. 200) 
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protectionism as absolute categories.12 According to Magnusson, the 
interpretation of Smith outside of Britain (in Sweden and the United States) was 
as the exponent of a new political economy which stressed the need to establish 
modern industry in order to achieve economic progress and that they saw 
nothing contradictory in defending him in principle and still advocating tariffs 
to promote industrial development. (Magnusson, 2004, p. 17). In a similar vein, 
Vaggi and Groenewegen, citing the so called, Early Draft of the Wealth of 
Nations, claim that it supports the view that Smith was never a naïve supporter 
of free trade. In particular they maintain that it shows how Smith explicitly 
recognised the difficulties that poor countries have in their dealings with rich 
ones. “it is easier for a nation, in the same manner as for an individual to raise 
itself from a moderate degree of wealth to the highest opulence, than to acquire 
this modest degree of wealth” (Smith, 1763, cited in Vaggi and Groenewegen, 
2003, p. 113).  
  
Smith was essentially an Enlightenment figure, who took a critical stance 
against the practices of the State that he observed. He probably observed the 
extent to which most government interventions benefited the rich and powerful 
as opposed to the poor. According to Magnusson (2004, p. 25), it was possibly 
Smith’s argument for a free corn market (on the grounds that existing monopoly 
trading practices hurt the poor) and the British Prime Minister William Pitt’s 
frequent invocation of Smith’s authority, that did much for Smith’s image as a 
free trader. To the extent that Smith’s theoretical system attacked mercantilism 
and cited the interests of the consumer, it could be said that he was motivated by 
ontic concerns.  
 
What can also be asserted with a reasonable degree of confidence is that Smith’s 
writings did not contain a uniform message. Moreover, the implications of much 
of his theorising were not apparent until other economists interrogated them. 
This is particularly true when it comes to his dynamic argument for trade as a 
facilitator of growth. On the surface it would appear that Smith reconciled his 
                                                
12 Magnusson (2004, p. 4) believes that it was the Manchester men, a group of political reformers 
within the Anti Corn Law League, who in their free trade campaigning, popularized this view of Smith.  
 54 
static case in favour of free trade with his dynamic case, because of the 
centrality of savings and material capital accumulation to his theory of growth:  
 
The industry of the society can augment only in proportion as its capital 
augments, and its capital can augment only in proportion to what can be 
gradually saved out of its revenue. But the immediate effect of every such 
regulation is to diminish its revenue and what diminishes its revenue is 
certainly not very likely to augment its capital faster than it would have been 
augmented of its own accord had both capital and labour been left to find out 
their natural employments (Smith, 1999 [1776], p. 34).  
 
This argument stands or falls on the extent to which one accepts the centrality of 
physical capital accumulation to economic growth and the idea that aggregate 
national savings are proportional to national income, thus ignoring income 
distribution issues and their impact on aggregate savings.  
 
Smith also had a dynamic theory of the consequences of trade that derived from 
his views about the benefits of the division of labour that larger markets 
facilitated. This has been called Smith’s productivity theory by Myint (1958, p. 
318). A narrow interpretation (using contemporary language) is that there are 
economies of scale associated with large scale production. Maneschi (1998, p. 
46) highlights how economies of scale make absolute advantage endogenous 
while Irwin (1996, p. 80) stresses the extra benefits that accrue to countries 
when productivity is enhanced. The latter cites Smith on the manifold ways that 
free trade can enhance a country’s productive power, not just through the 
division of labour but also as a result of the exchange of knowledge about new 
methods of production and new business practices. Such static and dynamic 
benefits as Smith alluded to are, in Irwin’s view, “outstanding” given the period 
when he was writing. (p. 80). However what both Maneschi and Irwin fail to 
point out is that if economies of scale are not common across all sectors of the 
economy, then it is possible for a country to lose from trade if trade results in a 
decline in sectors where those economies exist. This omission is surprising 
given that this point had been made many years earlier by Graham (1923) and 
sparked a lively debate at that time. John Stuart Mill called these extra effects 
indirect effects that must be counted beneficial of a high order (Mill, 2004 
[1848], p. 542).   
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What has caused far more consternation for those who view Smith as the 
destroyer of mercantilist doctrine is his vent for surplus theory. This was the 
view expressed by Smith that one of the benefits of foreign trade was that it 
provided an outlet for the surplus produce of a country. Mill (2004 [1848], p. 
540) was very dismissive calling it a surviving relic of the mercantile theory. He 
claimed that it suggested, either that the good would be produced in sheer waste 
if the foreign market was not there to absorb the surplus or that, in the absence 
of production, capital would lie idle. He questioned why the labour and capital 
would not find alternative employment producing goods for which demand 
existed (p. 541). Myint (1958, p. 322) interpreted the vent for surplus as 
implying inelastic domestic demand for the export good and considerable 
specificity of resources tied up in the production of goods for export. This could 
apply to a developing country with surplus productive capacity. This view has 
not found favour with current historians of trade theory. Irwin (1996) in his 
account of Smith’s static and dynamic gains from trade does not even mention 
the vent for surplus, which Magnusson (2004, p. 162, note 48) attributes to his 
desire to put the right ideological label on Smith as the father figure of the free 
trade movement. Bloomfield (1994, p. 128) calls it a mystery and says that 
probably more has been read into it than Smith intended. Similarly for Maneschi 
(1998, p. 48) too much energy has been devoted to teasing out what Smith 
meant and it is better to simply see vent for surplus and the productivity theory 
as being two sides of the one coin. Gomes (2003, p. 33) appears to agree, 
though, rather typically, he cites others in support of the view.  
 
The disquiet provoked by the vent for surplus views of Smith appears to be 
because they contradict what he has to say about the workings of a competitive 
market system. Myint (1958) originally related the vent for surplus to conditions 
that could conceivably exist in less developed countries but this explanation did 
not satisfy the sceptics such as Bloomfield, since such conditions could not 
readily be applied to developed countries such as Britain. Later, Myint (1977) 
claimed that Smith also meant for his vent for surplus to be applicable to the 
developed countries of Western Europe. According to Magnusson (2004, p. 33), 
the alarm generated by the vent for surplus was simply because it did not suit 
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those who wished to portray Smith as the father of free trade to accept that he 
may have harboured mercantilist prejudices. Magnusson suggests that one way 
around the puzzle is simply to conclude that, although Smith may have had a 
dynamic productive view of trade, he may have been sceptical as to its realism. 
This scepticism could have been due to his awareness of the conditions of 
production, especially in agriculture, at the time he was writing. If one accepts 
that agriculture may not operate to full capacity and that it is difficult, even in 
the medium term, to change from one kind of production to another, his vent for 
surplus views of the benefits of trade make sense. However, for neoclassical 
economists, who claim Smith as their intellectual forefather, such views are 
anathema, since they imply either generalised market failure or individual 
irrationality. Social realism played a key part in Smith’s theorising unlike that of 
those who claim to be his successors.  
 
2.6.2 Ricardo and the repeal of the Corn Laws 
It would not be an overstatement to say, as Findlay (1974) does, that David 
Ricardo’s static theory of comparative advantage is his most famous single 
contribution to economic analysis and the repeal of the Corn Laws, the policy 
objective most closely associated with his name. While the static theory of 
comparative advantage is the acquaintance that most students of international 
economics have with Ricardo, the fact is that, like most economists of his day, 
his main preoccupations were dynamic. Central to his dynamic analysis was a 
theory of value and distribution. In the original preface to his Principles of 
Political Economy and Taxation, he says:  
 
The produce of the earth – all that is derived from its surface by the united 
application of labour, machinery and capital, is divided among three classes of 
the community, namely, the proprietor of land, the owner of the stock or 
capital necessary for its cultivation, and the labourers by whose industry it is 
cultivated. But in different stages of society, the proportions of the whole 
produce of the earth which will be allotted to each of these classes, under the 
names of rent, profit and wages, will be essentially different (Ricardo, 1996 
[1817], p. 13). 
 
 Determining the laws which regulate this distribution was, for Ricardo, the 
principal problem in political economy. His theory of value was that the value 
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in exchange of a good depended on the relative quantity of labour necessary for 
its production and he saw distribution as essentially conflictual (as far as the 
economic interests of the different social classes were concerned). According to 
Roll (1992, p. 167), not only is the picture drawn by Ricardo of the future 
pessimistic, it also implicitly destroys the harmony of social interest that Smith 
had been at pains to establish. This is a heritage from which neoclassical 
economics has been eager to distance itself and has, arguably, done so very 
successfully considering the static, individualistic, harmonious world of 
production, exchange and distribution that characterises neoclassical analysis.   
 
Ricardo’s pessimism derived from the conclusions of his theoretical system; 
that is, that economies tended to a steady state, where profits were zero and 
growth ceased, since growth was driven by the savings from profit of the 
capitalist class who invested in material capital. His system depended on a 
labour theory of value, a subsistence theory of wages, an inverse relationship 
between wages and profit and a theory of differential rent due to the diminishing 
productivity of land, as less fertile land was taken into cultivation. Higher 
population levels would lead to increased demand for corn and result in this 
corn being produced on less fertile marginal land. By virtue of diminishing 
productivity of resources used to produce the extra corn, the price of corn would 
rise, as would rents, while profits would fall “Thus by bringing successively 
land of worse quality, or less favourably situated, into cultivation, rent would 
rise on the land previously cultivated, and precisely in the same degree would 
profits fall” (Ricardo, D., 1815, p. 9). The mechanism through which higher-
priced corn would lead to lower profits was through its impact on wages, “Corn 
being one of the chief articles on which the wages of labour are expended, its 
value, to a great degree, regulates wages” (Ricardo, D., 1822, p. 42). Higher 
wages mean lower profits and lower profits mean less capital accumulation and 
growth. Eventually profits would be driven to zero and all capital accumulation 
and growth would cease. Any policy measures that could alleviate or postpone 
this gloomy future were, for Ricardo, desirable, since in his view “Nothing 
contributes so much to the prosperity and happiness of a country as high profits” 
(p. 40).  
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Hence, if the price of the wage good (corn) was to be somehow lowered, this 
would reduce wages, increase profit, lead to more capital accumulation and 
postpone for a while the eventual steady state. The repeal of the Corn Laws in 
Britain would allow for the importation of cheap corn and achieve this desired 
effect: “general profits on capital, can only be raised by a fall in the 
exchangeable value of food, and which fall can arise from three causes [among 
which are] … the discovery of new markets, from whence corn may be 
imported at a cheaper price than it can be grown for at home” (Ricardo, 1815, p. 
21). As for distribution issues, the landowner would lose from the cheap 
importation of corn. “The landlord would be the only sufferer” (p. 48) but 
Ricardo did not accept that the interests of a particular class should be allowed 
to stymie progress, “I shall greatly regret that considerations for any particular 
class, are allowed to check the progress of wealth and population of the 
country” (p. 49). It made no real difference in the long run to labour (though 
there might be short-run benefits due to increased labour demand), and 
capitalists would undoubtedly gain. But, most importantly, free trade was good 
for industrial Britain, conferring on it both static and dynamic benefits, “The 
wealth of England would, I am persuaded, be considerably augmented by a 
great reduction in the price of corn” (p. 46).  
 
What Ricardo’s dynamic theory does is raise questions about the universal 
benefits of free trade in a world where countries have a static comparative 
advantage in agriculture. Findlay (1974, p. 12) developed Ricardo’s dynamic 
model in a formal way and he grudgingly admitted that while free trade raises 
the profits and growth rates in England, it has the opposite effect on the 
agricultural exporter. However, in the next sentence, he attempts to mitigate this 
gloomy prognosis with the observation that the same analysis predicted a 
secular decline in the terms of trade against manufactured exporters to the 
benefit of the agricultural exporter. The essential point of Ricardo’s analysis is 
that developments that benefit the capitalist class benefit society because of the 
propensity of that class to invest. The corollary is that developments that benefit 
the landed class will not benefit society because of their spendthrift habits and 
lower propensity to save.  
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It is noteworthy that Ricardo’s dynamic theory of the effects of trade 
liberalisation does not make it into any textbook on international economics. 
Moreover, historians of economic thought have, by and large, ignored the 
implications for trade policy of Ricardo’s dynamic analysis. Even Findlay 
(1987), when writing about the evolution of the concept of comparative 
advantage, skips over the more general point (that he first alluded to in his 1974 
article), which is that the optimal trade policy for maximum growth depends on 
a country’s circumstances and the structure of its economy. He discusses 
comparative advantage as a dynamic concept that evolves due to changes in 
technology and/or capital accumulation but presents this as something 
naturalistic that relates to underlying factor endowments, preferences and/or 
simply exogenous change. In fact he takes a swipe at the development literature 
saying its talk of dynamic comparative advantage is loose and that they try to 
change the pattern of production before necessary changes in a country’s 
capacity have taken place (Findlay, 1987, p. 517).  
 
Irwin (1996, p. 94) alludes to Ricardo’s dynamic analysis presenting it as an 
additional and perhaps more significant benefit of trade beyond the static 
efficiency gain. He makes no mention of its implications for free trade as a 
beneficial policy with allegedly universal application. By contrast, Maneschi 
(1998, p. 72) does devote a sentence to dynamic losses, saying that as Ricardo’s 
attention was focused on Britain, he did not mention the dynamic losses that the 
corn exporting country would incur. However, similar in spirit to Findlay 
(1974), Maneschi qualifies this statement with the observation that if a ready 
supply of fertile land exists (as was the case in North America at the time 
Ricardo was writing), it could produce corn at practically constant cost. 
 
Gomes (2003) also discusses Ricardo’s dynamic model but his account is very 
confusing. When discussing the social context of the debate on the Corn Laws, 
he acknowledges that free trade might be detrimental to the long-term interests 
of food-producing countries, giving them an incentive to alter their comparative 
advantage bases (p. 188). However, in his account of doctrinal history, he 
presents the dynamic model as leading to growth regardless of the goods that a 
country exports or imports. While he acknowledges that profit is inversely 
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related to wages and that the latter depend on the cost of wage goods (the price 
of corn), he claims that increased capital accumulation can also occur if the 
country imports luxury goods. The basis for this claim is that cheaper imports 
raise the real income of capitalists (especially if they consume luxury goods) 
and, while the rate of profit will not be affected, they will still increase savings 
as a result of the increased purchasing power of their income (pp. 56-57). It is 
not clear whether Ricardo said this or this is a conclusion that Gomes drew from 
his writings. In Principles Ricardo is very clear when he says:  
 
 Foreign trade, then, though highly beneficial to a country as it increases the 
amount and variety of objects on which revenue can be expended, and affords, 
by the abundance and cheapness of commodities, incentives to saving and to 
the accumulation of capital, has no tendency to raise the profits of stock unless 
the commodities imported be of that description on which the wages of labour 
are expended” (Ricardo, 1996 [1817], pp. 92-93).  
 
This reiterates what he had said before which is that, “Profits then depend on the 
price, or rather on the value of food … The facility in obtaining all other things, 
only increases the amount of commodities” (Ricardo, 1815, p. 27). In other 
words, a fall in the price of goods consumed by the rich will not affect the rate 
of profit since that depends on wages. In any case the picture presented by 
Gomes is too rosy, since the country that imports luxury goods (who must 
therefore export food) will have higher wages and a lower profit rate. Therefore 
it is far from clear whether the income of capitalists in such a country will rise 
or fall, since the income-boosting effect of lower priced luxury goods must be 
weighed against lower rates of profit. 
 
Ricardo’s conclusions are not dependent on a subsistence theory of wages. The 
neoclassical specific factors model of trade (with its assumption of market-
clearing wages) predicts that trade will benefit the fixed factor employed in the 
export sector, hurt the fixed factor employed in the import competing sector and 
have an ambiguous effect on the mobile factor (labour) depending on what 
goods labour consumes. So for a country with a comparative advantage in 
agricultural goods, this implies that landowners (capitalists) would 
unambiguously gain (lose) and labour would lose to the extent that food was 
important in its consumption bundle.  
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While Ricardo has generally been presented as the first real exemplar in 
classical political economy of the abstract deductive method, a legacy that 
neoclassical economics enthusiastically embraced, his method was not 
abstraction for its own sake. As Roll (1992, p. 157) says, Ricardo was 
essentially a practical thinker in that his theorising was always about the 
contemporary world that he knew so well. This is obvious in the manner in 
which he addresses the risk to Britain of dependence on foreign supply for its 
food, a danger that he considered over-rated and to some degree a matter of 
opinion not capable of correct estimation (Ricardo, 1815, p. 28-29).  
In support of his position he mentions, among other things, how “Buonaparte, 
when he was most hostile to us, permitted the exportation of corn to England by 
licences, when our prices were high from a bad harvest” (p. 32) and the case of 
Holland, a country dependent “almost wholly on foreign supply”, and where the 
price of corn “has been remarkably steady, even during the convulsed times 
which Europe has latterly experienced” (p. 35). As with Smith, the contrast 
between Ricardo and his neoclassical successors (such as Samuelson) is very 
stark in this respect. Ricardo’s pragmatism is also reflected in that despite his 
sustained onslaught against the Corn Laws, he recommended that the duty on 
corn be reduced gradually over a ten year period. Moreover he felt that the 
Navigation Laws were necessary for the upkeep of the navy and appeared 
ambiguous on the issue of reciprocity in trade liberalisation (Magnusson, 2004, 
p. 39).  
 
2.6.3 Trade policy and other classical economists 
According to Magnusson (2004, p. 44) none of the classical economists was a 
doctrinaire free trader. (He says this to dispute the view that the liberalisation of 
trade in the 1820s and the repeal of the Corn Laws in the 1840s should be 
viewed as a victory for the classical economists). This is a view shared by 
Backhouse (1985, p. 65) who also claims that the economists were circumspect 
when it came to drawing policy conclusions from their theorising. Robert 
Torrens stands out because he opposed unilateralism in trade liberalisation on 
the grounds that it could lead to a deterioration of a country’s terms of trade, 
behaviour that has been described by Robbins (1998, p. 216) as “frightful”. But 
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even other economists who took issue with Torrens, such as Nassau Senior and 
Ramsey McCulloch, supported tariffs in certain instances, such as for revenue 
purposes and, surprisingly in the case of Senior, when there was a danger of 
immediate injury to the domestic producer with whom the imported commodity 
would interfere (Magnusson, 2004, p. 41). Mill, who was critical of the 
Navigation Laws and both the subsistence and revenue arguments for tariffs, did 
famously support the infant industry case for tariffs where “they are imposed 
temporarily in the hopes of naturalising a foreign industry, in itself perfectly 
suitable to the circumstances of the country.” (Mill, 2004 [1848], pp. 839-840).   
 
In all instances, these economists appeal to pragmatic considerations or social 
circumstances in defence of their position. Contrast this more nuanced approach 
with the all too (unfortunately typical) dogmatic claims of  a contemporary 
theorist, Willem Buiter, chief economist at the European Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development, when he berated what he considered to be the 
unenlightened stance taken by developing country negotiators at the World 
Trade Organisation meeting in Cancun in 2003. “Remember unilateral trade 
liberalisation is not a concession or a sacrifice that one should be compensated 
for. It is an act of enlightened self interest. Reciprocal trade liberalisation 
enhances the gains but is not necessary for the gains to be present. The 
economics is all there” (cited in Chang, 2003, p 9). While I would be loath to 
accuse Buiter of bad faith, it does reinforce the view that the tools and 
techniques that contemporary neoclassical economists use have rendered them 
blind to the social material that their models are supposed to represent.  
 
2.7 The Early Neoclassicals and the Triumph of Tools over Ontic Concerns 
 
 2.7.1 Preamble 
The early neoclassical economists, especially Marshall, were keenly aware of 
the social material about which they attempted to theorise. This 
notwithstanding, by the 1920s, ontic concerns had retreated and the 
development of neoclassical trade theory was driven by and circumscribed by 
the tools that had become part of the kit of the academic economist. In order to 
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understand how this happened, it is necessary to look at the motivation and 
choices of some of the principal protagonists of the new science in the period 
between 1880 and 1915, especially the legacy of Alfred Marshall. However, 
before turning to Marshall, it is useful to look at contributions made by lesser 
known economists (many of whom were operating in the Marshallian tradition) 
and the extent to which the less amenable aspects of their theorising ceased to 
be part of the main canon of thought. What most of these economists had in 
common was that they were all, by and large, committed free traders, even as 
their theorising sometimes pointed in a contrary direction.  
 
2.7.2  Henry Sidgwick and his unemployment and emigration fears 
Henry Sidgwick has been described by Schumpeter (in a footnote) as one of the 
great university men in the sense of milieu creating and shaping (Schumpeter, 
1994 [1954], p. 408). He has also been portrayed as a moral philosopher in the 
tradition of Hume and Mill (Hutchison, 1953, p. 50), a Utilitarian who wanted 
to provide guiding principles for State intervention (Winch, 1969, pp. 37-39). 
One of his better known legacies is the distinction he made between wealth 
when expressed in money values and wealth when expressed in terms of utility, 
from which the uncomfortable conclusion can be drawn that community welfare 
depends on distribution as much as on production. He made different 
contributions to the theory of international trade, including the indirect one of 
first publishing privately Marshall’s essays on international trade. He was 
fundamentally a free trader but more on pragmatic political economy grounds 
than on the basis of theoretical speculation (see Jha, 1973, p. 36 and Irwin, 
1996, p. 227).  
 
Of interest to us however are the various arguments that he provided in support 
of temporary protection. First, he strongly endorsed the infant industry case for 
protection as expressed by Mill, where the industry in question is suitable to the 
circumstances of the country. In doing so, he enumerated conditions whereby it 
may be unprofitable for a private capitalist to engage in production in the 
absence of protection but, if protection is afforded, then its cost is compensated 
to the community by the ultimate economic gain that accrues from domestic 
production of the good (Sidgwick, 1901, pp. 488-490). This is very much in the 
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public good, externality tradition that he helped pioneer, when he presented 
well-known cases where the market and laissez-faire fail because of the inability 
of individuals to get adequate remuneration for services rendered (pp. 399-418). 
Another interesting contribution was his analysis of the elimination through 
competition of industrial production in a country where the primary 
(agricultural) sector has strongly diminishing returns and is therefore incapable 
of absorbing all the displaced labour from the industrial sector (see Jha, 1973, p. 
40 and Irwin, 1996, pp. 173-174). He concluded that it would result in 
immediate unemployment that would become permanent unless the workers 
emigrated. This analysis is distinctive in that he addressed frictions in real 
markets and how agents respond to them. It also presented a legitimate 
argument for protection. This case caused some mild controversy, with Bastable 
and Loria questioning the validity of the hypothetical example, especially its 
departure from classical theory that denied altogether the possibility of 
unemployment in the long run. Two defenders of Sidgwick’s conclusions were 
J. S. Nicholson and, more surprisingly, Edgeworth. The former descends from 
generality to particularity when he challenged the appropriateness of always 
assuming that markets operate in a frictionless fashion. "The assumptions that 
labour and capital cannot be exported and can always find an equally 
advantageous employment in 'other things' in case of displacement, though 
useful as first approximations in economic theory, require considerable 
modifications before being applied to particular practical cases" (Nicholson, 
1903, p. 327). For Nicholson, the removal of trade restrictions could force 
manufacturing workers into agriculture with disastrous results (Nicholson, 
1903, pp. 317-318). Likewise Edgeworth (1901) alluded to the immediate social 
and distributional consequences of the removal of protection, even as he 
stressed that the real difference between the two sides rested on the extent of 
abstraction that they employed, with Bastable and Loria taking a more abstract 
perspective by treating the country as a whole and ignoring non-competing 
groups and internal divisions.  
 
According to Irwin, this challenge to classical doctrine was “remarkably 
uncontested” (Irwin, 1996, p. 174). Presumably he feels that a better defence of 
the classical doctrine could have been offered. In his discussion of the 
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Australian case for protection, that was subsequently proposed in the Brigden 
Report in 1929 (which rested on a Sidgwick type analysis, though without 
attribution), he claims that the free trade case was intact, since what the Report 
presented was a non-economic case for protection that emphasised redistributive 
issues (and their possible social and political consequences) over the economic 
case for free trade as a means of increasing national income per capita (p. 176). 
For the purposes of this thesis, what is remarkable is that this particular case for 
protection, as presented by Sidgwick, simply disappeared from view. For 
example, Viner (1964 [1937]), who does mention some of Sidgwick’s views on 
international trade, makes no makes no reference to this particular argument; 
likewise, the case of Haberler (1936), who fails to mention Sidgwick altogether. 
Full employment, as a necessary assumption on which the positive normative 
conclusions of neoclassical theory are based, became (and still is) a largely 
unquestioned premise that academic trade theorists accepted without demur. 
Similarly consigned to the dusty archives of history is Sidgwick’s conclusion 
that “the fashion which lingers of treating the protectionist as a fool who cannot 
see – if he is not a knave who will not see … is really an illogical survival of a 
mere fragment of what was once a coherent doctrine.” (Sidgwick, 1901, p. 487).  
 
2.7.3 J. S. Nicholson and imperfect markets 
Another overlooked theoretical contribution is that of Nicholson’s analysis of 
free trade in a situation where a country has a comparative disadvantage in the 
decreasing cost industry and a comparative advantage in the increasing cost 
industry (Nicholson, 1903, pp. 308-309). He showed that specialisation 
according to comparative advantage would reduce the average productivity of 
labour (and hence wages) due its decreased productivity in both sectors. He 
does ameliorate the normative conclusions by mentioning that the only 
compensation would be the improved terms of trade that the country would 
enjoy as its export good exchanged on better terms than before specialisation 
and trade. Viner (1964 [1937], p. 475) peremptorily dismisses Nicholson’s case 
on the grounds that his analysis (of the decreasing cost industry) was conducted 
in average cost rather than marginal cost terms. This dismissal is interesting, 
based as it is on another unchallenged and seemingly unchallengeable 
neoclassical construct that pricing must be governed by marginal cost 
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considerations. Irwin (1996, pp. 140-141) reiterates the Viner conclusion 
claiming that Nicholson’s analysis did not clinch the case, not least because of 
its average cost assumptions as to pricing. Irwin is revealing when he comments 
rather acerbically on the fact that Nicholson, as others of his era were prone to 
do, implied that anything that increased labour’s share of national income was 
inherently desirable. One can only conclude that Irwin has some reservations on 
this front. In fact elsewhere, Irwin (p. 176) quotes Viner approvingly when the 
latter dismissed a definition of standard of living that ignored the income of 
landowners and capitalists.13  
 
Nicholson (1903, pp. 315-317) also addressed the effects of trade when labour 
markets were segmented and free trade resulted in driving labour from the high 
wage to the low wage sector. Again, Irwin cites the case but dismisses it by 
saying that the example was short and confused and failed to bring out fully the 
problem presented for comparative advantage and free trade (Irwin, 1996, p. 
161). The reason for Irwin’s dismissal of the argument is not very clear (and 
certainly does not clinch the case), though he cites that Nicholson expressed 
prices and wages in nominal terms. From the perspective of this thesis, what 
stands out is that Nicholson’s theoretical contributions with their often 
uncomfortable results were written out of history. Even Irwin (p. 141) mentions 
the curious lack of contemporary commentary that accompanied Nicholson’s 
decreasing cost industry example, without probing further as to why this might 
be the case. Of course it needs to be remembered that Nicholson (like Sidgwick) 
was a pragmatic free trader who, while accepting the theoretical exceptions to 
free trade, denied their practical application. He was also a signatory to the free 
trade manifesto signed by the fourteen professors in 1903 in defence of free 
trade for Britain.14 Possibly, given his practical reservations, the subsequent 
                                                
13 Irwin’s admiration for Viner’s scholarship (and ideological defence of free trade) are revealed by his 
supportive adjectives whenever he refers to Viner. For example, he talks of Viner’s “harsh but reliable” 
judgement on an economist’s defective procedure (Irwin, p. 139n), whereas elsewhere he makes 
reference to his “incisive review” (and dismissal) of the Australian case for protection (p.176), while on 
the external economies issue, he claims that it was Viner who delivered the “key qualifications” to the 
use of trade policies (p. 149).  
14 The Tariff reform controversy was a product of an unsuccessful campaign launched by Joseph 
Chamberlain (the Colonial Secretary in the government of the day) in 1903 to abandon Britain’s free 
trade policy for a policy of imperial preference. The political dispute exposed deep divisions among 
academic economists of the day, when fourteen economists signed a letter (drafted by Francis 
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neglect of his more heretical theories did not provoke much of a crusading 
response from him.  
 
2.7.4 Charles Bickerdike and the terms of trade argument for tariffs 
The last of the lesser known economists whose analysis was not so much 
challenged as neglected was Charles Bickerdike. He developed the terms of 
trade argument for protection, first alluded to by Torrens and Mill and 
resurrected by Edgeworth (1894a). The latter showed the theoretical possibility 
of the use of a nationally advantageous tariff, while denying its practicability. 
“As I read, protection might procure economic advantage in certain cases, if 
there was a Government wise enough to discriminate those cases, and strong 
enough to confine itself to them; but this condition is very unlikely to be 
fulfilled” (Edgeworth, 1894a, p. 48).  
 
According to Jha (1973, p. 46), Bickerdike was unique in that his argument for 
the economically advantageous use of tariffs was not based on exceptional cases 
but was more general. His analysis is also noteworthy as he used Marshallian 
partial equilibrium diagrams to illustrate his argument. His case was 
strengthened when the tariff was protective as opposed to for revenue only. 
What Bickerdike (1906) said was that a small import or export tax would be 
beneficial in normal circumstances and, in the case of import taxes, the 
advantage was greater the more elastic the demand of the taxing country. The 
latter was more likely when the import was a finished good and if there was an 
untaxed domestic source of supply (meaning that the tax would be protective). 
In his manipulation of the Marshallian diagram, he showed that once the foreign 
supply curve is upward sloping (implying a less than infinitely elastic supply to 
the domestic market), the effect of the tariff would be to lower the foreign price 
of the good. This terms of trade gain he illustrated to be greater than the 
deadweight consumer loss from consumers exiting the market. Bickerdike 
(1907) extended his findings by deriving a mathematical formula for the 
                                                                                                                                       
Edgeworth) to the Times rejecting Chamberlain’s proposals and affirming support for free trade. By 
and large it could be said that it was  theoretical economists (of whom Alfred Marshall was the pre-
eminent figure) who defended free trade while the historical economists, such as William Hewins, 
Percy Ashley, William Cunningham and Herbert Foxwell, questioned it.  
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optimum tax in terms of export and import supply elasticities. His analysis was 
praised by Edgeworth (1908a and b) who conceded that his results were 
theoretically correct and, moreover, that they appeared to be general. However, 
the extra theoretical argument against the use of such tariffs that Edgeworth 
cited in this case was the possibility of retaliation by foreign governments. For 
this reason he continued to deny the economic viability of protectionism. 
According to Jha (1973, pp. 36-37), Bickerdike, in all his varied writings up to 
1929, was consistent in maintaining that there was a divergence between the 
sum of individual interests and the aggregate national interest, thus implicitly 
questioning laissez-faire as an appropriate economic approach by national 
governments. Joan Robinson viewed Bickerdike’s analysis as a serious breach 
in the free trade case and claimed that the response to it by the mainstream 
fraternity was simply to hush it up (Robinson. 1962, p. 64). This is consistent 
with the general claim in this section that, any conclusions not amenable to the 
development of a unified general theory, were not so much contested as 
ignored.  
 
2.7.5 Bastable and Pigou: defenders of the orthodoxy 
The more orthodox exponents of the free trade is best view in this period were 
arguably Charles Bastable and Alfred Pigou. Bastable’s book is a trenchant 
defence of free trade in general, and economics as a science as a methodological 
stance. For him international trade is not qualitatively different to trade between 
individuals and its general advantage is that it increases utility (Bastable, 1903, 
p. 13 & p. 18). Since he views international trade as simply a sum of individual 
exchanges, protection must be necessarily injurious to the extent that it hinders 
exchange (p. 138). While he acknowledged the infant industry case for 
protection in very limited circumstances (and indeed gave his name to the extra 
conditions that would need to be satisfied for the case to be valid), his general 
conclusion is that if manufactures in general do not exist, then they are not 
meant to be. Their lack of existence is proof that the country is better off 
without them (p. 141). Furthermore, he disputed the notion of industrialisation 
as a necessary condition for economic and social development, citing the social 
evils of a complex industrial society, especially in the absence of material 
advancement and moral and intellectual training (p. 148). In the spirit of Mill, 
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he extols the moral and social superiority of international trade over protection 
as a disseminator not just of goods but also of ideas. Bastable was another of the 
signatories of free trade manifesto in 1903. 
 
In Pigou’s Protective and Preferential Import Duties, his defence of free trade is 
similar in spirit to that of Bastable, in that it is based on a belief in the harmony 
of interests between the individual and society (Pigou, 1906). Anything that 
limits scope for individual bargaining must therefore reduce national income 
“the dividend of the whole community is, prime facie, larger when exchange is 
free than when it is subject to impediments” (p. 8). For him, import duties were 
necessary as a form of revenue raising and the real issue was the efficiency of 
protective versus non-protective taxes (p. 23). According to Bickerdike (1907, 
p. 99), Pigou concentrated on the direct distortionary effects of a tariff (the 
misallocation of resources and distorting of consumer choice) but minimised the 
indirect effects (improved terms of trade) that Bickerdike emphasised. “The real 
costs of our foreign imports … would be slightly lowered … This indirect 
influence is not, however, the chief element that has to be considered” (Pigou, 
1906, p. 25).  However, like many of his contemporaries, Pigou accepted the 
infant industry argument but did not see its relevance for an advanced industrial 
country like Britain. His signatory of the economists’ free trade manifesto 
would be consistent with this position and, moreover, he was one of the more 
public and active campaigners on the free trade side.  
 
2.7.6 Understanding the role of Marshall in the triumph of tools over ontic 
concerns 
According to Winch (1969. p. 60), academic economists were not attached to 
the doctrine of free trade in unqualified form and almost all the arguments used 
by tariff reformers in the 1903 dispute had long been familiar to economists. In 
particular he cites Marshall as the representative of the moderate anti-tariff 
position, reluctant to sign the economists manifesto and willing to admit that 
free trade was not a universally applicable policy. Yet, in order to understand 
how ontic concerns were increasingly sidelined in economic theorising in 
general and especially in the area of international trade, it is necessary to 
address the paradox that is Marshall. Marshall is a central figure, to the extent 
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that he dominated British economics at the turn of the century and has left an 
enduring legacy.  
 
Marshall is a paradox in terms of his theorising and his legacy. He represented 
an all-embracing eclecticism that is far removed from the abstract mechanical 
general equilibrium theorising that developed post-1940. Yet, it could be 
claimed, that it was Marshall who was responsible in no small way for the 
mechanistic, static, tool-driven economics that subsequently emerged. 
According to O’Brien (1990, p. 157), it was because of Marshall’s eclecticism 
as far as English economics is concerned that the marginal revolution worked. 
His all encompassing eclecticism can be seen in his reconciliation of the 
classical theory of value with the newer emphasis on demand (Vaggi and 
Groenewegen, 2003, p. 227). This was achieved via his enduring partial 
equilibrium supply and demand model. This technical feat showed the emerging 
neoclassical (as it was designated by Thorstein Veblen) theory to be a logical 
progression from its classical antecedent. In this way, it reinforced the claim 
that economics was a science with a progressive agenda. He was intolerant of 
methodological disputes as had plagued political economy in the 1870s, “I say 
of methods simply that economics has to use every method known to science” 
(cited in Coase, 1975, p. 26). He was also very attuned to the social material that 
was the substance of economic theorising. According to Coase, Marshall always 
emphasised induction and the collection and assembly of facts and much of his 
source material was gleaned from government reports, visits to factories and the 
questioning of workers and businessmen (p. 28). When it came to the analysis 
of firm behaviour, his metaphors were often biological as opposed to 
mechanical (Creedy, 1990, p. 21). This is very clear in his evolutionary concept 
of the life cycle of firms. Even his consumer theory was more variegated that a 
simple adherence to utilitarianism would warrant. According to Parsons 
“Marshall explicitly states that … the subject matter of utility theory is only part 
of economics and the less important part. The more important part is the 
influence of economic conditions on human character” (Parsons, 1931, p. 106). 
This holistic view of what economics could and should be was expressed 
directly by Marshall when he declared the Mecca of the economist to be 
economic biology (Marshall, 1898, p. 43). While he was trained as a 
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mathematician and began his economic studies by translating Mill and Cournot 
into mathematics, it is claimed that he had what amounted to an obsession for 
hiding his tools away (Pigou and Robertson, 1931, p. 3). His fear about the 
excessive use of mathematics was that it could lead economists down the road 
of mathematical temptation, where, according to Pigou, they would pursue 
“intellectual toys, imaginary problems not conforming to the conditions of real 
life” (quoted in Coase, 1975, p. 30).  
 
However, Marshall’s particular forte were his diagrams, which he used for 
deductive and inductive purposes. He considered them to be his engine of 
inquiry and when he presented them to the Cambridge Philosophical Society in 
1873, his objective was to show that economics, just like the contemporary 
sciences, had its own machinery of thought (Cook, 2005, p. 186). In 
international trade theory, his major bequest is his offer curves determining 
international values. The general view is that Marshall was reluctant to publish 
this work. In his stated reservations about the use of mathematics as an aid to 
theory and his own early contribution to trade theory, he said “Much of pure 
theory seems to me to be elegant toying. I habitually describe my own pure 
theory of international trade as a toy” (cited in Coats, 1992, p. 262). Yet this 
early contribution found its way relatively unchanged into his last work, Money, 
Credit and Commerce, published in 1923 (Marshall, 2003). As far as trade 
policy is concerned, Marshall is not presented as a dogmatic free trader but as 
someone who, for example, recognised the infant industry case for protection 
(see Jha, 1973, p. 31). However after his visit to the USA in 1875, he became 
sceptical about the workability of protectionism as an aid to economic 
development due to the limited wisdom, knowledge and power of national 
governments (see Whitaker, 1975b, pp. 89-90 & p. 108). During the tariff 
reform crisis he lent his name and considerable authority to the free trade case, a 
measure designed not only to impact on a particular political problem but also to 
underline the specialised expertise of the economist when it came to economic 
issues. Moreover, according to Cambridge gossip that circulated between 1903 
and 1908, Marshall is alleged to have declared that the man who refuses to 
support free trade could not be a bona fide professional economist (Coats, 1972, 
p. 488). His influential role in the appointment of Alfred Pigou as his successor 
 72 
over the more fancied and experienced Foxwell has been well documented (see 
Coats, 1968, 1972, Coase, 1972 and Jones, 1979). The hypothesis suggested by 
Coats (1968, p. 226) for his preference, was Pigou’s public championing of the 
free trade case and his defence of the authority of the economist.15 This has been 
challenged by Coase, who maintains that Marshall’s issues with Foxwell were 
longstanding and predated the schism caused by the tariff reform controversy. 
Regardless of which position is more correct, what both Coats and Coase appear 
to agree on is that Marshall was very concerned with the future of economics 
and the favouring of Pigou indicated a choice for the ascendancy of economic 
theory over the historical approach. According to Coase (1972, p. 485), the 
direction that economics at Cambridge and in the broader academic community 
took was not good, though he exonerates Marshall and lays the blame on Pigou, 
claiming that he failed to fulfil the high hopes that Marshall had for him.  
 
It is a matter of speculation to question whether Marshall would have applauded 
or regretted the future development of economics as the tool-driven discipline 
that it became, divorced from ontic concerns. Parsons claimed that Marshall’s 
economics hesitated between the analytical opportunities gained by a static 
resource framework and a dynamic theory of wants and activities (cited in 
Maloney, 1985, p. 52). However, regardless of his much cited eclecticism when 
it came to theory and method, it is undeniable that his choices shunted 
economics in Britain in a certain direction. Even when he finally succeeded in 
getting an independent Economics Tripos for Cambridge in 1903, the lack of 
scope that it gave to economic history was mentioned at the time (see 
Hutchison, 1953, p. 70). This relegation of the historical was also evident in 
subsequent editions of Principles, where historical analysis was moved from the 
main text to the appendices. One possible explanation of the paradox that 
Marshall represents is his obsession with getting economics recognised as a 
scientific discipline in its own right. This would explain his synthesising of the 
new theories of value with the classical scheme. It would explain his antipathy 
to unnecessary disputes between economists and his desire to find common 
                                                
15 “economic science is not a subject in which persons, however eminent, can expect, without special 
training to negotiate an argument successfully. It is unpleasant, and may appear impertinent, to call 
attention to confusions of thought into which distinguished men have fallen” (Pigou, quoted in Coats, 
1968, p. 212). 
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ground among them. But it would also explain, why, when important tensions 
emerged between the historical and the analytical approach to economics and 
when a choice had to be made, he ultimately came down in favour of the 
analytical, despite all his earlier reservations about overly abstract theory.  
 
So the legacy of the Marshallian era was a retreat from the very social material 
that had been the catalyst of classical theory and, ironically, the theorising of 
these early neoclassicals. This retreat can be partially explained by the influence 
of Marshall and his scientific aspirations for his chosen discipline. In the field of 
international trade theory, the less agreeable theoretical conclusions of his 
contemporaries were not so much disputed and challenged as simply ignored. 
Possibly the fact that these economists were pragmatic free traders may explain 
their failure to protest at the lack of reaction to their more heretical conclusions.  
 
2.7.7 Social realism and the trade policy position of non-British economists 
Outside Britain, especially in Italy, work was proceeding apace on, inter alia, 
international trade theory and policy. Tools were refined and policy positions 
forwarded by the likes of Enrico Barone and Vilfredo Pareto. Barone, in his 
1908 textbook used partial equilibrium diagrams to show the positive welfare 
gains to exporting and importing countries of market integration. These gains 
are the now familiar changes in consumer and producer surplus as illustrated 
with reference to demand and supply curves. It was also Barone who devised 
the first production possibility frontier and combined this innovation with that 
of indifference curves to represent the welfare gains of moving from autarky to 
free trade. These contributions were not known to the broader academic 
community and have only been acknowledged retrospectively as a result of the 
work of Maneschi and Thweatt (1987). 
 
 From a theory-policy perspective, the contrast between Barone and the British 
economists is interesting. The modeling efforts of the latter qualified the case 
for free trade but, nevertheless, they remained free traders for reasons unrelated 
to their theoretical work. By contrast, Barone’s theoretical work reinforced the 
welfare case for a free trade policy yet he remained sceptical. According to 
Maneschi (1998, p. 149), Barone thought of the market as a large and 
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complicated machine subject to a large amount of friction. He believed that it 
was important to study the general equilibrium configuration of the mechanism 
and the dynamic phenomenon of adjustment to disturbances. For him dynamic 
phenomena were important because they represented reality. The reality of 
frictions, irreversibility (difficulty in shifting capital from one use to another) 
and unstable terms of trade, which could alter a country’s comparative 
advantage, were reasons not to be dogmatic about free trade (p. 
150). This gap between Barone’s theoretical endeavours and his policy stance 
must indicate that, despite his adept use of neoclassical tools, he was keenly 
aware of their methodological limitations.  
 
Pareto’s contribution to the development of the tools of international trade 
theory has been mentioned already. His position on trade policy matters 
appeared to have little to do with his theoretical work in economics and more to 
do with his changing political views. In his early work such as Cours (1896), he 
is unambiguously pro free trade, viewing protectionism as a destroyer of wealth. 
When he wrote his Manual of Political Economy in 1906, his position had 
modified. He still claimed that “we can grosso modo, and as a first 
approximation, conclude that every protective tariff is the cause of a destruction 
of wealth” (Pareto, 1971, p. 374). Yet because of what he believed to be indirect 
effects (including distribution, social and fiscal), he concluded that there was no 
way of “knowing whether protection is preferable to free trade or vice versa” (p. 
377). Maneschi (1998, pp. 144-146) refers to the evolution of Pareto’s views but 
attributes it to an ethical neutrality that he had started to advocate and a belief 
that non-economic variables were also significant to the choice of trade regime. 
Gomes (2003, pp. 122-123) explains Pareto’s later “confusion” on the issue 
because of the change in his political views. However, he does not elaborate 
apart from quoting Hutchison to the effect that Pareto started his economic 
writings as an ardent liberal but later changed. In Gomes’s view, Pareto’s later 
writings on the issue were more balanced and pragmatic. A reading of his 
various writings (such as essays and newspaper articles as well as his better 
known books) reveals the profound metamorphosis that occurred in Pareto’s 
political beliefs (see Bucolo, 1980, for a collection of these writings). While 
never a socialist, this was the man who, in 1891, called Marx “an indomitable 
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spirit, a deep thinker” and who acknowledged the destructive effect of industry 
on the well-being of workers, “The progress of industry tends to reduce the 
worker’s wages and to increase the length of the working day … damaging his 
health and strength” (Bucolo, 1980, p. 48). Even as late as 1900, he still thought 
that socialists and liberals could be allies in exposing corruption (pp. 116-117). 
At the time of his early economic writings he supported democracy, 
republicanism, disarmament and free trade. One reason for his free trade stance 
was that in the Italy of his day he saw that proposed agricultural protectionism 
would hurt the poor. The transformation in his political views was dramatic and 
occurred very suddenly around the year 1900. He became anti-democratic 
(questioning the extension of suffrage), extremely critical of trade unions and 
the right to organise collectively and worried that socialism would replace 
bourgeois with working class privilege. By the time he wrote the Manual in 
1906, he was claiming that protectionism could increase wealth to the extent 
that “this policy curbs municipal socialism and the system of humanitarian 
constraint or even simply cuts the power of trade unions” (Pareto, 1971, pp. 
382-383). In his later Treatise on Sociology, another potential positive effect 
that he attributed to protectionism, that it transferred wealth into the hands of 
the more adventurous and risk taking types, which he thought might ultimately 
lead to an increase in wealth (Finer, 1966, p. 62).  
 
Maneschi (1998) seeks to portray both economists as being socially aware and 
claims that this explains their trade policy positions. However of the two, 
Barone appears the more temperate and consistent in his analysis of trade 
policy. Given the virulent anti-working class bias in Pareto’s later writings, it is 
difficult to take seriously his claimed agnosticism on trade policy matters. From 
the point of view of the development of the discipline, Pareto’s more technical 
economic writings were acknowledged and his concepts became part of the 
tool-kit of the discipline. While Barone’s contribution to international trade 
remained unacknowledged until relatively recently, nevertheless the 
neoclassical apparatus that he wielded so successfully became an integral part of 
every student’s education in international trade. In both cases what was useful to 
the construction of the neoclassical edifice was retained.  
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2.8 Later Neoclassicals and the Neoclassical Reformulation of Comparative 
Advantage. 
 
Arguably, by the 1920s, neoclassical economics was developing into a unified 
theory with its own unique (in the social sciences) method. The theory was 
undeniably static, the basis for all social explanation was the rational self-
interested actions of atomistic agents and certain environmental assumptions 
like perfectly competitive markets were widely accepted. Although economics 
had yet to become very mathematical in its expression, the foundations were in 
place. The price paid for laying these foundations was a retreat from social 
realism and the recognition that the social world was qualitatively different to 
the natural or biological world. However, in this period, trade theory still 
operated with some handicaps inherited from its classical past, such as the 
subversive labour theory of value foundation to comparative advantage. This 
issue was finally dealt with when neoclassical production theory was integrated 
into international trade, and trade theory was reformulated as part of general 
equilibrium theory.  
 
2.8.1 Gottfried Haberler and the discarding of the labour theory of value 
Haberler’s contribution to the reformulation of the classical theory of 
comparative advantage in terms consistent with neoclassical theory has been 
overshadowed by the more hegemonic account of Ohlin. What he did was to 
liberate the theory of comparative costs from Ricardo’s labour theory of value 
by expressing it in opportunity cost terms. How he does so is set out clearly in 
chapter 12 of his book on international trade (Haberler, 1936). For a long time 
his name was associated with the innovation of the geometric production 
possibility frontier, which encapsulates the idea that given resources have 
competing uses and that the cost of a particular use is alternative output 
foregone. For Haberler, Ricardo’s labour theory of value was simply a special 
case of his more general theory with many factors of production. His model is 
what would today be described as a specific factors model, in that he assumed 
that some factors of production are tied into a sector and hence have no 
alternative use (and no opportunity cost) while others are inter-sectorally 
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mobile. The influence of neoclassical production theory is very clear in his 
assumptions that: (i) the price of every product equals its marginal (money) 
cost; (ii) the mobile factor gets paid the same amount regardless of the sector 
where it is employed and; (iii) all factors, including immobile ones get paid the 
value of their marginal productivity (Haberler, 1936, p.181). Taking labour as 
the mobile resource, then the opportunity cost of applying labour to produce 
cloth (for example) is how much wine is not produced as a result. This is 
determined by the marginal productivity of labour (MPL) in the two activities. 
For example, the opportunity cost of cloth production is wine
cloth
MPL
MPL
. If a country’s 
opportunity cost of production of a particular product is lower than that of the 
international competition, then it has a comparative advantage in that product.  
 
Haberler’s formulation of opportunity cost may seem to be similar to that of 
Ricardo’s, where the opportunity cost of cloth production is also the ratio of the 
marginal productivities of labour in wine to cloth, but there are important 
differences. Ricardo assumed that the productivity of labour was constant so 
that the average productivity of labour equalled its marginal productivity and 
this never changed as the level of production changed. By contrast, Haberler’s 
treatment of labour is standard neoclassical fare. First, the focus is on marginal 
magnitudes as opposed to average magnitudes. Second, there is a neoclassical 
belief that one can unpick the marginal contribution of labour to output. Third, 
the productivity of labour at the margin is assumed to be diminishing in the 
amount of labour used and, fourth, the marginal productivity of labour is 
assumed to be positively related to the amount of the accompanying fixed factor 
used. All this gives rise to a production possibility frontier that is concave, 
embodying the fact that, as specialisation proceeds, the opportunity cost of 
production will increase. This is obvious, as the more labour that is applied to 
cloth production and the less labour that is applied to wine production, so 
wine
cloth
MPL
MPL
 will rise. A concave production possibility frontier means that the 
opportunity cost of production (or value) is no longer determined solely by 
supply side factors as was the case in Ricardo’s simple model where the 
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opportunity cost of production never varied regardless of the output mix in the 
economy.  
 
One criticism of Haberler’s account was that it was not a general equilibrium 
theory (see Ellsworth, 1940). This is however unfair. It was general equilibrium 
insofar as it addressed the production side of the economy (albeit with the 
assumption of some specific factors of production) and, although he did not 
incorporate the demand side of the economy, he laid the groundwork for the 
subsequent integration of the demand and the supply side in the determination 
of comparative advantage. It was Lerner (1932, 1934) and Leontief (1933) who 
developed Harberler’s original production possibility approach (Haberler, 1930) 
and united it with Edgeworth’s indifference curve analysis, effectively 
combining supply and demand analysis in a general equilibrium model of trade. 
An alternative, more general way of expressing opportunity cost is as the ratio 
of marginal costs. In other words the opportunity cost of producing cloth is the 
ratio of the marginal cost of cloth production to the marginal cost of wine 
production cloth
wine
MC
MC
⎛ ⎞
⎜ ⎟
⎝ ⎠
. General equilibrium assumptions get invoked by the 
claims that relative prices will always adjust to clear markets. So, for a non-
trading economy, equilibrium prices satisfy Pareto’s marginal conditions, 
whereby the ratio of marginal costs is presumed equal to autarky relative prices, 
which are taken to equal the ratio of marginal utilities from consumption for all 
individuals in this economy.  If this ratio is lower than that of the competing 
countries, then a country has a comparative advantage in the production of that 
good and will gain from specialising (though not fully) in its production and 
from exporting its surplus supply over domestic demand.  
 
Another criticism leveled at Haberler’s opportunity cost approach by Viner 
(1964 [1937], pp. 523-524) was that his analysis was too static insofar as the 
production possibility frontier was constructed on the assumption of a given 
stock of productive factors operating to some physical maximum. While 
Haberler’s account is undoubtedly static (in the spirit of Ricardo’s static model), 
it is a moot point whether the omission of preferences for leisure as compared to 
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employment (or preferences between different occupations) would have added 
substantially to the model or made it truly dynamic. It is also noteworthy that 
Viner makes no reference to countries operating at a level less than that 
indicated by Haberler’s production possibility frontier because of involuntary 
unemployment.  
 
Haberler’s achievement was that he managed to retain the essential insight of 
Ricardo, that is that all countries can gain from trade regardless of their level of 
development, but he put it on a more general footing than Ricardo’s labour 
theory of value. What matters now is opportunity cost which is determined by 
the productivity of mobile resources at the margin. This is a general theory of 
what determines the marginal productivity of resources since it can incorporate 
climate and technology (very Ricardian) with the level and composition of 
resources used in production.  
 
2.8.2  Heckscher and Ohlin, and Samuelson’s formalisation of their insights 
Eli Heckscher and Bertil Ohlin gave their names to the most enduring neo-
classical exposition of comparative advantage, the Heckscher-Ohlin theory. 
This is notwithstanding that Ohlin (unlike Heckscher) was critical of Ricardo’s 
concept mainly on the grounds of its classical labour theory of value and he 
rarely uses the term comparative advantage in his famous book on Interregional 
and International Trade, originally published in 1933 (Ohlin, 1967). Ohlin 
wished to develop a mutual interdependence price system and relate it to factor 
endowments and trade. He combined Walrasian general equilibrium as taught to 
him by Gustav Cassel (which assumed that factor proportions used in 
production varied according to the relative price of these factors) with 
Heckscher’s insight that trade flows could be explained by international 
differences in the relative abundance of factors of production. Heckscher 
(1919), who was most interested in how trade influenced the distribution of 
income and in the reasons for differences in comparative costs among countries, 
both of which were related, made a number of key assumptions which were 
later adopted by Ohlin. He assumed that: relative factor abundance differs 
between countries; that the way factors are combined in production differs 
between products and; that all countries had access to the same technology. This 
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became the version of trade theory that dominated the research agenda for 
nearly half a century. Comparative advantage was reformulated. Its basis was no 
longer unexplained technological differences between countries but differences 
in their relative factor abundance and in the relative factor intensities of 
different goods. Relative abundance of a factor led to a low market price for it, 
which explained why a good which incorporated a lot of that factor was 
relatively cheap. A country’s comparative advantage was in the production of a 
good(s) that used relatively intensively the country’s relatively abundant factor 
of production (Heckscher-Ohlin theorem).  
 
Students’ encounter with the ideas of Heckscher and Ohlin on trade are, 
invariably, mediated through Samuelson’s reformulation of their ideas. (See 
Stolper and Samuelson, 1941, Samuelson, 1948, 1949). Samuelson did to their 
ideas what Marshall had done earlier to the ideas of Ricardo and Mill; he 
expressed their content mathematically. In the course of this adaptation he took 
Ohlin’s general equilibrium model (which was also expressed mathematically in 
the appendix) and reduced it from 2 countries, n commodities, r factors of 
production and s individuals to 2 countries, 2 goods and 2 (representative) 
factors of production, the famous 2x2x2 general equilibrium model of 
production, consumption and trade. This Heckscher-Ohlin Samuelson (HOS) 
model, which is still taught to all undergraduate students of international trade, 
represents the apotheosis of abstract deductive reasoning. It combines 
neoclassical production, consumption and distribution theories in a perfectly 
competitive general equilibrium economy, where perfect competition prevails in 
all factor and product markets and all factors of production are perfectly mobile 
within countries and perfectly immobile internationally. It preserves the 
essential Ricardian insight that all countries can gain from trade but now 
explains comparative advantage on a naturalistic resource endowment basis. Its 
static character appears more justifiable than Ricardo’s static example, insofar 
as the land and the amount of labour can, with little loss of realism, be treated as 
given endowments (capital creates some complications). It preserves the 
harmonious conception of markets that are central to a static view of the 
benefits of exchange and it reinforces the neoclassical creed that all factors of 
production get their just and only possible reward according to their relative 
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contributions to the production of utility.  It has the benefit of preserving what 
was most desirable in Ricardo’s static model (the free trade conclusions) while 
subverting the heretical labour theory of value. This gives the illusion of 
continuity and progress in theorising. The only dissonant feature of the model is 
that it explicitly recognises that trade has income distribution effects and that 
not everyone will gain from trade. However, the case for trade liberalisation is 
still preserved in that the gains to the gainers exceed the losses to the losers. In 
other words, national income will be higher post trade liberalisation than pre 
trade liberalisation. This, for some, may be a sufficient case in itself to defend 
the free trade is best creed but others have felt obliged to make a stronger 
welfare case for such a policy stance on the basis of the potential for 
accompanying Pareto improving redistributive measures that ensure that there 
are no material losers post trade liberalisation. This “potentially” Pareto-
improving case for trade liberalisation assumes that the only constraint on the 
implementation of such “accompanying” policies is the size of national income. 
Political, administrative and budgetary constraints are not recognised.  
 
Samuelson’s role in the development of neo-classical trade is widely 
acknowledged and the impact of the HOS model was such that Ethier as late as 
1982 called it the modern theory of trade (Ethier, 1982a, p. 389). It is 
acknowledged that Samuelson’s contribution was his reduction of Ohlin’s 
multidimensional general model into a general equilibrium model with much 
less dimensions. Maneschi’s judgement on the Ohlin model was that it was so 
general as to offer no insights into the factor endowments theory itself 
(Maneschi, p. 183). Samuelson was also aware of his own contribution as he 
criticised Ohlin for not descending from full generality to strong and 
manageable cases such as his two-factor two-good world. He claimed that that 
left easy pickings for him and that Ohlin’s failure to reduce meant that he did 
not really understand his own system as he would have if he had played with 
more graphable versions itself (cited in Maneschi, p. 183). Samuelson in his 
claims as to the real insights that his method afforded sounds remarkably like 
Marshall in his claim to have developed an engine of scientific inquiry for 
economics. The stripped down 2x2x2 version of the H-O model as developed by 
Samuelson (1948, 1949) was attractive to the profession not just because it was 
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a simple general equilibrium model of trade but also because it gave strong 
unambiguous results. Such lack of ambiguity was much sought after by 
economists anxious to show that their discipline is a science which renders clear 
cut conclusions. It was also very amenable to subsequent comparative static 
analysis which has been the mainstay of neoclassical qualitative predictions. 
That the assumptions that underpin all general equilibrium trade models, 
including HOS, are very unrealistic is neither here not there and did not sway 
the profession from delving into ever more esoteric depths as they searched for 
new clear unambiguous results by making minor changes to exogenous 
variables that underpin their models.  
 
2.9 The Legacy 
 
2.9.1 The empirical productivity of neoclassical trade theory 
As early as 1953, Leontief (1953) tested the H-O theory of trade for the USA 
and got results completely at variance with what the model predicted; that is to 
say, it appeared that the US exported more labour-intensive goods than it 
imported. This in no way challenged the drift of theoretical trade research, its 
motor was not to be stopped. Leontief’s results were dubbed a paradox and 
instead of acting as a catalyst for new theoretical developments, it instead gave 
rise to a long line of lucrative empirical research trying to explain such 
anomalous results. This empirical quandary led to the reintroduction of more 
dimensions into theorising, such as addressing the issue of natural resources or 
recognising the importance of labour skills (known as human capital). These 
extra dimensional issues were acknowledged but then reincorporated into the 
2x2 model. They improved the results but certainly did not provide a strong 
empirical defence of the HOS model (see Kenen, 1965 and Baldwin, 1971). 
This theoretical/empirical dissonance has never disappeared. Bowen, Leamer 
and Sveikauskus (1987) generalised the model by using 12 factors of production 
and 27 countries and applied a rather weak binary test which compared the signs 
of trade flows (net exporter or importer) with the sign of factor endowment 
(abundant or not). They found a 35 percent violation of the signs. Even by the 
mid-1990s when trade theorists had found more enjoyable toys to play with, the 
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profession had still not given up on reconciling the strong H-O results with 
empirical reality. Every time, however, it seems that reality lets them down and 
new paradoxes have to be dealt with, such as Trefler’s (1995) realisation that 
there was a lot of missing trade, based on what the H-O model would have 
predicted. Maybe this would explain why trade theory and empirical trade 
research seemed to proceed in parallel grooves, occasionally confronting when 
empiricists found new data sources and new econometric techniques with which 
to test old models. It was rarely the case that empirical results affected the drift 
of theoretical research.  
 
2.9.2  The theoretical productivity of neoclassical trade theory 
If the HOS theory was not productive in an empirical sense – that is to say, if its 
theorems were not confirmed – could it be deemed productive in some other 
sense? What needs to be explained is why general equilibrium trade theorising 
in a perfectly competitive market framework persisted for so long before being 
eventually supplemented if not supplanted by new trade theory? Ideology is not 
sufficient on its own to explain this phenomenon, even though it must be 
admitted that imposing a static framework on trade theorising (taking tastes, 
technology and factor endowments as given) and allying it with self-interested 
optimising behaviour in an idealised market environment was a framework 
strongly biased towards yielding theoretical conclusions supportive of the free 
trade position.  
 
Trade theory did prove to be very productive in generating what Latsis (1972) 
calls interesting theorems. The basic model could be extended in different 
directions. First theorists exhausted the comparative static results associated 
with changes in exogenous features of the model (for example, the Rybczynski, 
1955 theorem). Core HOS theory was synthesized in four equations by Jones 
(1965). The model could be generalised to a higher dimensional world with 
many factors of production, many goods and many countries to see if the 
unambiguous qualitative theoretical results yielded by the lower dimensional 
model still held (see Jones, 1971, 1974, 1977 and Ethier, 1974, 1982b, 1984). 
As far as comparative advantage in its HO form is concerned, Ethier found that 
in a higher dimensional world, it held when expressed as correlations; that is to 
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say, that on average, a country tends to export the goods that use intensively its 
relatively abundant factors. Models could play around with different degrees of 
domestic inter-sectoral mobility of factors of production and see what results 
that yielded. These permutations to the core model were changes that were 
marginal in nature and all conducted within the environmental framework of 
competitive factor and product markets and exogenously fixed factor supplies 
with no international factor mobility. At a more technical level, the neoclassical 
trade model offered rich pickings for mathematically-oriented economists, such 
as Gale, Nikaido, Chang and Chipman, who were interested in examining the 
nature and properties of equilibrium, such as its existence, uniqueness, stability 
and efficiency.  
 
Chipman (1965) wrote a survey on the state of neoclassical international trade 
theory, which tellingly was published by Econometrica. In the sixty four pages 
of text, nine pages addressed necessary and sufficient conditions for the use of 
community indifference curves (identical and homothetic preferences), three 
pages dealt with opportunity costs, thirteen attended to the nature and 
consequences of external economies (one concession to realism) and thirty five 
focused on the properties of equilibrium. Effectively two heuristics co-existed in 
theoretical trade research, one that attempted to explain, as an exercise in 
applied logic, the cause and consequence of international trade in goods, while 
the other explored the  nature of the conditions that gave the general equilibrium 
matrix (arguably the pride of the economics profession) its elegant character. 
While such theorising did yield many theorems, which may indeed have been 
interesting to those involved in such exercises, one has to query the productive 
nature of this research in the sense of illuminating real world economic 
phenomena. Empirically, general equilibrium trade theorising was characterised 
by its lack of productivity, not just Leontief’s interestingly named “paradoxical” 
results for the USA but also its failure to explain the extent and relative global 
importance of intra-developed country trade of an intra-industry nature. Of 
course one could argue that trade theory (like general equilibrium theory) had a 
certain elegance, in that it allowed for the use of general functional forms (for 
utility and production) within a unified framework, but this is an aesthetic 
standard that must be of strictly second-order importance when it comes to 
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evaluating theories. Yet a lack of empirical productivity was insufficient to 
undermine the status of trade theory within the economics profession. Its social 
rank was high precisely because it was considered difficult. Any aspiring young 
economist knew that their probability of getting published was enhanced if their 
theorising was technically demanding, yielded counter-intuitive results but did 
not undermine the general policy thrust of mainstream theory.  
 
2.10 Concluding Comments 
 
Most general histories of economics tend (surprisingly) to neglect international 
trade or, if they do not, the focus is on the static progressive account of 
comparative advantage and its successful transformation into forms compatible 
with neoclassical theory. Comparative advantage, as expressed and developed 
by the classical economists, is presented as neoclassical theory in embryonic 
form. While no account of the historical development of international trade 
theory can afford to ignore comparative advantage (because of its longevity and 
its enduring status as the principal normative account of the effects of trade 
liberalisation on individual countries), the static story is a limited, one-sided 
account of the often contradictory theories of classical economists. Similarly, 
early neoclassical theorising on trade is less uniform than the way it is presented 
in conventional retrospective accounts.  
 
Classical economists also had dynamic theories of the effects of trade which 
were characterised by more equivocal policy implications. In particular, a 
product of these dynamic theories is that the normative impact of free trade 
depends on the structure of the economy. The economic structure of the 
economy also matters in the less well known accounts of the effect of trade 
presented by some early neoclassical economists, though their analyses tended 
to be static. The few specific histories of international trade theory that do exist 
have addressed the dynamic theories of the classical economists (Irwin is an 
exception) but they tend to gloss over their uncomfortable normative 
consequences and present them as reinforcing their static theories. It is 
reasonable to assert that these more specific histories of the evolution of 
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international trade theory view theoretical developments as having been 
essentially progressive. 
 
The main aim of this chapter has been to contest this hegemonic view that trade 
theory has followed a progressive path. On the contrary, it is claimed that 
international trade theory has been characterised by a retreat from social realism 
as it was reformulated in neoclassical terms. While the classical economists 
were essentially motivated by ontological considerations in their theoretical 
endeavours, this eventually ceased to be the case with neoclassical trade theory. 
This was partly achieved by simply ignoring early theoretical (neoclassical) 
challenges that qualified the central corpus of theory. Such neglect met with 
little resistance from the economists whose theoretical speculations were written 
out of history. A potential explanation for this uncontested disregard was the 
desire by Marshall and his disciples to establish economics as an independent 
scientific discipline with its own machinery of thought and its own set of 
techniques, that subsequently came to define the discipline. Economics (and 
international trade) became increasingly less concerned with the subject matter 
of the economy and more preoccupied with agreeing on a shared set of core 
concepts and on the application of certain techniques. The very techniques that 
came to define neoclassical theorising (rational choice maximisation) 
necessitated that the social world be described in an unrealistic way. One 
example of such a lack of realism is the concept of perfectly competitive 
markets. As Morgan (2001, pp. 13-14) pointed out, perfect competition is an 
abstract situation characterised by a lack of any active competition between 
firms. It is very far removed from free competition as conceptualized in the 
older classical tradition. While all theorising necessarily involves abstraction 
and the neglect of certain aspects of reality, it is hard to justify certain 
assumptions if their only purpose is to increase the formal tractability of models 
as opposed to highlighting some central causal feature of social reality. This is 
certainly the case with perfect competition. Yet, as we shall see in the next 
chapter, by the 1920s, the assumption of perfect competition had become so 
central to orthodox theory that subsequent challenges to free trade could now be 
defeated simply by questioning if theoretical speculation was consistent with 
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this view of markets. Silence was no longer a necessary defensive strategy when 
there existed concepts that even dissident voices were loath to challenge.  
 
From this period on, research in trade was constrained within a narrow formal 
structure and was internally driven. It was protected to some extent by its non-
empirical nature, since many of its central propositions could not be tested. 
Even when empirical evidence finally emerged that cast doubts on certain 
central positive claims of theory, it was named a paradox and had no impact on 
core theoretical assertions. Instead it led to new concepts (human capital), new 
measurement approaches and a rich vein of empirical research that tried to make 
reality conform to theory, while leaving the theory intact. The lack of any 
widespread subsequent dissent within the discipline is unsurprising given the 
education of economics students with its emphasis on techniques and problem 
solving and its lack of historical analysis. Even the great John Maynard Keynes 
illustrated the power of an economics education claiming that as late as 1923 he 
was still “a faithful pupil … who did not at that time doubt what he had been 
taught and entertained on the matter [free trade] no reserves at all” (Keynes, 
1997 [1936], p. 334). In seeking an explanation for economists’ denial of the 
obvious, he reaches for a religious analogy, saying that “it is a far greater 
exercise of the potency of an idea to exorcise the obvious than to introduce into 
men’s common notions the recondite and the remote.”(p. 351). Once 
international trade theory (like much of general equilibrium theory) became a 
formal system uninformed by ontological considerations, it had erected its own 
impregnable system of defence against all attacks. The ontic had been reduced 
to the theoretic and the only challenges that would be entertained were those of 
a family nature; that is to say, marginal objections by those who accepted the 
principal metaphors and constructs of mainstream theory.  
 
 88 
Chapter 3.  Trade II: The Forgotten Challenges to the Central 
Tenets of International Trade Theory 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
The policy conclusions of the theory of comparative advantage are 
unambiguous; that non-interference by national governments in international 
trade is the optimal policy to pursue (to maximise national income) regardless 
of a country’s level of economic development. The last chapter endeavoured to 
show that the transformation of the theory of comparative advantage into forms 
compatible with neoclassical microeconomics necessitated describing the social, 
economic and technological environment in an excessively narrow and idealised 
way. The next chapter will highlight how in the last quarter of the twentieth 
century, neoclassical trade theory appeared to reverse this trend by allowing for 
more variable technology, incorporating various types of market imperfections 
and, in some instances,  jettisoning the general equilibrium framework when 
model requirements demanded same. However, this does not mean that, in the 
period between Ricardo’s first exposition of comparative advantage and the 
eventual broadening of trade models to allow for market imperfections, 
challenges to the theory and its policy conclusions did not exist. They did, but 
they were insufficient to dislodge the dominant view that unilateral trade barrier 
dismantlement represented an act of enlightened national self-interest based on 
the unintuitive mainstream theory of trade. The reason for the failure of these 
challenges is what this chapter will attempt to address.  
 
To do so, we must revisit the challenges to comparative advantage that its 
detractors forwarded and the basis for their various critiques. What emerges is 
that the primary reason for their failure to dislodge, or in any way influence, the 
evolution of mainstream trade theory, was due primarily to a series of diverse 
but effective immunizing strategies that mainstream practitioners deployed to 
preserve the core of classical and neo-classical trade theory intact. These ranged 
from: collective amnesia (where Cournot’s trade theory was concerned); 
misrepresentation (of the nature of Manoilescu’s challenge); the invocation of 
 89 
unverifiable and essentially metaphysical concepts to undermine the apparent 
veracity of empirical challenges (Schuller’s unemployed resources); consigning 
the issues to other sub-disciplines in economics but leaving international trade 
theory untouched (Keynesian macroeconomics and development economics); 
and grudging acceptance, ironically allied with a  failure to incorporate the idea 
into trade theory until it could be safely neutered (infant industry as the one true 
exception to free trade). These tactics  are very revealing of the nature of the 
neoclassical project and serve to illustrate how tool-driven, scientistic, and 
detached from reality it is.  
 
The layout of this chapter is as follows. Section 3.2 addresses the full 
employment assumption that underpins comparative advantage and the 
implications of idle or underutilised resources for the theory. This requires re-
examining the market theories of Auguste Cournot (1971 [1838]), Richard 
Schuller (1905) and the various writings of John Marynard Keynes on 
employment and trade, together with the responses that the ensemble of writings 
provoked. Section 3.3 deals with the issue of structural heterogeneity (as far as 
resource productivity is concerned) across different sectors of the economy. 
This necessitates interrogating the theoretical objections of Frank Graham 
(1923, 1925) and the empirical and theoretical objections of Mihail Manoilescu 
(1931) to mainstream theory. Again, of particular interest is how leading trade 
theorists of their time reacted to these alternative theories. Section 3.4 resurrects 
the nature of the infant industry case for trade protection as variously argued by 
Alexander Hamilton (1827 [1791]), John Rae (1964 [1834]) and Friedrich List 
(2005b [1841]). We see that their arguments for departing from free trade logic 
were dynamic (they were well aware of the short-run costs of protection) and 
primarily concerned with issues of workers’ and managers’ capacities and how 
they were  influenced, among other things, by the broader social and political 
environment in which they operated. Moreover, the case made by them for 
departing from free trade doctrine was considered to be sufficiently strong to 
serve (for a long time) as the one true theoretical exception to comparative 
advantage. In Section 3.5, we look at the trade aspects of the theories of some 
leading post-war Development Economists and how their appeal for a more 
socially relevant and dynamic trade theory not only appeared to fall on deaf ears 
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but to coincide with its theoretical opposite; that is to say, trade theory became, 
if anything, even more ahistorical and abstruse in the 1950s and 1960s. Finally, 
Section 3.6 concludes with various observations on what we have learnt about 
the nature of the neoclassical project from this analysis of the various challenges 
to, and defences of, mainstream trade theory.  
 
3.2 Constant Employment and Free trade 
 
3.2.1 The unusual case of how posterity has treated Auguste Cournot’s theory 
of international trade 
The partial equilibrium model of demand and supply, whereby demand and 
supply are negatively and positively related to own price, respectively, is 
generally attributed to Alfred Marshall, although it was first expressed in 
mathematical form by Auguste Cournot.16 Both Cournot and Marshall’s student 
Henry Cunynghame applied these tools to show the effects of trade when 
communication is allowed between two previously isolated markets (Cournot, 
1971 [1838] and Cunynghame, 1903). The positive account of the effect of 
market integration on the determination of prices, production and consumption 
in both markets and the flow of trade is the same in Cournot’s mathematical 
exposition and Cunyghame’s diagrammatic one. According to Creedy (1990, p. 
100), Cunynghame produced the now familiar back-to-back diagram without 
any reference to Cournot but virtually paraphrasing the latter’s introduction to 
his model. He added that it is not widely recognised that Cunynghame’s 
treatment stems from Cournot, citing how the major study on the theory of trade 
by Jacob Viner fails to acknowledge that the diagram represented Cournot’s 
model (Creedy, 1990, p. 100). This implicit criticism of Viner is, in this 
instance, unduly harsh, since the purpose of the section to which Creedy refers 
was to introduce the gains from trade as developed by Enrico Barone (1908) 
who also used (without attribution) Cunynghame’s back-to-back diagram. Also, 
in the preceding section, Viner had interrogated and negatively pronounced on 
Cournot’s trade analysis. However, Creedy’s general point is valid; that is to 
                                                
16 According to Creedy (1990, p. 99), Marshall said that he had read Cournot in 1868, while Vaggi and 
Groenewegen (2003, p. 228) confirm Cournot’s influence on Marshall with the information that 
Marshall’s first paper on the theory of value written circa 1870 dealt with price determination simply in 
terms of supply and demand, ignoring utility.  
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question why it is that a model of trade that is to be found in all contemporary 
textbooks and that owes its origin to Cournot is used without attribution or 
(probably in the majority of cases) even awareness of its originator? This is all 
the more striking given his high standing in general with the economics 
profession and the familiarity that contemporary students have with his other 
theories, such as Cournot oligopoly. 
 
One explanation for this lacuna could be the uncomfortable normative 
conclusions that Cournot derived from his model, that stand in contrast to those 
forwarded by neoclassical theory, even as both sides use the same apparatus and 
show the same partial equilibrium effects of trade liberalisation. For, as Irving 
Fisher acknowledged, Cournot considered the extreme position of the free 
traders to be untenable (Fisher, 1898, p. 129). Indeed, in his analysis, he 
purported to show how a protective tariff may, under special circumstances, 
increase national income. This conclusion ran contrary to the views of a 
subsequent generation of neoclassical economists who did theoretical work on 
international trade. So, possibly the professional desire for academic unity when 
it came to core theories might explain why Cournot’s contribution disappeared 
from view. An alternative reason forwarded for the neglect of Cournot’s 
contribution to the theory of international trade is that it was written out of 
history because it was wrong. This was the view of Bertil Ohlin who remarked 
“Cournot’s work on international trade has attracted little attention, which is no 
doubt partly to be explained by the fact that his conclusions are on the whole 
erroneous” (Ohlin, 1935, p. 563).17 However, accusing Cournot of logical errors 
is a disquieting position to adopt, given the high esteem in which he was held by 
a succeeding generation of neoclassical economists, especially for his 
mathematical ability. One way out of the impasse is to accuse him of 
protectionist sentiment that overrode his analytical judgement. This was the 
position adopted by Charles Bastable, for whom the only explanation why 
someone of Cournot’s analytical power could have derived the conclusions that 
he did, had to be due to “bias against the free trade doctrine of Adam Smith and 
                                                
17 This judgement on Cournot is contained in Appendix II of Ohlin’s original edition of Interregional 
and International Trade, where Ohlin discusses some earlier theories of trade. The appendix is not 
contained in the revised 1967 edition of the book.  
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his followers” (Bastable, 1903, p. 175). Fisher, by contrast, laid the blame 
squarely on Cournot’s faulty reasoning, which he attributed to  
“gross carelessness” (Fisher, 1898, p. 129). Consequently, Fisher suggests 
attaching little importance to Cournot’s speculations on the subject (Fisher, 
1898, p. 132).18 
 
What I shall attempt to do in the rest of this section is to analyse Cournot’s 
analysis of international trade and to show that it was internally logically 
consistent. Undoubtedly, he appeared to make some strong assumptions about 
employment dynamics and, to a lesser extent, consumer welfare, but those 
assumptions are no more extreme than those of his neoclassical critics, whose 
professional descendants unheedingly and unknowingly use the apparatus that is 
his technical legacy. In order to do this, a diagrammatic representation of his 
positive analysis will be reproduced and the implicit assumptions underpinning 
his normative conclusions will be contrasted with those of the neoclassical 
school. This analysis draws primarily on chapter 12 of Cournot (1971 [1838]). 
 
What Cournot set out to do was to show how commerce between two markets 
caused the value of national income to vary in both the exporting and importing 
market. He defined equilibrium before and after trade. In country A, the before 
trade price, quantity equilibrium is pa and qa, while in country B, it is pb and qb. 
Implicit in Cournot’s analysis is the notion that the exporting (importing) 
country will be the one with the lower (higher) autarky price. In chapter 10, he 
had already defined equilibrium in both countries before trade (where domestic 
demand equals domestic supply) and after trade (where combined demand 
equals combined supply). Likewise it is taken as obvious that, for export 
(import) activity to occur, the international price would have to be higher  
                                                
18 To bolster his case that Cournot was careless, Fisher, in a footnote (p. 132) points to an error that 
Cournot made when working out the effects on national income of free trade when transport costs exist, 
and the profits from same accrue to agents in the importing country. Fisher is correct in his accusation.  
The effect of transportation profits accruing to agents in the importing country is to reduce the losses to 
the importing country (applying Cournot’s model). However, the conclusion that Cournot reaches that 
such a reduction will turn losses into gains is not logically conclusive, in that it may or may not.  
However, this error by Cournot does not invalidate his general model on the effect of free trade on the 
importing country when transport costs are disregarded.  
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(lower) than the before trade price in the exporting (importing) country. In terms 
of the above diagrammatic representation of his analysis, the free trade price is 
p* where country A’s exports of q*s- q*d equals country B’s imports of q*d- q*s. 
There is no disagreement between Cournot and neoclassical economists on the 
positive representation of the effects of trade in the market for a single good, 
which explains the durability of his tools. 
 
Cournot proceeded to look at the impact of trade on the income of producers 
and consumers. He concluded that producers in the exporting country A would 
enjoy an increase in income equal to p* q*s- paqa, while consumers would suffer 
an income loss equal to (p*- pa) q*d. In other words the aggregate change in 
income for the exporting country would be equivalent to the area B+A+D+E, 
which he concluded was unambiguously higher than it was before trade. By 
contrast for the importing country B, producer income would fall by pb qb- 
p*q*s, while consumers would enjoy an income gain of (pb-p*) qb. The net effect 
would be a fall in aggregate income equivalent to the area d. The neoclassical 
interpretation of Cournot’s diagram is that in the exporting country, producers 
 94 
gain to the extent of C+B+A, while consumers lose to the extent of C+B, 
leaving a net gain to the country of A. For the importing country, producer loss 
is Z while consumer gain is Z+b+c, which is a net gain to the country of b+c. So 
in comparing Cournot’s normative interpretation with that of subsequent 
neoclassical analysis, the exporting country gains more according to him, while 
the importing country loses. By contrast, for the neoclassicals the gains from 
exporting are smaller and the importing country gains too.  
 
One criticism leveled at Cournot was his use of nominal prices to evaluate 
changes in income. Bastable (1903, p. 174) raised this point adding that since 
the value of money may vary between countries, this in itself is enough to 
render his results unsound. Edgeworth (1894c, p. 630) dismissed this criticism 
on the grounds that Cournot’s reasoning was as valid as that of Marshall who 
used nominal prices when discussing consumer rent. In any case, since this 
partial equilibrium diagram is used in neoclassical economics to show the 
normative effects of trade, the appropriateness or otherwise of using money 
prices as a measure of value is extraneous to explaining how an identical 
diagram with identical equilibrium outcomes can yield such different normative 
conclusions. The essential difference lies in the interpretation of consumer 
welfare and the assumptions regarding markets in general, that underpin the 
respective analyses. 
 
Cournot has been accused of inadequately addressing the effect of liberalisation 
on consumers’ income (Viner, 1964 [1937], p. 588 and Gomes, 2003, pp. 93-
94). In fact, Cournot explicitly recognises the income losses to consumers who 
stay in the market but must now pay a higher price in the exporting country and 
the income gains to existing consumers in the importing country. What he does 
not include are the presumed extra consumer income losses (gains) in the 
exporting (importing) country as a result of consumers exiting (entering) that 
particular market. He is explicit as to why he does this, saying that in the 
exporting country, consumers who leave the market will transfer to other 
markets the value of their previous purchases, albeit on goods less to their 
liking. This is a loss that Cournot considers to be “not capable of measurement” 
(Cournot, 1971 [1838], p. 154). Similarly, the advantage to consumers attracted 
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to a market because of lower prices “is incapable of valuation, and can only 
increase the mass of wealth indirectly” (p. 156). This may seem extreme but it is 
no more extreme than the alternative neoclassical interpretation which implicitly 
assumes that consumers who leave the market because of higher prices enjoy no 
consumer surplus with their alternative purchases or that those who enter the 
market had no consumer surplus with income previously spent on other goods. 
While one can acknowledge that by virtue of spending resources on good X as 
opposed to good Y, good X must be presumed to yield greater subjective 
satisfaction, it is misleading to represent the extent of the additional consumer 
gains as the area c for example for the importing country in the above diagram, 
since in reality this would be an upper bound to consumer gain which would 
only occur if no consumer surplus was feasible on alternative purchases.19 
 
The other major fundamental difference between Cournot’s and neoclassical 
normative analyses is the presumed effect of trade on production in a country. 
Cournot is implicitly assuming that resources no longer employed in the import 
competing sector do not find employment elsewhere in the economy. Hence the 
loss of producer income in country B is not just Z (as in neoclassical 
interpretation) but Z+b+d. In contemporary language, we would say that he is 
assuming that the opportunity cost of production is zero. For similar reasons, 
when production increases in the exporting country, the gain in producer 
income equals C+B+A+D+E (not C+B+A as in neoclassical analysis). 
Undoubtedly, it is extreme to assume that resources no longer employed in the 
import competing sector do not find alternative employment elsewhere in the 
economy or that resources now employed in the export sector were idle 
previously, but it is no more extreme than the alternative neoclassical 
interpretation.20 According to neoclassical analysis, the industry supply curve is 
                                                
19 This is essentially a problem that arises from the necessity to use actual as opposed to compensated 
demand curves, since in the former instance the marginal utility of nominal income is not constant but 
instead varies inversely with price.  
20 There is some disagreement on whether Cournot was assuming lack of mobility of resources between 
sectors of the economy (see Viner 1964 [1937], p. 587, footnote 7). My understanding of what Cournot 
wrote was that employment in other sectors does not change because overall demand for their products 
remains unchanged. This would tie in with his claim that trade between two countries must be 
balanced. So, in the case of Country B depicted above, imports of d+e must be matched by an 
equivalent value of exports elsewhere. These exports come from reduced domestic demand for other 
goods to the value of d+e, with output remaining unchanged in other sectors of the economy. Just as 
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the marginal cost of production. This presupposes that the industry is perfectly 
competitive and producers treat prices as given. If markets are perfectly 
competitive, then market prices reflect social opportunity cost, which is the 
value added foregone elsewhere in the economy as a result of employing 
resources in this particular market. Increased import competition results in 
reduced domestic production in the import competing sector, and the 
presumption is that those resources released as a result of the domestic industry 
decline will find employment elsewhere at their social opportunity cost. So, for 
the import-competing country (Country B), the areas b+d are not a loss, since 
that is the value of production that will ensue when the resources let go are re-
employed elsewhere in the economy. Similarly, for the exporting country 
(Country A), the areas D+E do not represent a net gain to the exporting country, 
since these extra resources that are now employed in order to expand production 
in this particular market, required a reduction in output elsewhere in the 
economy. For this to hold, economy-wide employment must be constant and 
resources employed in a sector must be paid their opportunity cost.  
 
So, while it must be acknowledged that Cournot’s implicit assumption about the 
nature of employment appears extreme, as possibly is his explicit failure to give 
weight to the income gain of new consumers attracted to a market by lower 
prices, this admission must be tempered by a similar awareness of how extreme 
are the assumptions that underpin neoclassical trade theory. A more realistic 
position would be to recognise that resources may have alternative uses but that 
there is no guarantee that in their alternative use, they would earn as much as in 
their current occupation, if employed at all. Furthermore, it may be that the 
alternative to current employment is unemployment.21 So, it is sufficient simply 
to assume that resources released from the import competing sector have an 
opportunity cost between zero (Cournot case) and b+d (neoclassical case) and 
that consumers attracted into the market by lower prices have a real income gain 
                                                                                                                                       
national output is deemed to fall by d, so too does national consumption, as consumption in other 
sectors falls by d+e while consumption in the import competing market under consideration rises by e. 
A similar reasoning can be applied to Country A. This would explain why he insisted that the two 
countries “are not placed under symmetrical conditions” (Cournot, 1971 [1838], p. 163).  
21 In the preceding chapter on Social Income, Cournot alludes to the possibility of displaced resources 
finding less well remunerated alternative employment (p. 147) as well as the possibility that resources 
are specific to a sector (p. 148).  
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of between zero (Cournot case) and c (neoclassical case) for the real income 
effects of trade liberalisation to be ambiguous. Arguably, Cournot’s analysis 
and the neoclassical analysis represent two extremes with the gain of b+c being 
an upper bound and the loss of –d a lower bound when it comes to the effect on 
national income of international trade liberalisation.  
 
What the above analysis shows is that disputes in economics need to be resolved 
empirically. It is not simply a matter of analytical rigour. Both Cournot’s and 
the neoclassical analysis of trade are internally consistent. Where they differ is 
in their assumptions as to how the economy generally and markets in particular 
function. Is full employment a reasonable assumption or is the equilibrium rate 
of unemployment the actual existing rate of unemployment? Are markets 
perfectly competitive in the sense that all agents are price takers and do owners 
of productive resources, including labour, get paid their opportunity cost (no 
economic rents)? The validity of their respective conclusions depend on the 
validity of their model assumptions. Tellingly, Cournot developed his analysis 
of market behaviour inductively. His demand and supply analysis corresponded 
to the regularities of market behaviour that he observed. By contrast, 
neoclassical use of Marshall’s partial equilibrium diagram is based on abstract 
deductive logic that gives a utilitarian, marginalist interpretation to consumption 
and production behaviour. To arbitrate between the two positions, it is first 
necessary to be aware that there are indeed two positions. The neglect of the 
substantive aspect of Cournot’s historical legacy (as opposed to his tools of 
analysis) does not reflect well on the discipline of economics and it is neither 
correct nor sufficient to justify this lapse on the grounds that Cournot’s analysis 
was wrong. Furthermore, exposing students to the two alternative conclusions to 
be derived from the same set of analytical tools would not only encourage 
critical debate, it would inevitably raise interesting epistemological issues as to 
how one establishes which theory gives a better representation of the causal 
forces at work in society.  
 
 
 
 
 98 
3.2.2 Schuller and the empirical reality of underutilised resources 
The economist Richard Schuller made an argument for protection on the 
grounds that the existence of idle and underutilized resources is the norm in 
countries: 
 
the productive forces of a State are exploited in very different degrees – or not 
at all … fertile soil, deposits of coal, ore and minerals, and water power – 
constitute the most sharply defined productive factor … Nevertheless, no 
country exploits them to their maximum capacity, but every State has them at 
its disposal for the purposes of expanding the branches of production for 
which they are required (Schuller, 1921 [1905], p. 378).  
 
What is true for natural resources also holds for labour “[it is] untrue to say that 
the active working-force of a country constitutes a fixed quantity which 
determines the expansion of production as a definite value that cannot be 
diminished in consequence of foreign competition” (p. 378). He cites 
“migration” the reality that workers may be “unemployed” or if employed may 
be “fully or partially active according as factories find a larger or smaller outlet 
for their products” (p. 379). Even employed workers have variable productivity 
depending on whether they are “employed in a capacity commensurate with 
their qualifications” (p. 379) and whether the worker “exerts himself or not” (p. 
380). Similarly, Schuller disputes that the quantity of capital in a country is a 
fixed datum and furthermore contends that, even if it were fixed, this does not 
negate varying degrees of production (p. 380-381). All of which leads him to 
conclude that “The possibilities of development of the productive forces of a 
given territory are … very diverse; and foreign competition may lead to a 
retardation of domestic production, hampering the utilization of available but as 
yet unexploited productive forces” (p. 382). Or even more strongly “[the] 
consequences of a transition from a system of protection to one of free trade … 
may … involve a considerable diminution of domestic production” which he 
also felt could be “permanent” (p. 383). So, as noted by Haberler (1936, p. 188), 
one justification for tariffs is to bring about the utilization of such idle means of 
production and lead to an increase in total production in the country. According 
to Gomes (2003, pp. 123-124), Schuller discussed how manufacturing could be 
ruined, even when foreign producers were only slightly more efficient than 
domestic manufacturers. He also mentions Schuller’s partial equilibrium 
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approach and how, given the elasticities of demand and supply at home and 
abroad, only small tariffs were needed to have the desired protective effects.  
 
So, unlike Cournot, Schuller is very explicit as to the underlying reasons why he 
believed that there is not a general principle in favour of free trade, which is the 
existence of unemployed resources. It can only be assumed that this assertion 
was based on his interpretation of the economic reality that he observed, a view 
bolstered by his discussion of elasticities in different sectors of the economy and 
his claim that diminishing returns is less pronounced in manufactures than in 
agriculture, as noted by Bickerdike (1905, pp. 413-414).  
 
Of interest is the reaction of the neoclassical fraternity to his thesis in favour of 
occasional judicious protection. The first notable reaction was from C. F. 
Bickerdike who, while acknowledging that the Schuller case was systematically 
presented and carefully argued, classed him “with the mystics” when it comes to 
the balance of trade and concluded his review with the assertion that it would 
not be sufficient to convince any free traders, mainly because they do not admit 
that “the import of competitive goods can, except temporarily, cause greater 
losses to producers than gain to consumers” (Bickerdike, 1905, p. 415).22 The 
crux of Bickerdike’s counterargument is to insist that no free trader will admit 
that unemployment can persist as other than a short-run phenomenon. His 
argument is as follows:  
 
If resources in a sector cannot find alternative employment then wages and 
profits will fall sufficiently to allow the sector to compete with the foreign 
competition. In this instance, the loss to domestic producers is a gain to 
domestic consumers, so there is no loss. Alternatively, resources may shift to 
other sectors if the return there is greater than in the existing sector that is 
subject to increased import competition. In this instance, the economy as a 
whole gains (p. 414).  
  
The claim that unutilised means of production is no argument for tariffs was 
reiterated thirty years later by Haberler. The latter’s analysis is similar to 
                                                
22 Regarding the balance of trade, what Schuller challenged was the “mechanical conception of 
commercial intercourse” (Schuller, 1921 [1905], p. 383). He was at pains to stress that trade balance 
could be achieved in different ways, so that while an increase in imports must necessitate an increase in 
exports, this did not imply anything about production (which could fall or stay the same) since the 
same effect could be achieved by reduced domestic consumption (p. 384). This is similar to Cournot’s 
argument although, it is more clearly expressed by Schuller.  
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Bickerdike’s although he defends the case with the use of numerical analysis. 
Haberler is at pains to emphasise that resource immobility and specific means of 
production are not an argument for protection. In his analysis, if a factor of 
production is specific to a sector, then its earnings can be classified as economic 
rents. As is the way with rents, if increased competition were to cause the value 
of the product to fall, this would result in a fall in the value of the rent accruing 
to the specific factor. On the other hand, if any factors are not completely 
sector-specific but can be used elsewhere, then their value will be written down 
to what they are worth elsewhere (see Haberler, 1936, pp. 183-186). Haberler 
acknowledges that his analysis rests upon the assumption “that competition 
ensures flexible prices and, in particular, that the prices of specific factors will 
fall, if necessary to zero before their owners cease to use them” (p. 187). He 
does concede that the assumption of price flexibility may not apply to labour but 
considers this to be of less consequence since labour is the least specific factor 
of production. To the extent that unemployment of labour does exist, Haberler 
accepts that it is a loss but views such unemployment as being due to a friction 
and sees it as being at worst transitional (p. 187).  
 
What Bickerdike and Haberler have in common is a denial of the possibility that 
unemployment can be anything other than a short-run phenomenon. Both accept 
that it can occur in that workers’ “obstinacy may compel employers to shut 
down works occasionally” (Bickerdike, 1905, p. 415) or “modern developments 
have tended, and still do tend, to lessen the mobility and adaptability of labour” 
such developments being “the strength of organised labour … and State 
intervention in labour questions, especially in connection with unemployment 
insurance and unemployment relief” (Haberler, 1936, p. 194). So the message is 
clear, unemployment if it persists would have to be attributable to irrationality 
on the part of workers or institutional interventions in the working of the 
market. As for Schuller’s assertion that tariffs can increase total production in 
an economy, given that unutilised means of production are an empirical fact, 
Haberler claims that this argument, as far as other material means of production 
are concerned “rests upon a fallacy” (p. 188). Here he distinguishes maximum 
utilisation from optimal utilisation. If material resources are not being utilised, it 
must be because it does not make economic sense to utilise them. Omniscient 
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rationality on the part of those controlling resources means what we observe 
must be for the (economic) best. Alternatively, if miscalculation or error occurs 
in investment, then it is best treated as a sunk cost or as Habereler says “in 
economic affairs bygones are bygones” (p. 189).  
 
Subsequent historians of economic thought appear to agree that Schuller’s 
argument did not stand up to scrutiny. For Gomes “A certain amount of 
unutilised resources is inevitable in a dynamic growing economy. Market 
adjustments will leave some specific factors temporarily idle; and while such 
transitional adjustments may result in private losses to the owners of specific 
factors, the community as a whole gains from the more efficient deployment of 
available resources” (Gomes, 2003, p. 125). Irwin deals with Schuller’s 
argument in a footnote claiming that that “his argument lacked satisfactory 
theoretical underpinnings” (Irwin, 1996, p. 190). While Irwin does not specify 
what he would consider to be a satisfactory theoretical basis for Schuller’s 
inconvenient empirical observation, one can hazard a guess that it would 
probably include Haberler type claims, that attribute unemployment to 
institutionally imposed (and therefore potentially reversible) price rigidities.  
 
As already mentioned, unemployed resources are implicit in Cournot’s analysis, 
possibly indicating that he felt no need to defend this view of markets. Schuller, 
by contrast, is explicit that the empirical reality of unutilised and underutilised 
resources represents a case for protection in some instances. Yet the latter’s 
appeal to empirical reality did not constitute a sufficient case in the minds of 
those neoclassical economists who deigned to respond to the challenge. What is 
striking is their invocation of other unverifiable concepts to undermine the case. 
Unemployment cannot exist in the long run because it would be irrational. So, 
what one perceives, must be a short-run phenomenon, “a milestone upon the 
road of economic progress” (Haberler, 1936, p. 188). Or if the reality is 
accepted, it must be optimal, again because of the unverifiable assumption that 
decision makers are rational and the implicit assumption that micro rationality 
cannot result in macro irrationality. This is just another example of one of the 
immunising strategies that the neoclassical orthodoxy deploys in the face of 
theoretical challenges. Deny apparent reality or claim that it is something 
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different to what it appears and support the assertion by invoking unverified and 
fundamentally metaphysical concepts.23 
 
3.2.3  Keynes and the macroeconomic reality of inefficient economic 
equilibrium 
“If there is one thing protection can not do, it is cure Unemployment … But the 
claim to cure Unemployment involves the Protectionist fallacy in its grossest 
and crudest form” (Keynes, 1923, cited in Keynes, 1997 [1936]). Yet by the 
1930s, Keynes was making a case for protection on employment grounds saying 
that the problem with the free trade argument was that it assumed “if you throw 
men out of work in one direction you re-employ them in another. As soon as 
that link in the chain is broken the whole of the free trade argument breaks 
down.” (Keynes, 2013 [1981] p. 117).  
 
Keynes’s views on international trade theory and policy have been subject to 
varying retrospective interpretations. For some, Keynes was and remained at 
heart a free trader and his espousal of protectionism for Britian in the 1930s was 
a practical solution given the constraints of the Gold Standard.  This was the 
view of Roy Harrod who declared that “If the Gold Standard had broken down 
early in 1930, I have no doubt that Keynes would have remained a Free Trader” 
(Harrod, 1951, p. 431). By contrast, for Joan Robinson, Keynes’s views 
underwent a transformation as evidenced by his defence of mercantilism in the 
General Theory. According to her, Keynes had been a dogmatic free trader in 
his youth but with his usual lack of patriotism for his own ideas he chose 
himself in the General Theory as the exponent of the doctrine that he wanted to 
attack (Robinson, 1962, p. 86).  
 
The context for Keynes’s public disavowal of his previously free trade position 
was the economic depression in the UK in the 1930s. In his testimony to the 
                                                
23 Viner also interrogated Schuller’s thesis but from a different angle. He placed emphasis on Schuller’s 
assertion of differences in the cost of production among producers in an industry. According to Viner, 
under free competition, marginal costs should be equal across producers, in both the short and long run. 
He also asserts that it is marginal cost and not average cost that regulates value. For that reason, he 
dismisses Schuller’s case as being without force. Here Viner invokes two other unverified concepts: (i) 
that markets are competitive and; (ii) that the volume of production in a firm is determined by marginal 
cost considerations.  
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Macmillan Committee on Finance and Industry, set up to offer advice to the 
British Government at the onset of the Depression, Keynes proposed a ten 
percent uniform tariff on all manufactured imports and an export subsidy 
(Gomes, 2003, p. 283). This was in February 1930. Later that year, the UK 
Prime Minister Ramsey McDonald established a Committee of Economists to 
review the economic conditions in Britain and indicate possible policies for 
recovery. Keynes chaired the committee. As part of his contribution to the 
discussion, Keynes denied that up to 1929, real wages had grown faster than 
output per capita  and saw unemployment as being a consequence of the 
economic slump, the high exchange rate and the stance of monetary policy (p. 
282). In September 1930, Keynes raised the issue of tariffs as a potential 
solution to the economic crisis, claiming that the gains from specialisation and 
free trade were not as great as they had been in the nineteenth century for 
manufacturing countries as well as citing the increased employment argument 
for protection (p. 284). The majority of economists on the committee backed the 
proposal for protection with Lionel Robbins being a notable exception. The 
disagreement among economists about the desirability of protection went public 
when Keynes, in a series of articles to the New Statesmen and Nation, espoused 
protection (p, 286). The main critics of Keynes’s stance came from economists 
at the London School of Economics (LSE), who disagreed with the assertion 
that protection could add to employment. They also claimed that any restriction 
on imports would lead to an equivalent reduction in exports (Irwin, 1996, pp. 
196-197). In September 1931, Britain left the gold standard and, in a letter to 
The Times shortly afterwards, Keynes dropped his call for a tariff, instead 
suggesting other measures to stimulate economic recovery (pp. 197-198).  
 
The subsequent debate on Keynes’s utterances and writings on international 
trade deals with three related issues. The first is whether the later Keynes 
returned to the free trade fold or not. The second is whether the General Theory 
supports or undermines the case for free trade. And the third is whether trade 
intervention is really only a second best policy.  
 
For Donald Winch, Keynes’s apostasy in the early 1930s was due to the 
pressures of the immediate situation (Winch, 1969, p. 151). Similarly, Barry 
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Eichengreen claimed that protection remained for Keynes a second best policy 
“one that the authorities might be forced to avail of if other constraints 
prevented the adoption of first best measures” (Eichengreen, 1984, p. 364). Yet, 
even after Britain left the gold standard, Keynes endorsed protectionism for 
certain industries: motorcars, for economies of scale reasons; iron and steel, for 
equity reasons and; agriculture, for public good reasons (see Eichengreen, 1984, 
p. 371). Also, in 1933 Keynes wrote an article entitled National Self-Sufficiency, 
where he said “Ideas, knowledge, art, hospitality, travel – these are things which 
should be of their nature international. But let goods be homespun whenever it 
is reasonable and conveniently possible; and, above all, let finance be primarily 
national.” (Keynes, 1933, p. 758). While Eichengreen acknowledges these 
lapses from free trade orthodoxy, he attributes such protectionist sentiments to 
Keynes’s infatuation with “central control of the economy” a position that he 
claims “is difficult to reconcile with his prior or subsequent views” 
(Eichengreen, 1984, p. 371). Indeed Eichengreen claims that in the years of the 
General Theory and after, Keynes focused increasingly on “demand 
management to maintain full employment rather than on planning to influence 
inefficient resource allocation” (p. 372). Gomes is also of the opinion that the 
debate between Keynes and his adversaries in the early 1930s was not about 
fundamental differences and that Keynes’s position was essentially pragmatic. 
Nevertheless, he does maintain that, subsequently, Keynes never fully regained 
his faith in free trade (Gomes, 2003, pp. 290-291). Irwin goes further in alleging 
that Keynes’s views on trade protection  hardened over time and that, while 
Keynes of the early 1930 clearly appreciated the gains from trade (despite his 
occasional remarks deprecating such gains), Keynes of the 1940s was much less 
of a friend to free trade (Irwin, 1996, p. 200). For example, Irwin mentions how 
the later Keynes favoured protection over currency devaluation as a way of 
addressing the problem of insufficient demand, since devaluation tended to 
worsen a country’s terms of trade and could even worsen the trade balance 
under certain circumstances, disadvantages not shared by tariffs. (p. 201).  
 
Chapter 23 of Keynes’s General Theory is a defence of mercantilism against its 
subsequent dismissal by classical economists. For him, the substance of the 
mercantilist case was the idea that there was no self-adjusting tendency that 
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ensured that resources in the economy were fully and optimally employed. 
While he believed that the mercantilists perceived the problem of inadequate 
demand without being able to solve it, his charge against the classical 
economists was that they ignored the problem by “introducing into their 
premises conditions which assumed its non-existence” (Keynes, 1997 [1936], p. 
350). For comparative advantage and the gains from trade to work, full 
employment must be taken for granted. He underlined that economists never 
made any concession to protection on that score; that is to say, that it might 
increase employment. Yet, according to Irwin, Keynes in this chapter was really 
arguing against the theoretical foundations of laissez-faire as opposed to making 
a case for the systematic restriction of trade. He talks of how Keynes mentioned 
the much cited practical disadvantages of protection, from administrative 
incompetence to such measures being a zero sum game internationally (Irwin, 
1996, p. 199). Irwin’s position is contestable since Keynes’s case against the 
classical economists and their espousal of free trade derived from his jaundiced 
view of the operation of free markets and the inadequacy of the laissez-faire 
doctrine. For the classical economists, with their belief in the self-regulating 
nature of markets, preoccupation with the balance of payments was a waste of 
time, since interest rates and the level of investment would always settle at their 
optimum level (Keynes, 1997 [1936], p. 339). These were errors of which the 
mercantilists were not guilty, knowing that excessive liquidity preference and 
high rates of interest had a negative effect on economic activity and that a 
favourable balance of payments was one solution, since it encouraged economic 
activity directly (in terms of demand for products) and indirectly through its 
impact on interest rates. According to Keynes “the methods of the early 
pioneers of economic thinking in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries may 
have attained to fragments of practical wisdom which the unrealistic 
abstractions of Ricardo first forgot and then obliterated” (p. 340). Where Irwin’s 
assertion has some force (when denying the link between the challenge to 
laissez-faire and protectionism) is the recognition that achieving a favourable 
balance of payments can be complex. But, as Keynes pointed out, mercantilists 
were well aware of this, which is why they were not naïve protectionists. 
Moreover, mercantilists were also cogniscent of the practical limitations of their 
balance of trade fixation such as its zero sum nature or, worse, negative 
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senseless international competition if carried too far. Keynes highlighted all of 
these dangers by way of showing the sophistication of the mercantilist case and 
even added other practical drawbacks such as the danger of rent seeking. 
Furthermore, he conceded that for mid-nineteenth century Britain, complete 
freedom of trade was probably the policy most conducive to a favourable 
balance of trade. However, all these caveats notwithstanding, he accused 
orthodox economists (his younger self included) of faulty logic insufficiently 
tempered by commonsense (p. 349).  Unemployed resources may exist because 
of insufficient demand. The latter arises partly because of the peculiarity of 
money as a store of wealth whereby, according to his macro theory, the rate of 
interest is really a monetary phenomenon, which is why savings can exceed 
investment. Also, he held that capital is brought into existence more in response 
to demand than by the propensity to save. All of which lent theoretical support 
to policy intervention if it were to lead to increased aggregate demand. 
Protection is one such potential policy tool, which is why he advocated its use in 
the early 1930s when Britain experienced high levels of unemployment due to 
what he perceived to be inadequate demand. This was the view of his followers 
such as Joan Robinson for whom, “As soon as the assumption of full 
employment is removed, the classical model for the analysis of trade is reduced 
to a wreckage” (Robinson, 1946-47, p. 112).24 
 
Another line of attack against the unemployment case for protection is to allege 
that trade interference is really a second (or third) best policy. Hicks expressed 
this view when he conceded that while protection with full employment might 
be preferable to free trade with unemployment, the real issue is whether “full 
employment with free trade … really is out of reach” (Hicks, 1959, p. 53). This 
view tailors nicely with free traders such as Haberler, for whom persistent 
unemployment had to be a consequence of insufficient wage flexibility in a 
downward direction. As will be shown in the next chapter, rigid wages were the 
                                                
24 None of the aforementioned is incompatible with Keynes’s support for a rules based system of 
multilateral trade liberalisation during the negotiations in Bretton Woods, which led to a new post-war 
international monetary architecture that included pegged exchange rates and capital controls. All 
should be seen as a reaction to the economic chaos of the 1930s, where the rigidity of the gold standard 
was replaced with competitive currency devaluations and where the breakdown in international trade 
failed to arrest unemployment and economic depression. The overarching principle guiding Keynes’s 
position was “Never again!” – never again anything like the 1930s.  
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first kind of market imperfection that was permitted into the general equilibrium 
model of trade. Arguably, its acceptance by orthodox economists may have 
been because it did not really present much of a challenge to the free trade is 
best school of thought, since they had ready-made solutions to the 
unemployment consequences of freer trade, arguing that the issue was not free 
trade per se but the factor market imperfection that was exacerbated by free 
trade. An interesting angle on the implications of Keynes’s macro theory for 
free trade is that forwarded by the self-styled Keynesian and passionate endorser 
of free trade, Paul Krugman. When defending the Ricardian model of 
comparative advantage he acknowledged that it was based on a number of 
implicit assumptions one of which was constant employment. However for him, 
“Constant employment is a reasonable approximation” either because 
“international trade is a long run issue and in the long run the economy has a 
natural self-correcting tendency to return to full employment” or because “it 
makes sense to think of the Federal Reserve and its counterparts acting in the 
background to hold employment constant” (Krugman, 1998a, p. 30). 
Effectively, what Krugman is arguing is that an activist macro policy renders 
redundant (or second or third best) the employment argument for trade 
intervention. Rather incongruously, Irwin claimed that it was the subsequent 
undermining of Keynesian macroeconomics by Monetarism and New Classical 
theories (that dispute the efficacy of an activist macro policy in determining the 
level of economic activity in both the short and long run) that limited the 
Keynesian case for protection. So the theoretical case for free trade against the 
challenge that unemployment poses is, on the one hand the efficacy of macro 
policy, and on the other, the inefficacy of the self same policy. What kind of 
truth is established by this reductio ad absurdum is hard to say.  
 
What is interesting to note though is that long before the backlash happened 
against Keynesian macroeconomics, Keynes’s challenge to the free market and 
the policy (or non policy) of laissez-faire appeared to have no impact on the 
development of trade theory. This is evident from the published work in 
mainstream economic journals and from textbooks in international economics. 
In the 25 years of relatively unchallenged Keynesian macroeconomic 
supremacy (from the late 1940s to the early 1970s), the dominant model of trade 
 108 
was based on a perfectly competitive general equilibrium view of the world, 
where all resources were assumed to be fully and efficiently employed. Maybe, 
this was possible precisely because Keynes’s theories were safely corralled into 
the new sub-discipline of macroeconomics and the frontiers between 
developments in the different sub-disciplines proved relatively impermeable, 
thus avoiding cross infection with heretical ideas. Or, possibly the Krugman 
position (that activist macro policy is sufficient to ensure constant employment) 
allowed trade theory to evolve along the lines dictated by a moneyless economy, 
where all resource allocation decisions are determined solely by relative prices 
and protection merely shifts resources from one sector to another. But, even 
accepting the latter argument, one must still question why the employment basis 
for trade interference never gets mentioned (even as a second best policy), 
especially since it so accords with the commonsense view. One is tempted to 
agree in the affirmative with Keynes’s question (when wondering at the 
virulence of his detractors over his public stance on tariffs in 1931) when he 
asked “Is it that economics is a queer subject or in a queer state” (Keynes, 2013 
[1981], p 505). For Joan Robinson, the answer to the question was ideological. 
Free trade was an ideology that had long outlived its usefulness for Britain at 
the time Keynes turned apostate, but its grip on men’s minds showed how little 
logic an ideology needs (Robinson, 1962, p. 88). This, however, begs the 
question of whose interests were being served by the resistance of the 
neoclassical profession to the seemingly plausible assertion that trade protection 
could result in increased employment, especially in an environment where 
unemployed resources formed part of the apparent empirical reality.  
 
3.3 The Quality of Work and Nature of Production 
 
3.3.1 Graham’s theoretical challenge 
In 1923, Frank Graham resurrected the case of variable returns to scale in 
production in order to show that “the principle of comparative advantage is no 
infallible criterion of the best commercial policy, even from a purely economic 
point of view” (Graham, 1923, p. 200). In common with many critics of the 
principle, part of his motivation was to explain the dissonance between 
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theoretical best practice and the actual practice of commercial policy.25 For 
Graham, it was the preference for manufactures that was the secret of 
protection, and he wanted to explain the basis for this preference for 
manufactures (p. 201). He held that it was because most saw that manufactures 
(unlike agriculture) made for economic prosperity. That economists failed to 
acknowledge what he believed to be an empirically informed view, he attributed 
to their reliance on deductive logic (pp. 201-202). His theoretical counter-attack 
was not novel, since it had already been forwarded by Nicholson (1903, pp. 
307-09), even though he made no reference to the latter. He used a variety of 
hypothetical numerical examples to represent what would happen if a country 
specialised according to its comparative advantage in a situation where 
manufactures was characterised by increasing returns to scale and hence 
decreasing costs while agriculture was characterised by decreasing returns to 
scale or increasing costs. The country with a comparative advantage in 
agriculture would lose, as the reallocation of its resources away from 
manufactures to agriculture would result in a lowering of the average 
productivity of its resources at a national level. He also dismissed the notion of 
compensating gains for the agricultural country through improved terms of trade 
arguing presciently that “world demand for goods produced at decreasing costs 
is growing more rapidly than that for goods produced at increasing costs” 
(Graham, 1923, pp. 213-214). While he acknowledged that specialisation 
according to comparative advantage (even in his hypothetical examples) 
resulted in the efficient global use of resources, he dismissed this as a sufficient 
argument for free trade, as it did not make sense to him for a country’s policy 
makers to act against their own national economic self-interest. In short, he 
claimed that he had provided an economic justification for permanent protection 
for countries whose comparative disadvantage was in manufacturing. He saw 
himself going much further than those who argued for temporary educative 
                                                
25 Economists have long been challenged by the need to explain why their policy advice appears to be 
so routinely ignored by policy makers. In the last thirty years, the commonest defence has been to 
invoke public choice arguments that essentially assert that policy makers interested in re-election will 
pander to sectional interests that may not be in the national interest (see Baldwin, 1989, for a synthesis 
of this literature). Another defence has been to lay the emphasis on policy makers’ lack of economic 
understanding, since as Krugman argued comparative advantage is “truly, madly deeply difficult” 
(Krugman, 1998a, p. 35), the implication being that it is a concept not readily accessible to the 
untrained mind.   
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tariffs for some countries at a certain stage of their economic development (such 
as Alexander Hamilton and Friedrich List), since for him their arguments 
conceded too much, in that they predicated the success of such a policy on the 
protected sectors eventually being able to compete successfully without such 
protection. By contrast, Graham aimed to show that a country could gain from 
protection even if it never developed to the point where it could survive without 
it (pp. 202-203). While he acknowledged that his thesis was primarily 
theoretical, he nevertheless cited examples to give his case more empirical 
respectability. That the economic success of France, Germany and the USA 
coincided with them becoming industrialised and pursuing protectionist  
policies was, he felt, proof that protection was a factor whose contribution could 
not be discounted (p. 225).  
 
The principal critics of Graham’s argument for protection were Frank Knight, 
Haberler and Viner. For Knight, the existence of economies of scale at the firm 
level meant that either the productive unit would grow until such economies no 
longer existed or else monopoly would ensue (Knight, 1924, p. 597). In neither 
instance did he accept that increased competition through international trade 
could lead to a lowering of national production. This point was reiterated by 
Haberler and Viner. For Haberler, the monopolist is in a position to survey the 
situation as a whole and to decide what output is most profitable under changed 
conditions. Therefore, the monopolist will never blindly make a decision that is 
not profit maximising (Haberler, 1936, p. 205). Viner claimed that it was 
Graham’s use of average costs and his failure to deal with the problem in terms 
of marginal costs and marginal returns that led him into error, saying that if he 
had dealt with the problem in marginal terms, he could not have obtained results 
unfavourable to free trade (Viner, 1964 [1937], p. 480).  
 
All conceded that if economies of scale were external to the firm but internal to 
the national industry, then Graham’s case was valid, even as they proceeded to 
dismiss external economies as primarily a theoretical curiosity with little 
empirical weight. Graham’s response to Knight’s argument about internal and 
external economies of scale was to claim that such a nomenclature was not 
central to the issue, since what was at stake was the actual existence of such 
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economies associated with increased volume of output in manufactures. As a 
point of logic, Graham’s response was inadequate (even though his economic 
intuition was well-grounded) and, the examples that he cited in his reply to 
Knight were of external economies, even if he did not designate them as such 
(Graham, 1925, p. 325). The external economies argument was crucial, since it 
was necessary in order to show logically how it was that individual producers 
could make rational decisions that had collectively irrational consequences (to 
the extent that their decisions lowered the productivity of resources). Knight 
proceeded to argue the case for external diseconomies of scale being more 
likely than external economies of scale, as firms competed for scarce resources 
(Knight, 1925, p. 332). Since he “never succeeded in picturing them in my 
mind, or finding any convincing reason to believe they exist” (p. 332), he felt 
that this placed the “onus probandi on anyone who advocates the contrary 
principle” (pp. 332-333). He attempted to diminish further the weight of 
Graham’s argument for protection by claiming that, even when external 
economies of scale existed in manufacturing, the country importing the latter 
would enjoy a terms of trade gain. Again his logic is impeccable, if external 
economies of scale exist, competitive conditions are not undermined, so the 
exporter of manufactures will pass on the cost benefits of expansion in the form 
of lower prices to the importer. Haberler was similarly sceptical of the empirical 
relevance of external economies of scale and the practicality of a protectionist 
policy based on their presumed existence, since he felt that they were too vague 
and difficult to measure. He also qualified the plausibility of the theoretical 
case, citing how economies external to one industry could be internal to another, 
therefore creating the incentive for vertical integration and the exploitation of 
such economies (Haberler, 1936, p. 208). In the same way, Viner gave examples 
of external economies that were either not genuine or irrelevant. To the extent 
that an industry’s economies were pecuniary in nature, that is, they were derived 
by an industry at the expense of other domestic producers in other sectors, then 
their exploitation in no may benefited a country. Or, if they did exist, but were a 
function of the size of the global industry (as opposed to the national industry), 
then there could be no loss to a country if its increasing returns sector shrunk in 
size, since the productivity of its resources would be enhanced by the expansion 
of the foreign industry (Viner, 1964 [1937], p. 480).  
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Neither Graham, nor his challengers relied on direct empirical evidence when 
making their contrasting contentions. All operated in the realm of deductive 
logic when describing the different types of economies of scale and how they 
might operate. As far as the evolution of trade theory is concerned, while the 
issue of external economies did raise its head periodically, and no one was able 
to show any logical flaws in the intrinsic argument, it in  no way undermined 
the faith in comparative advantage.  Irwin concedes that the issue was never 
satisfactorily resolved in the aftermath of Graham’s article and that the study of 
trade-related aspects of external economies nearly evaporated until the early 
1980s, despite the logical veracity of the case (Irwin, 1996, p. 151). Yet, he 
effectively defends the status quo claiming the need for more evidence on the 
existence of such economies or the description of more plausible market 
structures that could explain how they could arise. Similarly Gomes, while 
granting the intrinsic merit of the Graham argument, cites the position adopted 
in the recent literature against policy activism, as evidence of its empirical 
irrelevance (Gomes, 2003, p. 132).  
 
As already mentioned when talking about Cournot’s trade theory, what the 
debate about Graham’s theoretical speculations reveals is the need for empirical 
evidence to arbitrate between competing theoretical models. Furthermore, it is 
not adequate to argue, as Graham’s critics have done, that the onus was on him 
to show that external economies of scale exist. There is an equal onus on them 
to show that they do not. In any case, it is disingenuous of his critics to call for 
empirical evidence when the orthodoxy is being challenged, given how 
extraneous empirical evidence has been to the evolution of the self same 
orthodoxy. As we shall see in the next section, a not dissimilar argument to 
Graham’s (that productivity is variable across sectors of the economy and policy 
should be oriented towards encouraging the expansion of the more productive 
sectors) was advanced just a few years after the debate between Graham and his 
critics, but it took as its starting point the empirical evidence of heterogeneous 
sectoral productivity of resources. So it was not simply an abstract theoretical 
exercise. What the reaction to this exercise revealed is that empirical evidence 
was not sufficient to shake an orthodox view, especially in a discipline like 
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economics that bases its theory on constructs that are not observable and 
therefore open to challenge. If there is a seeming conflict between empirical 
reality and theory, then it must be either more apparent than real or some 
extraneous non-economic reason must be found to explain the anomaly.  
 
3.3.2  Manoilescu’s empirical observations 
In 1929 the Romanian economist and Minister for Trade and Industry published 
a book making a theoretical and what he believed to be scientific case for (if 
necessary, permanent) protection of selected industries. This book was 
published in English for the first time in 1931 and was entitled The Theory of 
Protection and International Trade (Manoilescu, 1931). Manoilescu’s objective 
was to overturn Ricardo’s theory of comparative advantage and to show that, 
especially for backward agricultural countries, economic development 
necessitated the selective protection of certain industrial sectors. Manoilescu’s 
motivation was, among other things, to provide theoretical respectability for 
what was widespread practice, while at the same time, providing scientific 
principles for when and where protection should be applied. “It appears to us to 
be the greatest paradox of science and social life that so important a 
phenomenon as protection could be developed without the approval of science, 
indeed in spite of science and contrary to science.”(Manoilescu, 1931, p. 6). He 
did not accept that critics of free trade such as Friedrich List had done a 
sufficient job claiming that they weakened protection as a general principle, “He 
presents protection as the exception and grants the character of general validity 
to the free trade system” (p. xxii). Another gripe was that, not only did List 
advocate temporary protection for some industries in some countries passing 
through certain phases of economic and social evolution but the presumed 
benefits of such protection were partially social and definitely in the future. By 
contrast, Manoilescu claimed that he was interested only in the direct, present 
advantages of the policy of protection (ignoring indirect, social and future 
benefits). His unit of analysis was the country and, contrary to the orthodox 
views of free trade economists, he challenged the notion that what made sense 
for the individual made sense for the nation.  
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The foundation on which Manoilescu built his theory was the empirical 
regularity which he amply documented, that everywhere, the productivity of 
manufacturing exceeds the productivity of agriculture. He presented data on the 
average productivity per worker in different sectors of the economy in countries 
as diverse as the USA, Holland, Romania and Bulgaria. While he acknowledged 
differences in hours of work and the quality of labour, he asserted that what 
made the greatest difference between the different kinds of production “is the 
organization of the combination of material forces (physical or chemical), be it 
in agriculture or industry” (p. 28). Another contention of his was that the 
productivity of industry was more consistent internationally than the 
productivity of agriculture. In partial support of this conclusion, he cited the 
value of production per head of producer in agriculture and in industry in 
Russia, England and the USA. His data showed that while the US was 20 times 
as productive as Russia in agriculture, it was 10 times as productive in industry. 
The comparable ratios between England and Russia were 12 and 1.75, 
respectively (p. 43). He also cited data showing how the ratio of industrial 
productivity to agricultural productivity in the US fell in the period between 
1880 and 1920 (p. 44). From this he concluded that it was agricultural or 
backward countries (he saw the two as being synonymous) that could derive the 
greatest benefit from industrialisation. “It follows that for agricultural and 
backward countries, there is a greater advantage to pass from agricultural to 
industrial production” (pp. 43-44 ).  
 
In his theoretical analysis Manoilescu held that price was the immediate proxy 
for value (p. 63). He contrasted the complexity of decision making by policy 
makers in the national interest with those of self-interested individuals. He said 
that while it was natural for an individual whose income was given to want to 
buy as cheap as possible in an exchange situation, for a country the advantage of 
an operation depended on “how cheaply goods are bought” but also, and 
especially on “how buying capacity may be created” (p. 65). The key distinction 
that he was making was assuming that an individual’s revenue at a given point 
in time tended to be fixed but that this was not the case as far as national 
revenue was concerned. “So the buying problem of a country depends not only 
on what is bought but also on what is produced, in order that it may purchase” 
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(p. 66). He also made a distinction between what he called “national gain” and 
“individual profit” claiming the profit of the capitalist is “a superficial thing” (p. 
20). This distinction is important to justify protection, since under a free trade 
system, if profit does not exist, production will cease, yet there may be national 
profit from the activity (p. 18).  
 
In his theoretical exposition, Manoilescu attempted to show that a country 
whose comparative advantage was in lower productivity agriculture could lose 
from such specialisation and exchange, if the intrinsic superiority of industry (in 
terms of labour productivity) over agriculture exceeded the country’s 
comparative (international) superiority with respect to agriculture (p. 106). 
Effectively, what he was arguing was that deploying labour in this way would 
mean that the country would end up being able to consume less industrial goods 
(through international trade) than if it had made them itself. Accordingly, his 
scientific basis for protection was the selection of those sectors whose intrinsic 
productivity exceeded the average productivity of labour in a country. In effect, 
given the empirical evidence, he claimed that this meant industrialisation was 
necessary for agricultural countries to increase their buying power.  
 
He acknowledged that national strategies to increase productivity of resources 
could be a zero sum game on the international stage, the reason being that the 
most productive sectors are few and so many countries pursuing such a strategy 
could, possibly, lead to international antagonisms. Unsurprisingly therefore, he 
rejected out of hand the natural harmony view of the free traders. Pertinently, he 
pointed out that if free trade conclusions were true, then the problems of 
international co-operation would not exist. For him, “Economic cooperation of 
the world of free trade is an empty word covering exploitation” (p. 213).  That 
did not mean that he was predicting that a world where countries attended to 
their own national interests would be inherently dystopian, simply that it was 
better to be honest and to acknowledge that in such a world, co-operation would 
be possible but difficult. His fundamental thesis was that if countries wish to get 
richer (and increase their buying power), they should apply their resources to 
the most productive sectors and not be deterred by their lower productivity in 
those sectors relative to the international competition (p. 140). As he saw it 
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(though it is not totally supported by his analysis), the focus of policy makers 
should be on the features of their own economy (my emphasis), such as the 
relative productivity of different sectors, not on the productivity of sectors 
relative to those sectors abroad.26 On a more optimistic note, he claimed that 
selective protection of the sort that he advocated for agricultural countries could 
even assist international trade, to the extent that it enriched previously poor 
countries and thus added to their purchasing power (p. 209).  He also made a 
perceptive point (in the light of recent empirical work on the relationship 
between trade and economic prosperity) that foreign trade was the effect not the 
cause of national prosperity (p. 209). Besides, he was not advocating 
generalised protection, since for him such decisions on protection versus free 
trade needed to be decided case by case, on the basis of things that are 
“measurable” (p. 137). 
 
Manoilescu’s challenge to the orthodox free trade doctrine had a big impact and 
almost immediately provoked a response from Ohlin (1931), Viner (1932, 1964 
[1937]) and Haberler (1936). Of the three, Ohlin’s response is the most 
challenging and measured, Viner’s the most vituperative and Haberler’s the 
most accessible and comprehensive. Interestingly though, they all concede the 
validity of Manoilescu’s thesis, while trying to miminise its practical impact and 
empirical relevance.  Ohlin (on the basis of his reinterpretation of Manoilescu’s 
work) concluded that there was a case for temporary protection of high wage 
industries, where the latter was due to the existence of non-competing groups of 
labour (Ohlin, 1931, p. 45). Viner made a similar point, claiming that when a 
country’s comparative advantage is not revealed in terms of price advantage, 
such that under free trade the country specialises in the wrong sector, then 
protection “will operate to reduce the diversion” (Viner, 1932, p. 125). But, in 
typical Viner fashion, he calls it “one grain of truth, which is embedded – but 
not displayed – in the author’s exhaustive argument. But it is a very tiny grain 
indeed” (p.125). Haberler, like the aforementioned authors, addresses the issue 
in terms of inter-sectoral wage differentials and the varying reasons why these 
                                                
26 Though this is what Manoilescu said, it is not totally accurate insofar as his theoretical analysis 
depends on the relationship between the relative productivity of sectors at home and the relative 
productivity of domestic sectors compared to their international counterparts.  
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can exist, justifying his detailed treatment on the basis of the widespread interest 
that Manoilescu’s protectionist theory had aroused. (Haberler, 1936, p. 198). He 
cites Viner’s grudging grain of truth but concurs with the latter that 
“Manoilescu does not reveal it but conceals it, for he is unaware of the 
numerous qualifications which limit his doctrine” (p. 198).  
 
What Ohlin (1931) did was to reinterpret Manoilescu’s analysis in terms of 
differential payments to factors of production, specifically different wages in 
different sectors. His point was that if resources are more productive in industry 
than in agriculture, then these resources must get paid more. He considers the 
most useful indicator of productivity to be “height of wages” as “the rate of 
interest does not vary much between industries in the same country” (Ohlin, 
1931, p. 35). Ohlin works through Manoilescu’s example and gives a qualified 
agreement that “if the comparative superiority in agriculture is less than the 
intrinsic superiority in manufacturing [abroad], then … the latter has a full right 
to exist” (p. 32). But he adds to the analysis by insisting that what also matters 
is the intrinsic superiority of manufacturing at home, showing the conditions 
under which a country could gain from having its own manufactures and yet 
still be unable to compete freely with manufacturing imports, thus implicitly 
providing an economic justification for protection (see pp. 32-33). But, then 
Ohlin adds his coup de grace and asks why, if protection will effect such a 
productive transfer of resources from low productivity to high productivity 
sectors, can they not be effected without protection? Or “If a worker obtains a 
much higher wage in the Romanian coal industry than in most other Romanian 
industries, why do not those employed in the latter offer themselves to the coal 
industry at somewhat lower rates than the present one?” (p. 36). After posing 
this question as to why the forces of arbitrage should not work in the labour 
market, he proceeds to give logical explanations as to why seeming inter-
sectoral differences in wages may not point to a failure of the law of one price.  
 
Ohlin had earlier made passing reference to wage differences being due to the 
differences in the quality of labour. However, in his explicit reply to his own 
question, he mentions how nominal wages differences may not translate into 
real wage differences if the cost of living varies, as he claims it does between 
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rural environments (where agricultural production takes place) and urban 
environments (the presumed location for manufacturing). He also cites the 
preference that individuals may have for agricultural occupations, the 
implication being that while lack of mobility may reduce national income in 
terms of goods and services, maximum national income would not be desirable 
under those circumstances (p. 40).27 The only explanation that he can give for 
why urban industrial workers might get more desirable well paid jobs than farm 
workers is because these two classes of labour are non-competing groups. This 
he attributes to genuine differences between long-established and new labour 
(an interesting forerunner to the turnover theory of efficiency wages) or the 
effect of trade unions and closed shops in the higher paid industrial employment 
(p.41). In this instance (where non-competing groups of labour exist), he 
acknowledges that protection can, under certain circumstances, reduce the 
losses that are a product of the existence of these groups and bring about a more 
efficient allocation of resources across sectors, similar to what they would have 
been if labour had been freely mobile (p. 44). Nonetheless, Ohlin still does not 
consider the example of “artificial” non-competing groups to be a sufficient 
argument for protection claiming that the more natural remedy would be to do 
away with the watertight labour compartment or to find some other mechanism 
to encourage mobility.28  
 
Viner, in his ad hominen critique, refers to Manoilescu’s empirical evidence 
(that productivity varied across sectors and was higher in industrial sectors than 
in agriculture) claiming that it was a “medley of statistical data of miscellaneous 
dates and various degrees of unreliability and irrelevance” (Viner, 1932, p. 122). 
He provides no justification for asserting that Manoilescu’s data were unreliable 
and irrelevant. While adopting Ohlin’s interpretation of Manoilescu’s work (that 
treats variations in productivity across sectors as variations in wages), he 
proceeds to ridicule what he perceives as the superficial use of wages and prices 
                                                
27 In an interesting qualification to the latter argument, Ohlin distinguishes between ex ante and ex post 
preferences, claiming that man is by nature a conservative animal which could act as a deterrent to 
rural urban mobility. However, if ex post, he adapts to (or prefers) urban life, then it would be 
inappropriate to give more weight to his psychological reactions before the change.  
28 Ohlin suggests a system of unemployment relief to encourage such mobility. This suggestion has 
usually been omitted from subsequent appraisals of Ohlin’s critique (see for example, Irwin, 1996 and 
Gomes, 2003).  
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as indicators of value and as appropriate weights to be given to different 
activities. To underline this point he mentions how artificial impediments, such 
as monopoly, could raise price and thus affect the interpretation of what sectors 
were productive or not (p. 123). Reasons that he gives for inter-sectoral wage 
differentials are: “equalizing differences” a phrase borrowed from Frank 
Taussig, where the ratio of wages in two sectors is assumed to be equal to the 
reciprocal of the attractiveness of the two occupations in terms of the 
irksomeness of the work and cost of living differences in the regions where the 
occupations are carried out. These reasons were already alluded to by Ohlin in 
his review. Unlike Ohlin, he does not explain wage differences on the basis of 
quality of labour differences, which Haberler attributed to Viner’s adherence of 
real cost theory, as opposed to the opportunity cost doctrine that Haberler 
espoused (Haberler, 1936, p. 196n). Viner also refers to non-competing groups 
in two instances: one where there is complete inter-sectoral immobility of 
labour and the other where labour is completely mobile. In the first instance, 
where there is no mobility between non-competing groups of labour, 
international trade will change the rewards to the different groups of labour but 
it will not affect the national gains from trade. The free trade case remains 
intact. This point had not been made by Ohlin, who assumed that such labour 
was mobile, albeit imperfectly. Finally, he conceded the case that if: (i) real 
wages are higher in one sector than another for whatever reason (he cites trade 
unions and custom); (ii) both occupations are equally attractive; and (iii) 
mobility between sectors does exist, then a free trade regime could result in a 
country allocating its resources inefficiently in the low wage sector  (Viner, 
1932, pp. 124-25).29 However, he proceeded to minimize the likelihood of this 
happening arguing, on the contrary, that free trade would probably force those 
in the high wage sector to abandon their monopoly wage, thus removing the 
underlying distortion that rendered protection attractive as a policy. So, as far as 
Viner is concerned “finding an intellectually satisfactory economic defense of 
protection still awaits achievement” (p. 125) and was not furthered by 
Manoilescu’s work.  
 
                                                
29 It would only be inefficient if the ratio of wages between the two sectors results in the country 
specialising in the sector where it had a comparative disadvantage.  
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Haberler (1936), as an extension of his section on the impact of trade, when the 
labour market is divided into non-competing groups of labour, cited all the 
aforementioned (quality of labour, equalizing differences, non-competing 
groups with and without mobility) as reasons why differences in real wages may 
exist and persist between different groups of labour. Like Ohlin and Viner, he 
conceded that the only theoretically important exception to the free trade case 
was that of non-competing but inter-sectorally mobile labour. As he put it, this 
is because “the exchange ratio is not determined exclusively by the opportunity 
costs” (Haberler, 1936, p. 197). So, one could have a situation where the 
opportunity cost of the good exported exceeded its relative price, thus resulting 
in a loss from such production and exchange. But, since he believed that this 
had to be a consequence of high paid workers acting monopolistically, he 
therefore concluded that they were unlikely to persist with such behaviour in a 
free trade regime, as the consequence would be unemployment. Productivity 
differences across sectors had to be the product of a distortion, one which meant 
that protection, given the distortion, could be economically advantageous but, 
since free trade is presumed to nullify the distortion, the case for free trade was 
considered to be practically (if not theoretically) still intact. 
 
Ex post, orthodox opinion is in agreement with Viner that Manoilescu’s thesis 
did not amount to much of a challenge to the free trade case. Most believe that it 
gave rise to the subsequently entitled theory of factor market distortions and 
suggested alternative policy remedies to correct for the distortions other than 
protection. For Irwin the broader consequence of the theory of domestic 
divergences was that “the case for free trade was delinked from the case for 
laissez-faire” (Irwin, 1996, p. 171). Gomes makes a similar point when talking 
of higher industrial wages being necessary to attract and retain skilled labour, an 
adequate supply of which may not be forthcoming because of a market failure. 
He dismisses protection as a solution, claiming that “the theory of domestic 
distortions provides no support for intervention in trade to remedy the situation 
– the optimal policy is a subsidy to labour training” (Gomes, 2003, p. 127). 
Likewise Maneschi (2008) claimed that it was only apparent years later (when 
the officially acceptable work on factor market imperfections was incorporated 
into general equilibrium modelling) that “Manoilescu had discovered the first 
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case of … market distortions” but that a consequence of that literature was “it 
brought home to economists the important distinction between the policies of 
laissez-faire and free trade”, the cure for which were “first best policies such as 
subsidies or taxes” (Maneschi, 2008, p. 131).  
 
What is noteworthy and seemingly not well known (judging from subsequent 
references to Manoilescu’s work) is that Manoilescu did not present his case as 
a situation of inter-industry wage differentials or an example of the failure of the 
law of one price to hold as far as labour was concerned. He never mentioned 
differences in wage rates between sectors. On the rare occasion when he does 
talk of wages he is more interested in its share of net production, and he cites 
US published figures in the second half of the nineteenth century to show that 
labour contributed more to net production than it received in wages (see 
Manoilescu, 1931, table I pp. 46-47). It was Ohlin (1931) who interpreted 
Manoilescu’s work in this way and it would appear that all subsequent 
economists accepted this interpretation. Manoilescu’s starting point for his 
theoretical analysis and policy recommendations was the evident existence of 
productivity differentials between sectors. He explicitly says “Without 
examining what are the factors which cause such ample variations in the 
productivity of national value, we merely wish to state that, from the point of 
view of productivity (either of capital or of human labour) the economic life of 
a country is essentially heterogeneous” (Manoilescu, 1931, pp. 28-29). This is 
why he discussed at some length what he meant by “more productive sectors” 
and the challenges of measuring them. He developed three proxies in order to 
measure and compare productivity of resources across sectors: (i) net 
production per worker or P/T, where P is net production and T is the number of 
workers; (ii) net production per unit of capital or P/C, where C is the unit of 
capital; and (iii) his geometric mean which is net production divided by the 
product of labour and capital employed (√P2)/√(TC) or P/√(TC). So it is clear 
that when Manoilescu was referring to productivity differences between sectors, 
he was not confining his argument to inter-sectoral differences in labour 
productivity only, or indeed to the case of different wages being paid to 
identical labour in different sectors of the economy. He justified using capital 
and labour (and not other resources) as the basis for his productivity 
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measurements on the grounds that labour and capital were common to all 
branches of production, unlike for example arable land (p. 21). His objective in 
using such measurements was  “Given a number of workmen, and a ready 
accumulated capital within a certain limit of natural possibilities, to find the best 
employment for these workmen and this capital so as to obtain the maximum of 
net production” (p. 21). Indeed Ohlin took issue with Manoilescu’s different 
attempts to rank industries according to their productivity. He questioned why 
land was not included, what the exact meaning of a unit of capital was, and what 
was the basis for using a geometric mean of output of capital and labour? It was 
Ohlin who concluded that it was better to stick to the criterion used in “orthodox 
economics” that the industry that could pay the highest price for its productive 
factors is the most effective one (Ohlin, 1931, p. 35). From this he decided that 
the most useful indicator of productivity differences across industries was the 
height of wages, even though he accepted that it was misleading to the extent 
that other resources or profit differed between industries (p. 35). Certainly the 
statistics quoted most often by Manoilescu are labour productivity in different 
sectors and different countries at different points in time but that merely 
reflected data availability. Even in his theoretical analysis, his use of inter-
sectoral and international differences in labour productivity is understandable, 
given that he was taking on Ricardo’s theory of free trade on its own terms. 
Wages however do not get a mention.  
 
So one difference between Manoilescu and his critics was that he took it as 
given that different sectors of the economy were heterogeneous in terms of their 
productivity and he wanted to examine the implications of such empirical 
evidence, whereas they interpreted such productivity differences as differences 
in wages across sectors and wanted to interrogate how this could be the case. As 
Viner said, in his dismissal of Manoilescu’s thesis, it is necessary to know “the 
reasons why prices and wage rates are what they are” (Viner, 1932, p. 123). So 
Viner, possibly on the basis of Ohlin’s prior review, proceeded to assume that 
Manoilescu’s productivity differentials were revealed as inter-sectoral 
differences in wages, and he went on to question whether such apparent 
phenomena represented a violation of the law of one price (or wage) or not. To 
the extent that real wages differ for identical labour in different jobs of identical 
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desirability, it can only be attributed to monopoly labour power, since what else 
could it be? At least Ohlin provided some justification for narrowly interpreting 
Manoilescus’ work in the way he did. As he says, “the industry which can pay 
the highest price for its productive factors is the most effective one” (Ohlin, 
1931, p. 35). And he justifies his exclusive focus on the remuneration of labour 
since natural resources are “differently situated” which is analogous to a 
“difference in quality” while “differences in interest …are relatively 
unimportant” (p. 37). Yet he is aware of his sleight of hand even as he justifies 
his exclusive focus on wages as evidenced when he said “it is differences in 
wages which above all should be analysed. The fact profits in certain industries 
are much greater than in others also deserves attention but will not be discussed 
here” (pp. 37-38).   
 
This is an unfortunate omission and one that channeled subsequent work 
unnecessarily down the route of erroneously assuming that Manoilescu’s 
challenge to free trade was based on inter-sectoral wage differentials. A 
discussion on why profits differ across sectors and why the law of one price 
does not appear to hold for productive capital might have given rise to a totally 
different debate. Certainly, it would have been possible to argue that one reason 
why profit differs across sectors is because of monopoly forces at work in some 
sectors and possibly too, if such monopoly was due to “legal privileges” the 
implication would be that it is desirable to break up such monopolies in order to 
get the desired allocation of capital across sectors. It could be argued that in this 
instance, free trade is a good thing since it leads to increased competition and 
reduces the monopoly power of certain firms. But, it may also have led to a 
debate on the nature of capitalist production and whether monopolies, 
oligopolies or heterogeneous firms are an inevitable product of competition in 
markets. The varied nature of production is such that it leads to varied barriers 
to entry in different sectors of the economy. These barriers may be more natural 
than contrived, being intrinsically tied up with the diverse nature of production 
in different sectors and the understandable strategies pursued by those in 
business to protect their profit (much of which may be in the nature of economic 
rent) by whatever stratagems form part of the acceptable cut and thrust of 
economic life. Removing such barriers that give rise to heterogeneous profit 
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may not even be feasible, especially if information on products, processes and 
internal organization is not readily accessible. Furthermore, it may not be 
desirable. Natural monopolies are a case in point, whereby larger firms are more 
cost productive. In such instances, legal measures to make the market more 
competitive would result in resources becoming less productive. All of this is of 
course speculative, but it does serve to highlight the empirical facts on which 
Manoilescu based his case, that there are economic activities that appear to be 
more productive than others.  Therefore, to the extent that this is the case, 
governments should concern themselves with trying to encourage the expansion 
of the more productive sectors in the interests of enhancing national income. 
This may well involve protection in order to encourage more productive sectors 
to expand and, given the realities of capitalist production and the different 
constraints that governments face, protection may not be a second or third best 
solution, it may well be the first best. However, this debate on why some sectors 
appear to be more productive than others and its implications for government 
policy never happened. Instead, the response to an empirically based challenge 
to a core theory was to restate the phenomenon in terms that do not wholly 
explain its existence. Having set up a straw man (wage differentials) 
neoclassical economists then proceeded to rationalize the now restated problem 
by offering explanations that are either not verifiable empirically (utility 
differences across employments) or difficult to verify (quality of labour). The 
only limited concession to the challenge that markets may not be as competitive 
as the economics profession perceived they should be, was to allow for a very 
specific type of labour market distortion that readily suggested a number of 
solutions, of which trade interferences were very far down the hierarchy.  
 
In this instance a whole gamut of strategies was used to protect core theory 
against empirical evidence that appeared to undermine it. The evidence was 
restated in a misleadingly narrow way, it was minimized by recourse to 
explanations based on unverifiable or difficult to verify concepts and the limited 
concession that was made (Viner’s tiny grain of truth) was an easy concession 
since it did little to undermine the hegemonic status of free trade theory among 
neoclassical economists. Indeed, it gave rise subsequently to a seam of 
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theoretical work that proved very productive for its proponents, without in any 
way threatening the core.  
 
3.4 The Infant Industry Exception to Free Trade 
 
3.4.1 Infant industries: Integral to mercantalism and yet running within free 
Trade logic?  
The idea of nurturing infant industries (II) using, among other measures, 
protection and maintaining that protection until such time as those industries 
have matured sufficiently to be able to deal with the forces of international 
competition has a long and strange lineage. Long, because it dates back to the 
mercantalist era and strange because, although the infant industry argument 
formed part of mercantalist economic theory (see Viner, 1964 [1937], pp. 71-
72), it was also considered to be “not inconsistent with classical and modern 
theory” (Haberler, 1936, p. 280). This view was supported by Schumpeter when 
he asserted that Friedrich List (who theorised the infant industry basis for 
protection in the mid-nineteenth century) produced an argument that “developed 
into a free trade argument” (Schumpeter, 1994 [1954], p. 505). One reason why 
the position of Haberler and Schumpeter is not paradoxical but downright 
contradictory is because classical political economy, as developed by Adam 
Smith, set itself up in direct opposition to mercantalism. Admittedly, his 
depiction of the mercantile system was misleadingly narrow, to the extent that 
he represented it as an obsession with the balance of payments and bullionism.  
As pointed out by Perrotta, the founding fathers of mercantilism, such as 
Antonio Serra and Thomas Mun, favoured a positive balance of trade only to 
the extent that it promoted manufacturing. State intervention was considered 
necessary to develop domestic production, which was seen as central to wealth 
formation (Perrotta, 1991, p. 303). Likewise, as Irwin noted, British writers 
before Smith, such as Josiah Tucker, James Steuart and even Smith’s teacher, 
Frances Hutcheson, all accepted, with different degrees of qualification, the 
infant industry argument (Irwin, 1996, pp. 117-118). For Irwin, it was a sign of 
Smith’s intellectual independence that he opposed government interference. 
Moreover, despite his narrow depiction of the objectives of mercantilist policy, 
Smith did attack directly the infant industry basis for government intervention, 
 126 
claiming that it was a matter of irrelevance whether the cause of a country’s 
superiority over another in production was due to natural factors or factors that 
could be overcome, since all that mattered was the cost of buying the good 
versus the cost of making it. (Smith, 1999 [1776] p. 35).  
 
This claim that the source of a country’s advantage over another was of no 
consequence was strongly contested by the economist John Rae for whom it 
was “of the greatest consequence” since unlike the case of natural advantages, 
acquired advantages “can be transferred from one country to another” (Rae, 
1964 [1834], pp. 71-72). However, it was John Stuart Mill who conferred 
respectability on the infant industry case for protection. In a famous passage, he 
acknowledged the influence of the otherwise forgotten Rae and made the case 
for a protecting duty when a country’s competitive disadvantage was due to 
“skill and experience yet to acquire” (Mill, 2004 [1848]), p. 840.). According to 
Haberler, the infant industry argument was accepted in principle by many free 
trade economists after Mill gave it his approval, citing neoclassical heirs of Mill 
such as Marshall, Pigou and Taussig who all endorsed it (Haberler, 1936, p. 
281). However, he also points out, while the aforementioned accepted the infant 
industry case as a genuine theoretical exception to the theory of comparative 
advantage, they all had reservations about its practicality (p. 284, footnote 8). 
Theoretical acceptability and practical reservations aside, the question remains, 
as to how a concept, that was central to mercantalist theory and its policy of 
State intervention, could also be compatible with the competing theoretical 
framework of classical political economy which, by and large, favoured laissez-
faire and free trade. More substantially, the essence of Ricardo’s theory of 
comparative advantage was that economic backwardness was not a reason not to 
engage in free trade, since all countries could gain from trade regardless of their 
level of economic development. If one accepts the logic of comparative 
advantage, then protection to develop fledgling industries means foregoing the 
gains from specialisation and trade. Of course, the real disconnect between 
Ricardo’s theory of comparative advantage, its neoclassical offspring and the 
infant industry argument for deviating from free trade is that the former are 
static theories whereas the latter is a dynamic theory of development.  
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In the following sections I will review the work of the most influential theorists 
on infant industry protection. What these writers had in common was that all 
directly took issue with Adam Smith’s theory as to the determinants of the 
wealth of nations and the policy of laissez-faire and free trade, which was his 
legacy as expressed by his followers. Of particular interest is their alternative 
theorising of the determinants of the wealth of nations and the interventionist 
policies that this supports. What is also worthy of notice is how mainstream 
economics, classical but especially neoclassical, responded to the infant industry 
theories. We will see a gamut of strategies to deal with this direct challenge to 
free trade theory. These ranged from extra-economic arguments against trade 
interference, acceptance of the theoretical case but failure to incorporate it into 
the mainstream of theory, resuscitation of the argument in a particularly partial 
way with the objective of showing its limited empirical importance, to complete 
misrepresentation of the essence of the infant industry case by influential 
economists. 
 
3.4.2 Hamilton and his rejection of laissez-faire 
In 1791, Alexander Hamilton, in his capacity as Secretary of the US Treasury, 
submitted to Congress his “Report on Manufactures.” While this report was 
supposed to be a policy document, and his brief from Congress was to prepare a 
plan for the encouragement of manufactures, the document proved to be much 
richer insofar as it addressed why manufactures were necessary if a country was 
to develop economically and why, without State intervention, this was unlikely 
to happen expeditiously enough. Although he never mentioned Smith explicitly, 
it is generally acknowledged that he was familiar with the Wealth of Nations 
from the language of the report and its unattributed citations.30 
 
The first Smithian claim with which Hamilton took issue was the idea that “it 
can hardly ever be wise in a government to attempt to give direction to the 
industry of its citizens” (Hamilton, 1827 [1791], p. 10). He also questioned what 
                                                
30 Bourne (1894) compares passages from both books to back up the view that Hamilton had read the 
Wealth of Nations and was in effect, in much of his report, challenging the political economy of Smith. 
For Bourne, “political expediency” had to be the reason for not mentioning Smith by name, since “The 
citation of an English writer on Political Economy would have weakened rather than strengthened his 
case” (p. 329).  
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he claimed was a widespread view that “agriculture is the most beneficial and 
productive object of human industry” (p. 9). Given the interventionist and 
manufacturing-oriented thrust of the Report, it is unsurprising that he challenged 
the harmony of interests idea that justified laissez-faire and the notion that 
agriculture was more productive than manufacturing. While questioning the 
empirical basis to the claim that agriculture was the most productive branch of 
industry (p. 11), he enumerated different reasons to support his case that, on the 
contrary, manufacturing resulted in higher levels of output than would be the 
case in its absence. He used Smith’s idea of the division of labour against him, 
claiming that manufacturing offered greater scope for the division of labour than 
agriculture, and he enumerated the different productivity benefits that ensued 
from such specialisation. These included greater skill in the performance of 
tasks, less time lost transitioning between tasks, and more opportunity to apply 
machinery (p. 19). He asserted that manufacturing would add to overall 
employment by hiring more workers and extracting more labour out of them (p. 
21). The basis for this claim was the implicit view that it was production that 
determined employment, that production was less variable in manufacturing 
than in agriculture as it was less weather constrained (p. 13), and that there was 
a ready source of untapped labour in the form of women, children, immigrants 
and the previously idle. He anticipated Ricardo’s notion of comparative 
advantage (in this instance at the level of the individual), claiming that another 
source of productivity gain was the enhanced scope that manufacturing afforded 
to better use the diversity of talents of individuals (p. 22). Tellingly, he alleged 
that human motivation was not predetermined and that effort and enterprise 
fluctuated in proportion to the stimuli that they received (p. 23). This was 
another advantage that a nation with manufacturing enterprises had over an 
agricultural nation since, in his view, the former offers much more stimuli than 
the latter due to the sheer variety of occupations and productions that exist in a 
manufacturing country. And, finally, he claimed that agriculture itself would 
gain from the existence of more local manufacturing, as it would replace 
capricious international demand and poor terms of trade (under which 
agricultural exporting countries such as the US laboured) with more stable 
domestic demand.  
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Having established why manufacturing was desirable from an economic point 
of view, he then had to address why, without government intervention and 
incentives, manufacturing might not develop or develop as early as was 
nationally beneficial. Here his reasons allied a certain view of human nature and 
behaviour with commercial and political realities. He spoke of  “the strong 
influence of habit and the spirit of imitation; the fear of want of success in 
untried enterprises; the intrinsic difficulties” (p. 28). Moreover, there was the 
obstacle of knowing that there existed foreign competition that was better able 
to produce the good (p. 29) and an awareness that existing incumbents in the 
industry would respond to new sources of competition by trying to frustrate it 
(dumping in modern language), even if that meant temporary losses, and that 
they would be assisted in their attempts to maintain their commercial supremacy 
by their own governments (pp. 29-30).  
 
Hamilton was well aware that there were costs associated with assisting new 
enterprises, even when there was no fiscal burden, because the policy adopted 
was to protect the domestic market with import duties. But he believed that 
higher short-run prices, consequent upon the adoption of protectionist polices, 
was a price worth paying, because prices would fall in the long run and 
domestic goods would be even cheaper than foreign imports. What is more, he 
did not perceive that domestic monopoly was a credible threat due to domestic 
competition (p. 43). He discussed different policies that could be used to assist 
fledgling industries and personally expressed a preference for direct subsidies, 
on the grounds that they were most efficacious in raising profit, they did not add 
to domestic prices and they did not discriminate against exports (pp. 51-53). 
However, with his characteristic realism, he could see the political difficulties 
that would accompany this form of government assistance, so he proposed 
import duties, the revenue from which should be used to subsidise production.  
 
3.4.3 John Rae, the strangely neglected but intellectually consequential 
Scottish economist 
Rae’s best known work is his book “Statement of some New Principles on the 
Subject of Political Economy Exposing the Fallacies of Free trade and some 
other Doctrines Maintained in the Wealth of Nations.” As the title reveals, this 
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book was intended as a critique of free trade and the political economy of Adam 
Smith, whose methodology and conclusions he contested. Of all the infant 
industry cases that were presented, Rae’s was arguably the most academically 
influential through its impact on Mill, who picked up on the market failure 
aspect of Rae’s case. Yet, as noted by Dimand (1998), historians of international 
trade have by and large ignored (or been unaware of) Rae. (Maneschi and Irwin 
are two exceptions). He cites studies by Viner (1964 [1937]), Chipman (1965-
66) and Blaug (1978) on trade which all neglect Rae’s work. Even those who 
have addressed the infant industry argument such as Meier (1995), Haberler 
(1936) and Kemp (1960), either fail to mention Rae or mention him in passing 
when citing Mill’s statement of the case (Dimand, 1998, p. 178).31 
 
For Rae, the subject of political economy was the cause of the wealth of nations, 
the appropriate method to unveil these causes was induction and he believed 
that the possibility existed to uncover the one cause (among many) that was 
sufficient to ensure the advancement of a nation’s wealth (Hamouda, 1998, p. 
59). His methodological challenge to Smith was that his “speculations” were not 
inductively informed and that, as a consequence, he confused the causes of 
prosperity with the effects, since for Rae, the division of labour and free trade 
were outcomes not causes of economic development (p. 59). The theoretical 
error that Rae claimed Smith committed was due partly to the methodologically 
individualist underpinnings of his theoretical approach. “The axiom which he 
[Smith] brings forward, that the capital of society is the same with that of all 
individuals who compose it, being granted, it follows that to increase the 
capitals of all the individuals in a society is to increase the general capital of 
society” (Rae, 1964 [1834], p. 9). Since Smith assumes that “every man is the 
best judge of his own business and of the modes by which his own capital can 
                                                
31 Rae’s contribution to economic thought and his subsequent neglect is not confined to the case for 
protecting infant industries. He was also a pioneer in the area of capital theory whose contribution was 
acknowledged by Bohm-Bawerk (1959 [1884]) and Fisher (1930).  Moreover, he is hailed by 
American institutionalists as a founding father because of his treatment of luxury expenditure 
(Mitchell, 1924).  According to Brewer, there are obvious parallels between Rae’s ideas and those 
forwarded by Schumpeter as to the sources of  economic development (Brewer, 1998, p. 137). 
Meanwhile, Schumpeter paid tribute to Rae’s originality, while conceding  that it had not brought him 
either contemporary or posthumous success (Schumpter, 1994 [1954], p. 468). The contemporary lack 
of awareness of Rae is all the odder given the esteem in which he was held by such influential figures 
in the evolution of economic ideas, something that an edited book dedicated to his work by Hamouda, 
Lee and Mair (1998) attempted to rectify.  
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be augmented, so to prevent him from adopting these modes is to obstruct him 
… and in so far as his capital is a part of the general capital of society, to check 
the increase of that general capital” (p. 9). 
 
While Rae did not assert that capital accumulation was the only way that an 
individual enriched himself (given that savings depended on earning power and 
the latter was determined by knowledge, skill, dexterity and capacities (p. 11)), 
he did draw a distinction between the process by which an individual and a 
country acquired wealth. In many instances, for an individual, personal 
enrichment can be a zero sum game, insofar as one person’s gain may be 
another’s loss. By contrast, nations can only get rich by producing a wealth that 
did not previously exist. “The two processes differ in this, that the one is an 
acquisition, the other a creation” (p. 12). Central to Rae’s theory of national 
economic development was the notion of invention, which generally involved 
qualitatively different methods of production than had previously been 
employed. He bolstered this claim that physical capital was not the essential 
determinant of a country’s economic development by empirical reference to 
natural and man-made calamities (fire of London, wars, revolutions) which, 
despite the destruction of capital that these caused, did not arrest development 
(p. 30). For him this revealed that “while the principles and elements, through 
and from which they sprang, are not consumed along with them, we see them 
quickly reproduced” (pp. 30-31). According to Brewer, this made Rae the first 
economist to see technical change as the main source of continuing economic 
growth and, since he saw no limit to the inventive faculty, the first to foresee an 
unlimited potential for growth (Brewer, 1998, p. 129).  
 
For Rae, Smith’s methodological individualism and his theory of wealth 
creation led to the “doctrine of complete inaction on the part of the legislator” 
(Rae, 1834, p. 7). By contrast, Rae allied his empirical claim that the wealthiest 
nations were those engaged in manufacturing (p. 7) with his theoretical 
assertion that “invention is an essential element in the process of the increase in 
national wealth” (p. 15) to make the case for policy activism on the part of the 
legislator. Arguably, he saw the legislator as not only having the power to act 
for the community but also having a moral duty to do so. Rae’s justification for 
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the protection of infant industries rested on his broad interpretation of invention. 
For him, invention was not just the progress of science and arts but also the 
adaptation of arts already practised in another country (pp. 15-16). This was 
because such adaptation always involved learning since circumstances were 
never the same in any two countries and so consequently importing techniques 
from elsewhere inevitably involved more than simply copying (p. 46). However, 
in order to justify policy activism, he (like Hamilton) had to show why laissez-
faire was insufficient. First, he stressed the obstacles that had to be overcome 
and the learning involved in starting a new enterprise (pp. 46-48), and then he 
had to prove that individuals would be unlikely to do so if left to their own 
devices. Effectively what Rae described was a case of market failure where 
individual and social interests do not coincide. He even illustrated the nature of 
the market failure, saying that while new entrants into an industry had to incur 
great costs, their potential success would be undermined by “projectors” who by 
“bribing his workmen with higher wages … succeed in depriving him of the 
profits he might otherwise have drawn from his extraordinary outlay of labour 
and capital” (p. 52). For this reason “in all ordinary cases, a due regard to their 
own interests cannot be a sufficient motive to prompt individuals to such 
undertakings” (p. 52). He admitted that it could happen through miscalculation 
on the part of an individual investor but did not feel that it was either just or 
judicious to await such a doubtful occurrence. As far as he was concerned, if the 
benefits of a new activity are enjoyed by the whole community then it is only 
right that the community (and not an unfortunate individual) bears the cost of its 
introduction (p. 53).  
 
Rae was aware of the short-run costs attendant on nurturing infant industries. 
But he asserted that notwithstanding such costs, legislative interference was 
justified if eventually the industry became competitive, in the sense of being 
able to produce at lower cost than international competition “and it is to effect 
this desirable result that we are going to undertake the project” (p. 59). This is 
why he took such issue with Smith’s refusal to distinguish between the 
situations of natural advantage and acquired advantage, since for Rae, it was 
obvious that while no amount of legislative effort would be sufficient to 
overcome natural advantages this was not the case for acquired advantages (p. 
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71). The essential difference was that the while natural advantages could never 
be transferred from one country to another; acquired advantages could be so 
transferred, since acquired advantages had to do with knowledge (p. 72).  
 
Rae however was not a naïve protectionist saying that while the legislator 
should act, he should do so cautiously and be guided by the evolution of events. 
A necessary condition for legislative interference is the reasoned view that 
eventually the activity being promoted will be competitive (p. 367). He even 
acknowledged that legislative interference might sometimes fail (to promote a 
competitive industry successfully) but, as with individual failures, the gravest 
error was “to sit down therefore in resolute inactivity” (p. 69). Protection was 
only one of a number of measures by which policy could be brought to bear on 
private activity, the others being premiums for successful imitation of foreign 
articles and bounties on home production. The advantage of premiums was that 
it was a measure that could precede protection in testing how practicable it was 
to try to establish an activity (p. 368). In defending the desirability of 
manufacturing, he cited two of the arguments forwarded by Hamilton, one, on 
the beneficial impact of manufacturing on the agricultural sector and the other, 
on how it enhanced the inventiveness and ingenuity of society’s members.  
 
While Rae’s case for supporting infant industries was of a sort that neoclassical 
economists would find most acceptable (difference between private and social 
costs and benefits), his quotation of Hamilton revealed a view of human nature 
that would put him strictly at odds with rational homo economicus of 
neoclassical lore.  
 
3.4.4 The well known but much reviled Friedrich List 
According to Shafaeddin (2000), while the infant industry argument for 
protection is based mainly on List’s writing, he alleges that List’s ideas have not 
been reviewed adequately in the economic literature published in English, and 
he cites Blaug’s history of economics and his failure to mention List as 
testament to this generalised neglect. Gomes attributes the initial neglect of List 
in the English-speaking tradition to Britain being the home of classical political 
economy and the free trade doctrine that List was challenging. He also claims 
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that Mill’s endorsement of the infant industry argument served to redeem 
partially List’s reputation while obscuring his central message (Gomes, 2003, 
pp. 86-87). But it would seem that antipathy to List’s writing was not confined 
to English writers in the classical political economy period. For the Austrian 
neoclassical, Haberler, there was some merit to List’s exposition insofar as it 
was not to be dismissed out of hand but he accused List of “great  exaggeration 
and gross Protectionist fallacies”  in addition to “bitter and quite superfluous 
attacks upon the classical economists” (Haberler, 1936, p. 280). Meanwhile, the 
American neoclassical free trade theorist and economic historian, Viner, 
denigrated List in his characteristically dismissive way, saying that his “ideas 
were unworthy of notice; he had departed from the true principle of economics” 
(cited in Gomes, 2003, p. 86). Swedish Ohlin was, as ever, more temperate in 
his pronouncements while revealing once again his tendency towards 
reinterpretation, when he asserted that the infant industry argument should be 
called instead the infant country argument and that what really mattered and 
what List had in mind was how protection impacted on the quality of labour 
(Ohlin, 1935, p. 321). Arguably, Irwin provides the most revealing explanation 
for the lack of regard that economists have for the otherwise influential List, 
saying that they [economists] were suspicious of his historical analysis and 
sceptical that it could provide an analysis of the problems faced by infant 
industries or useful guidance as to when protection was advisable (Irwin, 1996, 
pp. 127-128). Why? Because the implications of economic theory are not 
historically dependent and this is also the case with comparative advantage. 
Furthermore, “List did nothing to advance the theory underlying the infant 
industry case because this was not his purpose” (p. 128). So here we have an 
honest though highly questionable explanation of List’s neglect that has to do 
with his rejecting the universalising claims of the emerging discipline of 
economics, by claiming that context matters, and the straying of his analysis 
beyond the narrow confines of the market when trying to explain the causal 
determinants of economic phenomena - all cardinal sins in the eyes of the 
economic discipline with its pretension to scientific respectability.  
 
Both Hamilton and Rae focused on the nation-state and the role of government 
policy in advancing the wealth of the nation. The same is true of List, and his 
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first theoretical criticism of Smith’s theory was its focus, which List designated 
“cosmopolitical” to be contrasted with his own focus of “political or national 
economy” (List, 2005b [1841], p. 7). For List national economy arose with the 
idea of nations, which he saw as being the medium between individuals and 
mankind, possessing, among other things, common government, laws, 
institutions, interests and history (List [1827], p. 162). Moreover, the object of 
political economy was more than just wealth but also power because, to his 
mind, the two were interlinked as national wealth was increased and secured by 
national power. So the remit of any study of national economy had to involve 
principles that were not only economical but also political (p. 162). Given the 
distinction that List drew between the individual and the nation, it is 
unsurprising that he, like Hamilton and Rae, argued for an activist State based 
on such a distinction between “private and national economy” (List, 2005b 
[1841], p. 57).  
 
List’s method of investigation was historical and inductive as well as axiomatic 
as evidenced by the first part of his famous 1841 book National System of 
Political Economy looking at the history of successful states and attempting to 
explain the causal factors behind such success (List, 2005a [1841]). Like Rae, 
he criticised Smith’s methodology and accused him of confounding “effects 
with causes” (List, 2005b [1841], p. 14) and “the principles of private economy 
with those of national economy” (p. 57). For List, the individual is more short-
term in his orientation than the legislator and the pursuit of private interests can 
be socially destructive. That is the reason why governments everywhere impose 
restrictions on the autonomy of individuals, of which commercial restrictions 
are simply one of many taken with the interests of the collective in mind. The 
examples that List gave of such restrictions were commonsensical and designed 
to be sufficient evidence of the dichotomy between individual and collective 
well-being and how both could be secured (pp. 59-64). The errors of Smith and 
his followers, List attributed to their flawed theory (of exchange values) which, 
partially derived from their methodological failures that took no account of 
history and statistics. If the teachings of classical political economy were valid 
and the correct policy was one of non-interference by the State, then, according 
to List “savage nations ought to be the most productive and wealthy of the earth, 
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for nowhere is the individual left more to himself than in the savage state, 
nowhere is the action of the power of the State less perceptible” (p. 67).  
 
List’s theoretical innovation was his concept of productive power, which he 
juxtaposed with Smith and his followers’ idea of exchange value. For List, the 
power to produce wealth was more important than wealth itself, since “it insures 
not only the possession and the increase of what has been gained, but also the 
replacement of what has been lost” (p. 22). Clearly, List saw productive power 
as being non-depreciable by contrast with wealth, which can be diminished and 
lost. According to Levi-Fauer, List believed that productive power consisted of 
three types of capital, natural (resources of nature), material (machines and 
utensils) and mental and of these, mental capital was the most important in the 
creation of wealth (Levi-Fauer, 1997, p. 157). Therefore, economic policy that 
aimed to develop mental capital would, all other things being equal, be more 
successful than economic policy aimed at the development of natural or material 
capital (p. 158). Smith’s mistake and those of his successors was to emphasise 
bodily labour as the sole productive power and their failure to assign a 
productive power to mental labour, in particular if it was of a form that did not 
earn exchange value in the market (List, 2005b [1841], pp. 32-33). For List, 
such a theory was unscientific as it failed to unearth the deeper causes of 
productive labour since “history teaches us that whole nations have, in spite of 
the exertions and thrift of their citizens, fallen into poverty and misery” (p. 25). 
Smith’s doctrine is indicted on the grounds of its “materialism, individualism 
and particularism” (p. 27).  
 
When discussing the determinants of mental capital, List moves beyond the 
narrow remit of the economic, which was doubtless the reason for his dismissal 
by subsequent generations of economists. He sees the mental capital of a nation 
as being determined by the broader socio-political and institutional context; that 
is to say by the rules and regulations of society, by the state of its sciences and 
arts, as well as by its social norms and moral culture (pp. 29-30). This 
knowledge or mental capital is built up over generations and is, in his view, 
specific to nations, which are productive insofar as they can appropriate the 
attainments of previous generations and add to them. The role of the State, far 
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from being unimportant is, for List, indispensable as the ultimate promoter and 
facilitator of the underlying conditions of a nation’s productive power, since the 
latter is presumed to be culturally grounded and nationally bounded.  
 
Like both Hamilton and Rae, List viewed manufacturing as being essential to a 
nation’s economic development and the expansion of its productive powers. To 
some extent, the desirability of manufacturing derived partly from its 
association with urban living, by contrast with agricultural and rural living. For 
List, urban living was more conducive to the development of mental capital than 
rural living. This he attributed to the stimuli and friction of living in close 
contact with others as opposed to the isolation of the rural dweller. “Friction 
produces sparks of the mind … Mental friction, however only exists where 
people live closely together …. where there is a large interchange both of goods 
and ideas” (p. 104). By contrast the agricultural population “lives dispersed” 
and “The agriculturalist has to deal less with his fellow-men than with 
inanimate nature” the upshot of which is “contentment with little, patience, 
resignation, but also negligence and mental laziness” (pp. 96-97).  List also 
perceived that there was a symbiotic relationship between the production of 
manufactures and arts and the sciences. “Manufactures are at once the offspring, 
and at the same time the supporters and nurses, of science and the arts” (p. 100). 
He reiterates Hamilton’s point that a nation with manufactures can make better 
use of the variety of talents of its citizens, thus adding to its productive power. 
However, his essential point has to do with human behaviour which he sees as 
being culturally determined by the activities that people pursue, the education 
that they received and the environment in which they find themselves. This is 
why he goes to such pains to emphasise that an urban society that produces 
manufactures and engages in commerce will not only be more productive but 
also more educated, cultured, less superstitious and more tolerant than its 
agricultural counterpart (pp. 108-109). His view of human behaviour is that it is 
fundamentally determined by the constraints of the situation in which we find 
ourselves and sustained by habit (p. 114). For this reason a country that makes 
the transition from agriculture to manufacturing and commerce develops in its 
citizens’ different values and qualitatively different modes of behaviour. This is 
an important feature of his work and worth emphasising because later 
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neoclassical interpretations of the infant industry case for protection rest on a 
very different view of human behaviour, where preferences are given (and 
separate from constraints) and the rational agent is always optimising regardless 
of the context in which he/she finds him/herself.  
 
State assistance is recommended for a nation seeking to develop its 
manufacturing especially if there already exists (as was the case when List was 
writing) a superior manufacturing power. List enumerated the difficulties 
attendant on setting up new enterprises, from capital outlays to lack of skill, 
experience and knowledge (pp. 201-211). He especially emphasised the time 
element involved in developing expertise in certain activities and pointed to 
different types of social institutions whose principal function was to ensure that 
knowledge was maintained and developed over generations. However, unlike 
Rae, his rationale for State assistance could not be interpreted as being due to 
market failure but, rather due to lack of capacity. This is an important 
distinction, since the market failure argument suggests market correction 
measures, whereas if a country lacks the capacity to compete successfully, all 
the market incentives in the world will not remedy this lacuna. That is why the 
infant analogy is so pertinent and why protection is needed until such time as 
productive powers have been developed. For List, exposing an immature 
industry to the rigours of unbridled competition with a superior opposition was 
akin to pitting a child against an adult in a wrestling match. The outcome of 
such a contest is almost always a foregone conclusion (p. 216).  But, as pointed 
out very effectively by Chang, while one can be sure that without protection (or 
some form of State nurturing) the products that a catching up country can 
successfully produce will be extremely circumscribed, that does not imply that 
protection will always be successful (Chang, 2007, pp. 66-67). What State 
assistance does is replace certain failure if it is absent with improved odds of 
future success if it is given.  
 
As far as the modalities of nurturing nascent industry are concerned, List 
differed from Hamilton and Rae in that he focused almost exclusively on import 
protection as the principal means of establishing manufacturing power in a 
nation (List, 2005b [1841], pp. 226-227). Also, not all nations were considered 
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suitable candidates for the nurturing of manufactures. Countries had to be at a 
certain stage in their economic development and possess certain cultural, 
demographic and geographic pre-requisites. Effectively List excluded tropical 
countries (for whom he felt free trade was the best commercial policy) and those 
with small populations and limited territory. Since the development of 
manufacturing capacity was the objective of commercial policy, neither raw 
materials nor capital equipment should be protected (p. 233). Not all 
manufactures were deemed suitable for protection; suitable candidates were 
those that mobilised a lot of a country’s productive powers. These included 
many articles of general consumption but excluded luxury goods. Another 
reason why the latter goods were considered unsuitable was because List 
assumed that their production required technical skills that were beyond a nation 
embarking on industrialisation (p. 232). His system recommended increasing 
duties as productive power was being developed but eventually reducing and 
removing protection. However, he was at pains to point out that the trajectory of 
protection could not be determined theoretically and could only be decided on 
the basis of a country’s and a sector’s relative condition (p. 231). In this vein, he 
cautioned against both premature liberalisation, which he deemed to be wasteful 
of resources, and excessive protection (p. 229).  
 
Like all the infant industry theorists he was aware that there was a short-run cost 
to protection (higher prices) but, like Hamilton and Rae, he deemed such a 
policy worthwhile if eventually the country succeeded in developing its 
productive power sufficiently so that it could produce the good more cheaply 
than the imported substitute (p. 35).  
 
3.4.5 Similarities and differences between the three theories of infant industry 
protection 
All three writers critiqued what they considered to be the theoretical 
underpinnings of Adam Smith’s Wealth of Nations and the generally accepted 
policy conclusions of his economic model. Their approaches differed insofar as 
Hamilton never explicitly mentioned Smith or his work, while List aimed his 
arrows also at J. B. Say and what he dubbed The School, namely classical 
political economy in the Smithian tradition. All were focused on the nation-state 
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and all called for temporary state protection to develop manufacturing activity 
in countries where it was undeveloped and in the context of an international 
environment with superior competition. Both Rae and List emphasised the need 
to be selective in the manufactures chosen for protection and all realised that 
protection imposed costs on society. However, all presumed that such costs 
would be short-run in nature and that the policy of protection would be justified 
if eventually it could be disposed of because of the superior productivity of the 
enterprises once protected. Both Rae and List were familiar with the work of 
Hamilton but there is no evidence that they knew of each other’s work.  
 
What Hamilton does very expertly is make the case for the superior productivity 
of manufacturing compared to agriculture. This is a theme taken up by List who 
repeated some of Hamilton’s arguments but also enlarged upon and added to 
them greatly. While Hamilton spoke of the “busy nature of man” that expanded 
in response to “new scenes”, List went much further, developing on the notion 
that workers in a manufacturing and urban environment are qualitatively 
different to agricultural workers. For List, preferences and behaviour are 
culturally determined by socio-political context and by the activities that 
workers engage in, while social mores and habit play an important role in 
sustaining behavioural patterns. This is a very different perspective on human 
behaviour to the (subsequent) neoclassical one, where preferences are treated as 
exogenous and behaviour is presumed to be always of an optimising variety 
regardless of social context. It is also the part of the infant industry tradition that 
neoclassical theory has never acknowledged.  
 
Where Rae and List overlap is in their belief that the most important 
determinant of a nation’s prosperity is its mental capital. For Rae, the well-
spring of national wealth was invention which he saw as an act of human 
creation. List, in his attack on Smith’s materialism, was at pains to emphasise 
that what mattered was less the actions of individuals than the spirit that 
animated them and the social order that rendered their disparate energies 
fruitful. Rae applied his concept of creativity and invention to justify copying 
and adapting foreign production in a domestic setting (with State assistance), 
while for List, the State’s role was indispensable in the development of 
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knowledge and skills and in regulating them to ensure sufficient cooperation for 
a common purpose. Both cited historical examples of natural and man-made 
events that resulted in the wholesale destruction of physical and natural capital 
without fundamentally undermining the prosperity of the country that had 
endured such calamities. This served as empirical evidence for their respective 
theses, which (although expressed differently) fundamentally amounted to the 
same claim; that mental capital is the most important determinant of national 
prosperity.  
 
All writers stressed the difficulties and challenges inherent in setting up a new 
enterprise, especially in the face of superior foreign competition. However, 
Rae’s exposition of differences between private and public costs and benefits is 
the sort of market failure rationale for state intervention that neoclassical 
theorists can most readily accept. Rae did cite Hamilton on how diverse 
production stimulated human energy and creativity but he did not elaborate 
much on this justification for State intervention. List’s rationalisation of State 
intervention was based on the need for the State to foster certain activities for 
behavioural and cultural reasons. His emphasis on productive power (or 
capacity) and its socio-political determinants is an argument for infant industry 
protection that is far removed from any possible individualistic interpretation so 
beloved of neoclassical theory.  
 
All discussed the modalities of State assistance and fundamentally favoured 
protection (for a variety of motives) but List gave the most elaborate exposition 
of how and where protection should be applied and the principles underlying its 
trajectory.  
 
3.4.6 Infant industry in classical political economy and its neoclassical 
offspring 
According to both Irwin and Maneschi, the infant industry argument only 
gained formal acceptance in classical trade theory when it was endorsed by John 
Stuart Mill in his first edition of Principles of Political Economy published in 
1848 (see Irwin, p. 128 and Maneschi, 1998, pp. 120). In a much cited passage, 
the infant industry justification for protection made by Mill is similar to that of 
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Rae (whom Mill had read) with its important proviso that the industry being 
assisted was at a disadvantage simply due to “skill and experience yet to 
acquire” (Mill, 2004 [1848], p. 840). According to Irwin, Mill came to recant 
his views that import protection was the best way to promote infant industries, 
despite his belief that such industries could exist and that they in principle 
constituted a genuine exception to the free trade case. His disillusion with the 
infant industry argument in practice was that such protection was applied in too 
crude a fashion (Irwin, 1996, p. 129). But Irwin himself admits that Mill never 
incorporated any such recantation into subsequent editions of Principles.  
 
Economists who came after Mill had mixed views about the desirability of 
protection to promote nascent industry. John E. Cairnes pointed to the 
limitations and restrictions with which Mill hedged his case but still claimed 
that “with or without such limitations” his position on the topic was untenable 
(cited in Irwin, 1996, p. 130). J. S. Nicholson doubted the feasibility of 
temporary protection because of vested interests (Nicholson, 1901, Vol III, p. 
364). By contrast, Henry Sidgwick not only defended Mill’s version of the 
infant industry basis for protection (claiming that it represented the most 
important exception to free trade), he elaborated by showing how a 
manufacturing activity could be of benefit to a community but that, without 
protection, it would not sufficiently compensate the early private undertakers 
the costs they would have to shoulder in the early period of production 
(Sidgwick, 1901, pp. 488-490). In his elaboration of the private disadvantages 
of being an early entrant into a new industry, he cited, among other things, the 
cost of skilled labour and the strong probability of dumping (a word not used by 
him) by incumbents to stop the new upstart. These were not new insights, as 
they had been raised by  Hamilton and Rae,  respectively, but given that 
Sidgwick did not mention either of them, it may be that his familiarity with the 
infant industry case for protection was confined to Mill’s exposition32 The 
interesting aspect of Sidgwick’s contribution (in the light of the reservations 
expressed by some of his contemporaries) is that while he acknowledged the 
                                                
32Rather strangely, Irwin claims that Sidgwick did not elaborate on what he called the externality basis 
for protection (Irwin, 1996, p. 131). This possibly may have been the case in the first edition of his 
book, which was published in 1887 but it was not the case in the third edition published in 1901.  
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dangers of prolonged and/or inappropriate protection, he was at pains to stress 
that those were political arguments against the policy and therefore not 
belonging within the realm of economic theory (p. 491).  
 
This position of claiming that the infant industry case represented a theoretically 
acceptable exception to the logic of free trade but that protectionism on such a 
basis was fraught with practical danger appears to have been the position of 
early neoclassical economists, such as Alfred Marshall and Frank Taussig. The 
ambiguous views of Marshall on the topic are cited in various footnotes by 
Haberler (1936, p. 281, pp. 284-85). For Irwin, the support of Marshall and 
Taussig gave the infant industry argument another lease of life and allowed it to 
escape careful scrutiny (Irwin, 1996, p. 134). He also asserts that for the first 
half of the twentieth century, it was the universally acknowledged theoretical 
exception to free trade, despite the continued scepticism among economists 
about its operation in practice (p. 135). Theoretically, the only advance on 
Mill’s version of the infant industry argument by the generation succeeding him 
was considered to be that forwarded by Charles Bastable. Whereas the Mill test 
of the acceptability of protection was the eventual survival of the industry 
without protection, Bastable held that survival in itself was an insufficient 
condition to justify protection. Rather he argued that the issue was whether “the 
certain and immediate loss resulting from protection be outweighed by the 
future gains from the new industry” (Bastable, 1903, p. 140). To the extent that 
the infant industry case was considered a genuine exception to the theory of free 
trade, it was the Mill-Bastable version of the story that was generally 
acknowledged (see Kemp, 1960).33 
 
There were a lot of theoretical innovations within neoclassical trade theory from 
the 1930s to the late 1960s. These involved incorporating neoclassical 
production theory into the comparative advantage story of the causes and effects 
of trade, as well as the development of international trade theory as part of the 
general equilibrium model of the (cashless) economy. A feature of all this 
                                                
33 For Maneschi, Rae came very close to formulating the Bastable test. He cites two different passages 
from Rae to show that he had an appreciation of the inter-temporal issues at stake when trying to 
determine the benefits or otherwise of nurturing a nascent industry (see Maneschi, 1998, p. 190).  
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theorising was that it was static in nature. In a prescient article published in 
1929, John Williams took issue with what he called English classical theory of 
international trade, claiming that it was based on premises sufficiently 
inaccurate as to raise questions of the soundness of the theory and its useful 
application to the trade of the world (Williams, 1929, p. 196). Particularly, he 
indicted the theory for its static nature; that is to say, for assuming as fixed the 
very things which should be the object of study. As he said: 
 
 the relation of international trade to the development of new resources and 
productive forces is a more significant part of the explanation of the present 
states of incomes, prices and well-being, than is the cross section value 
analysis of the classical economists, with its assumption of given quantums of 
productive factors, already existent and employed (p. 196).  
 
The infant industry theory of protection was about the development of a 
country’s productive powers. There was a realisation that developing a 
country’s productive power was complex (involving a range of socio-political 
determinants), that it was costly and that it took time. In other words, the infant 
industry argument can only be understood within a dynamic model of economic 
change. Orthodox, neoclassical trade theory could not have been in a position to 
incorporate infant industry theorising into its models because it was essentially 
static in nature. However, given that infant industry had been rendered 
respectable by Mill, neither could it be dismissed out of hand. So the collective 
response of the profession (either consciously or otherwise) was to accept that it 
was a genuine exception (when pushed) but effectively to ignore it and its 
implications for trade policy. Silence was more powerful than direct refutation 
in this case. 
 
While Haberler (1936) did explicitly mention the “external economy” rationale 
for protection, the idea that infancy in itself did not justify protection and that it 
could only be rationalised (within a neoclassical framework) on the basis of a 
specific type of market imperfection was first elaborated by James Meade. 
Meade unequivocally declared that “Infancy … provides no argument for even 
temporary State support” (Meade, 1955, p. 256). The rationale was simple, if an 
activity is presumed to be ultimately profitable, then short-run costs associated 
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with infancy would not be enough to dissuade the self-interested, all seeing, 
private producer (who always acts in profit maximising way) from engaging in 
it. The omniscient decision maker of neo-classical production theory will desist 
from engaging in a socially productive activity only if it is not sufficiently 
privately profitable. The State should intervene if it can be ascertained that what 
is socially beneficial is privately unprofitable because of some kind of “market 
imperfection”. The nature of the market imperfection needs to be identified, 
what Irwin called “putting economic structure on the argument” (Irwin, 1996, p. 
135). The only acceptable imperfections according to Meade were large 
indivisible factors of production (giving rise to increasing returns to scale) or 
atmosphere creating external economies, where the learning of infants impacts 
on the knowledge of other infants (Meade, 1955, p. 256).  
 
Others, following in the lead of Meade, who put “economic structure on the 
argument” were Kemp (1960) and Baldwin (1969). Kemp asserted that Mill and 
Bastable (whose version of the infant industry “dogma” he was using) did not 
spell out in sufficient detail the nature of the learning process. For Kemp, the 
infant industry argument was about a dynamic learning process. The firms, he 
contended had to have static increasing costs over output, since decreasing costs 
would lead to monopoly and that would  be sufficient inducement to enter a 
sector without State assistance or protection. But, increasing static costs 
notwithstanding, the learning economies had to be external in nature (in the 
sense of firms only learning from the experience of other firms), since if firms 
can learn from their own internal experience, that would constitute a barrier to 
entry, resulting in above normal profits and hence a sufficiently healthy 
inducement to attract early pioneers into the sector. By contrast, learning only 
from the experience of other firms means no barriers to entry in the industry, 
putting new firms on the same cost footing as pioneers and all the gains from 
such learning being passed on to the consumer in the form of lower prices. In 
this instance, protection is a sine qua non of the establishment of the industry. 
The upshot of Kemp’s analysis was to show that the nature of the market 
imperfection that justified infant industry protection was limited (See Kemp, 
1960, pp. 65-67).  
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Baldwin (1969) wrote with the express purpose of showing that economists had 
too readily accepted the arguments for infant industry protection. His work on 
this topic has received much praise as the “classic article” that finally exposed 
how limited is the case for infant industry protection. Baldwin focused on the 
nature of the market imperfection that rendered it unprofitable for firms to enter 
a sector without protection. If the issue is the acquisition of knowledge of how 
best to produce the product and if this knowledge is not appropriable by the 
firm, then, according to Baldwin, the industry will not be established. However, 
he disputes that protection will make a difference since, in his world view, as 
long as there are costs that the firm must invest in learning, no firm will have an 
incentive to do so if new entrants can copy them at lower cost than that which 
the firm had to invest. Protection will merely serve to make production privately 
profitable without inducing any firm investment in learning. Alternatively, if the 
costs of learning by the pioneers are less than the cost of copying by later 
entrants, there is no need for protection as early entrants will enjoy a natural 
barrier to entry that will result in above normal profits for a while and make 
protection unnecessary. Baldwin also examined the case where the skill was 
embodied in labour, which must be trained but can then be poached by later 
entrants to the sector. For him, the solution to this “market imperfection” was to 
make workers pay for their own training, so that there is no loss to the firm from 
un-recouped training costs. For Baldwin, the infant industry argument for 
protection was only worthy of its reputation as the major exception to the free 
trade case if a clear analytical case could be made, based on well-known and 
generally accepted empirical relationships unique to infant industries. He 
contended that such a case could not be made (Baldwin, 1969, p. 303).  
 
What clearly occurred, when neoclassical writers stopped accepting and 
ignoring the infant industry case for protection and engaged with it (essentially 
for the first time) was that they re-interpreted it in a partial way. The infant 
industry case became a particular kind of market imperfection. So when 
neoclassical man was placed in this imperfect market environment, protection 
did not resolve the imperfection by allowing for the development of a nation’s 
productive powers. This is unsurprising, since the assumptions central to 
neoclassical production theory are the omniscient agent who always makes the 
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best possible decisions at any point in time regarding organisation and 
production. Knowledge and capacity may come with practice and investment in 
learning but neoclassical man knows in advance the potential return from such 
investment. Such a view of human nature and behaviour and the development of 
capacities could not be further from the vision of Hamilton, List and even Rae. 
For Hamilton, man’s nature could be roused rendering him/her more productive 
and adding to the stock of effort. This was also a perspective that Rae must have 
endorsed, given that he quoted Hamilton on how energy and the spirit of 
enterprise were a variable product of the variety of occupations to be found in 
society. List was even more radical because for him preferences, behaviour and, 
arguably, human nature were self-evidently products of the wider social context 
in which persons found themselves. What we do determines what we become 
and what we value. Even a more modern Institutional/Evolutionary perspective 
on firm behaviour would better capture how firms make decisions by 
rationalising why organisational cultures can differ across firms, including those 
in the same industry. Omniscient optimisation with regard to product, process 
and firm organisation would be replaced with routines that firms develop to 
cope with profound uncertainty. This might better explain the complexity 
associated with learning and why, given the challenges new entrants to an 
industry face, protection is needed during the vital early stages of the 
establishment of a new industry. Un-nuanced, asocial, all-seeing and super-
calculating neoclassical man is a very one-dimensional construct and allying 
him with the market imperfection interpretation of infant industry 
unsurprisingly diminished the richness of the arguments developed by 
Hamilton, Rae and List. Despite references to the contrary (by Baldwin), it is 
hard not to conclude that the above revisionists lacked first hand acquaintance 
with the writings of Hamilton or List, which could go some way to explaining 
the distorted representation of their views. Alternatively, the optimising agent is 
so central to neoclassical theory that all theorising and interpretation could not 
proceed on any other basis. Either way, it does not reflect too well on the 
integrity or profundity of neoclassical scholarship.  
 
By the 1970s, the idea that infant industry represented a genuine exception to 
free trade appeared to have been forgotten by those neoclassical economists 
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who bothered to comment on it. Such was the lack of awareness of the 
arguments, that the policy prescriptions of the original infant industry theorists 
were profoundly misrepresented. For example, critics of interventionist policies 
pursued by many developing countries erroneously attributed perceived failures 
of such policies to deficiencies in the theory of infant industry protection (see 
Krueger, 1978). Shafaeddin (2000) pointed to the extent to which the literature 
on the infant industry argument was loaded with fallacies and confusions, citing 
Little et al (1970), Corden (1974), Krueger (1978) and Greenway and Milner 
(1993) as perpetrators of such canards. Among the more blatant 
misrepresentations perpetrated by the above authors was the view that infant 
industry protection was synonymous with import substitution industrialisation, 
that it was conceived as a permanent feature of policy, and that it was envisaged 
across the board for all of manufacturing as opposed to being applied selectively 
(Shafaeddin, 2000, p. 3). If such errors were not an act of bad faith, then they 
serve to highlight a widespread malaise in economics, which is the failure of 
economists to read original works often resulting in partial and sometimes 
erroneous interpretations being compounded and widely propagated.  
 
3.5 Development Economics and its lack of impact on International Trade 
Theory 
 
Development Economics as a distinct sub-discipline within economics is a post 
World War II phenomenon. It coincided with the political reality of a new social 
democratic compact in many developed countries, in the form of expanded 
welfare states and State responsibility for macro-economic stability and newly 
acquired independence for many ex-colonial dependencies. These newly formed 
States were by and large characterised by low levels of economic development 
and a trade structure biased towards the exportation of a few primary 
commodities, principally to the markets of their erstwhile colonial masters. 
However, policy makers in developing countries were imbued with a post-war 
optimism that a better future was possible and that poorer economies could 
achieve greater material prosperity if the correct policies were adopted. This 
optimistic expectation on the part of policy makers was supported by new 
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theorising on the issues of economic development by economists in the 
emerging sub-discipline of Development Economics.  
 
The majority view among early Development economists (and policymakers) 
was that a necessary condition for catch up by poorer economies involved 
limited openness and integration into the global economy and the strategic 
intervention of the State as a mobiliser of scarce resources (Nayyar, in Chang, 
2003, p. 63). Like the infant industry theorists of the previous century, increased 
industrialisation was seen as being the conduit through which economic 
progress would be achieved. It was to this end that most of the theories of these 
early development economists and the policies that emanated from them were 
aimed. In this section, attention will be focused on those economists who 
specifically addressed the issue of international trade and its impact on 
economic development. Accordingly, we confine ourselves to the work of Raul 
Prebisch, Hans Singer and Gunnar Myrdal.  
 
The logic of the dominant theory of international trade (comparative advantage) 
is that open borders is the best policy for a country (regardless of its level of 
economic development) to adopt in order to maximise national income. Despite 
the failure to develop a dynamic theory of international trade, early neoclassical 
economists, such as Alfred Marshall were optimistic about how the fruits of 
technological progress would be dispersed globally. He accepted that 
technological change was more likely to occur in the industrialised sectors 
where developed countries prevailed. However, he saw the fruits of such 
advances in technological knowledge also benefiting developing countries 
through improved terms of trade. The logic is simple, technological advance 
results in greater global supply of industrial goods relative to agricultural goods, 
so all other things being equal (the key qualification), this should result in lower 
(higher) relative prices of industrial (agricultural) goods to the benefit of 
countries who export primary commodities and import manufactures (Marshall, 
1930 [1879],  p. 13).34 
                                                
34 Classical economists such as Malthus, Ricardo and Mill also expected the terms of trade to move in 
favour of primary producers over time due to diminishing returns as a result of scarcity of suitable land 
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Prebisch and Singer independently but almost simultaneously challenged this 
view that exporters of primary commodities should enjoy improved terms of 
trade over time (Prebisch, 1950, Singer, 1950). According to Singer (1990, pp. 
323-24), the historical statistical basis for their claim was an analysis of British 
terms of trade from 1873 to 1938 which Singer presented to the United Nations 
(UN) in 1947/48 and which formed part of the UN study of the terms of trade of 
underdeveloped countries. The evidence was of a fall in the relative price of 
commodities compared to manufactures over that time period. Both writers 
claimed that there were good reasons to believe that developing countries who 
accepted their static comparative advantage in primary commodities would 
suffer worsening terms of trade over time to their economic detriment. This 
formed part of the rationale for their recommendation of activist policies such as 
import-substitution industrialisation (ISI). The terms of trade argument runs 
within neoclassical orthodoxy which acknowledges that a disimprovement in a 
country’s terms of trade will reduce the economic welfare benefits to it from 
integration into the global economy. It behoved neoclassical trade theorists to 
address this challenge to trade orthodoxy, which two stalwarts of mainstream 
orthodoxy, the ubiquitous Haberler and Harry Johnson duly did. Haberler 
exhibited one of the tendencies that is all too common among neoclassical 
economists when confronted with challenging evidence and that was to question 
the empirical accuracy of the claims. He alleged that the failure to include 
services trade or take account of quality improvements biased the results in a 
way unfavourable to the free trade case for primary commodity exporting 
nations (Haberler, 1961, in Theberge, 1968, p. 329). He also maintained that a 
more accurate measure of the economic welfare effects of economic 
developments were factoral and not commodity terms of trade, even as he 
acknowledged the inherent difficulties in defining and measuring these (p. 324). 
Finally he asserted that it was better for countries to learn to cope with 
instability through increased flexibility than to interfere politically. For Johnson, 
a deterioration in a country’s terms of trade, while unfortunate from an 
economic welfare perspective, did not necessarily justify a country straying 
                                                                                                                                       
and mineral resources. This is what happened to British terms of trade which deteriorated for the first 
half of the nineteenth century (Singer, 1990, p. 323).  
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from its comparative advantage. Adverse global developments happen but it still 
made sense for a country to export primary commodities as long as international 
prices indicate that this is where their comparative advantage lies (Johnson, 
1964, in Therberge, 1968, p. 355). Like Haberler, his default position was that 
adverse global market developments should never provoke government 
intervention (p. 355).  
 
The limitation of Marshall’s expectation as to the evolution of the terms of trade 
over time was that it ignored potential developments on the demand side. For 
terms of trade to go against producers of manufactures, supply enhancing 
developments have to exceed demand enhancing developments. Both Prebisch 
and Singer claimed that in a dynamic growing global economy, growth in 
demand for manufactures would exceed growth in demand for primary 
commodities. This is partly due to the innate character of manufactures as 
compared to primary products (Engel’s law) but also because as demand for 
industrial goods shows signs of flagging, new products or new types of existing 
products act as a continual stimulus to industrial demand (Prebisch, 1963, in 
Theberge, 1968, p. 291). The fact that primary commodities are used as inputs 
in manufacturing and the evolution of technology in such a way as to replace 
primary commodity inputs with synthetic substitutes also leads to a lower 
income elasticity of demand for commodities over time (Singer, 1950, p. 479).  
 
The aspect of Prebisch and Singer’s thesis on declining terms of trade that has 
filtered down into mainstream theory is the aforementioned elasticity pessimism 
where primary commodities are concerned. (Singer also spoke of how low price 
elasticities meant greater instability of primary commodity prices and hence 
greater instability in terms of trade). However, to focus only on the demand side 
of their analyses is overly reductionist of their writings on terms of trade, since 
both writers also spoke of supply side developments, in particular the ways in 
which technological advance manifests itself, which both saw as being 
influenced by the nature of markets where products were traded and the nature 
of labour markets in different countries. Here, their theorising is much 
influenced by their awareness of the different economic realities internationally; 
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that is to say, how imperfectly markets work and the role of economic power in 
determining economic outcomes.  
 
Singer (1950) highlighted that productivity gains have two ways of manifesting 
themselves, either in the form of higher income for producers and/or lower 
prices for consumers. While the different forms of manifestation are a matter of 
indifference in a closed economy, they matter for the distribution of the benefits 
of technological progress in a globalised world. He claimed that industrialised 
countries got the best of all worlds since they enjoyed the fruits of their own 
technological progress in the form of higher producer income and that of 
foreign technological progress in the form of lower prices for their imports (p. 
479). Prebisch explained that this occurred because manufactures were 
generally sold in monopolistic markets (which gave producers price setting 
powers), and labour in developed countries (at the time he was writing) had 
more bargaining power due to high levels of employment, social legislation and 
trade union muscle. This meant that higher productivity resulted in higher 
wages and higher profits with minimal effects of price. By contrast, primary 
commodity producers sold into very competitive markets, which gave them 
limited price-setting powers, and developing countries were characterised by 
chronically high levels of unemployment and underemployment, which meant 
that labour had limited bargaining power. Unsurprisingly then, productivity 
advances in primary commodity production translated into lower commodity 
prices as opposed to higher producer income (Prebisch, 1963, pp. 291-92). 
Singer subsequently added that prices of manufactures produced in developed 
countries included a Schumpetarian rent element for innovation as well as 
monopolistic profits (Singer, 1990, p. 326).  
 
Just as Prebisch and Singer’s theses on the determination of terms of trade relied 
on the reality of market structures (product and labour) as well as on demand 
elasticities, so too, their arguments in favour of State intervention in the form of 
ISI were broader than simply terms of trade arguments. According to Palma, the 
core of Prebisch’s analysis was his differentiation of the structure of economies 
in core (developed) and peripheral (developing) countries, the former being 
homogenous and diversified while the latter were heterogeneous and 
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specialised. Structural heterogeneity was associated with unemployment, while 
excessive specialisation combined with unemployment reinforced a tendency 
towards problems with the balance of payments and deterioration in a peripheral 
country’s terms of trade. However, Palma claims that, notwithstanding the 
association of Prebisch with the terms of trade issue, it is not clear whether he 
himself saw it as being the most important aspect of his work. Palma attributes 
this legacy to the tendency of the North American academic world to extract 
unidimensional hypotheses from his work (Palma in Newman et al, 1990, p. 
292). For Ho (2008, p. 511), Prebisch’s principal concern was the tendency 
among peripheral economies to disequilibrium in the Balance of Payments and 
the constraining effect this had on investment and development. It was to relieve 
the foreign exchange constraint that Prebisch supported ISI. Palma also claims 
that Prebish’s argument for industrialisation had to do with the very nature of 
manufacturing, such as the presumed positive externalities that it generates 
(Palma, in Newman et al, 1990, p. 294).  
 
Singer (1950) was also keenly aware of the dualistic nature of developing 
countries; that is to say, the productivity gap between the export-oriented sector 
and the non-traded goods sector. For him, the dangers of static theorising were 
that it could lead to incorrect policy prescriptions, such as promoting the export 
sector on the grounds of its superior (static) productivity. As he asserted, the 
relevant opportunity cost that should guide policy makers was not determined 
by existing productivity differentials but rather by comparing what is with what 
might have been, if scarce domestic resources had been deployed differently 
(Singer, 1950, p. 476). He alleged, rather contentiously, that nowhere was the 
limited static comparative advantage story accepted, not even in developed 
countries. In reasserting the importance of dynamic considerations in a 
country’s economic life, he strayed beyond the static moorings of neoclassical 
theory. In a further violation of neoclassical tenets, he claimed that the gains 
from industrialisation were as much social and behavioural as economic. For 
him what mattered in the economic life of a country was “how one thing leads 
to another, and the most important contribution of an industry is not its 
immediate product ... and not even its effects on other industries and immediate 
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social benefits … but … its effect on the general level of education, skill, way 
of life, inventiveness, habits … etc” (p. 476).  
 
It was not even that Prebisch and Singer favoured ISI as the single policy means 
by which peripheral countries could industrialise and develop. According to Ho 
(2008, p. 511), Prebisch started to advocate the promotion of manufactured 
exports among peripheral countries as well as to the centre, while also insisting 
on the continuation of ISI (see Prebisch, 1951, p. 77, 84; 1964, p. 20, 25, 76, 
115, 123).35 And, as Singer (1990, p. 327) points out, export-substitution 
industrialisation is as much a logical policy consequence of the desire to get 
exports away from primary commodities as is ISI. Singer’s thinking on 
economic development also evolved to put less emphasis on the product 
characteristics of a country’s trade and more on the characteristics of the 
country itself, and on its ability (or lack of it), to develop autonomous 
technological capacity (Singer, 1975, p. 376). Until developing countries 
acquired such capacity, he viewed them as being the losers in all their economic 
dealings with developed countries (both trade and investment) and for such 
flows as existed between them to contribute to economic divergence and not 
convergence, as neoclassical theory claims. His adoption of Myrdal’s notion of 
cumulative effects was rooted in the nature of knowledge and its importance in 
technological advance. For him, knowledge feeds on itself (leading to ever 
greater productivity) whereas for the country without such capacity, even 
knowing what knowledge is needed is a challenge (p. 379). This inevitably 
results in unequal bargaining power that affects all economic relations between 
developed and developing countries, to the detriment of the latter.36  
 
For Gunnar Myrdal, neoclassical international trade theory was patently 
inadequate to the task of explaining economic underdevelopment. He asserted 
that no study of the orthodox theory of international trade, however intensive, 
                                                
35 The policy of simultaneously protecting the domestic market to foster industrialisation, while also 
promoting manufacturing exports was part of the unorthodox policy arsenal successfully deployed by  
the East Asian economies in their quest for economic development.  
36 Intra-manufacturing terms of trade between Developed and Developing countries would appear to 
support Singer’s later view, with the worst deterioration in their terms of trade over time being 
experienced by the least Developed countries in their trade dealings with the Developed world 
(Maizels, 1998).  
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was capable of furnishing an explanation of the reality of international 
economic inequality and its growth over time (Myrdal, 1957, p. 147). He 
alleged that policy advice on trade matters given to underdeveloped countries 
was scientifically unfounded and practically misleading (p. 99). He questioned 
the failure of trade theorists to reassess the adequacy of their theory in the light 
of divergent facts (p. 150) and concluded that it had to do with the inherited 
predilections of economic theory, claiming the purer the theorist, the more in 
thrall he/she was to such predilections (p. 162).  Yet, he felt that the literature on 
the problems of underdeveloped countries was too atheoretical and needed to be 
integrated with economic theory and international trade, albeit in a more 
comprehensive and realistic way (p. 156). So, in his view, development 
economics needed to be more theoretical while international trade theory 
needed to be more empirically informed.  
 
The predilections of economic theory of which Myrdal was so critical were 
equilibrium (which he rightly stated was incapable of explaining change in a 
social system) and what he saw as the unwarranted separation of economic 
phenomena from non-economic (but still economically relevant) phenomena. 
For him, many economic processes were self-reinforcing and this was partly 
explicable because of the way social and cultural forces interacted with 
economic forces (Myrdal, 1957, Ch. 3). Among the economic self-reinforcing 
phenomena that he alluded to were economies of scale, agglomeration 
economies and increasing marginal productivity of resources, while the socially 
reinforcing but economically consequential phenomena had to do with health 
and education, superstition and attitudes. As he said, the frustrating effects of 
poverty operate through other media than those analysed by traditional 
economic theory. Nevertheless, they (economic and non-economic) are 
interlocked in circular causation (pp. 26-27, 29-30). 
 
Myrdal did not consider all market forces to be disequilibrating, he also 
acknowledged that they could, under certain circumstances, be equilibrating. 
(He labelled such effects as backwash and spread, respectively). However, he 
believed that the determining factor as to which effect prevailed was the level of 
economic development, with spread effects more likely the higher the level of 
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economic development and vice versa (p. 34). This he attributed to a range of 
inter-related economic, political and social factors, such as the shrinkage of 
economic space (due to better transport and communications infrastructure) and 
a more interventionist State that provided social-safety nets as well as better 
health care and education, resulting in  more room for rational social solidarity. 
By contrast, countries with low levels of development usually possess 
economic, political and social features the opposite of those just listed, meaning 
that backwash effects were more likely to ensue as a result of market processes.  
 
As far as unfettered international trade for developing countries is concerned, he 
considered it much more probable that backwash effects would predominate, to 
the detriment of the development potential of such countries (pp. 51-52). This is 
why he favoured interventionist policies in general and mercantilist policies in 
particular with regard to trade. These were, inter alia, infant industry protection 
and export promotion. He rejected the mainstream view that it was always 
economically irrational to produce at home what could be imported more 
cheaply, citing the immediate realities of unemployment, foreign exchange 
constraints as well as the dynamic benefits of learning (pp. 95-96). This was 
consistent with his view that market prices were no objective indicator of 
scarcity and wants, as they reflected the institutional framework of society with 
its laws, rights and entitlements, asset distribution and powerful organisations 
(p. 49). This does not mean that he was unaware of the dangers of 
protectionism, simply that he saw State planning and intervention as a necessary 
albeit insufficient condition for economic development among poorer countries. 
As he saw it, building capacity is the business of government. Incentives alone 
will not work because understanding how people respond to market signals 
requires an awareness of the social and cultural context. 
 
The work of Prebisch, Singer and Myrdal has been cited by mainstream trade 
theorists as giving intellectual support to ISI at the expense of outward-oriented 
policies but this is a travesty of their position. Effectively what they were 
advocating as far as the architecture of international trade was concerned was 
for special and differential treatment for developing countries in the interests of 
their economic development (see Ho, 2008). All rejected free trade as being 
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incompatible with economic development for developing countries. As Myrdal 
said, the advice “to abstain from interfering with foreign trade … is in most 
cases tantamount to advice not to bother about economic development” 
(Myrdal, 1957, p. 94).  All started from the position that there were distinctive 
differences between the economies of developed and developing countries and, 
given this inequality, that the rules should be tilted in the favour of the latter, in 
the sense of having privileged access to developed country markets while 
retaining discretion to protect their own domestic markets. For Myrdal this 
“double standard morality” (Myrdal, 1956, p. 292) in international trade was 
rationally motivated until such time as the poorer economies caught up with the 
richer ones. Their rejection of free trade and laissez-faire was based on their 
dynamic perspective, their starting point of profoundly imperfect markets and a 
view of human behaviour as being situationally rational (understandable given 
the context) as opposed to the universally applicable, omniscient hyper-
rationality of neoclassical lore. In all of this, their analysis was a twentieth-
century reflection of the issues that infant industry theorists, like List had raised 
a century earlier.  
 
It is claimed that classical economists and neoclassical economists accepted the 
infant industry argument as a genuine exception to the free trade logic of 
comparative advantage. It is noteworthy, that despite this “apparent” 
acceptance, no attempt was made to integrate the dynamic and social insights 
contained in the infant industry thesis into mainstream international trade 
theory. Likewise, it is significant, that beyond a few quibbles about countries’ 
trade structures and their bearing on their terms of trade, that the other issues 
raised by this generation of socially-aware Development economists had limited 
impact on the mainstream of economic theory and international trade theory. 
And all this occurred at a time when mainstream trade theory was considered to 
be very productive as evidenced by the number of new theorems that became 
part of its central canon. For Myrdal, the latter type of theorising was essentially 
arid, as an economic theory that was not simply “empty boxes” also needed to 
be more adequate to the facts (Myrdal, 1957, p. 163). Given that many of the 
relevant causal factors in economic life are non-economic, this inevitably 
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required a broader type of economic analysis; that is to say, general economic 
theory should be recast as social theory (p. 100).  
 
What happened was the exact reverse. Economic theory subdivided into sub-
disciplines and there was almost no cross-fertilisation between them.  
Just like macro and micro, development economics and international trade 
existed in separate and relatively impermeable silos. This state of affairs 
persisted until the 1970s, when there was a conservatively-inspired theoretical 
counterattack with the intent of showing that the theories of the emerging post-
war disciplines of Development and Macro were really fallacious after all, thus 
allowing for their re-colonisation by the untainted theoretical core of 
international trade theory and microeconomics.  
 
3.6 Conclusion 
 
The theory of comparative advantage is as valid as the fundamental assumptions 
on which it is based. These include, inter alia, the assumption of constant 
employment at a national level; arbitrage where factor earnings are concerned 
(which renders such earnings independent of the sector where the factor of 
production is employed); and a belief that what is economically optimal in a 
static sense must also be optimal in a more dynamic sense. As this chapter has 
highlighted, each of these assumptions about the nature of economies has been 
contested. If employment is variable and trade liberalisation leads to an increase 
in unemployed resources, then National Income could fall. Likewise, if a 
country’s comparative advantage lies in low productivity sectors (in other words 
if the economy is characterised by structural heterogeneity) then, National 
Income could also fall consequent to trade liberalisation. Finally, if a country’s 
ability to compete in the international economy depends on, among other things, 
the capacity of its domestic resources and if the development of that capacity 
requires more than self-interested, individually rational behaviour (since the 
nature of learning is such that you cannot know ex ante what you will know ex 
post), then selective protectionism to develop such capacity may ultimately 
deliver greater economic prosperity than free trade.  
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The unambiguous policy conclusions that derive from the comparative 
advantage theory of free trade have been subject to challenges on the grounds 
that the above cited fundamental assumptions are not a valid representation of 
how economies function. Cournot’s trade analysis implicitly assumes that actual 
employment is equilibrium employment, while Schuller explicitly referred to 
the empirical phenomenon of unemployed and underemployed resources to 
motivate his trade recommendations. Keynes arguably started an academic 
revolution with his assertion that there is no automatic in-built tendency for an 
economy to operate at full employment equilibrium. Graham believed that 
manufacturing was characterised by economies of scale unlike agriculture, 
while Manoilescu documented the superior productivity of certain 
manufacturing activities over others, including agriculture. What is striking is 
that none of these pertinent arguments had any fundamental impact  
on the development of mainstream trade theory. That is despite them being 
usually internally logically consistent and generally empirically-informed. 
Moreover, they appealed to commonsense. As shown in this chapter, there was 
some limited engagement with them but they were variously dismissed using a 
variety of stratagems. So Cournot was incorrectly accused of being logically 
wrong in his analysis, while Schuller’s empirical assertion of the existence of 
unemployment was rejected on the grounds of being more apparent than real, 
since unemployment could not be reconciled with individual rationality. 
Graham’s thesis was diverted into a cul de sac with disputes over the exact 
nature of such economies of scale and a dismissal of the one logically accepted 
exception (external economies of scale) on the grounds of empirical irrelevance. 
Manoilescu’s empirically based challenge was contained by reinterpreting it in a 
misleadingly narrow way but which once again served to insulate the free trade 
case. Where the challenge was too great to contain (Keynesian unemployment 
or infant industry case for protection) it was effectively ignored until such time 
as those contentions could be rebutted.  
 
The question that requires an answer is why neoclassical economists in 
particular have displayed such tenacity when it came to defending core theory 
and why their theorising has been so uninformed by empirical considerations? 
Myrdal (1957), who appealed in vain for economic theory in general and 
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international trade in particular to become more empirically engaged, attributed 
such theoretical stubbornness to the predilections of economic theory, especially 
the central notion of equilibrium and the belief that economic phenomena could 
be fruitfully separated from non-economic phenomena. For him, economic 
theory if it was to be of any use, needed to be social theory but he was aware 
that such a general theory would probably never fit into a neat econometric 
model (pp. 100-101). This fixation that economists have with models may in 
large part explain the resistance that economists have to a description of and 
explanation for social and economic phenomena that is not amenable to the 
models that economists normally deploy. Krugman admitted as much when he 
acknowledged that important ideas in Development economics (Myrdal’s 
cumulative causation and Albert Hirschman’s notion of linkages) were ignored, 
not because they were wrong, but because they were meaningless until such 
time as they could be modelled (Krugman, 1995, p. 27). He confessed that an 
idea is only taken seriously by the economic fraternity if it can be modelled (p. 
5). His definition of an economic model, when expressed formally, is one where 
an agent is maximising something and the outcome is an equilibrium of sorts (p. 
75). For Krugman, the predilections of economists for the sort of modelling that 
he mentioned is in no way an indictment of the profession, even when it results 
in the neglect of important ideas. This is because he views such neglect as a 
mere temporary phenomena, part of the inevitable cycle of knowledge 
acquisition associated with formal model building (p. 72). Furthermore, while 
accepting that the principles on which economic models are based are crude, he 
asserts that they work surprisingly well and that attempts to find an alternative 
have been notably unsuccessful (p. 77).  
 
Krugman’s defence of economic method as ultimately yielding of valuable 
insights (if not quite truth) smacks more of a belief system than a claim that is 
empirically well-founded. Moreover, as this chapter has attempted to show, 
economists, when in thrall to a belief system, can stubbornly defend their 
economic models, even in the face of glaring contrary evidence. All of which 
would be of mere academic interest if such ideas were not so socially 
consequential in a policy sense. To restate a Keynesian assertion in the form of 
a question that it behoves all economists, regardless of their methodological 
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leanings, to answer, and that is, whether it is better to be roughly right or 
precisely wrong. 
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Chapter 4. Trade III: Bringing it all Back In: Neoclassical Trade 
Theory gets more real? 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
Chapter 2 looked at how a core concept in trade theory “comparative 
advantage” evolved from its classical political economy foundations to a form 
that anaesthetised it as an extension of the perfectly competitive general 
equilibrium model of the economy. This development necessitated an 
increasingly idealised description of the economic environment in which 
economic agents were presumed to operate. It has been claimed consistently 
that this retreat from social realism occurred because developments in trade 
research were primarily tool-driven, with ontic concerns being of secondary 
importance. The last chapter addressed the strategies deployed by mainstream 
practitioners in international trade in order to protect the core claims of 
neoclassical trade theory from multifarious challenges during the period when 
the neoclassical model was being developed and refined. In this chapter, I will 
evaluate developments in trade theory over the last 60 years, in particular the 
questionably named “new trade theory” that has analysed the causes and 
consequences of trade when markets are permitted to operate in a manner 
different to the perfectly competitive construct. Superficially at any rate, trade 
theorising had reversed its previous tendency to describe the economic 
environment in an increasingly narrow way, by permitting markets to take on 
more varied forms than perfect competition. The era of narrowing was 
succeeded by an era of ostensible broadening. Some might argue that the new 
heuristic in trade research (modelling trade when markets are imperfect) was 
driven by an awareness of the empirical inadequacies of the theory of 
comparative advantage based on perfect competition. Regardless of whether 
they concur or not with this view, most mainstream practitioners have hailed 
such theorising, claiming that it has enriched our understanding of the positive 
and normative consequences of trade. The following quotation is representative 
of this position. “The explorations of trade with imperfect competition have also 
 163 
deepened our understanding of the costs and benefits of trade policies” 
(Grossman, 1992, p. 1).  
 
It is the contention of this chapter that such theoretical developments were not 
primarily driven by empirical concerns but (like earlier developments in trade) 
were internally driven by tractability considerations as well as the need to derive 
new theoretical results, especially as comparative advantage under perfect 
competition was essentially a finished endeavour. (I make this claim even as I 
acknowledge that, in the last decade, empirical trade research has expanded 
considerably owing to improved data sets). Partial evidence that will be offered 
in defence of this assertion is the timing and sequence of permissible market 
imperfections and the relative paucity of empirical research (at least until very 
recently). Furthermore, I would challenge the view a la Grossman that this latter 
day modelling has enhanced our understanding of the consequences of trade 
policy in any appreciable way.  
 
The layout of this chapter is as follows. Section 4.2 examines the factor market 
imperfections literature which, for the most part, rationalised unemployment 
and the different earnings of similar labour, by attributing them to distinct 
failings in the labour market, chief among them being inflexible wages. In this 
way, limited damage was done to the policy conclusions of the perfectly 
competitive model. Section 4.3 looks at increasing returns to scale that are 
external to the firm and how their admission altered the positive and normative 
predictions of trade theory. Both departures from the standard model still 
retained the central assumption of perfect competition in product markets. The 
major rupture in theorising occurred in the late 1970s and early 1980s with the 
emergence of a wave of literature on trade when product markets are imperfect. 
Such was the perceived change in direction with that which had gone before, 
that this theory was labelled “new trade theory”. Section 4.4 critically 
interrogates this “new trade theory” in its different guises. These guises are: (i) 
homogenous firms producing differentiated products under technological 
conditions of internal economies of scale and market conditions of monopolistic 
competition; (ii) partial equilibrium oligopolistic trade models where firms 
compete in a strategic fashion; (iii) economic geography or the rediscovery of 
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space, which is effectively a variant of monopolistic competition when 
resources are also mobile; (iv) heterogeneous firms operating in 
monopolistically competitive markets. (The latter, which is of very recent 
vintage, has been given the creative label of “new new trade theory”). Section 
4.5 considers the various attempts that were made to render trade theory (which 
in its neoclassical form had always been resolutely static) dynamic. This form of 
theorising did not take off until the 1990s with the application of tools gleaned 
from the also questionably designated “new growth theory”.  Section 4.6 
contains a brief overview of the empirical literature that sought to establish the 
relationship between a country’s trade regime and its economic performance. 
Section 4.7 concludes with reflections on the value added of this ostensible 
broadening of trade theory.  
 
4.2 Factor Market Imperfections: The First Permitted Wrinkle in the 
Neoclassical Trade Model 
 
4.2.1 Explaining labour markets by recourse to factor market imperfections: 
an example of neoclassical reductionism 
Incorporating non-clearing and/or segmented labour markets into otherwise 
standard neoclassical trade models started in the 1950s and became an accepted, 
albeit marginal, part of mainstream research that persisted up to the late 1970s 
when it was overtaken by the more exciting new trade theory. The literature fell 
broadly, though not exclusively, into two camps: an economy with involuntary 
unemployment and a full employment economy where identical labour gets paid 
different (non-compensating) wages.37 Common to both approaches is the idea 
that wages do not reflect the opportunity cost of labour. Early exponents of each 
type of market failure were Haberler (1950) and Hagen (1958), respectively.  
 
Haberler’s principal task was two-fold, to look at how inter-sectoral factor 
immobility impacted on the welfare effects of trade liberalisation and also to 
examine the effects of trade when real wage rigidity characterised a sector of the 
economy. He also briefly addressed the impact of trade liberalisation when 
                                                
37 By non-compensating is meant wages that are not designed to reimburse recipients either for higher 
levels of skill or higher levels of disutility associated with the work in question.  
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external economies exist in production. Ultimately, what his modeling showed 
was that the immobility of factors of production in and of themselves was 
insufficient to negate the gains from trade liberalisation and that it was only 
when combined with wage rigidity that a country might lose from trade.38 This 
could happen if trade liberalisation resulted in relative prices moving against the 
sector where rigid wages applied. Even then, a welfare loss (in the sense of 
lower national income) was not a certainty as the output loss had to be weighed 
against the terms of trade gain. The same scenario holds if, due to external 
economies, trade liberalisation resulted in a country specialising in the good 
where it had a comparative disadvantage.  
 
Hagen (1958) addressed the implications of trade liberalisation when non-
compensating wage differentials exist between sectors for both a one factor and 
two factor economy. In the one factor (Ricardian type) economy, he showed 
that it was feasible for a country to specialise in the wrong good; that is to say, 
the good where it has a comparative disadvantage. This would occur if the wage 
differential was sufficiently large to cause the domestic relative price of the 
good with the underlying comparative advantage to exceed the international 
relative price. In that instance, the country would be better off (in the sense of 
having higher levels of national income) if the high-wage sector were protected. 
In the two factor case the effects of a wage differential are two fold. First, it 
causes the production possibility frontier to shrink as resources are not 
efficiently allocated between sectors. The high-wage sector employs too much 
capital and too little labour and the reverse is the case for the low-wage sector. 
The second effect is to create a wedge between domestic relative prices and the 
marginal rate of transformation along the distorted production possibility 
frontier. Again, trade protection of the high-wage good would be welfare 
enhancing in the sense already described. However, trade protection would be 
insufficient to return the economy to the more efficient production possibility 
frontier. That would require a labour subsidy equal to the difference in wages 
between the two sectors.  
                                                
38 It was Johnson (1965) who explained the insufficiency of factor immobility to negate the gains from 
trade by highlighting that immobility of factors is not sufficient to disrupt the first order conditions for  
Pareto optimality. In other words, factors of production can still be paid their opportunity cost.  
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These two seminal papers inspired a flurry of successors, the most prominent of 
which were Bhagwati and Ramaswami (1963), Johnson (1965), Kemp and 
Neighi (1969), Bhagwati, Ramaswami and Srinivasan (1969), Pattanaik (1970), 
Batra and Pattanaik (1971), Bhagwati (1971), Magee (1973), Brecher (1974a, 
1974b), Bhagwati and Srinivasan (1974) and Corden and Findlay (1975). The 
succeeding literature in this field had two principal themes. The first was to 
analyse the impact of trade liberalisation for varying types of factor market 
imperfections and varying assumptions as to the production structure of the 
economy. The other was to address first best policy issues when such market 
imperfections exist and to rank policies in terms of their welfare impact. These 
two themes were not always distinct with some contributions developing new 
models and also ranking policy instruments.  
 
Pattanaik (1970) showed that free trade is still superior to autarky and a lower 
tariff to a higher tariff when factors of production are completely immobile (an 
exchange economy), provided that factor price rigidity is defined in terms of the 
import good. Likewise, when factors are inter-sectorally mobile and a wage 
differential exists between sectors, trade (and lower tariffs) will still be better 
than autarky (and higher tariffs) provided the distortion does not result in the 
country specialising in the wrong good. Conversely, when factors are immobile 
and factor prices are rigid in terms of the export good (or some constant utility 
combination of the export and import goods) or if the country specialises where 
it has a comparative disadvantage due to the wage differential, then, one could 
not make the welfare case for free trade or lower tariffs.  
 
Brecher (1974a) looked at the impact of trade liberalisation in a Heckscher-
Ohlin type 2x2 economy with a binding economy-wide minimum wage. (By 
binding is meant that the wage is above the market clearing level and so results 
in involuntary unemployment). The welfare impact of trade liberalisation 
depends on whether it renders the constraint more or less binding. For a labour-
abundant economy, trade liberalisation would increase labour demand and be 
employment and welfare-enhancing. On the other hand, for a capital-abundant 
country, it would reduce labour demand and employment and, provided the 
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economy remained incompletely specialised, it would reduce welfare. The 
welfare impact when a country ends up completely specialising in the capital-
intensive good is ambiguous.  
 
Corden and Findlay (1975) combined an inter-sectoral wage differential with 
equilibrium unemployment in a Harris-Todaro type model, where capital is 
sector specific but labour is inter-sectorally mobile. In this instance, the labour-
allocation mechanism equalizes rural wages with expected urban wages, where 
the probability of getting a job is determined by the proportion of the urban 
labour force that is employed.  Most of the focus of their contribution is on 
optimum policy intervention, but they highlighted the disadvantages of tariffs: 
first, for the consumption distortions that they create, but also because, in a 
Harris-Todaro type economy, protection of the high-wage industrial sector 
could conceivably result in lower net output at world prices, due to the 
reduction in agricultural output that such a policy would induce.   
 
4.2.2 Why factor distortions posed a minimal threat to neoclassical trade 
theory 
According to Harry Johnson (1965, p. 260), it was Bhagwati and Ramaswami 
(1963) who reduced all ad hoc arguments concerning tariffs to a simple 
application of second best welfare theory. Their innovation was to interpret 
market imperfections in terms of a violation of one of the conditions of Pareto 
optimality.39 They reviewed Haberler’s external economy example and Hagen’s 
wage differential in the two- factor case. First, they showed that trade 
liberalisation could still be welfare enhancing notwithstanding the market 
imperfections posited. The main emphasis of their paper was to show that 
domestic distortions do not automatically lead to a recommendation for 
protection but rather to some other form of government intervention, the nature 
of which depends on the type of imperfection present in the economy. So, for 
example, in Haberler’s instance of external economies in production, they called 
                                                
39 Pareto optimality under conditions of free trade hold if the MRT = MRS = FRT, where MRT is the 
domestic marginal rate of transformation (or slope of the production-possibility frontier), MRS is the 
marginal rate of substitution in the preferences of consumers and FRT is the foreign rate of 
transformation or international relative prices if we are considering a small price-taking economy.  
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for a production subsidy in the relevant sector, whereas for Hagen’s wage-
differential case, they argued that the optimal policy was a wage subsidy. They 
also claimed that there may be cases where a welfare-improving tariff does not 
exist when there are domestic distortions. This claim appeared to be supported 
by Johnson (1965) invoking second best arguments and claiming that, a priori, 
one cannot know whether a substitution of one violation of Pareto optimality 
conditions for another would worsen or improve economic welfare. This was 
refuted by Kemp and Neigishi (1969), and Bhagwati, Ramswami  and 
Srinivasan (1969) accepted that their prior conclusion had been erroneous. In 
their clarification the latter showed that if two out of the three Pareto optimality 
conditions held, then a tariff could be welfare-improving even if it disrupted the 
equality of the two variables that originally satisfied Pareto optimality. However 
they showed that if none of the three variables was equal; that is to say if the 
domestic marginal rate of substitution, the domestic marginal rate of 
transformation and the foreign rate of transformation  all differ (MRS ≠ MRT ≠ 
FRT), then there is no feasible single policy intervention to raise welfare above 
the laissez-faire level.  
 
The upshot of Bhagwati and Ramaswami’s (1963) contribution to the debate 
was to shift the focus away from trade intervention when domestic distortions 
exist and towards other forms of policy intervention. The nature of the 
intervention depends on the nature of the distortion and the structure of the 
economy. So, for example, Corden and Findlay (1975) showed that if capital 
was sector-specific and labour inter-sectorally mobile but Harris-Todaro-type 
search unemployment did not exist, then a wage subsidy to increase 
employment in the higher-wage manufacturing sector would be the optimal 
policy. But if there was Harris-Todaro-type unemployment, then the first best 
policy would be a uniform wage subsidy regardless of the sector of 
employment. Bhagwati and Srinivasan (1974) had reached similar conclusions.  
 
Bhagwati (1971) synthesized the various contributions into a common analytical 
framework whereby he both enumerated optimal policies for different forms of 
distortions but also ranked suboptimal policy interventions. Specifically in the 
wage differential case, he ranked production subsidies as second best and trade 
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intervention as third best. According to Bardhan, Bhagwati (1971) laid down the 
general principle of targeting in economic policy: 
 
departures from the usual marginal conditions of Pareto efficiency are best 
tackled by using policy instruments that act most directly on the relevant 
margin. Not merely is this the most general result available to this day in the 
theory of trade policy, it allowed liberal economists the leeway, in departure 
from the practice of classical economists, to be interventionist on matters of 
domestic policy and at the same time to be a free-trader in the international 
arena (Bardhan, 1993, p. 138). 
 
Other less weighty criticisms of trade intervention, when factor market 
distortions exist, were issued by Batra and Pattanaik (1971) and Magee (1973). 
The former claimed that this sort of analysis conflated two effects, the effect of 
the original distortion and the effect of trade liberalisation, but that it attributed 
the potential inferior outcome to one effect only, trade liberalisation. The latter 
was uttering the general view of economists when he said that “the rigidity may 
be caused by a combination of institutional forces such as minimum wage 
legislation, governmental regulation or control, labour unions or other forces” 
(Magee, 1973, p. 4). The implication was that trade would always be beneficial 
provided institutionally created distortions did not exist. If they did exist, then it 
was more accurate to compare distortion-riddled free trade equilibrium with its 
counterpart in protected trade than to compare full-employment autarky with 
less than full employment free trade equilibrium. While trade liberalisation 
would always confer consumption gains in the form of lower prices, the effect 
on production depends on whether the policy shift would exacerbate or 
ameliorate the underlying distortion. If it ameliorated the distortion then trade 
liberalisation would be unambiguously positive, whereas if it exacerbated it, 
then production losses would have to be weighed against consumption gains.  
 
Ultimately, the heretical idea that trade intervention could be justified because 
labour markets do not function in the idealised manner that trade theory had 
traditionally assumed did not present much of a challenge to the neoclassical 
trade model. This was partly because undesirable labour market phenomena 
were reinterpreted within a neoclassical framework as being the product of 
some exogenous distortion. Modeling the effects of trade proceeded by 
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introducing a specific distortion (capable of rectification) into an otherwise 
perfectly competitive product market. General equilibrium was maintained and 
model closure was facilitated by the perfectly competitive product market 
assumption which ensured marginal cost pricing. An added bonus was that such 
distortions did not dispense with the use of general functional forms to describe 
preferences and technology. Moreover, it only marginally weakened the 
presumed beneficial welfare effects of trade liberalisation, since protection was 
rarely more than a third-ranked policy measure among the hierarchy of 
measures, and optimal policy was simply a question of getting prices right, so 
that they reflected their Pareto-efficiency scarcity values. The concession was at 
the level of laissez-faire not free trade. According to trade historian Irwin (1996, 
p. 170), the theory of domestic divergences constituted an important landmark 
because it established general, powerful principles that limited the damage 
suffered by free trade from any number of imaginable market failures. The only 
broad consequence was that once and for all the case for free trade was delinked 
from the case for laissez-faire. Irwin claimed that the linking of laissez-faire and 
free trade was a confusion of which many critics of free trade were guilty.  
 
4.2.3 Weaknesses in the neoclassical analysis of labour markets and trade 
The neoclassical analysis invokes a lot of extra (mainly implicit) assumptions. 
First, it takes for granted that the root of the problem is some exogenous 
interference that is preventing labour from being priced correctly. This in itself 
is a heroic assumption since it dismisses the possibility that the problem may be 
endogenous to the system. Second, it assumes that the distortion is identifiable 
and correct scarcity values knowable. Only in this way can policy makers apply 
the policy instrument directly on the relevant margin. Third, it dismisses that 
possibility that there may be multiple distortions at work. If this were the case, 
then second best considerations would be relevant and Bhagwati’s and 
Bardhan’s policy prescriptions may be inappropriate. Fourth, it presupposes that 
there are no other constraints that could render first and second best policies 
(usually some kind of subsidies) infeasible. One reason for the popularity of 
tariffs or border taxes in developing countries is because they are a relatively 
easy way to raise taxes, especially if the fiscal system is underdeveloped. This 
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issue of fiscal and distributional constraints was raised by Anand and Joshi 
(1979) who showed that the ranking of policy instruments may change when 
these additional constraints are recognised. Fifth, it ignores the possibility that 
there may be political and social constraints limiting the applicability of first 
best policies. Trade theorists are negative about trade taxes as they see them as 
causing a consumption distortion, when consumers leave the market due to 
higher tariff induced prices. This loss is considered deadweight since it cannot 
be recouped. Yet they assume zero costs with other forms of revenue raising. A 
priori, there is no justification, not just for the assumption of zero administrative 
costs, but also for the weaker assumption of administrative neutrality across the 
different forms of revenue raising and spending. However, the principal 
objection to the Bhagwati inspired generalised rules regarding policy ranking 
has to be that of oversimplification. As Rodrik (1987) showed, it fails to 
recognise the endogenous element of many distortions. Certain features of the 
world are assumed fixed and others variable, but the fixed elements may also be 
capable of variation based on behavioural responses to new policies. So, for 
example, a production subsidy designed to encourage output in a sector where 
positive externalities exist, may encourage a change in plant design that results 
in less positive externalities. Policymakers thought plant design was exogenous 
when it may be endogenous. Rodrik holds that such policy errors can be 
avoided if endogenous behaviour is recognised by policy makers, which can 
only occur if policy intervention is conducted on a case-by-case basis, as 
opposed to following general rules, Bhagwati style.   
 
The conclusion that policies need to be tailored to particular circumstances is a 
big departure from neo-classical orthodoxy, which assumes that universal 
principles guide the operation of markets and hence a universal one size fits all 
policy is appropriate. The latter is the thinking behind the policies of the major 
international organisations such as the World Bank and International Monetary 
Fund (IMF).40 The issue of the endogeneity of distortions should cause policy 
makers to question whether something that is a product of market processes and 
                                                
40 It is worth remembering that List, when making his case for protection, specifically said that the case 
for duties and their levels could not be determined theoretically but on the special conditions of the 
country in question. (List, 2005b [1841], p. 231).  
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human behaviour can be addressed or even redressed by simply tinkering with 
the price mechanism through taxes and subsidies. Moreover, there is the added 
issue of the diffuseness or otherwise of market distortions. The neoclassical 
approach of treating distortions individually and assuming that they are 
unconnected stands in marked contrast to the theoretical approach of critics of 
the orthodoxy such as Myrdal. In contrast to the Krugman allegation that old 
development economists lacked technical competence, it has been suggested 
that their resistance to formalism was a matter of choice (Fine, 2008, p. 8). That 
their theories contained multiple distortions (to use neoclassical language) 
would support this thesis. Formalism would inevitably have resulted in so many 
compromises that the resulting theories, while elegant and tractable, would have 
been of questionable relevance.  
 
4.2.4 Diminishing returns to orthodox theorising as an explanation for the 
research on neoclassical labour markets and trade 
The structure of the neoclassical trade model in its purest unsullied form, as an 
extension of perfectly competitive general equilibrium, was effectively 
complete by the mid-1950s. Thereafter (or at least for the following twenty 
years), modifications to the structure were of a cosmetic nature. These included 
allowing for variations in: (i) the number of factors of production; (ii) the 
number of goods (including non-traded goods) and; (iii) the degree of inter-
sectoral mobility of factors of production. A feature of the original neoclassical 
trade model is not simply the highly stylised (and unrealistic) depiction of the 
social environment in which workers, consumers and producers are presumed to 
operate, but how impervious trade theorists appeared to be to empirical reality. 
Empirical inconveniences such as the mass involuntary unemployment of the 
1930s or different wages being paid to apparently identical workers did not push 
the juggernaut off course during the period when the neoclassical trade model 
was still under construction. This seemed to change in the 1950s, 60s, and 70s 
(as the previous sections indicate), when trade analysis was conducted taking 
account of unemployment and differential wages being paid to identical 
workers. It is my contention the motivation for this change was not the patent 
empirical inadequacies of the neoclassical trade model but, rather, diminishing 
theoretical returns to the mainstream construct. There was a limit to the 
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theoretical harvest that could be reaped from the main props of neoclassical 
method; that is to say, individual optimisation and perfectly competitive 
markets. The structure was almost complete and if theorising was to continue, 
then something would have to give. The first thing to give was the assumption 
of perfectly competitive factor markets. Arguably, this was the first permitted 
wrinkle in the otherwise pristine structure of perfectly competitive general 
equilibrium, because it was the least damaging to the mainstream method and to 
the normative implications of the application of this method.  Readdressing 
(previously neglected) labour market issues as the outcome of a factor market 
imperfection still preserved perfect competition in product markets, it still 
permitted general equilibrium analysis, it still allowed for general functional 
forms to be used in production and consumption, and it still resulted in the 
normative conclusion that free trade was probably a desirable policy. The only 
concession that needed to be made was that laissez-faire might not be the best 
policy, depending on how trade interacted with the market imperfection. This 
was a small policy concession, doubtless worth paying, in the light of the 
theoretical dividend that it yielded in terms of new theoretical outputs.  
 
4.3 Increasing Returns: A Spotted History within Neoclassical Trade 
Theory 
 
4.3.1 Questioning the unpalatable but preserving the useful: the irrelevance 
of empirical relevance 
It is curious that a phenomenon so widely recognised and so central to the 
efficiency case of industrial capitalism as economies of scale should have 
received such shabby treatment at the hands of the very practitioners who were 
considered economic experts and defenders of laissez-faire capitalism. Arrow 
(2000) contrasted the history of competitive equilibrium, which he described as 
cumulative, with the more erratic history of increasing returns. He attributed the 
steady history of competitive equilibrium to its coherence, in the sense of 
supplying answers to all sorts of questions (even if it was frequently at variance 
with observation). By contrast, the erratic history of increasing returns can be 
attributed to its incoherence. The reason he gave for this difference was 
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“mathematical accident” that derived partly from the difficulties of articulating 
a theory of value when increasing returns exist (Arrow, 2000, p. 173).  
 
According to Arrow (2000, p. 171), Smith’s theory of value, which equated 
price with cost, implicitly assumed constant returns to scale. This is despite the 
centrality of increasing returns to Adam Smith’s case for laissez-faire and free 
trade. David Ricardo ignored increasing returns, while John Stuart Mill, despite 
acknowledging that increasing returns could lead to monopoly, otherwise 
operated within the tradition established by Ricardo (Arrow, 2000, p. 172). 
While Auguste Cournot (1971 [1838]) was the first to recognise that increasing 
returns were not consistent with parametric pricing, it was Alfred Marshall who 
fully realised how devastating economies of scale were for the emerging 
discipline of economics. Simply that economies of scale are not compatible with 
central (fundamentally static) constructs of neoclassical theory namely, 
optimisation, unique equilibrium and perfect competition. His ingenious way 
out of the impasse was to focus on external economies of scale, whereby the 
industry supply curve was negatively sloped in price-output space, but at the 
level of the firm, it was positively sloped (Marshall, 1920, Book V, Ch. XII and 
Appendix H). This way, marginalist analysis and competitive markets could be 
retained while still preserving some of the central Smithian insights about the 
productivity benefits of extended markets and large industries. One problem 
associated with such economies (that is not immediately visible because of the 
partial equilibrium nature of his analysis) is that of multiple equilibria. The 
existence of the latter obviously creates problems for the deterministic world 
view of markets where laissez-faire is considered the best policy. So, while 
making economies of scale external to the decision-making unit resolved one 
problem, it created another. Graham’s (1923) case for permanent protection, on 
the grounds of variable returns to scale in different sectors of the economy, can 
also be viewed as an argument for intervention in order to achieve a better 
equilibrium. The reaction of the mainstream to Graham’s thesis is very 
revealing, in that they conceded the logical merit of his case under the strict 
assumption that such economies were external to the firm (a distinction that 
Graham did not make) but then dismissed it as a theoretical curiosity with little 
empirical merit (Viner, 1937, p. 481). Regardless of whether such economies 
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were internal or external, it never occurred to Knight (1925) to apply the same 
standard of empirical relevance to the construct of perfect competition as it did 
to the less amenable construct of external economies of scale. It would seem 
that empirical relevance gets invoked when useful but otherwise has limited 
impact on the nature of neoclassical theorising.41  
 
4.3.2 The grudging acceptance of external economies: theoretical productivity 
reigns again 
Despite the initial hostile reaction to Graham’s thesis and the scepticism 
regarding the existence of external economies of scale, a sporadic literature did 
develop in succeeding decades (up to the 1980s) that incorporated external 
economies of scale into the otherwise conventional perfectly competitive 
general equilibrium model. This literature fell broadly into two camps, one 
which addressed the positive and normative consequences of trade liberalisation 
when economies of scale exist and the other which looked at the implications of 
variable returns to scale for traditional core propositions in trade, such as the 
Stolper-Samuelson and Rybczynski theorems, respectively. Related to both 
concerns was the shape of the production possibility frontier in the presence of 
variable returns to scale.  
 
Tinbergen’s (1945) contribution to the debate was to express the Graham 
argument of variable returns to scale using geometry as opposed to numbers. He 
acknowledged that he did not differ in his conclusions from Graham, even 
though he questioned the consistency of the latter’s numbers. He showed that 
when the production possibility frontier is concave; that is to say, when there 
are increased opportunity costs associated with specialisation, then the usual 
effects (incomplete specialisation) and gains from trade prevail. Likewise, when 
increasing returns exist in all sectors (a situation represented by a convex 
production possibility frontier in two-good space), gains from trade are to be 
expected, though in this instance trade induces complete specialisation. The 
interesting case is the Graham example where both increasing returns to scale 
                                                
41 Another critic of Marshallian external economies of scale was Sraffa (1926) who dismissed the 
concept, (along with that of perfect competition) on the grounds of empirical implausibility. For him 
internal economies of scale were more probable with demand acting as a brake on increased 
production.  
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(IRS) and decreasing returns to scale (DRS) exist simultaneously in different 
sectors. Such production possibilities are characterised by a production 
possibility frontier (PPF) that is both concave and convex over different ranges. 
While trade may be welfare enhancing (especially if the country specialises 
completely in the IRS good or incompletely in the DRS good along the concave 
portion of the PPF), the economy could also settle at a sub-optimal equilibrium 
simply because there is more than one output mix that is an equilibrium. 
Moreover, he assumed that in the IRS industry, prices were determined by 
average (not marginal) costs, giving rise to inefficient output mixes. He 
concluded that for countries to gain from trade, they must either have full 
information (so as not to settle at an inferior production point) or they must 
engage in marginal cost pricing (a view at variance with his theory of pricing 
when IRS exist).  
 
The value added of Tinbergen’s contribution, over and above what Graham 
(1923) had to say, was his application of geometrical tools (PPF and 
indifference curves). This is unsurprising given the relatively recent 
development and application of those tools to trade theory in the 1930s. 
However, it is also noteworthy that Tinbergen’s professional background was as 
a trained physicist, one who along with a wave of other scientists, switched to 
economics during the depression of the 1930s. According to Mirowski (1991, 
p.152), these new recruits to economics had only a passing acquaintance with 
the long tradition of economic theorising but were armed with more up-to-date 
mathematical techniques, which they immediately applied (with questionable 
effect) to the neoclassical programme. It could be viewed as a case of tools 
looking for suitable applications.  
 
Matthews (1949/50) addressed IRS and convex PPFs in instances where he is 
explicit on the external nature of such economies of scale. For Matthews, 
positing IRS as external to the firm is important since it results in a divergence 
between private marginal opportunity cost, that is relevant for managerial 
decisions, and social marginal opportunity cost, that determines the slope of the 
PPF. Unlike Tinbergen, he did not believe that complete specialisation was 
inevitable if IRS existed in all sectors. He showed that incomplete specialisation 
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could be a stable equilibrium if the slope of the PPF was less convex than the 
slope of the indifference curves. His conclusions were that the presence of IRS 
of an external variety could result in both countries having sub-optimal levels of 
consumption or one country being worse off in a trading equilibrium than under 
self-sufficiency.  
 
For Chipman (1965), the most interesting consequence of external economies 
was the existence of multiple equilibria (Chipman, p. 749). He claimed that 
common to Matthews (1949/50, p. 154), Meade (1952, Figure XVII) and Kemp 
(1964, pp. 114-117) was the depiction of two stable equlibria, where 
specialisation was complete and one unstable equilibrium, where specialisation 
was incomplete. Government intervention (such as a tariff) of a temporary 
nature is sufficient to move an economy from a stable equilibrium to a preferred 
stable one, but preserving an unstable equilibrium would require permanent 
protection. Chipman made passing reference to Graham and Matthew’s 
argument that trade may be welfare disimproving but refused to elaborate on the 
issue on the grounds that what interested him more were positive issues such as 
stability of equilibrium.  
 
The accepted view as articulated by Tinbergen was that when all sectors were 
characterised by IRS, then the PPF was convex, whereas when economies were 
variable across sectors, the PPF was concave near the axis representing the DRS 
good and convex near the axis representing the IRS good. Minabe (1966) 
pointed out that IRS in production was not sufficient to ensure that the PPF was 
convex when there was more than one factor of production. He showed that 
whether the PPF was concave, linear or convex depended on the relative 
strength of the returns to scale and the relative strength of factor-intensity 
effects. Herberg and Kemp (1969) illustrated that, contrary to the geometric 
exposition of Tinbergen, the production possibility frontier was actually 
concave at the axis representing the increasing returns good and convex at the 
axis showing the decreasing returns product. Panagariya (1981) corroborated 
the geometric assertions of Herberg and Kemp and demonstrated that an 
implication of the properly formulated PPF was that an economy (especially if it 
was small) could end up specialising completely in the DRS good, something 
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that would never occur with the IRS good. Such an equilibrium would not 
necessarily imply welfare losses from trade (as account has to be taken of terms 
of trade effects) but it would be inferior to an internal production equilibrium. A 
temporary subsidy to the IRS sector would improve matters but it would not be 
welfare maximising. That would require a permanent subsidy. Moreover it is 
not necessary for the country to change its comparative advantage to benefit 
from subsidising the IRS good.  
 
Much of the normative work on external economies was designed to show that 
the case as made by Graham really was a theoretical curiosity that was possible 
but unlikely. Kemp and Negishi (1970) demonstrated that a sufficient condition 
for a country not to lose from trade in a multi-commodity world was for its 
increasing returns sector not to contract and its decreasing returns sector not to 
expand. Negishi (1972) argued that if scale economies were the result of 
learning, then they were irreversible and so a country could not lose from trade 
even if scale economies existed. Krugman (1987a), in an elaboration of Kemp 
and Neighsi, showed how all countries could gain from trade regardless of 
whether their increasing returns to scale industry contracted or not. A sufficient 
condition was international factor price equalisation and the global non-
contraction of output in the increasing returns sector. In other words, it did not 
matter where the increasing returns industry was located. To get this result, he 
had to assume that labour was the only factor of production, that the other sector 
exhibited constant returns to scale and that trade resulted in the constant returns 
to scale good being produced in both countries. The only problem with this 
analysis was that if trade resulted in complete specialisation in both countries, 
then international wage equalization would not exist and the country producing 
the constant returns good could lose. Krugman (1987a) was at pains to state, 
however, that he considered the former case (international wage equalization) to 
be a not unusual event, although he admitted that if countries were very unequal 
in size, complete specialisation was more likely. Finally, Ethier (1979) 
resurrected an earlier argument of Viner (1937, p. 480) claiming that if such 
external economies of scale existed, they were more likely to be a function of 
the size of the international industry and not the national industry. His rationale 
was that a larger international industry would allow for greater specialisation in 
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the production of intermediates, at lower cost. In this instance, as long as the 
global output of the increasing returns sector increases, all countries can gain.  
 
Another line of investigation in this literature was to see how the presence of 
variable returns to scale modified or otherwise altered the standard trade 
theorems associated with the constant returns to scale, perfectly competitive 
general equilibrium model of trade. Minabe (1966) showed that if the PPF 
retained its concave shape (the factor- intensity effect being stronger than IRS), 
then the Stolper-Samuelson (SS) theorem on the income distribution effects of 
trade would continue to hold. On the other hand, if IRS resulted in a convex 
PPF, then SS would no longer hold. Jones (1968) did to Minabe’s analysis what 
Tinbergen did to Graham’s; that is to say, he applied new tools to essentially the 
same issue. Using algebra to describe the economy and assuming that trade 
always resulted in incomplete specialsiation, he showed that SS and the 
Rybczynski theorems do not readily hold when there are IRS. SS can be 
reversed if external economies of scale are large enough or marginal and 
average factor intensities across sectors of the economy do not correspond in 
terms of rank. Moreover a convex PPF can be expected if average and marginal 
factor intensities differ in terms of rank. The Rybczynski theorem (which in the 
standard, constant returns to scale, general equilibrium model, predicts that an 
increase in a factor of production will result in an increase in the output of the 
sector that uses intensively that factor of production and a decrease in the output 
of the other sector) will only hold if average and marginal factor intensities 
correspond across sectors. Mayer (1974) corroborated Jones’s finding with 
regard to SS but showed that that when variable returns to scale exist across 
sectors, Rybczynski will continue to hold provided the system is stable. Finally 
Panagariya (1980) revisited SS and Rybczynski in the presence of variable 
returns to scale but with less restrictive assumptions. First he showed that for SS 
and Rybczynski to hold, it is neither necessary nor sufficient for the PPF to be 
concave. Second, he drew a distinction between relative returns to factors of 
production and real returns, showing that when variable returns to scale (VRS) 
exist, they do not necessarily move in the same direction. So for example, if the 
relative price of a good rises, the real return to the factor of production that is 
used less intensively in its production could rise (contrary to SS) but the 
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relative return could fall (in accordance with SS). Some of these issues on 
factor returns had already been raised by Batra (1968), as acknowledged by 
Panagariya (1980), but, as is common in this kind of theoretical research, he 
claimed that his analysis was more general and dependent on less restrictive 
assumptions than that which preceded him.  
 
Just as with factor market imperfections, it would seem that the form of 
theorising described in this section was more internally driven by a desire to 
obtain new theoretical results (through marginal modifications to the dominant 
theoretical model) as opposed to being ontologically driven by a desire to 
describe social reality better. However, an unexpected bonus was that some of 
these models did explain certain features of social reality in a more realistic way 
than the models that had preceded them. The traditional constant returns to 
scale, perfectly competitive trade model, predicted that international trade 
occurred because countries were different. Allowing for increasing returns to 
scale led to the prediction that trade could occur because there were inherent 
efficiency benefits to be derived from specialisation. Melvin (1969) showed that 
trade was possible between two identical economies (in terms of production and 
tastes) provided increasing returns to scale exist. This would have been 
impossible with traditional models. Such trade leads to greater global efficiency 
to the extent that it permits the concentration of industry in one or a few centres, 
thereby reaping the efficiencies of large scale production. It also provides a 
rationale for the observed phenomenon of large trade flows between relatively 
similar countries. A less desirable aesthetic outcome of a Melvin-type model 
was that it introduced an inherent arbitrariness into trade theory in terms of 
explaining which country is likely to export which good. It suggests a crucial 
role for accident, history and policy as determinants of the international pattern 
of production and specialisation.  
 
Similar to the factor-market imperfections literature, the external economies of 
scale research had limited impact on the main body of international trade theory. 
According to Krugman (1987a), this was because it could not be reconciled in a 
fruitful way with comparative advantage, which he ascribed to its excessive 
loyalty to the techniques of traditional models, such as PPFs and offer curves. 
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He claimed that such research was theoretically awkward and empirically 
elusive and was a literature with little influence (Krugman, 1990, p. 4). The lack 
of influence until recently is a valid claim. (A quick perusal of international 
trade textbooks in the early 1980s is testament to same). However, this could 
also be attributed to its very successful replacement by the so called new trade 
theory that emerged in the late 1970s and 1980s which introduced a new 
heuristic into international trade research; that is to say, the analysis of 
economies of scale under conditions of imperfect competition, rather than to its 
empirical elusiveness.  
 
When assessing the historical literature on external economies of scale, Gomes 
and Irwin fall into a predictable pattern, with Gomes more loath to express 
directly his own opinion. He outlined the arguments, said that Graham’s thesis 
had intrinsic merit, then asked the age old question of how relevant it was to 
contemporary international commerce. He answered indirectly by citing the 
anti-interventionist preference of a “significant strand” of modern literature, 
concluding that if such economies were international, Graham’s argument for 
protection was invalidated, “according to Ethier” (Gomes, 1990, p. 101). Irwin 
is more refreshingly direct. For him the case for protection has not been made 
because our understanding of the determinants and effects of external 
economies is so weak (Irwin, 1996, p. 152). Neither writer questioned why 
external economies of scale were not central to mainstream research until 
relatively recently. Irwin, erroneously, said that trade-related aspects of the 
debate had evaporated until the early 1980s, basically overlooking the work of 
Kemp, Negishi and others already cited in this section. For him, the recent 
analysis (especially Panagariya, 1981) showed that Graham, taken on his own 
assumptions, was correct, but subsidisation was a better policy than protection. 
Gomes said that renewed interest in the Graham controversy resulted in more 
thorough analysis than previously with the conclusion mentioned above. It is 
clear that both writers accept that more recent research, and the methods used, 
added clarity to the debate. Yet for all this more “thorough” analysis, Graham’s 
thesis has not been fundamentally altered. It did, however, afford theorists 
ample opportunity to write lots more abstruse papers on the shape of the 
production possibility frontier and the nature of equilibrium (or equilibria), 
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while downplaying (exactly as Knight, Viner and Hablerler had done) the 
normative significance of the argument. It is paradoxical that a concept so 
disputed as external economies of scale should have become an indispensable 
component of trade theory once it finally (propelled by the new growth theory) 
attempted to cast off its static garb and move down the dynamic path.  
 
4.3.3 The indispensability of external economies to a later heuristic: 
reconciling optimisation and dynamics 
The neoclassical project is erected on the foundation of optimal decisions taken 
by rational individual agents. Such an edifice implies equilibrium outcomes, at 
least in a personal sense. When a rational decision making agent is in personal 
equilibrium, he/she is using his/her scarce resources in the best possible way 
and has no incentive to deviate from this path unless the constraints that he/she 
faces change. In the general equilibrium world of neoclassical economics, only 
exogenous changes in resource endowments, technology or preferences 
stimulate changed actions on the part of micro decision makers. By contrast 
with behavioural views of human nature or Marxian analysis, the neoclassical 
perspective is inherently static, since optimisation by all seeing all knowing 
agents and continuous change are not obviously compatible. Either the agent is 
not all knowing or the agent’s preferences are continually changing (both of 
which bring the methodology of optimisation into question) or else purposeful 
human action has consequences that cannot be fully appropriated by the 
individual. Hence external economies are indispensable if optimisation is to be 
reconciled with endogenous change.  
 
From a mechanical point of view, neoclassical theory requires that the actions of 
individual agents, when viewed collectively, generate increasing returns if 
endogenous change is to be built into the system. In other words, an agent might 
optimise and use his/her scarce resources in the best possible way but the 
system generates positive feedback, either in the form of augmented resources 
or increased productivity of existing resources, which leads the agent to change 
his/her behaviour and do more of the growth generating activity. This is an issue 
to which I will return to in section 4.5.  
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4.4 New Trade Theory: Technical Wizardry to what Effect?  
 
4.4.1 Separating truth from fiction 
New trade theory is, of course, not new in terms of the subject matter that it 
addresses. Spatial issues, economies of scale, economies of agglomeration and 
imperfect markets have long been the subject of regional and location studies. 
Theories of imperfect markets in neoclassical economics are also of mature 
vintage having been given academic respectability with the almost simultaneous 
publications of Robinson (1933) and Chamberlin (1933). Even the integration of 
trade and imperfect markets had earlier precedents in neoclassical trade theory 
with the work of Lovasy (1941) and Enke (1946). Yet it is valid to claim that 
what happened with static trade theorising in the 1980s represented a discrete 
break with that which had gone before. This is all the more remarkable given 
the resistance to any departure from perfectly competitive theorising that the 
profession had previously exhibited. Breaking away from perfect competition 
involved multiple compromises; specific functional forms had to be used, new 
forms of model closure had to be found and, in the case of oligopolistic models 
of trade, even general equilibrium had to be abandoned in favour of partial 
equilibrium models. Moreover, much of this new form of theorising also had 
uncomfortable normative implications for trade policy. The previously 
monolithic, aesthetically pleasing structure of trade theory whose theoretical 
results had been unambiguously supportive of free trade was replaced by a 
plethora of very specific models supportive of a variety of policy positions. 
Moreover, this new structure to trade theorising dominated the research agenda. 
The challenging question is to try to explain this apparently new departure and 
the acceptance of what had been previously so unacceptable. I remain sceptical 
of the hypothesis that it was empirically driven by the patent empirical 
inadequacies of the orthodox model.  
 
Empirical work in the 1960s and early 1970s had already highlighted the 
explanatory weakness of the orthodox trade model and its inability to explain 
similar trade between similar countries (Linder, 1961, Grubel, 1967, 1970, 
Kravis, 1971). Balassa, (1966) rationalized this trade by appealing to internal 
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economies of scale, whereby firms in a country produce only a limited range of 
potential products within an industry in order to lengthen their production runs 
in the interest of efficiency. Yet, as acknowledged by Krugman (2009), such an 
intuitively plausible explanation of empirical reality was not part of standard 
international trade theory, even as late as a decade later, because such ideas 
seemed “incomprehensible”. This incomprehensibility was due to a lack of any 
“usable model of imperfect competition” or more to the point “general 
equilibrium models of imperfect competition” (p. 563) He claimed that 
international trade, more than any other applied field in economics, was built 
around general equilibrium models. This could be considered a partially valid 
defence, since general equilibrium analysis, with its focus on market 
interdependence, does capture essential aspects of economic reality and, as 
such, is a framework that theorists justly wished to preserve. What renders it 
spurious as an argument was that it was precisely this framework that was 
jettisoned in what was a major field of international trade research for much of 
the 1980s and 1990s, that of oligopolistic competition and contestable markets. 
Also, elsewhere Krugman had asserted that economic theory was simply a 
collection of models, which for him represented the outcome of maximising 
behaviour, ideally in a general equilibrium setting, but one that is also 
acceptable as a partial equilibrium analysis (Krugman, 1995, p. 40). So if the 
history of trade theorising over the last thirty years is anything to go by, what 
renders an idea acceptable to the economic fraternity is its amenability to 
economic modeling, the essential aspect of which is individual rational decision 
making of a maximising variety and some kind of equilibrium outcome. 
Inconvenient empirical reality would be acknowledged only when it could be 
rationalised with the tools that define the mainstream economic project. It seems 
that reality must fit the tools rather than vice versa. Rather naively Krugman 
acknowledged as much when he spoke of the sociology of late twentieth century 
research, replete with technically able researchers desperate for interesting 
questions to study (p. 34). Fourteen years later in his Nobel acceptance speech 
Krugman spoke of how colleagues had tried to dissuade him from international 
trade research on the grounds that it was a “monolithic field” and “a finished 
structure, with nothing interesting left to do” (Krugman, 2009, p. 561). This 
would appear to be an admission that the traditional trade model (the perfectly 
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competitive general equilibrium construct) had run its course and was incapable 
of fruitful extension or of yielding any new theoretical results. So the emergence 
of a new heuristic in international trade research (modeling individual behaviour 
under conditions of imperfect competition) was timely, in that it offered scope 
for the derivation of a whole new set of theoretical results. Empirical relevance, 
while undoubtedly a bonus, was not the driving force behind this (not so) new 
field of research. Tractability was the necessary condition, and the scope it 
offered to derive new theoretical results appeared to be sufficient to ensure its 
academic respectability in the intellectual environment of late twentieth century 
economics. Perfectly competitive, general equilibrium models had been 
exhausted but there was the whole new arena of imperfect competition to be 
exploited.  
 
4.4.2 Monopolistic competition part 1: Homogenous firms 
The biggest problem associated with abandoning perfect competition was that 
of model closure. Lancaster (1980) and Krugman (1979) assumed that the 
market structure was monopolistic (in the Chamberlin sense), with each firm 
producing a differentiated product under conditions of increasing returns to 
scale and facing a parametric demand function. Firms in the industry can 
differentiate their products from each other, thereby giving them some degree of 
price setting and monopoly power. On the other hand, low barriers to entry 
mean that market entry will continue until economic profits are driven to zero 
(as happens in a perfectly competitive environment). Product differentiation is 
presumed to derive from consumer preferences, with Lancaster assuming that 
consumers are heterogeneous, where each has a preferred version of the 
differentiated good. Therefore, increased product variety enhances consumer 
welfare as it makes it more probable that the consumer will find his preferred 
version of the good. This account of preferences was also adopted by Helpman 
(1981). The other story is that told by Krugman (1979) and Dixit and Norman 
(1980), who adopt a Dixit-Stiglitz account of consumer preferences, whereby 
the representative consumer has an innate taste for variety, with more varieties 
adding to consumer welfare. Of the two versions of consumer preferences, 
Lanacaster’s is undoubtedly more realistic but it is also harder to model. 
According to Krugman (1987a), it makes little difference to the outcome of 
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trade theorising which version is adopted and, given how influential Krugman’s 
work has been, his version will be recounted.  
 
Krugman (1979) showed how two identical countries, each with a 
monopolistically competitive industry, could gainfully engage in intra-industry 
trade with each other. The essence of the model is contained in three equations: 
(i) marginal cost = marginal revenue, which yields the price over marginal cost 
mark up; (ii) average cost = price, which determines the level of output for the 
representative firm and; (iii) labour demand = labour supply, which determines 
the number of firms in the industry, since labour demand is proportionate to the 
output of the representative firm. In this model, the gains from trade come from 
increased product variety and increased scale of production, which lowers price. 
The direction of trade, which country will export which good, is indeterminate 
although the volume of trade is not. Krugman (1980) extended his original 
model by introducing transport costs and allowing for diversity of tastes 
between countries. This gave rise to a home market effect, whereby a country 
has a competitive advantage in the good for which a large home market exists. 
An important theoretical extension that restored the unity of trade theory was 
the uniting of monopolistic competition and economies of scale with 
comparative advantage (see Krugman, 1981, Dixit and Norman, 1980 and 
Helpman, 1981). This was done by allowing for more than one sector and by 
assuming that factor intensities differed between sectors but were the same 
within sectors. In other words, all differentiated goods within a sector were 
assumed to be produced with the same factor proportions.  
 
Despite differences in detail, what these models showed was that when 
countries had very different factor endowments and when the factor intensity of 
production differed across industries, then trade was more likely to conform to 
the predictions of the H-O model; that is to say, be trade of an inter-industry 
variety where each country exports the good that uses relatively intensively its 
abundant factor. Alternatively, when countries were very similar in terms of 
their factor endowments, then trade was more likely to be of an intra-industry 
variety. Another feature of Krugman (1981) was that his results substantially 
weakened the traditional Stolper-Samuleson prediction that trade resulted in 
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winners and losers within countries. He showed that if goods are highly 
differentiated, even scarce factors of production can gain from trade, albeit to a 
lesser extent than the abundant factor. That result derives from the presumed 
benign impact of increased variety on consumer welfare. Alternatively, if goods 
are highly substitutable (less differentiated), the scarce factor has an increased 
risk of loss but may still avoid being worse off after trade liberalisation if the 
trading countries are not too dissimilar in factor endowments. According to 
Krugman this latter result was his “killer ap”, an insight that was different and 
that mattered (Krugman, 2009, p. 564). Arguably (though Krugman does not 
say so explicitly), this result mattered for ideological reasons, to the extent that 
it implied low risk of losers from trade liberalisation.  
 
This new departure in trade theorising had much to recommend it. The depiction 
of markets (where firms are price makers) and technology (where economies of 
scale may exist) represented an improvement in terms of realism over the type 
of firms and forms of technology that were assumed to exist in perfectly 
competitive environments. It also theorised the real and important phenomenon 
of intra-industry trade. It preserved the valuable structure of general 
equilibrium, albeit at a cost of using specific and highly special functional 
forms. In addition it was possible to integrate these new theoretical insights with 
the older H-O model of inter-industry trade, thereby giving the impression of 
continuity with the past and, at the same time, knowledge advancement. Even 
the normative implications were attractive, illustrating extra potential (though 
not guaranteed) gains from trade due to economies of scale and product variety.  
 
Notwithstanding all their apparently multiple advantages, these models failed to 
inspire much subsequent theorising (of the general equilibrium monopolistically 
competitive variety) or, especially, empirical work in the 1980s and 1990s. In 
his review of the structure of international trade in the Journal of Economic 
Perspectives, Helpman only cites two pieces of empricial research testing the 
efficacy of the theory and these results do not appear conclusive (Helpman, 
1999). Helpman (1987) found that the share of intra-industry trade in bilateral 
trade between two countries was greater the more similar countries were in 
terms of income per capita (which he took as a proxy for similarity of factor 
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endowments) and the more similar they were in size, as measured by GDP. 
Hummels and Levinsohn (1995) confirmed this finding (supposedly supportive 
of the theory) but then found that the inclusion of country pair-wise dummies 
could explain variations in intra-industry trade just as well as the variables 
emphasised by theory. The relative lack of empirical research until recent times 
could be attributed to a lack of suitable data and the statistical challenge of 
trying to corroborate theories, especially when they are underdetermined by the 
data.  
 
I would assert (contrary to the current retrospective view) that a major research 
agenda in trade in the 1980s and for much of the 1990s lay, not so much in the 
development of general equilibrium monopolistic models of trade, as much as in 
the development of partial equilibrium oligopolistic trade models.42 So, for 
example, looking at the various anthologies of trade that emerged in the 1990s, 
the majority of articles related to oligopoly and strategic trade policy issues, 
with monopolistic competition being represented by the original articles cited in 
this section. Examples of such anthologies are Grossman (1992) and both 
volumes of Neary (1995a and b). Imperfect competition of a monopolistic 
variety only appeared to have life under the rubric of “new economic 
geography” whose essential difference from its progenitor was that it allowed 
for factors of production to be mobile internationally as well as nationally and it 
dealt with inter-regional trade as well as international trade.   
 
4.4.3 Oligopolistic trade models: claiming realism but not so real 
What defined static new trade theory was the application of the tools of 
industrial organization (I-O) to trade. Practitioners, unsurprisingly, were 
unanimous in their approval though they recognised that there were problems to 
be ironed out. For Krugman, the development was extremely valuable, not just 
                                                
42 An example of this retrospective bias is Neary (2009), despite his own extensive work on trade 
under conditions of oligopoly. My contention is that while the general view in 2009 may have been 
that the dominant paradigms in international trade were the theory of comparative advantage under 
perfect competition and trade based on monopolistic competition, this was not the case in 1999.  
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for its empirical insights but (revealingly) because “the new approaches brought 
excitement and creativity to an area that had begun to lose some of its 
intellectual drive” (Krugman, 1990, p. 261). A similar sentiment was expressed 
by Neary, who claimed that the application of I-O models to strategic trade 
issues was “one of the most exciting developments in recent years” (Neary, 
1995a, p. xvi). Gomes (1990, p. 140) in his historical review of trade, approved 
of the development on the grounds of empirical realism, while Maneschi  (1998, 
p. 203) spoke approvingly of the brave new world of new trade theory. Irwin 
(1996, p. 207), in keeping with the general theme of his book, was at pains to 
stress that while the theory of strategic trade policy clarified many aspects of 
international competition under various market conditions, it failed to provide a 
robust and unqualified case against free trade. In this, he would be supported by 
most of those trade theorists responsible for pushing back the boundaries to 
reveal this brave new world.  
 
The birth of partial equilibrium models of trade under conditions of oligopoly is 
usually attributed to Brander (1981). The focus of his analysis was on the 
behaviour of two identical firms in two identical countries, each producing a 
homogenous product and each acting as a monopolist in their home market. It is 
assumed that each firm employed a Cournot strategy, treating the output of the 
other in each market as given. Transport costs were also assumed to exist. The 
net effect of allowing for international trade was reciprocal dumping caused 
because each firm had an incentive to sell more in the other’s market as long as 
price exceeded its marginal cost (this was not the case in the domestic market as 
profit maximisation meant equating marginal cost with marginal revenue which 
is less than price). Hence a new theoretical basis for trade was established, 
independent of comparative advantage, economies of scale and desire for 
diversity. Furthermore, this trade, although wasteful because of the existence of 
transport costs, could also be welfare enhancing since it led to more output and 
a lower price in both markets. In other words, it is pro-competitive. Crucial to 
the counterintuitive results of the model was the assumption of segmented 
markets, thereby ruling out third party arbitrage and implying that the firm 
makes different decisions for each market. Brander and Krugman (1983) 
elaborated on the Brander contribution by showing that his conclusions were 
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robust for a more general specification of firms’ behaviour and demand. They 
find that if transport costs are low, then the dumping that results from trade 
liberalisation is welfare-enhancing but if transport costs are initially prohibitive 
and then decline, there is a welfare loss because the pro-competitive effect is 
swamped by the waste of incurring the transport cost. However in the free entry 
Cournot model, opening trade increases welfare. When price is the strategy 
variable, then reciprocal dumping does not occur in the homogenous goods case 
but does if goods are differentiated. Moreover, Venables (1990) showed that 
that predictions held under the more plausible assumption that firms first choose 
their capacities and then decide how much to supply to each national market in 
the light of demand considerations and transport costs.  
 
Dumping models, though they broke new ground in that they introduced 
oligopoly in a partial equilibrium set up, were a sideshow to the main act, which 
was zero sum rent extraction models and how trade policy could be used to 
capture those rents at the expense of the competition. Early work in this vein 
was done by Brander and Spencer (1981, 1984) looking at conditions under 
which a tariff on imports could be welfare-improving. This was the case if the 
supplier was a foreign monopolist and potential domestic entrants were deterred 
from entering the market because of the foreign monopolist. A tariff would shift 
economic rents from the foreign monopolist to the domestic firm with little 
adverse effect on domestic consumers. Krugman (1984) showed that if marginal 
costs declined as output increased, one effect of protection was to make 
domestic firms more efficient and indirectly to act as a form of export 
promotion. Venables (1985) and Horstman and Markusen (1986) looked at the 
effect of protecting an oligopolistic domestic market when free entry exists, 
such that marginal profits go to zero. The former found that it could be 
beneficial provided the domestic and foreign markets were segmented and 
transport costs between markets existed. The source of the gain was the increase 
in consumer surplus as domestic firms displaced foreign firms and no transport 
costs were incurred when domestic firms served the domestic market. By 
contrast, Horstman and Markusen (1986) found that protection was not 
beneficial if markets were integrated (no transport costs) and protection 
encouraged inefficient entry into the domestic market. (One could question how 
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appropriate it is to designate markets with free entry as oligopolistic, since firms 
are not making economic rents). In a synthesis of the issues, Markusen and 
Venables (1988) showed that, ceteris paribus, protection was more likely to be 
welfare enhancing if markets were truly oligopolistic (no free entry) and 
segmented. Venables (1985) also showed that free entry does not invalidate the 
possibility that protection can be beneficial but it completely nullifies the case 
for using an export subsidy.  
 
By common consensus, the most influential paper in the strategic trade policy 
literature was Brander and Spencer (1985). Their simple partial model assumed 
an international market characterised by duopoly where the domestic and 
foreign firm competed in a third market selling a homogenous product. The 
strategic interaction between the firms was designated as a Cournot game, 
where the relevant decision variable is quantity of output and each behaves as if 
the other will not react to its decision. In this game, an export subsidy by the 
domestic government would lower the marginal cost of production (and export) 
of the domestic firm and lead to increased sales at the expense of the foreign 
firm. The domestic welfare effect would be positive in that the increased 
economic rents that the domestic firm would now earn outweighed the fiscal 
cost of the subsidy. The loser would be the foreign firm and such a policy would 
not be globally efficient. The effect of export subsidies was akin to the effect of 
investment in capacity or research; that is to say it committed the firm to 
producing a higher level of output than would otherwise be the case. It could be 
that this paper sparked so much interest because the commonsense view was 
that when countries had monopoly power, an export subsidy would be welfare 
worsening because of its adverse impact on the subsidising country’s terms of 
trade. In any case it sparked a series of responses in the form of other papers 
examining the welfare efficacy of export subsidies when markets are 
oligopolistic.  
 
Dixit (1984) had already shown that, as the number of domestic firms grows, 
the optimal subsidy declines and, beyond some threshold number, becomes 
negative. Likewise he highlighted the more ambiguous welfare implications 
when firms also sell in the domestic market. Probably the most trenchant 
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criticism of the policy conclusions were those of Eaton and Grossman (1986) 
who showed that if the nature of the strategic interaction was different; that is to 
say if firms played a Bertrand game, taking each others prices as given, the 
optimal policy would be an export tax as opposed to an export subsidy, since the 
latter would make credible their commitment not to undercut the other, to the 
detriment of both. The point of their paper was to show that the existence of 
oligopoly per se and the reality of strategic interaction between firms do not 
lend themselves to universal conclusions as to the welfare benefits of a certain 
kind of trade intervention. In a further broadside against the case for 
intervention, Dixit and Grossman (1986) made the point that if a country has 
several rent-earning oligopolistic industries that compete for a common resource 
in relatively inelastic supply, then designing an optimal form of trade 
intervention becomes more difficult. This is because a policy that is 
advantageous to one oligopoly sector may be disadvantageous to another, 
through its adverse impact on the price of the scarce resource. In other words, it 
depends on the assumption that the expansion of one industry inevitably means 
the contraction of another because of resource scarcity. It is obvious that the 
motivation of Eaton and Grossman and Dixit and Grossman was to weaken the 
case for interventionist trade policy. Indeed the latter clearly say that when it is 
difficult to establish which sectors yield most rent, then the optimal policy is 
free trade.  
 
All of the aforementioned papers assume that governments set their policy 
instruments prior to the competition between the oligopolistic firms. Another 
permutation is to assume that firms can take decisions (such as some form of 
irreversible investment) to influence the policy responses of government. Thus, 
an interventionist policy that could be sub-optimal from a national perspective 
before the firm undertook its investment, could become optimal after such 
investment has been made (see Dixit and Kyle, 1985). Other qualifications of 
the trade interventionist argument in favour of rent shifting are: the prospect of 
retaliation by foreign governments; the fact that domestic oligopolies may be 
part foreign-owned and, where profits have a lower weight in domestic welfare 
than government revenue (see Lee, 1990 and Neary, 1994). Leahy and Neary 
(2001) showed that the argument for an investment subsidy is much more robust 
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than the argument for an output subsidy. The basis for this claim is the assertion 
that negative (positive) spillovers from such investment and strategic 
substitutability (complemetarity) are likely to be associated together. In such 
instances investment subsidies are optimal. This holds when the game is 
extended from a bilateral context to a multilateral context (Leahy and Neary, 
2009). Similar issues were addressed by Collie (2005) and Haaland and Kind 
(2006, 2008) in the context of research and development subsidies. Other 
permutations of these models of strategic intervention are: strategic trade policy 
under conditions of asymmetric information (Collie and Hvid, 1993 and 
Brainard and Mortimort, 1997); strategic trade policy under conditions of 
uncertainty (Cooper and Riezman, 1989 and Dewitt and Leahy, 2004); and 
models of dynamic oligopoly in finite time. A different variation on these 
models was the attempt by Neary (2003) to develop a general equilibrium 
oligopolistic model. This could be considered a distinct theoretical advance over 
the existing partial equilibrium models but that is to overstate the case. To make 
his model tractable in a general equilibrium context, he invoked the very strong 
assumption that the oligopolistic sector was sufficiently small in the national 
economy to have no impact on economy-wide variables such as wages, national 
income or the general price level. His strategy was what he called being “large 
in the small (so as to allow for strategic interaction) but small in the large”. So 
to all intents and purposes his model is not that different to partial equilibrium 
models, the justification for which is the implicit assumption that the 
oligopolistic sector is sufficiently small for its developments to not impact on 
other sectors. From a normative perspective, Neary’s explicit embedding of 
oligopoly in a general equilibrium setting strengthens the pro-trade argument. 
The gains from trade are a pro-competitive effect, whereby oligopolistic firms 
face increased competition resulting in squeezed margins, as well as the 
standard comparative advantage effect in what is a two sector model.  
 
These models were hailed as a move towards realism to the extent that they 
acknowledged the existence of pure profit and the strategic behaviour of firms 
and governments. Despite this, the predictions of the models vary widely as do 
the policy conclusions that emanate from them. Model results depend on the 
nature of the game, that is to say, the variables that the modeler assumes are 
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key; the symmetry or asymmetry of the players; the sequence of play; the 
degree of market integration or segmentation; the ease of entry into the market; 
and the nationality of the resident firm. In order to be tractable (to the modeler), 
the dimensions of the game have to be restricted, which is why the emphasis is 
either on output, or price or capacity expenditure or some singular variable to 
the exclusion of all others. The technical apparatus is challenged by 
multidimensionality in the sense of addressing how the firm deals with, not just 
competition, but also, simultaneously, its suppliers, its workforce and 
governments, or all whose behaviour impact on the presumed bottom line of 
profit. Moreover, it is notable that most theorists, while enjoying the loosening 
of restraints that partial equilibrium theorising permits, nonetheless tend to 
favour free trade and defend their policy position on the grounds of 
considerations that their models have failed to address – namely inefficient rent-
seeking and retaliation by foreign governments. Yet this is never seen as a 
reason to question the usefulness of such models. The realism of these models is 
questionable, despite dealing with very real issues of market power and strategic 
considerations. The problem is that neoclassical method can only deal with 
them on its own terms (rational optimising behaviour), which limits the way in 
which realism can be accommodated. Finally very little empirical work has 
been done testing the validity of these (admittedly) highly stylized models. 
According to Leahy and Neary, this is because “oligopoly in trade does not lend 
itself easily to empirical work” (Leahy and Neary, 2011, p. 227). It is difficult to 
resist the conclusion that the fruitfulness of these models lay more in the 
opportunity that they afforded to researchers to derive new results (from some 
new optimising game) as opposed to adding to collective insights on the 
production and trading behaviour of real firms.  
 
4.4.4  Monopolistic competition part 2: Economic geography 
According to Krugman (1998b), economic geography (that emerged as a theme 
in mainstream economics in the 1990s) was the latest manifestation of the 
increasing returns/imperfect competition revolution in economics. Industrial 
organization supplied the tool box, new trade theory was the first useful 
application and space was, at that time, the latest application of the “technical 
tricks” that rendered this field fruitful foraging terrain for mainstream 
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economists. The issue at stake was how to explain uneven economic activity 
across space. Economics was not the first discipline to seek to understand the 
tendency for economic activities to cluster or why, on occasions, those clusters 
changed over time. There existed a Germanic tradition of location theory 
associated with the work of Von Thunen, (1966 [1826]), Weber (1909), 
Christaller (1933), and Losch (1954 [1940]). These accounts rationalised the 
uneven spread of economic activity on the basis of access to markets and access 
to critical inputs. According to Martin (1999, p. 66), location theory gave rise to 
two distinct traditions: regional science (which he asserts is closest to 
mainstream economics in terms of method) and economic geography which he 
designates to be more eclectic and empirically oriented. However, as Krugman 
(1995, p. 35) admitted, spatial economics remained a blind spot for the 
economics profession, despite elsewhere acknowledging that the facts of 
economic geography were obvious and striking, at least to the layman 
(Krugman, 1991, p. 483). His rationalization of this neglect is identical to his 
rationalization of the neglect of intra-industry trade, mainstream economists 
lacked the tools and therefore, this made space an unfriendly terrain for what it 
was that economists knew how to do (Krugman, 1995, p. 36). Notwithstanding 
the neglect of mainstream economists, Krugman dismissed the other social 
science traditions that did seek to understand and explain the distribution of 
economic activity over space, precisely because they did not theorise in the 
manner of mainstream economics; that is to say, the development of full 
maximisation and equilibrium models (p. 87). For Krugman, the inability of 
economic geographers to model resulted in them doing what they could do best, 
namely the description and organization of data (p. 85). While acknowledging 
the usefulness of the other traditions for policy purposes (p. 86) he still asserted 
that such work fell short of the ideal, which he and other mainstream 
economists were finally able to rectify through their use of clever models. In 
such a way would the “insight of geographers” meet the “standards of 
economics” (p. 88).  
 
Krugman (1991) developed a two-region two-sector model, with one sector 
(agriculture)  exhibiting constant returns to scale and employing sector specific, 
regionally immobile factors of production, while the other sector 
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(manufacturing) exhibits increasing returns to scale and employs mobile factors 
of production. Output in manufacturing is assumed to be differentiated and 
therefore the market structure is imperfectly competitive, albeit in a still quite 
competitive monopolistic sense, where firms never earn economic rents. The 
short run is differentiated from the long run by the mobility of workers, with 
workers presumed regionally immobile in the short run and mobile in the long 
run. There are costs to transporting manufacturing goods between regions and 
such costs are modeled as “iceberg”; that is to say, it is as if part of the value of 
the product is lost in transportation. The pattern of economic activity and how it 
evolves over time is determined by: the extent of economies of scale; transport 
costs; and the percentage of overall activity that is potentially mobile. So for 
example, if economies of scale in manufacturing are weak, if transport costs are 
high and if manufacturing is a small percentage of overall economic activity, 
then one would expect economic activity to be spatially dispersed. A weakening 
in these conditions, for example if transport costs fell substantially and 
economies of scale became more pronounced, then one would expect more 
concentration of increasing returns economic activity. The origin of centres of 
economic activity is not explained but their growth is. It all depends on the 
centripetal versus centrifugal forces associated with the concentration of 
economic activity (what Myrdal referred to as spread and backwash effects). 
For Krugman, the centripetal forces are economies of scale in production and 
the positive interaction between firms’ decisions to locate and labours’ decision 
to migrate. If firms’ decisions on location make a region more attractive to 
mobile labour and mobile labours’ decision to migrate make production more 
profitable for a firm, then this inter-action acts like a positive externality that 
makes such location and migration decisions self-fulfilling. Centrifugal forces 
on the other hand are increased competition in centres of economic activity, 
which can drive down product prices and drive up factor prices. How transport 
costs, economies of scale and location and migration decisions interact, 
especially when transport cost are neither prohibitive nor zero, depend on the 
parameters of the model. There are many alternative models that provide 
alternative explanations as to why location decisions can be reinforcing (in the 
sense of self-fulfilling), of which two are Venables (1996) and Baldwin and 
Forslid (1997). Venables (1996) focused on the intermediate goods sector, 
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whereby the increased size of the latter sector made manufacturing more cost 
effective and the size of manufacturing acted as a magnet for the intermediate 
goods sector. For Baldwin and Forslid (1997), large markets increase the 
efficiency of investment and increased investment enlarges markets.43 
 
For Krugman, the insights to be gleaned from the application of I-O tools to 
space can be used to rationalize world history! Technological advance that 
resulted in declining transport and communication costs could explain the 
differentiation of the world into a high wage core and a low wage periphery 
(Krugman and Venables, 1995). But then, he can also tell another story. Rather 
than increased economic integration caused by lower transport costs being the 
driving force behind an unequal world, market size could be the driver (Puga 
and Venables, 1996). Economic geography is sexy (Krugman’s words not mine) 
because so many inter-acting factors can potentially reinforce one another, and 
lead naturally to multiple equilibria (Krugman,1998b, p. 172). In such a world, 
history matters, small events can have big outcomes but, these factors do not 
condemn the world to chaos, since order will emerge spontaneously. 
Equilibrium reasserts itself. The methods of mainstream economics are 
validated. 
 
For other mainstream economists such as Neary (2001), Krugman is guilty of 
hyperbole, especially as the outcome of his (and other models) depend on 
special functional forms, and solutions can only be derived by numerical 
methods (not analytically). Moreover the propensity to agglomerate is just that, 
there is nothing inevitable about it. The main gripe that Neary has with 
Krugman’s geography is his much vaunted assumption of monopolistically 
competitive markets, which Neary believes is closer to the abstract construct of 
perfect competition than to the real world. Free entry exists, therefore a 
conclusion must be that costs are fixed but never sunk. As a consequence, even 
cities are free to move. Such a footloose facility, he finds hard to square with 
industrial clusters. Moreover, in these models, firms do not engage in any 
                                                
43 This point had been made much earlier by Young (1928), in his discerning critique of the static 
nature of neoclassical economics, when he said that the division of labour depends on the size of the 
market and the size of the market depends on the division of labour.  
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strategic behaviour (such as mergers and takeovers, outsourcing or other 
methods designed to deter potential entrants into the sector) to protect their 
positions. Even the scale of production is not driven by technology but is rather 
a product of the taste parameter that determines how substitutable goods are in 
consumer preferences. The more substitutable goods are in consumer 
preferences, the fewer varieties that will be produced and, consequently, the 
greater will be the median scale of production and the lower equilibrium price 
will be. Transport costs are intrinsic to the model, the implication being, that if 
they did not exist, agglomeration would result. This ignores other brakes to 
agglomeration, both economic and social, such as high rents, congestion and 
quality of life issues. Space is by and large one dimensional, most activities 
occur along a line or along a circle. Finally, the explanation for uneven spatial 
distribution of activity is primarily mono-causal, in this instance the result of a 
pencuniary externality. This rules out other sources of agglomeration, such as 
knowledge spillovers or simply quality of life issues and superior social service 
provision that is usually associated with urban centres.  
 
For all his nitpicking, Neary’s critique does not question mainstream economic 
method, rather it is with details of the model. Essentially it boils down to a 
belief that the monopolistically competitive model rests on flimsy I-O 
foundations and that, as a consequence, the theory of the firm is not sufficiently 
rich or insightful to capture aspects of real world production and commerce. 
Indeed he explicitly commends the work done by Fujita, Krugman and 
Venables (1999), that synthesizes the literature on economic geography that 
emerged in the 1990s. The basis for his commendation is that such work was 
based on economic methods, namely individual rational decision making and 
equilibrium. By contrast, Martin is extremely critical of the new economic 
geography, claiming that its results are not novel and that its empirical 
applications are trivial (Martin, 1999, p. 67). For Martin, it is the mathematical 
method, so central to and beloved of mainstream economics, that is the problem, 
since anything that cannot be expressed mathematically is assumed to be of 
marginal importance. This essentially relegates the role of social, cultural and 
institutional factors in the determination of economic activity (p. 75). For 
Martin, this is to exclude (or to include in a trivial way via a dummy variable 
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proxy) what is most important, at least if one believes that markets are socially 
embedded and that the broader social context is a necessary part of the story as 
to why industry thrives in some areas but not in others. The novel aspect of the 
new economic geography, namely path dependence, multiple equilibria and the 
notion that history matters, is also upbraided by Martin on the grounds that the 
history modeled is not real, path dependence is a function of initial conditions 
and the parameters of the model and history ends when spatial equilibrium 
emerges (p. 76). So while he acknowledges that history does of course matter, 
he maintains that the history of these economic models is metaphorical rather 
than real, since real history is particular, complex and open. This is why such 
models are unable to deal with change in any true sense, where regions may not 
only grow but may also decline and where lock in (in the sense of equilibrium) 
may occur but not necessarily irrevocably. For Martin, the limitations of new 
economic geography are an extension of the limitations of mainstream 
economics; that is to say, its idealistic philosophical underpinnings, whereby 
knowledge is assumed to derive from abstract deductive theorising (p. 82). In 
short, for economists it is tractability that drives the focus of theorising and not 
the social material about which they theorise. From the many comments that he 
has made on new trade theory and the reason for its emergence when it did, it 
would seem that Krugman would not disagree with Martin’s view of economics. 
The essential difference between them is that Krugman (contrary to Martin) 
believes real insights into economic phenomena can be gleaned from the 
application of orthodox economic methods. 
 
Of course Krugman, like most mainstream theorists, would prefer if his models 
were validated by empirical work. For the first twenty years of new trade 
theory, this was not the case, as Krugman (1998b, pp. 172-173) admitted. Kim 
(1995), using historical data to explain trends in regional specialisation, rejected 
the theoretical results of Krugman (1991), while Davis and Weinstein (1996) 
found no home market effect. However, when they interpreted home demand 
more broadly their results were more supportive (Davis and Weinstein, 1998). 
Neary (2001) also claimed that empirical support for the conclusions of new 
economic geography were weak but accepted that, at that time, it was too early 
to draw conclusions, since so little testing had been done. Interestingly, Neary 
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(2000, p. 16) underlined the curious phenomenon of the widespread acceptance 
of new trade theory, despite the lack of empirical testing and mixed results 
when such testing eventually commenced. He also drew attention to the 
difficulties involved in testing and how empirical models such as gravity 
equations can be consistent with different theories of trade. According to 
Deardorff (1998) gravity equations are consistent with any theory where 
countries specialise in different goods. This is something to bear in mind in the 
light of the vast explosion in empirical trade literature in the last decade (due to 
the availability of superior data sets) although the focus of that literature has 
shifted on to the issue of heterogeneous firms.44  
 
4.4.5 Monopolistic competition part 3: Heterogeneous firms 
Monopolistic theories of trade have enjoyed a renaissance among mainstream 
practitioners since the publication of an influential article by Melitz (2003). The 
latter adapted Krugman’s (1980) model of trade under monopolistic competition 
with increasing returns, by introducing firm productivity heterogeneity. He and 
subsequent theorists claimed that the motivation for this innovation was 
empirical research that testified to large and persistent productivity differences 
among firms within the same narrowly defined industry (see Bernard and 
Jensen, 1999). From the late 1990s, new firm level data, that was also able to 
distinguish the trading activities of firms, was available. The empirical studies 
corroborated (what doubtless was already well known to the ordinary layperson) 
that exporting firms tended to be larger, more skill and capital intensive, more 
productive and to pay higher wages than non-exporting firms in the same 
industry (see also, Clerides, Lach and Tybout¸1998, Aw, Chung and Roberts, 
2000, Bernard, Eaton, Jensen and Kortum, 2003). According to Redding (2010, 
p. 4), the evidence supports the view that the more productive self-select into 
exporting as opposed to becoming more productive as a result of exporting.  
 
The essence of the Melitz (2003) model is the assumption that all firms are ex 
ante identical but ex post different. In order to enter an industry they have to 
                                                
44 Krugman (2009) spoke of the explosion in empirical work on economic geography since 1990. This 
is at variance with what he claimed in 1998 and it is noteworthy that he does not cite any of the work. 
This is another example of the tendency within the discipline to engage in ex post rewriting of the 
history of the development of economic thought.  
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incur a sunk cost. Before entry they do not know what their productivity will be 
but know the distribution function from which it will be drawn. The 
productivity that they get after entry is a lottery and once drawn does not 
change. There is a lower bound productivity level and any entrant whose 
productivity is below this level will exit immediately. The more fortunate in the 
productivity lottery will make variable non-negative profits increasing in firm 
productivity. However, once in an industry all incumbents, however productive, 
face a constant and exogenous probability of death. There also exists a 
competitive fringe of potential entrants. Entry proceeds as long as expected 
profits are sufficient to cover the sunk entry costs and in equilibrium, expected 
net profits are zero. In order to export, firms have to incur an additional sunk 
cost, so the productivity threshold for entry into the export market exceeds that 
for entry into the domestic market. Any firm that exports will also sell in the 
domestic market.  
 
Trade liberalisation changes the incentive structure for firms in an industry. 
Increased competition in the domestic market raises the minimum productivity 
threshold associated with zero profit, while at the same time lowering the 
(higher) productivity threshold for successful entry into the export market. The 
net effect is that some of the least productive firms will be squeezed out of the 
domestic market, others will remain but with reduced market share and profits, 
while the most productive firms will more than compensate for lost share in the 
domestic market by expanding into export markets. Trade liberalisation weeds 
out the weakest (in productivity terms) and rewards the strongest. The net effect 
of this Darwinian process is to increase industry productivity. Hence, according 
to this and similar general equilibrium models, there is a new source of trade 
gain (in addition to comparative advantage, economies of scale and product 
variety) and that is increased productivity from intra-industry reallocation of 
economic activity away from the less productive towards the more productive 
firms.  
 
The most theoretically influential variant of the Melitz model is that of Bernard, 
Redding and Schott (2007), who developed the Melitz model in the same way 
that Krugman (1981), Dixit and Norman (1980) and Helpman (1981) developed 
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the original monopolistically competitive trade model, by incorporating it into 
the traditional comparative advantage story. Their world is represented by the 
familiar 2x2x2 model (two factors of production, two goods and two countries), 
where sectors differ in their relative use of factors and countries differ in their 
relative factor endowments. Each sector is monopolistically competitive and 
populated by heterogeneous firms. Within an industry, all firms have the same 
fixed cost but different variable costs. Trade liberalisation eliminates the 
weakest firms in both sectors (leading to productivity gains in both industries) 
but its impact is greatest in the country’s comparative advantage sector. In 
addition to the intra-industry reallocation of resources, there is inter-industry 
reallocation, with the country’s comparative advantage sector expanding and its 
comparative disadvantage sector declining. Income distribution effects of trade 
are also muted, in the sense that while the country’s abundant factor of 
production will have extra gains from trade, its scarce factors will have less 
losses and may even gain (contrary to the original Stolper-Samuelson view). 
The scarce factor loses less when world markets are imperfectly competitive 
because trade leads to increased variety of goods and increased industry 
productivity. Far from weakening the case for free trade, monopolistically 
competitive models imply extra aggregate gains and less adverse income 
distribution effects than their perfectly competitive antecedents.  
 
The new firm level data sets have also resulted in increased empirical work 
applying  variants of the gravity equation to understand the nature of firms’ 
trading patterns, what countries they export to and, how when they do export, 
their behaviour responds to changes in trade impediments and enhancers. 
According to Helpman, Melitz and Rubenstein (2008), the decision to export to 
a particular destination is a function of the fixed cost of exporting to that 
location. By contrast, the value of exports to a particular destination is a 
function of the variable costs and benefits associated with supplying goods to 
that particular market. A new focus is on how income and distance (standard 
explanatory variables in a gravity equation) impact differentially on the 
extensive margin of trade (new firms and new products) compared to the 
intensive margin of trade (higher value of sales for existing products).  
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For trade theorists such as Neary, this relatively recent interplay between theory 
and empirics has proved enormously fruitful and “is the hallmark of a genuinely 
scientific methodology” (Neary, 2009, p. 17). This revealing statement begs the 
question as to the nature of methodology in international trade research prior to 
this recent development? As alluded to already, trade theorising for most of the 
twentieth century was remarkably impervious to empirical reality. Inconvenient 
empirical results that challenged the predictions of theory were labelled 
paradoxes, and efforts were devoted to resolving the paradox as opposed to 
changing the theory. The claim that new trade theorising in the 1980s (with its 
focus on imperfect markets) was driven by empirical considerations is also open 
to challenge, given its timing and the exhaustion of the theoretical possibilities 
associated with the perfectly competitive general equilibrium model. But, one 
could argue late is better than never, and that this new research, informed as it is 
by empirical considerations, represents a quantum positive change in our 
understanding of the causes and effects of international trade. To evaluate 
whether or not this is the case, it is necessary to interrogate these new 
heterogeneous firm models in order to see if they do enhance our understanding 
of the causes and consequences of trade and, more importantly, to see what 
guidance they give to policy makers.  
 
On a positive note, abandoning the representative agent model in favour of 
heterogeneous actors is a step in the direction of increased realism that has to be 
applauded. But this is as far as improved theoretical foundations go or can 
possibly go, given the methodological bias of mainstream theorising. Markets 
are still assumed to be relatively competitive with free entry by ex-ante identical 
firms who are infinitesimal in scale and who compete non-strategically. No 
reasonable account is given as to what it is that gives some firms a productive 
edge and permits them to be larger and more competitive. Instead the 
explanation supplied is that the competitive outcome is a product of chance, a 
lottery where, ex-ante, all firms have an equal chance of success. No learning 
exists in these models, so a firm’s fate is irrevocably determined (for better or 
worse) after it has drawn its lot in the productivity gamble. Most heroically, it is 
assumed that the (known) distribution of potential industry productivity will be 
of sufficient range to ensure that there will always exist firms at the upper end 
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of the productivity distribution that can compete, regardless of how competitive 
the market environment is in which they find themselves. Without this 
assumption the extra productivity gain that trade confers, as more productive 
firms expand and weaker firms contract or exit the industry, could not exist. No 
allowance is made for the very real possibility that in some countries (especially 
developing ones), even the most productive firms may not be able to compete in 
an unrestricted international market. All of these models (one sector and multi-
sector) assume full employment. This is an important assumption as it implies 
that higher productivity at industry level must necessarily translate into higher 
levels of national output as a consequence of trade liberalisation. Many 
researchers cite empirical work showing how trade liberalisation leads to higher 
industry productivity as proof of the newly recognised additional gain from 
trade (see Pavcknik, 2002, Trefler, 2004 and Bernard, Jensen and Schott, 2006). 
This is disingenuous as remaining resources in a sector(s) may become more 
productive but output from that sector could still fall due to firms exiting the 
industry or contracting their activities. While the multi-sector model does allow 
for output to shrink in sectors where a country has a comparative disadvantage 
(notwithstanding the fact that its remaining resources become more productive), 
this contraction does not matter as it is more than compensated by the expansion 
of the sectors where a country has a comparative advantage (whose resources 
also become more competitive). In other words, the traditional assumption of 
full employment as well as the notion that a country’s resources can always be 
deployed successfully in some economic activity still prevail and ensure that a 
country cannot lose from trade. To conclude, the latest developments in trade 
theory may appear more realistic but, fundamentally, the predilections of old 
trade theory still remain, albeit dressed up in modern garb. These predilections 
are no more realistic now than they ever were, which would in itself be of no 
consequence, if the results of this form of theorising did not help to inform 
policy. The problem with these simplistic models, where tractability is the 
guiding force driving theoretical advance (or change) is that they lead to 
simplistic policy conclusions at variance with the demands of open ended 
complex reality. As such, they are worse than useless, they are (arguably) 
malign in their impact.  
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4.5 Dynamic Trade theory.  
 
4.5.1 The danger and the challenge of dynamics 
Dynamic trade analysis is not without its challenges (both normatively and 
technically), which might explain why it took so long for it to form part of 
mainstream neoclassical trade theory. Neoclassical trade theory has always been 
resolutely static and appropriated from classical political economy the 
compatible static aspects of trade theory. Both Smith and Ricardo had dynamic 
theories of trade which, when carried to their logical conclusion (by others), 
sometimes invalidated their static results favouring the guaranteed universal 
benefits of free trade.  In his explicitly dynamic analysis Smith saw no conflict 
between the short-run and long-run effects of trade. This was reflective of his 
cosmopolitan view (for which he was much criticised by List) and his sense of 
Enlightenment optimism. Specifically, it derived from his belief that one of the 
main determinants of growth was the level of physical capital accumulation, 
which depended on savings which he assumed were a constant fraction of 
national income. Ricardo, by contrast, recognised the income distribution 
consequences of trade policy and how such distribution could impact on capital 
accumulation and growth because of the different propensities to save of the 
different social classes. It was Findlay (1974) who drew out the negative 
implications of Ricardo’s theory of trade for growth in predominantly 
agricultural countries.  
 
The infant industry theorists (in their criticisms of the commercial policy 
stances of Smith, in response to whom they developed their theories) primarily 
based their analysis on, dynamic considerations. List also castigated Smith for 
the narrowness of his approach, especially his focus on physical capital as 
opposed to learning, skills and knowledge and the role played by social 
institutions in developing these. These critics of classical economic orthodoxy 
always acknowledged the static losses from protection (in the form of higher 
domestic prices and poorer quality of product) but felt that this was a price 
worth paying for long run prosperity and growth.45   
                                                
45 List gave an analogy of two fathers, both of whom had equal savings which they used differently.  
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Normatively, any analysis that challenged the hegemony of the free-trade-is-
best view of static theory was firmly outside mainstream neoclassical discourse, 
as was obvious from the whole discussion on the implications of economies of 
scale for trade policy in the 1920s. Moreover, making orthodox theory dynamic 
was technically challenging. Ohlin rejected the assertion that the analysis of 
trade contained in his 1933 book was essentially static, claiming that too much 
importance had been attached to his factor proportions model (Ohlin, 1967, p. 
314n). While he did discuss the impact of trade on factor supplies (concluding 
that a positive factor supply response to increased demand counteracted 
international factor price equalization), he evaded the welfare implications of 
dynamic analysis, claiming that “since trade affects the character and number of 
the economic subjects, it is arbitrary and valueless to talk about the total gain 
from trade, much less to measure it” (Ohlin, 1967, p. 90). Besides, his legacy in 
terms of mainstream neoclassical trade is firmly wedded to his static factor 
proportions model. Haberler also cited the need for more research on the 
dynamic aspects of trade (Baldwin, 1982, p. 147). One can only speculate why 
he did not carry that agenda forward and, one possible explanation is that it was 
technically demanding to do so. Also, developments in neoclassical growth 
theory, such as the Solow growth model, were not encouraging, implying as 
they did the irrelevance of commercial policy to a country’s long-run steady 
state.  
 
Some work was done in the 1970s that attempted to dynamise the Heckscher-
Ohlin model by making capital dependent on savings (see Corden, 1971, Vanek, 
1971, Johnson, 1971, Smith, 1976, 1977). The issues are summarized in Corden 
(1997, pp. 162-167). A constant savings rate out of national income ensures 
dynamic as well as static gains from trade, whereas income distribution effects 
could complicate the analysis, depending on the propensity to save of different 
groups in society. Similarly, if the level of capital accumulation depends on the 
                                                                                                                                       
The first invested at the market rate of interest, while the second invested in the skills of his offspring. 
He claimed that the first acted according to a theory of values (as espoused by Smith) while the second 
acted according to the theory of productive powers (as espoused by him). He acknowledged that while 
the former may have been richer at his death than the latter, in terms of exchange values, it was not the 
case in terms of productive power. This is because he perceived the benefits of education to be more 
enduring and irreversible, thus having greater inter-generational impact. (List, 2005b, p. 28). 
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demand for investment goods, then the effect of trade on the relative price of the 
investment good will either work towards more capital accumulation (fall in the 
relative price of the investment good) or against it (rise in the relative price of 
the investment good. However, as shown by Corden (1971), even in the latter 
instance, one cannot assume that a higher relative price for the investment good 
will necessarily lead to less capital accumulation, since the negative substitution 
effect has to be weighed against the positive income effect. Vanek (1971) 
showed that the commercial regime could impact on capital accumulation if the 
marginal propensity to invest out of private income differed to the marginal 
propensity to invest out of public income. Smith (1977) however was at pains to 
point out that even when trade liberalisation reduced steady state consumption it 
could still be considered welfare enhancing in a potential Pareto sense. This is 
due to his interpretation of the intertemporal effects. Of course to the extent that 
these models are of a representative-agent type then, regardless of the 
intertemporal pattern of consumption, it is possible to claim they are welfare 
improving as long as the static gains from trade continue to hold. Likewise, one 
could say that as long as the short-run impact of trade on national income is 
positive, the government can implement optimal policies to ensure its 
continuance over time. Corden (1971, p. 132 and 1997, p. 166) adopts this 
stance in his criticism of protection, saying that even if it facilitates capital 
accumulation, it remains a fourth best policy.  
 
Attempts to render the H-O model dynamic were true to the spirit of Smith and 
Ricardo in their focus on savings and physical capital accumulation but they 
remained, at best, marginal to the mainstream project. Findlay when reviewing 
and expanding on this model made a telling comment.  “The good news, which 
can be announced at the outset, is that ultimately all is well and that the theory 
still holds when all three of the original trinity are allowed to vary endogenously 
in intuitively plausible ways. But we have to work hard to accomplish the 
extension” (Findlay, 1995, p. 36).46 Findlay, in common with his neoclassical 
contemporaries, obviously felt the need to derive results that reinforced the 
static wisdom. This shows the constraining effect that orthodox wisdom had 
                                                
46 The original trinity being labour, land and capital. 
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(and still has) on the direction of research. The minimization of the potential 
negative welfare effects that derived from dynamic analysis can also be 
explained by the timing of this research. Most of it was conducted in the 1970s 
before the free for all that emerged in the 1980s, when researchers were much 
less constrained by the normative implications of departing from the static, 
perfectly competitive model of trade.  
 
4.5.2 Microfoundations prevail at the cost of empirical relevance 
Exogenous growth theory (as conventionally recounted with emphasis on 
diminishing marginal productivity of resources) suggested convergence among 
all economies, which was and is at variance with empirical reality. One strand 
of the literature that attempted to address the obvious lack of convergence 
between the industrialised developed economies and the unindustrialised 
developing economies was the dual economy literature inspired by Lewis 
(1954). Findlay (1980, 1981) tried to combine the Solow growth model and the 
Lewis dual economy model to capture the experience of developed and 
developing countries. In the developed North it is assumed that full employment 
prevails and that wages equal the marginal productivity of labour. By contrast, 
the South has a dual economy structure and wages in its export sector are 
exogenously fixed, while employment is determined by labour demand. The 
North exports manufactures, which are both a consumption and investment 
good and the South exports primary commodities, which is a consumption good 
only. In the North savings come from all sources of income, wages and profit 
alike, while in the South savings come from profit only. The only way the South 
can get access to investment goods is to import them, which means that it is 
dependent on the North’s demand for its exports. The North’s growth rate is 
internally determined by Solow-type considerations while the South’s growth 
depends on the growth rate of the North. Findlay’s model predicts growth 
convergence but not convergence of income per capita. Gaps in income per 
capita will persist indefinitely. Furthermore the dependence is one way, with the 
South’s growth rate dependent on the economic fortunes of the North. 
Burgstaller and Saveedra-Rivano (1984) extended the Findlay model by 
allowing for international capital mobility. They assume that such flows will go 
from North to South but their surprising conclusion is that it will reduce income 
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per capita in the South. The reason for this is because Southern wages are fixed 
in the capital receiving sector, all profits are repatriated and the capital flow, 
through its impact on exports in both the North and South, will lead to a 
deterioration in the latter’s terms of trade.  
 
This dual economy literature was sparse and had little impact on the mainstream 
project, despite its attempted realism; that is to say, its appreciation of the 
differences in the structures and institutions of countries at different levels of 
development. By proceeding on the basis of an asymmetry between countries at 
different levels of development, it took as a starting point what neoclassical 
theory would traditionally have treated as endogenous. The assumption of a 
dual economy in developing countries might be broadly consonant with the 
economic reality of these countries but it departed from neoclassical 
fundamentals, where countries can only be permitted to differ in terms of factor 
endowments, technology or tastes. Allowing macroeconomic structures to be of 
varying types, such as Solow, Lewis, Kaleckian or Neomarxian was a new 
departure in mainstream theorising. This literature also produced non-orthodox 
results, such as failure of factor price equalisation, no international equalisation 
of per capita income and a recognition that trade based on static comparative 
advantage might be disadvantageous to catch up by developing countries 
(Darity and Davis, 2005, p. 142). 
 
However this literature did not speak with one voice on whether the structural 
asymmetries between North and South would persist or eventually disappear 
and had little to say about the role government policy could play in the process 
(Darity, 2005, p. 154). Indeed Findlay, in the optimistic vein of neoclassical 
growth theorists, asserted that dualistic models may some day “be of more 
historical interest than contemporary interest” (Findlay, 1984, p. 222). Then 
Findlay was also very specific that he did not intend his North-South models to 
be a rival or substitute for the conventional symmetric (as far as macroeconomic 
structures are concerned) approach to trade. He believed that his asymmetric 
type modelling was a fruitful addition to the main corpus of theory, saving it 
from irrelevance as far as developmental issues were concerned, while at the 
same time “respecting the canons of rigorous enquiry that trade theorists expect 
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in their field” (Findlay, 1984, p. 222). His concerns with rigour may have been 
misplaced if posterity is anything to go by, as it has not saved this branch of the 
trade, growth and development literature from intellectual oblivion as far as 
students of trade are concerned.  
 
4.5.3 The mainstreaming of dynamic issues: laying the foundations 
As recounted in the last two sections, early attempts to address the dynamic 
implications of trade were tentative and did not have a major impact. This 
changed, in particular in the 1990s, when issues of trade and endogenous 
growth were finally addressed. Key to this development was the renewed 
acceptance of external economies of scale in tandem with the new acceptable 
heuristic in trade, that of imperfect markets.  
 
As shown is section 4.3, one technical advantage of the invocation of external 
economies of scale was that they could be reconciled with perfect competition 
and price-taking behaviour. This convenient feature was exploited by 
researchers in the 1960s and 1970s. However, as acknowledged by Krugman, 
appealing to external economies as an explanation for trade patterns was not 
acceptable because “External economies are too vague and unmeasurable” 
(Krugman, 1983, p. 344). Or, as Krugman (1987b) alluded to, growth was too 
arbitrary in these models, since one industry was as likely as another to generate 
external economies. Krugman (1987c) himself developed a model of trade 
where dynamic increasing returns exist at the level of the industry, making 
industry productivity dependent on cumulative experience. The net effect was to 
show that initial slight competitive advantages that countries might possess in a 
sector get reinforced over time. So, historical accident can matter more for 
dynamic comparative advantage than underlying differences in national 
characteristics. In a similar vein, Matsuyama (1992) explained how countries 
relatively well-endowed with natural resources would grow more slowly than 
their less well-endowed trading partners, if there exists dynamic economies in 
manufacturing production associated with learning-by-doing. 47 
                                                
47 List had made a very similar argument 150 years earlier when he claimed that Holland was a 
successful country precisely because it was so disadvantaged in a natural resource sense. “Nature had 
conferred benefits on this small nation both by her frowns and smiles. Their perpetual contests with the 
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The catalyst for trade theory to evolve in a dynamic direction came from work 
on endogenous growth by Romer (1986) and Lucas (1988). They made growth 
endogenous to the economic system (notwithstanding the central role of 
individual optimisation) by assuming that knowledge was an input into the 
private production process but that knowledge (as a non-appropriable public 
good) had spillover effects into the social realm. For Romer, the extent of the 
knowledge spillover was proportionate to the aggregate level of knowledge in 
the economy, while for Lucas it was proportionate to the average level of 
human capital. The upshot of these models was an explanation of growth, 
though not of the unbounded kind.48 Also scale effects are more important in 
Romer’s world vision than in Lucas’s, with large economies growing faster than 
smaller ones. Apart from the technical issue of reconciling optimisation with 
endogenous change, what Romer and Lucas achieved was a renewed focus on 
knowledge as the mainspring of growth, as opposed to physical capital. While 
imperfect markets are not a necessary accompaniment to external economies for 
endogenous growth to occur, their invocation restores the primacy of 
deliberative individual action in the explanation of growth. For example, if 
growth is deemed to be driven by knowledge of the disembodied kind, then 
markets need to be imperfect and rent-yielding in order to provide sufficient 
incentive for the profit- maximising producer to invest in this activity. 
Alternatively, when knowledge is embodied (human capital), then agents are 
assumed to have infinite lives or, if finiteness is accepted, then self-regarding 
preferences need to be supplemented with altruistic feelings towards their 
offspring in order to provide a motive for such investment.  
 
                                                                                                                                       
inroads of the sea necessarily developed in them a spirit of enterprise, industry, and thrift while the land 
which they had reclaimed and protected by such indescribable exertions must have seemed to them a 
property to which too much care could not be devoted”. (List, 2005a [1841], p. 39). However, an 
important distinction between List and contemporary neoclassical theorists is in the conception of the 
individual.  
 
48Arrow (1962) had already adapted Marshallian external economies by relating them to human capital 
and not output. He invoked the idea of learning-by-doing (and doing more efficiently as a 
consequence) and claimed that the best proxy for positive spillovers was the level of human capital in 
an industry.  
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Methodologically, this new turn in the direction of dynamic theorising was 
acceptable because the essence of the neoclassical project had already evolved 
from individual optimisation in the context of perfectly competitive markets to 
individual optimisation in imperfect contexts. Optimisation was what now 
defined the project. And while optimisation and equilibrium seem to be 
profoundly static concepts, allowing for spillovers with positive feedback 
effects permitted the reconciliation of optimisation and equilibrium at the 
individual decision making level with endogenous growth at the system level. 
Also, going dynamic meant another degree of freedom as far as environmental 
constraints were concerned. For such an internally-driven project as 
international trade research, this meant increased sustenance in that it facilitated 
a whole raft of potentially new theoretical results. Of course, allowing the social 
consequences of individual actions to deviate from the private consequences 
weakens the presumed desirable normative effects of trade liberalisation, by 
making less benign welfare outcomes at least theoretically possible. But this 
ground had already been conceded when trade theorising removed the prop of 
perfectly competitive markets and, in any case, trade theorists had a ready 
supply of other (extra model) arguments to defend their free-trade-is-(probably) 
-best policy stance. Rather ironically, restoring the primacy of knowledge to the 
growth-generating process and, acknowledging that the social is more than the 
sum of the private, is akin to the arguments of Rae and List in their defence of 
government action to promote economic growth. However, the latter would 
have profoundly disagreed with the central neoclassical presumption that all 
explanations for economic growth must reside in individual motivation and 
actions as the following quote amply reveals, “It would be more correct to 
describe the limbs of men (the head, hands and feet) as the causes of wealth” 
(List, 2005b [1841], p. 25). For List, explaining the success of nations on the 
basis of the activities of individuals is patently insufficient, since the activities 
of individuals require a causal explanation and for him that must reside in social 
factors.  
 
4.5.4  The mainstreaming of dynamic issues: the edifice 
The research on endogenous growth bifurcated in two directions: one which 
focused on disembodied knowledge based on Romer (1986 and 1990) and; the 
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other in which knowledge is embodied in people (Lucas, 1988). Disembodied 
knowledge is generally conceptualized as technical innovations contained in 
designs (which have external effects) that result in either new intermediate 
goods, new differentiated final products or improved quality of products 
(Grossman and Helpman, 1991a, Chs.7&8, Segerstrom, Anant and Dinopolous, 
1990, Rivera-Batiz and Romer, 1991, Aghion and Howitt, 1992). The 
motivating force for the generation of this kind of knowledge is profit and, 
given its inherently non-appropriable character, markets need to be imperfect in 
order to provide the necessary incentives for this kind of activity. With 
embodied knowledge, when the motivation for investment is self-interest, then 
model tractability requires the (heroically) simplifying assumption that agents 
are infinitely lived (King and Rebelo, 1990). Otherwise, for agents with a finite 
lifespan, utilitarian self-interest needs to be complemented with altruism where 
the decision maker’s offspring are concerned (Becker, Murphy and Tamura, 
1990). Azariadis and Drazen (1990) supply a variation on the human capital 
growth explanation by introducing threshold effects; that is to say, increasing 
returns to investment in human capital become pronounced only when 
economic state variables have attained a critical threshold. This can explain 
multiple balanced growth paths and, according to the authors, a version of their 
model produces growth paths that resembles Rostow’s stages theory of 
growth.49 
 
One of the first to unite new trade theory and new growth theory were 
Grossman and Helpman. They initially drew on static monopolistic trade 
models which allow for intra- and inter-industry trade. Investment in research 
results in the production of new differentiated products and growth is a product 
of such investment. Nonetheless, their original forays in this direction did not 
give rise to endogenous change. In Grossman and Helpman (1989), there was 
free entry into R&D, which would only occur if profits earned on the sale of a 
                                                
49 According to the authors, Rostow (1960) did not inspire successive work on a stages theory of 
growth and development because “it failed to elucidate the economic mechanisms responsible for the 
jump from slower stages of the development path to more rapid ones in a way we would consider 
theoretically acceptable” (Azariadis and Drazen, 1990, p. 503n). For theoretical acceptability read the 
neoclassical micro foundations where all social outcomes depend on the rational behaviour of 
individual agents with given self-regarding (by and large) preferences.  
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new product covered the cost of its development. In their model, finite 
investment in R&D resulted in a net return on the new product variety of zero. 
However, as the returns to product development investment are assumed to be 
negatively related to the number of differentiated products already available 
(while the cost of such product development is constant), such investment 
eventually ceases and when it does the economy stops growing. However 
Romer (1990) had shown that innovation need not cease in the long run if 
private investment in blueprints for new goods spills over into the public stock 
of knowledge capital. This is sufficient to free such investment from 
diminishing returns. Segerstrom et al (1990) and Grossman and Helpman 
(1991b) got similar results when R&D resulted in better quality final goods, 
while for Aghion and Howitt (1992), it produced new intermediate goods that 
resulted in more efficient final good production.  
 
The human capital literature explored the relationship between income per 
capita, family size and investment in education (see Galor and Weil, 1999, 
Kremer and Chan, 1999 and Morand, 1999). It was observed that, above a 
certain threshold of development, family size fell and investment in education 
rose with beneficial effects for subsequent growth. Critical proxies were seen to 
be income per capita, the level of inequality in a country and women’s wages. 
The microeconomic explanation is that above a certain threshold, the 
opportunity cost of having children rises, leading to smaller family size and 
more investment in the education of existing offspring.  
 
From a welfare perspective, trade will only be universally positive if external 
effects are international. If they are national, then some countries could lose. For 
Feenstra (1990), small countries would lose in competition with larger ones due 
to (national) economies of scale in research. For Galor and Mountford (2004), 
the country that does not specialise in manufacturing experiences a fall in the 
return to human capital, which has a negative demographic effect in the sense of 
creating incentives for larger families with lower average levels educational 
investment. By contrast, in Grossman and Helpman (1991a, Ch.7), international 
spillovers mean that technology is everywhere the same and, trade is not only 
universally beneficial, it also conforms to a pattern predicted by static H-O 
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considerations. Rivera-Batiz and Romer (1991) give two reasons why trade 
should be beneficial to all countries: first, international knowledge spillovers 
expand the productive capacity of ALL countries; and, second, the increased 
resources devoted to growth-generating research activities as a result of scale 
effects.  
 
Of these two extremes, the idea that external effects are international appears to 
be the more unrealistic, not least, because the firms doing the innovating put 
pressure on governments to introduce an international regulatory framework 
that ensures that the knowledge that such research generates remains 
proprietary. Also, much depends on the process by which knowledge is 
acquired. If reverse engineering is costless, then it is sufficient simply to import 
products for technology to be everywhere the same. In this case the public good 
nature of knowledge is truly international and trade should be universally 
beneficial. On the other hand, if knowledge only comes from learning-by-doing, 
then externalities are local and production is essential to knowledge acquisition.  
 
The most interesting literature is that which assumes that knowledge spillovers 
can be imperfectly international but that this is conditional on a whole array of 
economic, geographic, cultural and institutionally specific factors. Some of 
these factors may be exogenously given while others may be susceptible to 
change if appropriate policies are adopted. For Goodfriend and McDemott 
(1998), the ease of knowledge flow is a product of geography and cultural 
factors thus implying that trade between geographically proximate, culturally 
similar countries is more likely to be mutually beneficial. In a similar vein, 
Krugman and Venables (1995) claim that such spillovers depend on the extent 
to which markets are truly integrated, a more likely situation when transport 
costs relative to value are low. This also favours mutually beneficial trade 
between adjacent countries and between those countries linked with a good 
transport infrastructure. One could (loosely) claim that these aforementioned 
factors are largely given and not amenable to change. By contrast, when the 
enabling conditions are economic, then government policies have a role to play 
in ensuring that these conditions are met or in minimizing their constraining 
effect. So, Keller (1996) stressed that for developing countries to benefit from 
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trade and move on to a virtuous growth path, accompanying investment is 
necessary, whether that be investment in human capital or imitation 
technologies (or social infrastructure). Of course the problem here for many 
developing countries is that they lack the resources to engage in this enabling 
investment. This is precisely why protection might be a first as opposed to a 
third or fourth best policy. Tamura (1996) stressed the role played by a 
country’s level of human capital in its capacity to absorb new technologies. For 
her, as for Becker and Murphy (1992), human capital acquisition (or labour 
specialisation decisions) is made on a cost-benefit basis and is influenced by 
market size, the ease of interpersonal exchange and economic organization.  
 
This union of new trade theory and new growth theory has still to reach 
maturity. Another  trend in growth theory has been the development of, what 
have been called semi-endogenous Schumpetarian growth models; that is to say, 
models without a scale effect.50 By contrast with the early endogenous growth 
literature, some of these models suggest not just the irrelevance of size to 
growth-generating activities but the irrelevance of policy too. In this, they 
appear to be closer in spirit to the original neoclassical growth models.  
 
Unsurprisingly (given the internally driven nature of economic theory), these 
attempts to dynamise trade research have not added clarity to the policy debate. 
So, for example, it can be shown that: trade has no impact on the relative wages 
of Northern workers (growth models with scale effects); that trade will raise the 
relative wage of Northern workers (scale invariant, endogenous Schumpetarian 
growth models); and that trade will lower the relative wage of Northern workers 
(scale invariant exogenous Schumpetarian growth models).51 
 
                                                
50 Jones (1995), Kortum (1997) and Segerstrom (1998) and Young (1998) suggest models where 
population size is not only irrelevant to steady state growth but so too is the level of research intensity 
in an economy, and policy has no impact on steady state growth. Dinopoulos and Thompson (1998), 
Aghion and Howitt (1998) and Peretto (1998) extend these models to remove the impact of population 
size but retain the impact of research intensity and policy on steady-state growth.  
 
51 See Grossman and Helpman (1991c), Sener (2006) and Dinopolous and Segerstrom (2006), 
respectively, for an account of these varying impacts of trade on Northern relative wages.  
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So where does all this research effort leave us? Has dynamic trade theory finally 
addressed the concerns of development economists and, more importantly, 
illustrated the role that trade policy can play in economic development? As with 
static new trade theory, much depends on the specificities of the models 
themselves. If disembodied knowledge, that is the product of investment in 
research and development, is truly non-appropriable and its reach international, 
then trade is to the betterment of all countries regardless of where such research 
is conducted. If not (either because of the international legal regime or because 
of the nature of knowledge acquisition) then interventionist policy, including 
trade policy, may be the best strategy. On the other hand, if the latest wave of 
scale invariant endogenous Schumpetarian growth models tell a convincing 
story, then policy has no impact at all. The real challenge is to find a way of 
arbitrating between all these different accounts. Trade theory may have gone 
dynamic but, it is questionable how illuminating this development has been, 
given what it is that has driven this research. The overriding consideration is the 
derivation of new theoretical results based on rational optimising behaviour in 
different social contexts. Increasing returns and external effects facilitated the 
transition to dynamic analysis since optimisation could be retained. However, 
optimisation also constrains, quite apart from whether it is a realistic 
behavioural construct by which to seek to explain all economic phenomena. 
Recent theorising may allow markets to be imperfect and even introduce social 
organization but this only matters to the extent that it alters the opportunities 
and constraints that the rational decision maker faces. Such a conception of 
individual behaviour and social organization remains diametrically opposed to 
the ideas forwarded by infant industry theorists, despite the belated neoclassical 
acknowledgement of the importance of knowledge and learning. This, in part, 
can explain the lack of coherence of neoclassical trade theory regarding issues 
to do with economic development.  
 
4.5.5 Trade, endogenous growth and old infant industry arguments 
The most obvious difference between recent theoretical efforts and the ideas of 
the infant industry theorists is their conception of the individual. In neoclassical 
theory, the individual is prior and always behaves in a manner to best satisfy 
his/her exogenously given preferences. By contrast, the social is prior for List, 
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and the challenge of economic development is how to effect a qualitative shift 
in the attitudes and behaviour of individuals: 
 
The publicity of the administration of justice, trial by jury, parliamentary 
legislation, public control of State administration, self-administration of the 
commonalities and municipalities, liberty of the press, liberty of association 
for useful purposes, impart to the citizens of constitutional states, as much as 
to their public functionaries, a degree of energy and power that can hardly be 
produced by other means (List, 2005b [1841], p. 29).  
 
List was in favour of policies that encouraged industrialisation because he 
believed that individuals in industrial society were qualitatively different to how 
they were in agricultural society, in term of aspirations, capacity and habits: 
 
In a country devoted to mere raw agriculture, dullness of mind, awkwardness 
of body, obstinate adherence to old notions, customs, methods, and processes, 
want of culture, of prosperity, and of liberty prevail. The spirit of striving for a 
steady increase in mental and bodily acquirements, of emulation, and of 
liberty, characterise, on the contrary, a State devoted to manufactures and 
commerce (p. 96).  
 
Moreover, cultural differences in behaviour could be explained as much by 
constraints and habits as by preferences and rationality. “Diligence, economy, 
order and forethought are at first produced by necessity afterwards by habit, and 
by the steady cultivation of those virtues.” (p. 114). Finally, he upbraided the 
classical school for its separation of politics from economics and for its failure 
to address the specific conditions of a nation which is why, from a policy 
perspective, he believed it offered so little:  
 
We can only learn from it how in private industry, natural ability, labour and 
capital are combined in order to bring into exchange valuable products and the 
manner these latter are distributed among the human race and consumed by it. 
But what means are to be adopted in order to bring the natural powers 
belonging to any individual nation into activity and value, to raise a poor and 
weak nation to prosperity and power, cannot be gathered from it because the 
school totally ignores politics, ignores the special conditions of the nation (pp. 
65-66). 
 
Classical political economy failed to get to the root of the problem of national 
economic development because, among other things, it did not learn from 
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history or from statistics. The conception of the individual, the separation of 
economics and politics and the non-inductive bias of neoclassical research (and 
trade theory) distinguish the latter (even more than classical political economy) 
from infant industry theorising, notwithstanding the mutual acceptance by both 
schools of the importance of learning and knowledge to economic development.  
 
All in all, neoclassical trade theorising, even in its recent dynamic form, 
assumes too much and too little. The method of neoclassical reasoning is 
restrictive, which is why it requires a relatively simple description of the 
environment in which the individual’s decision is supposedly made. Multiple 
market failures and multiple choice variables make for model intractability. This 
might explain why, for example, advocates of free trade belatedly acknowledge 
the importance of social and educational expenditure (if trade liberalisation is to 
be successful) yet fail to incorporate fiscal constraints into their models which 
might limit the feasibility of their policy recommendations. Furthermore, it is 
either naïve or disingenuous to present as alternatives, free trade allied with 
efficiency enhancing social expenditure versus protectionism without the social 
expenditure. A more plausible scenario might be the converse; that is to say,  
free trade devoid of social expenditure versus protection with it. Also, even on 
its own terms, neoclassical theory comes up short. Utility maximisation and 
profit maximisation are defended as plausible accounts of how decision makers 
behave in the market place. Yet, such self-regarding decision makers are always 
presumed to behave in a law abiding fashion or to take the legal constraints of 
the situation as given. This ignores the reasonable conjecture that, if they can, 
self-regarding agents will engage in activities designed to shape the laws and 
institutional environment to their own advantage. Examples range from the legal 
to the illegal: exploiting inter-jurisdictional competition for mobile investment; 
political donations; and political bribery in return for economic favours. This 
complex reality gets ignored in mainstream theorising, as much for reasons of 
method as of ideology. Optimisation, with its focus on the quantitative and its 
predilection for unique outcomes, precludes a focus on power and requires an 
unrealistic description of the economic environment. For this reason, even the 
most recent spate of trade theorising can, at best, yield only limited insights.  
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4.6 Resolving the Policy Debate 
 
Despite all the recent developments in trade research, the trade policy debate is 
no closer to resolution than it was in the days of classical political economy. 
Almost without exception, trade theorists still favour free trade, though they 
may bemoan the lack of innocence that this latest wave of theorising has 
heralded (see Krugman, 1987b, p. 132). In its policy stances neoclassical 
economics has shown remarkable continuity. Marshall, Pigou and Taussig are 
all said to have accepted the infant industry case for departing from free trade 
(Irwin, 1996, pp. 134-135). Yet this did not stop Marshall (in particular) from 
taking an unambiguous free trade policy stance when the insight and expertise 
of economists mattered as far as policy formation was concerned in the Tariff 
Reform debate of 1903. Explaining the policy conservatism of economists 
would make for an interesting sociological study but it is beyond the scope of 
this chapter. Suffice it to say that this disjunction between theory and policy 
serves to highlight the irrelevance of the latter to the direction of the former.  
 
The empirical work of economists has not served to clarify the policy debate 
although, most economists claim that the evidence is supportive of higher 
growth being associated with a more liberal trade regime (see Balassa, 1978; 
Bhagwati, 1978; Krueger, 1978; and Papageorgiou, Michaely and Choski, 
1991). The main statistical difficulties associated with such work is that of 
adequate proxies to measure a country’s trade regime, collinearity between 
different policies and the problem of endogeneity So, for example, many 
researchers take exports or the degree of openness of an economy to be 
indicative of its trade policy stance and conclude that, since higher growth in 
exports is positively correlated with higher growth in Gross Domestic Product, 
this must be a vindication of the dynamic benefits of trade liberalisation. This 
completely ignores the possibility that causality may run the other way: that is 
to say, that a higher rate of growth leads to more exports. As Rodrik (2001) 
anecdotally highlights, focusing on trade performance is not a clear guide to a 
country’s trade policy as the examples of Haiti and Vietnam show starkly.  
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The 1990s was characterised by more sophisticated cross-country econometric 
analysis of the trade-growth relationship, inspired partly by better data and in 
part by new growth and new trade theory. Without going into details of the 
studies, Dollar (1992), Sachs and Warner (1995) and Edwards (1998) broadly 
find in favour of the growth enhancing effects of a liberal trade regime. One of 
the more interesting and controversial studies to emerge from this period was 
that of Rodgiguez and Rodrik (2000) both for the nature of their study and their 
conclusions. They replicated the studies of the aforementioned and every time 
found that, with small changes in the data, the measure of trade distortion 
proved to be not significant. So for example, to the Dollar study, they added per 
capita income and level of education as explanatory variables and also updated 
the price series from which Dollar derived his trade distortion index. This 
proved sufficient to reverse the sign on the latter. Only exchange rate variability 
was shown to have a statistically significant negative impact on growth. When 
replicating the Sachs and Warner study, they replaced their dummy variable 
categorizing trade policy regimes with the underlying five criteria on which it 
was based. Only the dummy for State monopoly (which was perfectly 
commensurate with those African countries undergoing structural adjustment 
programmes) and the black market foreign exchange premium were significant. 
Finally with the Edwards study, of his nine measures of openness, again only 
exchange rate black market premium stood up after Rodriguez and Rodrik had 
interrogated the data.  
 
The work done by Rodriguez and Rodrik was valuable in that it was undertaken 
by economists who knew the empirical tricks of the trade that can be used to get 
the “right” sort of statistically significant results. They showed how small 
adjustments, such as adding variables that could reasonably be considered 
causal, re-designating existing variables, weighting countries differently and/or 
using more up to date data, could invalidate policy orthodoxy. Furthermore, 
their work showed how difficult it is empirically to establish policy causality. 
Even as far as the one not yet disproved significant variable is concerned 
(exchange rate variability and black market exchange rate premia), they 
question its suitability as an indicator of trade distortion, claiming such 
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variables are more reflective of the general economic environment and 
macroeconomic policy considerations than of trade policy orientation. Baldwin 
(2000) acknowledged the validity of the Rodriguez and Rodrik empirical 
critique pointing to the complex interrelationship between governments’ trade 
policy and other policies. However, in the spirit of neoclassical economic 
orthodoxy, he claimed that the empirical difficulties that exist are usually 
acknowledged by practitioners. This is the empirical equivalent of neoclassical 
theorists saying that unorthodox theoretical results are well recognised within 
the profession, usually as caveats to orthodox results. It does not typically 
extend to similar caution when it comes to issuing policy prescriptions, where 
the advice tends to be far from nuanced. The following quote from Baldwin is 
worth replicating because it is representative of neoclassical discourse and the 
seeming political naivety of the position that it embodies: 
 
It is true developing countries are often given the policy advise that decreasing 
trade barriers is a more effective way of achieving higher sustainable rates of 
growth than tightening trade restrictions. But, especially since the Bhagwati-
Krueger and Papageorgiou-Michaely-Choksi country studies, those giving 
such advice also emphasise the need, as a minimum, for a stable and non-
discriminatory exchange-rate system and usually also the need for prudent 
monetary and fiscal policies and corruption-free administration of economic 
policies for trade liberalisation to be effective in the long-run. It seems to me 
that the various country studies do support this type of policy advice and that 
the cross-country statistical studies do not overturn this conclusion  
(Baldwin, 2000, p. 16).  
 
It is not clear how compatible the call for prudent fiscal policy is with 
accompanying calls for social security and educational provision. In any case, 
the latter may not be feasible owing to the much cited (but in this instance 
disregarded) issue of scarce resources. As to the good governance call, it is at 
best a vacuous statement (akin to saying that in order to be developed you need 
to be developed) and at worst disingenuous, in the light of vested interests that 
the developed world has in accessing the markets and resources of the 
developing world.  
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4.7 Value Added of Recent Research 
 
Trade theorising of the past thirty years has supposedly got more real as 
evidenced by its embrace of imperfect markets and dynamics. That claim has 
been contested in this chapter, whose central thesis is that theoretical 
developments have been internally driven by the tools that economists use. I  
also challenge the view, so vociferously articulated by Paul Krugman, that the 
use of these tools has added clarity and insight to the analysis of trade issues. 
Traditional neoclassical trade theory had been defined by two essential features, 
the optimising agent and the perfectly competitive market. Abstract deductive 
theorising on the equilibrium outcomes of decisions by rational representative 
agents within such a rigid framework must eventually exhaust all possibilities. 
If new theoretical insights were to be gleaned via this method, something had to 
give, and what yielded in this case was the environmental assumption that 
markets were perfectly competitive. It is noteworthy that initial deviations from 
the competitive construct, notably factor market imperfections and external 
economies of scale, were the types of environmental concessions that did least 
damage to the perfectly competitive market paradigm. Even monopolistic 
competition, which was considered such a great departure from the standard 
perfectly competitive model, is still a very similar market structure, insofar as 
competition between firms is assumed to be non-strategic and the free entry 
assumption means that firms earn zero economic rents. The latter was a 
convenient assumption as it facilitated model closure, which may go some way 
to explaining why this was the form of market structure chosen.  
Methodologically, theorising trade in monopolistic markets was a break from 
what had gone before because of its recourse to specific functional forms to 
describe technology and preferences. Theoretically it was different in its 
assumptions about the nature of such technology and preferences. Oligopolistic 
trade modelling represented greater novelty in its embrace of strategic issues 
and its abandonment of general equilibrium. The most obvious explanation for 
the failure of this research to adopt general equilibrium forms of modelling had 
to be tractability issues. It also proved to be a voluminous and highly diverse 
(theoretical) literature, which is unsurprising, since there are so many diverse 
ways in which firms compete but modelling requirements usually necessitate 
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the focus on singular strategic variables at a time. A feature of the 
aforementioned research (and economic geography) was the lack of empirical 
corroboration of a statistical kind until the last decade. Of all the theoretical 
developments in new trade theory, only the heterogeneous firms operating in 
monopolistically competitive markets can claim to have been, at least partially, 
inspired by empirical considerations. That said however, the restrictive nature of 
the theorising is such that the normative conclusions derived from it are highly 
questionable. A notable feature of the monopolistically competitive theories in 
their different guises has been the attempts to integrate them with perfectly 
competitive trade theory. This makes sense if one is anxious to demonstrate that 
old and new trade theories are complementary and not competitive. A feature of 
more recent dynamic trade models has been how diverse they are and the wide 
array of conflicting conclusions emanating from them on the presumed effects 
of trade on growth. Again, as with oligopolistic trade models, this is because 
such models are highly specific in their designation of the growth process. A 
comparison of neoclassical dynamic trade models and the dynamic arguments 
concerning trade of infant industry theorists such as List, served to highlight 
how their different methodological predispositions conditioned their theoretical 
conclusions on trade and economic development. In neoclassical trade the 
individual is always prior and their environment only affects their behaviour to 
the extent that it alters the opportunities and constraints that they face. In terms 
of trade models, this requires the decision maker to optimise and this 
methodological imperative means that even the most complex environment 
must, of necessity, be represented in a simplistic way. Cross-country empirical 
studies on trade policies and economic performance highlight how difficult it is 
to establish the relationship in a statistically satisfactory manner because of 
data, timing and endogeneity issues. But then, attempting to establish the link 
between policies and economic performance by engaging in cross-country 
regressions implicitly means that the researcher accepts the premise that the 
determinants of growth are everywhere the same, with countries differing only 
to the extent that their explanatory variables differ. Here we face another 
methodological article of faith of neoclassical economics, the presumed 
universality of human behaviour and, as a consequence, the-one-size-fits-all 
approach to theorising.  
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Undoubtedly trade models have become more complex, more diverse and have 
given rise to more varied policy prescriptions than the monolithic perfectly 
competitive model of trade. The intellectual effort has been huge. The question 
that requires answering is whether it is has been worth it? It is my contention 
that all this effort has been of questionable value because of the commitment of 
neoclassical economists to methodological individualism of the optimising 
variety. If relevant aspects of reality cannot be modelled they are excluded. 
More narrowly, the commitment to mathematical optimisation (which despite 
recent developments on the frontiers of psychology and economics still remains 
the dominant heuristic in economic research in general and trade research in 
particular) requires an overly restrictive description of the economic 
environment. This is true notwithstanding the attempted moves towards more 
realistic market descriptions that the abandonment of perfect competition 
represented. More pertinently, it is a questionable portrayal of the behaviour of 
individuals in complex environments, where cognitive limitations are more 
likely to bind and individuality to have more force. In addition, the exclusive 
focus on the quantitative that optimisation requires means that the roles of 
power and conflict in determining outcomes is neglected. This is an important 
lacuna in contemporary theorising, especially in today’s economic environment. 
Finally, the methodologically individualistic foundations that underpin the 
neoclassical project distract from the proper questions that theorists should be 
asking. Scarcity and opportunity cost are important concepts, but from the 
perspective of economic (and trade) policy, where they really matter is at the 
central political level (where the command over resources is greatest), not at the 
level of the individual.  
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Chapter 5. Conclusion 
 
5.1 What has been done and why?  
 
This thesis has attempted to evaluate critically the evolution of international 
trade theory from its roots in classical political economy to its current 
neoclassical expression. The primary objective of the exercise was to use 
international trade theory as the template through which the apparatus and 
commitments of neoclassical economics could be interrogated. By apparatus is 
meant the tools of theoretical and empirical investigation and by commitments 
is intended the constructs that underpin the application of these tools, and the 
factors that have led to changes in research heuristics. The standard against 
which research has been evaluated is its ability to enhance understanding of 
economic phenomena and to act as an aid to policymaking.52 Trade theory was 
chosen as it had a number of distinctive characteristic which rendered it 
uniquely suitable for this exercise. First, there appears to be remarkable 
continuity between the classical political economy explanations of international 
trade and its neoclassical successors, in the form of the comparative advantage 
theory of international trade. Second, there emerged what seemed to be a new 
heuristic in international trade theorising in the 1980s with the abandonment of 
the construct of perfectly competitive product markets. Third, most research in 
this domain was characterised by a distinct lack of empirical engagement until 
this millennium. Fourth, there has been an upsurge in empirical work over the 
last decade. So, international trade theory has, superficially at any rate, 
exhibited both continuity and change and has done so most of the time without 
much by way of feedback or input from empirical studies, but that too has 
altered in recent times. All of these twists and turns in terms of method would 
appear to give prime facie support to the assertion that the apparatus and 
commitments of neoclassical economics, at least in this domain of application, 
                                                
52 The approach taken in this thesis was narrow and subjective, to the extent that it depended on my 
evaluation of the adequacy of international trade theory in the light of economic reality. Another 
approach would have been to evaluate trade theory in terms of a broader methodological framework of 
scientific development, such as Thomas Kuhn’s idea of paradigms and paradigm shifts or Imre 
Lakatos’s notion of progressive and degenerate research programmes. Such an approach was beyond 
the scope of this work but remains a potential area of future investigation.  
 
 227 
has been supportive of progress.53 Finally, the much cited status of international 
trade among economic practitioners was another reason to investigate the 
potential reasons for such eminence and to deduce what this tells us about 
economics as a discipline.  
 
5.2 How has the Exercise been Conducted?  
 
My approach was to return to the primary material of both classical and 
neoclassical writers as well as that of their critics. While this may seem an 
obvious and innocuous exercise, it proved to be a very revealing one in the 
sense of discovering just how nuanced were the views of early adherents to 
liberal trade theory, in both classical and neoclassical guises. Contemporary 
textbook accounts of the contributions of classical economists to international 
trade theory tend to be both uni-dimensional and Whiggish, in the sense of 
selecting what is useful in classical theory and presenting it as a forerunner to 
subsequent more developed neoclassical formulations. As far as early 
neoclassical contributions are concerned, any heretical caveats, that might limit 
or otherwise qualify the benign policy conclusions of orthodox theory, do not 
feature either in international economics textbooks or in general histories of 
thought. Interestingly, they did feature in the iconic texts written in the 1930s by 
Haberler, Ohlin and Viner. More recent studies of the history of international 
trade theory by Irwin (1996), Maneschi (1998) and Gomes (2003) do address 
the contributions (heretical and otherwise) of early neoclassical writers, but their 
interpretations of the meaning and value of such contributions differ from mine. 
This divergence is particularly stark where the critics of liberal trade policy are 
concerned (as outlined in chapter 3). That texts and writings can give rise to 
                                                
53 Adherents to this view more generally, include baseline guardians such as Backhouse who, while 
acknowledging the lacuna as far as empirical progress is concerned, nevertheless applauds the rigour of 
neoclassical economics and asserts that it contains internal forces for change, all of which have 
combined to yield theoretical progress (Backhouse, 2000, pp. 152-154). Colander, Holt and Rosser are 
more robust in their defence of mainstream economics, claiming that its commitment to model building 
is what defines it, but that it is sufficiently eclectic to have at its vanguard cutting edge critics, who, 
while embracing heterodox ideas, still remaining faithful to the methods that define the mainstream 
(Colander et al, 2004, 2010). Unsurprisingly, in such a Candidean world, progress is to be expected. A 
much cited exponent of such cutting edge practices is Krugman, who offers as a defence of modelling  
(apart from its rigour) its success, one that he acknowledged might be surprising in view of the usually 
crude principles on which such models are based (Krugman, 1995, p. 77).  
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such varying interpretations highlights the pedagogical importance of including 
such readings in academic curricula, as opposed to accepting partial, third-hand 
versions of the presumed contribution of these writers.  
 
This thesis has also interrogated the more recent development in international 
trade theory (since the 1950s) in a much more detailed  way than is to be found 
in the  historical accounts of Irwin, Maneschi and Gomes or in contemporary 
textbooks. For example, the literature on domestic factor market distortions and 
external economies of scale (which overlapped with the refinement of the 
general equilibrium model of trade) tends to be neglected in most textbooks and 
received only limited cursory treatment by Irwin et al. My explanation for this 
disregard is that the heuristic in theoretical research changed so dramatically 
with the focus on imperfectly competitive product markets, that it effectively 
obliterated a contribution that had, in any case, always been marginal to the 
mainstream project. Yet, in order to understand why trade theory evolved as it 
did, it is necessary to speculate on why these early departures from the perfectly 
competitive market construct were acceptable at that time, while others, such as 
imperfectly competitive product markets, were not. Additionally, my synthesis 
of new trade theory and understanding of its contribution, in addition to my 
interpretation of the relative popularity of different sub-themes within this 
literature, is also at variance with current mainstream expositions.  
 
5.3 Findings 
 
(i) The writings of classical forbears of comparative advantage do not 
contain a uniform message as far as trade liberalisation is concerned.  
 
While Smith, Ricardo and Mill may have advocated free trade as the best policy 
for Britain at the time they were writing, other elements of their writings cast 
doubt on the view that such a policy stance was universally applicable to all 
countries. This has already been alluded to in the case of Smith by Magnusson 
(2004, p. 155) who mentioned that a doctrinaire free trade reading is just one 
interpretation of Smith, citing nineteenth century American economic writers 
who favoured protection of manufactures and yet considered Smith to be an 
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intellectual forefather. Furthermore, Smith’s vent-for-surplus argument caused 
great consternation because of its mercantilist overtones. With the notable 
exception of Magnusson, historians of trade have either: ignored the vent-for-
surplus argument; dismissed it as a theoretical aberration; or treated it as part of 
his productivity theory on the benefits of market widening. The implication of 
Ricardo’s dynamic trade theory, whereby repeal of the Corn Laws in Britain 
was expected to lead to increased profit and investment, thus complementing 
the static gains from trade with dynamic ones, is never alluded to in 
international economic textbooks. This may be because it highlights how the 
dynamic effects of trade liberalisation depend on the structure of the economy. 
As shown in this thesis, the cautionary implications of trade liberalisation for a 
country with a static advantage in agricultural production have not been 
highlighted by historians of trade. Omitting to stress how Ricardo’s dynamic 
theory of trade can qualify or enhance his static theory of comparative 
advantage is an important lacuna, especially as the static theory of comparative 
advantage has been paraded as an exemplar for the scientific insights of 
economic theorising. Part of its appeal undoubtedly lies in the presumption of 
universal applicability, regardless of a country’s economic structure. Any 
qualification to such universalising claims can only serve to underline that, if 
economics is a science, it is not one in the image of the natural sciences. Mill’s 
endorsement of the infant industry case for protection aroused similar disquiet 
to the less well-mentioned views of his predecessors. Irwin, Maneschi and 
Gomes all make reference to this cited exception to the virtues of free trade but 
each is at pains to highlight that Mill later recanted or otherwise regretted his 
earlier support, on the grounds of its potential for abuse. Maneschi (1998, p. 
121) adds that it is only in recent times that rigorous criteria for its application 
have been provided, the implication being that it was a not very well thought out 
rationale.  
 
(ii) The mixed messages of classical economic theorising can be attributed 
to their ontological awareness.  
 
In other words, they were all practical free traders as far as Britain was 
concerned, because their social awareness led them to the view that such a 
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policy stance was the most appropriate for the country at the time they were 
writing.  
 
 (iii) Early neoclassical writers were also ontologically aware.  
 
Evidence lies in the various qualifications to the free trade argument provided 
by Sidgwick, Nicholson and Bickerdike. Even Marshall and Pigou accepted the 
infant industry exception to free trade but considered it unsuitable for an 
advanced industrialised country like Britain. This did not stop the 
aforementioned (Sidgwick excepted as he was deceased) from signing the Free 
Trade Manifesto in 1903. The manifesto, among other things, asserted that the 
tariff reform proposals were contrary to the doctrine of economic science. It is 
not unreasonable to speculate that the reasons for such a public stance by 
economists on an issue of policy importance were probably twofold: first, they 
genuinely believed that the proposals were not in Britain’s interest; and, second, 
they wished to invoke the authority of the economist and promote the view that 
they were purveyors of an impartial science. In addition, the authority and 
influence of Marshall, as well as his ambitions for his chosen subject, should 
not be discounted when considering such postures by these economists.  
 
The writings and policy stances of European writers on trade matters seem 
diametrically opposed to those of the British economists. In their theoretical 
work, Barone and Pareto developed the tools whose application showed the 
benefits of trade liberalisation. Nevertheless, they remained agnostic on the 
issue for reasons rooted in an awareness of social reality. Barone emphasised 
the frictions and uncertainty inherent in dynamic economic processes, while 
Pareto stressed the indirect effects of policy and how they could impact on 
wealth creation. What united all of these economists (British and otherwise) in 
their diverse policy stances on trade liberalisation was their sense of social 
actuality.  
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(iv) The development of the tools of neoclassical economics resulted in a 
loss of ontological awareness.  
 
This process started in the 1930s and reached its acme when trade was 
subsumed as part of general equilibrium analysis. The hard core of neoclassical 
theorising was symbolised by optimising representative agents with well-
behaved utility and production functions, whose decisions were coordinated in 
perfectly competitive markets. While the determinants of comparative 
advantage remained one heuristic, the predominant one was that led by 
Samuelson, which was the rigorous articulation and generalisation of the 
conditions governing the existence, uniqueness and stability of competitive 
equilibrium. In Samuelson’s hands, Ohlin’s interdependence theory of pricing 
(which integrated product and factor markets into trade theory) acquired 
significance unconnected with its accuracy as a description of real world trade 
flows (De Marchi, 1976, p. 112). Equally significant was the response to 
Leontief’s practical attempt to test the H-O theory of trade. His disconfirming 
results had no impact on the predominant comparative advantage explanation of 
trade flows but, instead, led to numerous refinements of measurement and the 
re-categorisation of variables. The virtual world of trade theory appeared to 
have very limited connection with its real world counterpart. While this virtual 
world was one that was still supportive of free trade, policy issues were now of 
secondary importance. Testament to the less important status of policy for 
theorists was Chimpan’s refusal to discuss how trade could conceivably make a 
country worse off (when external economies of scale result in multiple 
equilibria), on the spurious grounds that it was a “problem in welfare 
economics” (Chipman, 1965, p. 749).  
 
(v) The arguments for protection were not defeated either analytically or 
empirically.  
 
I would challenge vigorously Irwin’s assertion to the contrary. Rather, I would 
suggest that various arguments justifying protection were disingenuously 
sidelined by a variety of stratagems, which included, inter alia, appeals to the 
metaphysical commitments of neoclassical theory and, in some instances, 
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outright misrepresentation of the case as originally presented. Indeed, how the 
mainstream responded to these arguments is revealing of the commitments and 
limitations of neoclassical theory. The employment argument for trade 
protection, as implicitly articulated by Cournot, is generally not known, despite 
the widespread use of his tools. Schuller’s empirically-based appeal for 
protection was dismissed on the grounds that prolonged unemployment was 
inconsistent with rational behaviour. Similarly, idle material or natural resources 
were rationalised on efficiency grounds. The invocation of rationality as a 
defence against apparent empirical reality shows that it remains a core 
metaphysical commitment of the neoclassical programme. When involuntary 
unemployment as an empirical phenomenon was rendered respectable by 
Keynes, it still had no bearing on trade theory, as it was deemed a problem best 
tackled with macroeconomic tools. What could no longer be ignored could be 
sidelined, thanks to increasing specialisation within the discipline of economics. 
 
Graham’s “economies of scale” argument for protection was challenged on the 
basis of its incompatibility with perfect competition, unless such economies 
were external in nature. The possibility that this might be the case was 
dismissed on the grounds of lack of empirical support. In this instance, another 
inviolable construct (perfect competition) was invoked to browbeat protectionist 
upstarts and the abstract deductive method of making the case was held up as 
being insufficient to clinch the argument. The incongruity of the latter 
accusation, given the nature of mainstream theorising, appeared lost on its 
accusers. The starting point for Manoilescu’s protectionist thesis was the 
empirical reality of heterogeneous productivity across sectors of the economy. 
He made the case for policy activism in order to expand those sectors where 
resources could be most productively deployed. Yet, his argument as originally 
expressed seems to be not well-known. All writers instead claim his case for 
protection rests on the existence of non-compensating inter-industry wage 
differentials for mobile, homogenous labour, and proceed to question each of 
these elements; that is to say, are nominal wage differences real wage 
differences, are wage differences of a compensatory nature (though how one 
could prove this is an another issue) and how identical is labour? This is a 
misrepresentation of Manoilescu’s thesis, which never alluded to wage 
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differentials. I attribute this misrepresentation to Ohlin’s (1931) response to, and 
qualified re-interpretation of, the argument. That such a canard was repeated in 
even stronger form clearly illustrates the dangers of confining knowledge of 
arguments to secondary sources. The disservice done to Manoilescu’s thesis is 
all the more acute in the light of its empirical foundations.  
 
The most pertinent arguments against free trade are those based on the infant 
industry thesis. The exponents of this view all wrote before the emergence of 
neoclassical economics. As a thesis, its foundations are dynamic, in that the 
expected benefits are in the future. Despite a qualified acceptance of this being 
an exception to the free trade is best case, it had no impact on neoclassical trade 
theorising for the first half of the twentieth century. This is unsurprising given 
the static nature of neoclassical trade theory. When it was resurrected by Meade 
(1955) and elaborated by Kemp (1960) and Baldwin (1969), it was as a certain 
type(s) of market imperfection. Baldwin, in particular, illustrated the futility of 
providing trade protection when the acceptable forms of imperfections exist. 
Baldwin’s article was considered the definitive knock-out blow against this one 
theoretically embarrassing exception to the free trade doctrine. By the 1980s, 
trade liberalisation had become part of the policy tool-kit of the World Bank and 
unsuccessful protectionist regimes were cited as proof that such policies had 
failed to deliver the economic goods. The infant industry argument had been 
analytically defeated (as Irwin would say) or rigorous criteria for its invocation 
as a justification for protection were finally provided (Maneschi, 1998, p. 121), 
and found to be extremely limited in scope. Reducing the infant industry thesis 
to a certain kind of market imperfection is a blatant example of neoclassical 
reductionism and bears limited resemblance to the arguments as expressed by 
Hamilton, Rae and List. It did not occur to Baldwin to question the neoclassical 
construct of the independent, omniscient decision maker, who can correctly 
evaluate the payback to all potential decisions. In Baldwin’s world, the 
organisation of firms is always optimal and the benefits from learning are 
always knowable in advance. This reinterpretation of the infant industry thesis, 
with its presumption that behaviour is always optimal, is a travesty of the 
arguments put forward by Hamilton and especially Rae and List. Rae, for 
example, attributed the theoretical shortcoming of Smith’s system to its 
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methodologically individualistic foundations. For List, one could only 
understand individual preferences and behaviour by appreciating how they were 
shaped by social, political and institutional forces. The decision maker as 
envisaged by Hamilton, Rae and List is certainly not the asocial, omniscient, 
rational maximiser of neoclassical theory. Their arguments have not been fairly 
or correctly appraised, probably because it is not part of mainstream scholarship 
to read historical works other than for confirmation. The cost of this collective 
neglect, allied with a seeming unquestioning adherence to certain tools of 
theoretical investigation (in this case, optimisation) leads to an all too easy 
dismissal of important and valid theses. When such blinkered vision is 
compounded by a lack of empirical awareness, it should come as no surprise 
that the record of economic analysis, in particular in the policy sphere, has been 
so unsuccessful.  
 
(vi) New trade theory was not primarily motivated by ontological 
considerations.  
 
Trade theorising in imperfect markets was undoubtedly a new departure in 
international trade research, to the extent that the previous era of narrowing was 
now succeeded by an era of broadening, as far as a description of the economic 
environment is concerned. It was also capable of rationalising the phenomenon 
of intra-industry trade between similarly endowed countries. However, I would 
dispute that the motivation for such a change came from the empirical 
inadequacies of the various comparative advantage stories. Rather, I would 
suggest that the nature of mainstream theory was such that it had reached the 
end of the line. Deducing new conclusions from the behaviour of hyper-rational 
agents operating in perfectly competitive, frictionless markets reached a natural 
terminal point. Besides, the empirical inadequacies of mainstream theory had 
been exposed a quarter of a century before this new heuristic in trade theorising 
emerged as a central part of mainstream research. While comparative advantage 
was being absorbed into the general equilibrium project (with all the narrowing 
that this implied), considerations of empirical adequacy were not sufficient to 
derail the project.  
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Apart from the issue of timing, it is also interesting to note the sequencing of 
permissible market imperfections. The first permissible types of market 
imperfections were in factor, not product, markets. Factor market imperfections 
may not have been central to neoclassical trade theory, but neither were they 
beyond the theoretical pale. Arguably, this may have been because it was 
relatively easy to integrate them into mainstream analysis. Perfectly competitive 
product markets and generally specified production and utility functions could 
be preserved. Even the strong policy conclusion that free trade equilibrium is 
superior (in an efficiency sense) to equilibrium under some kind of 
protectionism, was effectively immunised, since at best, protection might be a 
third best policy, but was trumped by other factor market correcting 
interventions. Likewise, external economies of scale, while technically 
challenging, still had the advantage of leaving relatively untouched the core 
apparatus of competitive markets, general functional forms (although allowance 
had to be made for such economies) and optimising agents. The concession was 
that it led to multiple equilibria, which have uncomfortable normative 
implications for the free trade is unambiguously best view of the world. 
However, this did not appear to be the main focus of research energy. Instead, 
much energy was devoted to deriving new theoretical results; that is to say, 
seeing how it modified the core theorems (Stolper-Samuelson and Rybczynski) 
associated with the main model of trade, as well as its implications for the shape 
of the production possibility frontier. Arguably, the aforementioned market 
imperfections were the first to be acceptable because they did minimal damage 
to, or simply most readily built upon, the core apparatus of neoclassical trade 
theory.  
 
The admission of imperfect product markets into international trade theory was 
a rupture with what had gone before. The commitment of mainstream theorising 
up to this point had been to optimisation, general functional forms and perfectly 
competitive general equilibrium. Now, general functions forms were dispensed 
with, price-taking was no longer assumed, even general equilibrium was no 
longer a necessary framework for some category of models, and every kind of 
conceivable external effect was permitted. What is more, depending on the 
model, trade intervention could, in some instances, be deemed superior to free 
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trade. Part of the core of the apparatus of traditional neoclassical international 
trade theory looked as if it had been unambiguously violated. Yet this surrender 
was at best partial, given that it led to a renaissance in trade theory, at a time 
when it seemed a finished structure with nothing interesting left to do. Tellingly, 
new trade theory was as empirically immune as old trade theory (at least until 
this millennium), so the driving force for change was probably internal. The 
new heuristic yielded an incredibly rich (quantitatively) harvest of new 
theoretical results. It also retained part of its traditional core commitment; that is 
to say, optimisation and equilibrium. When Krugman defends the neoclassical 
predilections for constructing models as a means of gaining insight into 
economic and social processes, he is explicitly referring to the equilibrium 
outcome of rational decision making of a maximising variety. A quick perusal 
of articles published in recent editions of the Journal of International 
Economics will reveal that utility functions, maximising behaviour and 
equilibrium outcomes are still very much standard fare in contemporary 
neoclassical trade scholarship. The key question is whether this form of 
theorising has proven more insightful than traditional theory and whether the 
quantitatively enormous output of new theoretical results has aided policy in a 
socially constructive way?  
 
(vii) Trade theory has become more fragmented rather than pluralistic. 
 
Pluralism in theorising is to be commended, especially if it leads to a more 
encompassing account of economic phenomena. New trade theory has, in some 
manifestations (monopolistic competition), been successfully integrated with 
comparative advantage. It is debatable whether such unity is ontic as opposed to 
derivational. While it must be acknowledged that the latter unification can 
explain both inter-industry trade between very different countries and intra-
industry trade between similar countries, the imperfectly competitive models 
used in such cases of unification are of questionable realism. Full employment, 
low barriers to entry, parametric demand and zero economic rent are still de 
rigueur in such models. In addition they are supplemented by a plethora of 
oligopolistic and dynamic trade models. What is blatantly obvious from these 
models is that the impact of trade liberalisation (or trade intervention) depends 
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on the specification of the model. The sheer diffusion and heterogeneity of these 
models makes it all but impossible to derive useful generalisation about the 
consequences of international trade and the role of trade policy. The monolithic 
virtual world of perfectly competitive, general equilibrium trade theory has been 
replaced by a diffusion of models. The uniform policy conclusions of the former 
world have been replaced (logically) by a world where any variety of 
conceivable policies (including liberal trade policy) could be efficiency 
enhancing. Theorising has moved from one extreme to another, but neither 
extreme has led to useful abstraction in the sense of allowing us to make 
generalisations that would be of service to policy makers. This may partially 
explain why most economists engaged in this kind of international trade 
research continue to defend free trade as the best policy stance in such a 
confusing, multi-model world. If one subscribes to the view expressed by 
Hutchison (1994, p. 284), that the overriding aim for the subject should be real 
world policy relevance, or even the more modest aim of “damage limitation” in 
the sense of avoiding serious politico-economic catastrophe (p. 292), this new 
heuristic in trade theorising has been of questionable usefulness as far as 
important trade policy considerations are concerned.  
 
(viii) The recent empirical turn in trade research has not led to improved 
insights on important normative trade policy issues 
 
This view directly contradicts mainstream theorists, like Neary, for whom the 
recent interplay between theory and empirics has proved enormously fruitful. In 
support of my position, I refer to the substantive content of a recent review 
article on the gains from trade published in the Journal of Economic 
Perspectives by two of the leading exponents of “cutting edge research” in this 
field, namely Melitz and Trefler (2012). Apart from the traditional comparative 
advantage gains from trade, the other categories of gains that the authors 
enumerate are: increased product variety and economies of scale; productivity 
gains within industries due to resource shifting from low productivity to high 
productivity firms; and productivity gains at firm level due to increased 
innovation induced by trade enlarged markets. The supportive empirical 
literature on such gains related primarily to the impact on Canada of the 
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Canada-USA trade agreement and the effect on the productivity of Argentinean 
firms of the Latin American regional trade agreement, Mercosur. In addition, 
the authors cite work by Balistreri, Hillbery and Rutherford (2011) on the 
impact of adding firm heterogeneity to standard computable equilibrium models 
of trade, showing that it “raises the gains from trade liberalization by a multiple 
of four” (Melitz and Trefler, 2012, p. 114). For them “Empirical confirmation of 
the gains predicted by models with heterogeneous firms represents one of the 
truly significant advances in the field of international economics” (p. 114). 
 
What I find striking about this review article is not just its failure to articulate 
the possibility of resources being reallocated into unemployment, but the 
selective use of empirical studies. The theoretical part of this research, on the 
effects of trade when firms in an industry are heterogeneous, assumes that there 
are always firms at the upper end of the productivity spectrum with the 
technological capacity to expand and flourish in a more competitive trading 
environment. Also, assuming that the economic consequences of trade 
integration for a developed country like Canada are indicative of what might 
happen to a developing country that integrates into the global economy, is naïve 
at best and dishonest at worst. Even selecting Argentina is questionable, given 
that the institutional context was regional integration with countries at similar or 
lower levels of economic development. Finally, to cite without caveat the 
evidence from computable general equilibrium (CGE) models brings the 
practices of economists into disrepute. A built-in assumption of these CGE 
models is constant employment. So the possibility of trade-induced damaging 
resource reallocation cannot occur in the virtual world that these supposedly 
applied models represent. Such practices are even more misleading than abstract 
model building because they purport to have a closer resemblance to the real 
world and to be measuring the economic impact of policy. For all of these 
reasons, I would question just how “fruitful” in a policy relevant way, is the 
latest wave of research. Its fruitfulness, in a theoretical sense, is the scope that it 
gives to derive new results of questionable relevance.  
 
 
 239 
(ix) The idealising assumptions that underpin old, new and new-new trade 
theory render them of limited usefulness when it comes to policy.  
 
Common to most of these trade models are the assumptions of constant (or full) 
employment and balanced trade. Unemployment can only be admitted as a 
consequence of a domestic factor market distortion. Applied work informed by 
these models needs to be viewed with a healthy dose of scepticism, since it 
either assumes away inconvenient aspects of reality or it acts as if rectification 
is possible. For example, the traditional theory of comparative advantage 
(regardless of its presumed determinants) is meant to reflect the best use of a 
country’s resources, which it is assumed will prevail if markets operate under 
utopian conditions of perfect competition, full employment and balanced trade. 
So, agencies (like the World Bank) charged with the task of prediction have 
tried, in the past, to identify a country’s comparative advantage in a second best 
imperfect world, by acting as if they could correct for such imperfections. 
Domestic Resource Cost (DRC) methods are the applied equivalent of a 
comparative advantage world, where all resources are valued at their true 
shadow or social values, the latter being those values that it is presumed would 
pertain if markets were perfect, employment constant and trade balanced. 
Measuring trade gains, when markets are imperfect, means putting a value on 
diversity, allowing for cost reductions as a result of expected scale effects and, 
latterly, allowing for productivity gains from restructuring within industries. As 
mentioned in the previous section, efficiency losses in such a world are 
unlikely, as these models do not generally make allowances for employment 
losses or the consequences of balance of payments imbalances.  
 
(x) Orthodox trade theory is challenged to understand the forces that make 
for change in a dynamic world 
 
This is obvious from a recent review by Hanson (2012) of changing 
international trade patterns associated with the integration of low and middle 
income countries into the global economy. While his analysis appears sensible 
in terms of the correlation between the structure and composition of trade and 
the level of economic development of a country, it is fundamentally a static 
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analysis that, according to his reasoning, conforms to the edicts of comparative 
advantage. Low income countries export agricultural goods, raw materials and 
labour-intensive products. Middle income countries import capital-intensive 
products, which are also the exports of high income countries. Economic 
development is associated with a changing pattern of international trade. 
Hanson’s snapshot pictures of trade for middle income countries at two periods 
in time (1994 and 2008) are testament to this reality.  
 
But, this does not tell us how a country moves up the development ladder and 
starts exporting more advanced products. Hanson’s explanation for the changing 
pattern of trade focuses on factor endowments (accumulation of physical and 
human capital) and technological progress, as reflected in increased 
productivity. While there may be little dispute that the production and export of 
more advanced products is correlated with greater technological capacity and 
greater abundance of certain types of resources, this tells us nothing about 
causality. Neoclassical economists, viewing the world through their various 
comparative advantage lenses, assume that true and persistent causes must run 
from resources and technological capacity to output and trade structure. Indeed, 
they worry about efficiency costs when policymakers interfere with market 
processes by trying to bias the production structure towards higher value added 
goods. When case histories point to the role of government intervention and 
protection in a country’s economic development, they dispute the evidence and 
assert that it may be a case of pseudo-infant industries, since the country’s 
endowment base and technological capability were sufficient to explain that 
type of production and trade in any case.  
 
For neoclassical economists, recognising the role of the State and the role of 
protection in facilitating learning and the acquisition of relevant technological 
capability would require a gestalt shift of an order that would undermine what is 
left of the neoclassical apparatus. Just how big the divide is between orthodox 
economists wedded to a static view of the world, where all outcomes are 
determined by the optimal decisions of rational agents in a world of resource 
scarcity, and their historically and empirically oriented critics, was obvious 
from a debate between the then Chief Economist of the World Bank, Justin Lin 
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and the Cambridge economist Ha-Joon Chang in 2009. For Lin “the optimal 
industrial structure is endogenous to the country’s endowment structure … 
Upgrading the industrial structure first requires upgrading the endowment 
structure, or else the resulting industrial structure will become a drag on 
development” (Lin, 2009, pp. 485-486). By contrast Chang asserts that “factor 
accumulation does not happen as an abstract process … capital is accumulated 
in concrete form … and technological capabilities are accumulated through 
concrete production experiences” (Chang, 2009, pp. 490-491). These are 
diametrically opposing views of what is exogenous and endogenous, even as 
Chang acknowledges that a country cannot deviate too far from a production 
structure dictated by resources and technological capability. Such opposing 
world views derive from contrasting beliefs as to the nature of the world and the 
behaviour of decision makers. Chang’s case for infant industry protection 
(among other policy measures) seems to me to be a case of improving the odds 
as far as developing technological capability is concerned. He explicitly denies 
that the benefits and costs of such policies are amenable to an ex ante cost 
benefit study to see if they pass the “Mill-Bastable” test. The raison d’être 
behind this stance is that decision makers have “bounded rationality” and the 
world is characterised by “fundamental uncertainty” (p. 491). Obviously, 
optimisation does not make sense as a description of behaviour unless outcomes 
are in some sense knowable or, at the very least, probabilities can be attached to 
them. I cannot say whether or not neoclassical economists truly believe that this 
is a sufficient description of the world and of the cognitive capacities of 
decision makers or whether their commitment to optimisation is simply a 
conservative reflex action, in that this is all they know. It may even be possible 
to develop alternative mathematical ways of theorising about social reality. To 
the best of my knowledge, this is yet to happen in international trade theory. If it 
does happen, then nothing will remain of the original neoclassical paradigm 
and, if it were to happen, it would indeed qualify for the designation paradigm 
shift. On the other hand, there may not be an alternative mathematics that has 
the appealing tractable character of calculus and the alternative to the current 
mode of theorising may be to theorise in a non-mathematical way. One should 
not underestimate the resistance that there would be to such a development.  
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(xi) Orthodox trade theory is inadequate to the task of dealing with power 
in economic relations 
 
Those development economists who theorised about trade and economic 
development did not do so mathematically. One plausible reason could have 
been their awareness of the constraining effect of mathematically expressed 
theory and its unsuitability as a mechanism of investigation into the challenges 
of economic development. Singer (1975, p. 378) spoke of economic 
development in terms of the power to develop new technology and alluded to 
the cumulative processes at work where such forces are concerned. This power 
he believed led to unequal bargaining relations between developed and 
developing countries with obvious consequences for the distribution of benefits 
from all relations between such countries (p. 379).  
 
Neoclassical theory is not equipped to deal with power in economic relations. A 
party to an exchange is presumed to have done well if they earn more than their 
opportunity cost. Neoclassical theory designates this as economic rent, the 
implication being that one has earned more than was strictly necessary. But, 
opportunity cost is a static concept. What is of real interest in determining the 
consequences of trade and exchange are the determinants of opportunity cost. 
Those who do best from voluntary exchange are not necessarily those who earn 
economic rent, but those who have positioned themselves to have a high 
opportunity cost before engaging in exchange. Neoclassical theory does not 
equip us to address such a shifting of the opportunity cost goalposts.  
 
(xii) Orthodox trade theory reflects the broader malaise of mainstream 
economic theory 
 
Myrdal’s critique of mainstream economics in the field of international trade 
and economic development was that it was not adequate to the facts. This he 
attributed to the predilections of mainstream neoclassical theory, namely 
equilibrium and the artificial separation of the social from the economic. For 
him, the social and economic interact in such a way that many economic 
processes, especially relations between less and more developed countries, tend 
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to be cumulative in nature. The idea of using shadow prices to put a true value 
on resources and economic activity would not have made sense to him, not just 
because perfectly competitive markets are a chimera, but because all prices are 
reflective of the underlying social and political reality. Rules, rights and the 
distribution of resources will impact on market prices, whether those markets 
are characterised by market power or its absence. That is why economic theory 
needs to be recast as social theory if it is to be useful as an aid to understanding 
economic processes, and such a remoulding is probably not amenable to 
mathematical formalism alone.  
 
5.4 Has Economic Science exhibited Progress?   
 
Progress implies better understanding of economic processes. Progress should, 
at a minimum, mean less unsuccessful policymaking. While contemporary 
economic reality may be undoubtedly more complex than previously, it is 
debatable that the obvious policy failures of recent decades are solely 
attributable to such complexity. Some blame must be attributed to economists 
and the abject failure of their methods of investigation. In the sphere of 
economic development, the least successful countries in recent decades have 
been those compelled to follow questionable practices imposed on them by so-
called economically literate organisations such as the IMF and World Bank. 
Conversely, the faster growing economies have not trusted their economic 
fortunes to the unregulated dictates of the market, but have consciously directed 
resources and economic activity. Developed countries have been characterised 
by growing economic inequality in the last forty years, which is either a failure 
of policy or hidden malign design. Finally the current global economic crisis 
that has been caused by a global financial crisis is testament to economists’ and 
regulators’ worship at the feet of false economic models. Even the former 
chairman of the Federal Reserve, Alan Greenspan, was forced to admit that his 
previous world view on the efficient and self-correcting nature of markets was 
wrong. In his testimony before Congress on 23 October 2008, Greenspan 
acknowledged “I have found a flaw … a flaw in the model that I perceived is 
the critical functioning structure that defines how the world works” (PBS 
NEWSHOUR, 2008).  
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5.5 Why has Economic Research been so Unsuccessful?  
 
The policy failures are all the more perplexing in view of improved data sources 
and enhanced computing power. Gillian Tett in her acclaimed Fools Gold spoke 
of her Eureka moment, when attending a conference on credit derivatives during 
the halcyon days of early 2005. What she observed was that “finance was 
presented as an abstract mathematical game that took place in cyber space, and 
which could only be grasped by a tiny elite. Finance was not about grubby cash, 
but a string of mathematical equations” (Tett, 2009, p. xii). Moreover, using her 
anthropological hat, she observed the structural function of such conferences; 
that is to say, how they “reinforced the dominant ideology – or cognitive map – 
that united the group” (p. xii), which was that “it was perfectly valid to discuss 
money in abstract, mathematical, ultra-complex terms, without any reference to 
tangible human beings” (pp. xii-xiii). Tett’s observation of the behaviour of the 
mathematical architects of financial derivatives and their fascination with the 
elegance of the virtual worlds they were describing in their power-point 
presentations, are testament to Marshall’s fear of the consequences of the 
excessive use of mathematics and its impact on the minds of its users. Such a 
fascination might not have had such malign social consequences if there had 
been sufficient oversight, but that was lacking too. While economic self-interest 
might go some way to explaining the lack of oversight, one cannot discount the 
role played by insufficient understanding of how the models worked and their 
resemblance, or lack of them, to real economic processes.  
 
This parable raises two issues about mathematical formalisation of economic 
and social processes. First, how appropriate is it to theorise in this manner when 
the material of such abstraction is human behaviour and economic and social 
systems? Second, the esoteric nature of the language makes it comprehensible 
only to the initiated and this leads to a lack of suitable social control. Only those 
trained in the methods of economics understand what it is that economists are 
doing and why they are doing it. In many instances, the critical faculties of 
economists have been dulled by virtue of their training, quite apart from the 
sociological costs that a dissenter could expect to pay. For Hutchison, “producer 
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sovereignty” reigns in academic economics (Hutchison, 1994, p. 287). 
Mathematics is used both as an exclusionary device and to gain academic status 
(p. 286) - all of which is not innocuous but dangerous, given the extent to which 
such rigour conceals gross unrealism and vacuity.  
 
The second way in which economic research engages in exclusionary practices 
is the way in which evidence is evaluated. Econometrics is the tool of choice of 
the applied economist. Econometrics is used to test indirectly the veracity of a 
theory and/or to make predictions. The challenges of translating theories into 
relevant testable, hypotheses are legion and have been well documented.54 
When econometrics was still in its infancy, Keynes (1939), in his review of 
Tinbergen’s attempt to test business cycle theories statistically, cited many of 
them. In particular, he cautioned that such a method was only valid if one had a 
“complete list” of significant causes (Keynes, 1939, p. 560), which he deemed 
unlikely, to the extent that many significant causes, particularly those of a 
political, social and psychological nature, are essentially un-measurable and 
therefore not included (p. 561). But Keynes stressed that his “prime facie 
objection” to the method that Tinbergen was pioneering lay in “the complete 
lack of any adequate degree of uniformity in the environment” (p. 567).  
Keynes’s early warnings on the challenges of trying to quantify causal 
relationships had little impact on the evolution of economic practices, despite 
belated recognition of his prescience by both Patinkin (1976) and Hendry 
(1980).  
 
What Keynes failed to foresee were the unintended consequences of this form 
of evaluating evidence, namely: the subordination of data to statistical technique 
and a disregard for other ways of testing, such as appeals to qualitative history. 
The first shortcoming is a product of the social pressures within the economic 
profession that have put a premium on technical virtuosity. Leontief, in his 
                                                
54 See Hendry (1980, p. 396) who lists: omitted variable bias; unmeasurable variables; badly measured 
data; collinear variables; assuming linear functional forms; mis-specifying dynamic reactions and lag 
lengths; pre-filtering data; invalidly inferring causes from correlations; predicting inaccurately if 
parameters are non-constant; confusing statistical with economic significance; stochastic mis-
specification; incorrect exogeneity assumptions; inadequate sample sizes; aggregation; lack of 
structural identification and an inability to refer back uniquely from observed empirical results to any 
given theory.  
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presidential address to the American Economic Association in 1970, was 
explicit in his condemnation of what passes for empirical research in 
economics. “Devising a new statistical procedure … to squeeze out one more 
unknown parameter from a given set of data, is judged a greater scientific 
achievement than the successful search for additional information that would 
permit us to measure the magnitude of the same parameter in a less ingenious, 
but more reliable way” (Leontief, 1971, p. 3). He was also under no illusions as 
to why this was happening. “[It is all about] demonstrating prowess by building 
more and more complicated mathematical models and devising more and more 
sophisticated methods of empirical inference without ever engaging in empirical 
research” (p. 3). And his view of the consequences of all this intellectual effort 
is equally depressing.  “In no other field of empirical inquiry has so massive and 
sophisticated a statistical machinery been used with such indifferent results” ( p. 
3). For Leontief, the predominant practices of economists had engendered 
complacency, which acted as a deterrent to “venturesome attempts to widen and 
to deepen the empirical foundations of economic analysis, particularly those 
attempts that would involve crossing the conventional lines separating ours 
from adjoining fields” (p. 5).  
 
Mayer (1980) attributed the complacency of economists to the overly ambitious 
goal of ensuring that economics is a hard science. For him, this has resulted in 
the overselling of results to both policymakers and the public, and has induced a 
false sense of security, whereby the plausible is rejected in favour of what 
seems to be “proven” (Mayer, 1980, p. 176) - all of which would be to the good 
if truth wore the garb of equations and was born inside a computer. But the cost 
of this misplaced methodological security and attendant insensitivity to the 
complexity of social reality is that it leads to dogmatism when it comes to 
evidence and the neglect of other forms of casting light on this reality.  
 
This dogmatism was evident in the reluctance of economists to accept that some 
of the fastest growing (East Asian) economies were, not just interventionist, but 
also protectionist for a time. If the evidence was not presented in the form of a 
cross-country regression, where the proxy for trade interference showed a 
positive and significant impact on economic growth, it was not seen as 
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sufficient proof of causal forces in action. Moreover, at a more profound level, 
the very act of performing a cross-country statistical regression in order to 
measure the determinants of economic growth, implies an ontological 
commitment to the view that the determinants of growth are everywhere the 
same. In other words, that there is only one singular path to an economic 
outcome. Practising economists may splutter with indignation, claiming that I 
am caricaturing what they do, and that moreover, they do make allowances for 
the uniqueness of countries in their analysis. While I will concede that their 
practices do allow for country singularity, I would add that they do so in a 
frighteningly reductionist and unenlightening way. Country singularity is 
accounted for by the insertion of a specific dummy variable. The coefficient 
attached to the country dummy is meant to capture everything that is unique in 
that country that may have had an impact on its economic performance; its 
history, culture, geography, topography or whatever particular attribute one 
wishes to attribute to a place and its people.  
 
All of this is not meant to naysay the potentially very useful role that statistical 
analysis can play in understanding social reality. Social processes do display 
regularities, and an awareness of these regularities can be of use to 
policymakers, but only as one contingent form of evidence that needs to be 
supplemented with other ways of gleaning insights into social reality. Any 
method that claims a monopoly on rigour needs to be viewed as suspect.  
 
5.6 What is to be done? 
 
A necessary forerunner to any change in direction is a generalised 
acknowledgment of the failure of existing methods. A next necessary step is to 
be clear on what the objectives of economic research can or should be? This 
requires an honest admission of the challenges posed by the unique social 
material with which economists work. I would subscribe to the view expressed 
by Hutchison (1994, p. 292) of damage limitation, which I take to mean 
modesty of objectives. Social processes and their outcomes will never be as 
predictable as their natural equivalents, but that does not mean that economic 
and social research cannot be conducted to aid policy in pre-empting 
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catastrophic outcomes and improving the odds of good outcomes. I would add 
that modesty of objectives needs to be accompanied by pluralism in methods. 
The converse, whereby economists have avowedly aspired to the rigour of the 
natural sciences and exhibited an unknowing dogmatism in method has not 
served us well. Whether one works as a modeller, statistician, historian or case 
study analyst, we must stop turning away from economic reality as it is this 
reality that should condition methods of investigation.  
 
Keynes said that a good economist is a vigilant observer who uses his/her 
observations to choose good models (see Hausman, 1994, p. 286). Leontief 
spoke of the need to stop fetishising technique and to strive for better data. My 
inclinations are closest to Caldwell, in his call for methodological pluralism 
since “there are many paths to knowledge, there are many forms of criticism, 
and the more that are heard the better” (Caldwell,1994 [1982], p. 128). This 
may seem like methodological fence sitting, since it does not rule out 
(absolutely) theorising in a mathematical way or evaluating economic 
relationships statistically. It does however imply a major shift in emphasis. A 
mathematically developed theory may cast partial light on an issue under 
investigation, but the onus should be on the practitioner to show that this is 
indeed the case. I have even stronger reservations when it comes to the 
predominant empirical form of investigation, namely applied econometrics, 
partly because this is what the bulk of practising economists do and greater 
policy significance can attach to their research output. Furthermore, statistics 
dressed up as econometrics, carries with it the presumption that the practitioner 
knows what is causal and what is caused. But, my most serious reservation is a 
belief that the ever-expanding array of econometric techniques (facilitated by 
enhanced computing power) and the ease with which they can be mindlessly 
applied, does not incentivise the practitioner to attend to the data. Quantifying 
aspects of social reality (in the sense of attaching numbers to them) is not a 
simple or unambiguous process. Indeed, it can even be considered 
presumptuous. Nonetheless, it has its undoubted uses, socially and as an input 
into policy. But its usefulness depends on data awareness; that is to say, 
knowing what the data mean, knowing how they were collected, collated and 
aggregated. Only then, does it make sense to look for patterns or trends in such 
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sensitively measured social material. I would assert that simpler forms of 
pattern identification, such as pictorial representations or correlations, are less 
likely than fancier econometric techniques to distract the researcher from the 
data. They are also more likely to facilitate an open mind when it comes to 
understanding social reality. Such practices should serve to reinforce an 
awareness that patterns identified relate to time and place and that extrapolation 
from them to other times and places is not without risks. Such contingency can 
only be facilitative of admitting other forms of economic and social knowledge, 
leading to a healthier state of affairs than the status quo. Above all, it might 
encourage academic honesty in the sense of admitting, through our diverse 
practices, the contingent and evolving nature of economic knowledge.  
 
The current economic crisis presents an opportunity for academic economics to 
change direction. Crises are good for casting a spotlight on what went wrong 
and forcing a return to methodological foundations. Addressing what went 
wrong, why it happened, what were the policy failures and what were the 
economic models facilitating such policy failures, is a start. It provides a space 
for alternative narratives (especially heterodox ones) of the current economic 
crisis and different perspectives on the functioning of capitalist economies. 
However, a crisis of the magnitude of the current one will invariably provoke a 
response from orthodox practitioners, and those concerned with the 
predilections of mainstream economics, should not be surprised if the orthodox 
reaction is one of damage limitation. As pointed out in the body of this thesis, 
the orthodoxy adopts a range of stratagems to deal with criticisms and protect 
what it is that it does. These can range from the extreme position of ignoring 
critiques and carrying on as before (unlikely in the current climate) to accepting 
the critique and claiming that mainstream practice is changing in an informed 
and constructive way. The Keynesian critique of macroeconomics in the 1930s 
proved too hard to ignore, yet its more radical message was neutered through its 
absorption into the mainstream via the neoclassical synthesis. Similarly today, 
there are economists such as Colander, Holt and Rosser (2010) who claim that 
orthodox economics is so eclectic that it is a travesty to label it neoclassical. 
Arguably, behavioural economics (which is the orthodox economist’s answer to 
the claim that economic theorising is not adequate to the facts) could serve a 
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similar function currently as the neoclassical synthesis did in the post-war 
economic climate. That would explain its appeal to politicians; it facilitates 
tinkering around the edges of policy, nudging citizens (or society’s consumers) 
to different (if not necessarily better) outcomes. As far as I know, it leaves 
unaddressed the important questions of production, distribution, class, conflict 
and power. In other words, I am not sure that this latest change in mainstream 
research represents anything more than a patch-up exercise. Indeed, it cannot be 
otherwise unless theorising is grounded in historical and social context.  
 
Institutionally, some good may emerge from the current economic crisis if it 
reverses the narrowing in the academic curriculum that has characterised the last 
fifty years. Politically this may be easier to achieve in the present climate than 
has been the case for a considerable while, with such calls being made by 
respectable establishment figures like Robert Skidelsky, who would seek to 
include economic and political history, history of economic thought, political 
philosophy and sociology in the economics curriculum. One could add 
comparative economic thought and economic methodology to this list. The 
hurdles that would have to be overcome to accommodate such a shift in 
economic pedagogy are also political (not least because institutional financial 
support is politically determined) but also partly social. The skill set of the 
typical economist is very narrow. There is a basic lack of training in alternative 
epistemologies. Such a shift would require increased hiring of the small (but 
growing) number of economists with more pluralist and historically-oriented 
tendencies, including more hetereodox economists. It would (inevitably) 
necessitate greater collaboration between economists and those in the broader 
social sciences. Whether such a change in the economics curriculum will occur 
is an open question.  However, if it should, I would predict that the current 
disenchantment with economics among the student fraternity (as expressed in 
declining student numbers) would be arrested and probably even reversed. On 
such fragile foundations must we rest our hopes.   
 
 
 
 251 
References 
 
Aghion, P. and Howitt, P. (1992). A model of growth through creative 
destruction, Econometrica, 60 (2), pp. 323-351.  
 
Aghion, P. and Howitt, P. (1998). Growth without scale effects, Journal of 
Political Economy, 106 (1), pp. 41-63.  
 
Aldrich, J. (2004). The discovery of comparative advantage, Journal of the 
History of Economic Thought, 26 (3), pp. 379-399.  
 
Anand, S. and Joshi, S. (1979). Domestic distortions, income distribution and 
the theory of the optimum subsidy, Economic Journal, 89 (354), pp. 336-352.  
 
Arrow, K (1962). The economic implications of learning by doing, Review of 
Economic Studies, 29 (3), pp. 155-173.  
 
Arrow, K. (2000). Increasing returns: historiographic issues and path 
dependence, European Journal of the History of Economic Thought, 7 (2), pp. 
171-180.  
 
Aw. B-Y., Chung, S. and Roberts, M. (2000). Productivity and turnover in the 
export market: Micro level evidence from the Republic of Korea and Taiwan 
(China), World Bank Economic Review, 14, pp. 65-90.  
 
Azariadis, C. and Drazen, A. (1990). Threshold exernalities in economic 
development, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 105 (2), pp. 501-526. 
 
Backhouse, R. (1985). A History of Modern Economic Analysis, Oxford: Basil 
Blackwell Ltd.  
 
Backhouse, R. (2000). Progress in heterodox economics, Journal of the History 
of Economic Thought, 22 (2), pp. 149-155.  
 
 252 
Backhouse, R. (2002). The Ordinary Business of Life: A History of Economics 
from the Ancient World to the Twenty-First Century, Princeton and Oxford: 
Princeton University Press.  
 
Balassa, B (1966). Tariff reductions and trade in manufactures, American 
Economic Review, 56 (3), pp. 466-473.  
 
Balassa, B. (1978). Exports and economic growth: Further evidence, Journal of 
Development Economics, 5 (2), pp.181-189. 
 
Baldwin, R. (1969). The case against infant-industry tariff protection, Journal of 
Political Economy 77 (3), pp. 295-305.  
 
Baldwin, R. (1971). Determinants of the commodity structure of US Trade, 
American Economic Review, 61 (1), pp. 126-146. 
 
Baldwin, R. (1982). Gottfried Haberler’s contribution to international trade 
theory and policy, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 97 (1), pp. 141-148.  
 
Baldwin, R. (1989). The political economy of trade policy, Journal of Economic 
Perspectives, 3 (4), pp. 119-135.   
 
Baldwin, R. (2000). Trade and growth: still disagreement about the 
relationships, OECD Economics Department Working Paper, 264, Paris: 
OECD.  
 
Baldwin, R. and Forslid, R. (1997). The Core-Periphery Model and Economic 
Growth, Centre for Economic and Policy Research Discussion Paper 1749. 
London: CEPR. 
 Balistreri,	  E.,	  Hillberry,	  R.	  H.	  and	  Rutherford,	  T.	  F.	  (2011).	  Structural	  estimation	  and	  solution	  of	  international	  trade	  models	  with	  heterogeneous	  firms,	  Journal	  of	  International	  Economics,	  83	  (2),	  pp.	  95-­‐108.	  	  
 253 
  
Bardhan, P. (1993). Economics of development and the development of 
economics, Journal of Economic Perspectives, 7 (2), pp. 129-142.  
 
Barone, E. (1908). Principi di Economia Politica, Rome: G. Bertero.  
 
Bastable, C. (1903). The Theory of International Trade with some of its 
Applications to Economic Policy, 4th edition, London: MacMillan and Co. Ltd. 
 
Batra, R. N (1968). Protection and real wages under conditions of variable 
returns to scale, Oxford Economic Papers, 20 (3), pp. 353-360.  
 
Batra, R. N. and Pattanaik, P.K. (1971). Factor market imperfections and the 
gains from trade, Oxford Economic Papers, 23 (2), pp. 182-188. 
 
Becker, G. and Murphy, K. (1992). The division of labour, co-ordination costs 
and knowledge, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 107 (4), pp. 1137-1160. 
 
Becker, G., Murphy, K. and Tamura, R. (1990). Human capital, fertility and 
economic growth, Journal of Political Economy, 98 (5), part 2, pp. S12-S37.  
 
Bensel, T. and Elmsie, B. T. (1992). Rethinking international trade: A 
methodological appraisal, Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv, 128 (2), pp. 249-265.  
 
Bernard, A., Eaton, J., Jensen, J. and Kortum, S. (2003). Plants and productivity 
in international trade, American Economic Review, 93 (4), pp. 1268-1290.  
 
Bernard, A., Jensen, J. (1999). Exceptional export performance: cause, effect or 
both? Journal of International Economics 47 (1), pp. 1-25.  
 
Bernard, A., Jensen, J. and Schott, P. (2006). Trade costs, firms and 
productivity, Journal of Monetary Economics, 53 (5), pp. 917-937.  
 
 254 
Bernard, A., Redding, S. and Schott, P. (2007). Comparative advantage and 
heterogeneous firms, Review of Economic Studies, 74 (1), pp. 31-66.  
 
Bhagwati, J. (1971). The generalised theory of distortion and welfare, In: 
Bhagwati, J. Jones, R. W., Mundell, R. and Vanek, J. (eds) Trade, Balance of 
Payments and Growth: Essays in Honour of Charles P. Kindleberger, 
Amsterdam: North Holland, pp. 69-90.   
 
Bhagwati, J. (1978). Foreign Trade Regimes and Economic Development: 
Anatomy and Consequences of Exchange Control Regimes, New York: National 
Bureau of Economic Research.  
 
Bhagwati, J. and Ramaswami, V.K. (1963). Domestic distortions, tariffs and the 
theory of the optimum subsidy, Journal of Political Economy, 71 (1), pp. 44-50.  
 
Bhagwati, J.,  Ramaswami, V.K., and Srinivasan, T.N. (1969). Domestic 
distortions, tariffs and the theory of the optimum subsidy: some further results, 
Journal of Political Economy, 77 (6), pp. 1005-1010. 
 
Bhagwati, J. and Srinivasan, T. N. (1974). On re-analysing the Harris-Todaro 
model: policy rankings in the case of sector-specific sticky wages, American 
Economic Review, 64 (3), pp. 502-508.  
 
Bickerdike, C. F. (1905). Review of Schuller’s ‘Schutzzoll und Freihandel, 
Economic Journal, 15 (59), pp. 413-415.  
 
Bickerdike, C.F. (1906). The theory of incipient taxes, Economic Journal, 16 
(64), pp. 529-535. 
 
Bickerdike, C.F. (1907). Review of protective and preferential import duties by 
A.C. Pigou, Economic Journal, 17 (65), pp. 98-102.  
 
Blaug, M. (1978). Economic Theory in Retrospect. 3rd edition, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press.  
 255 
 
Blaug, M. (1996). Economic Theory in Retrospect. 5th edition, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
 
Blaug, M. (2002). Is there really progress in economics? In: Boehm, S., Gehrke, 
C. Kurz, H. D., and Sturn, R. (eds) Is there Progress in Economics? Knowledge, 
Truth and the History of Economic Thought. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, pp. 
21-41.  
 
Bloomfield, A. (1994). Essays in the History of International Trade Theory, 
Aldershot: Edward Elgar Ltd.  
 
Bourne, E. G. (1894). Alexander Hamilton and Adam Smith,  Quarterly Journal 
of Economics, 8 (3), pp. 328-344.  
 
Bowen, H.  Leamer, E. and Sveikauskus, L. (1987). Multicountry, multifactor 
tests of the Factor Abundance Theory, American Economic Review, 77, pp. 599-
620.  
 
Brainard, S. and Mortimort, D. (1997). Strategic trade policy with incompletely 
informed policymakers, Journal of International Economics, 42 (1-2), pp. 33-
65.  
 
Brander, J. (1981). Intra-industry trade in identical commodities, Journal of 
International Economics, 11 (1), pp. 1-14.  
 
Brander, J. and Krugman, P. (1983). A reciprocal dumping model of 
international trade, Journal of International Economics, 15 (3-4), pp. 313-321.  
 
Brander, J. and Spencer, B. (1981). Tariffs and the extraction of foreign 
monopoly rents under potential entry, Canadian Journal of Economics, 14 (3), 
pp. 371-389.  
 
 256 
Brander, J. and Spencer, B. (1984). Tariff protection and imperfect competition, 
In: Kierzkowski, H. (ed). Monopolistic Competition and International Trade, 
Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 194-206.  
 
Brander, J. and Spencer, B. (1985). Export subsidies and international market 
share rivalry, Journal of International Economics, 18 (1-2), pp. 83-100.  
 
Brecher, R. (1974a). Minimum wages and the pure theory of international trade, 
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 88 (1), pp. 98-116.  
 
Brecher, R. (1974b). Optimum commercial policy for a minimum wage 
economy. Journal of International Economics, 4 (2), pp. 139-149.  
 
Brewer, A. (1998). Invention, In: Hamouda O.F., Lee, C. and Mair, D. (eds) The 
Economics of John Rae. London and New York: Routledge Studies in the 
History of Economics, pp. 129-143. 
 
Bucolo, P. (1980). The Other Pareto, New York: St. Martin’s Press, Inc.  
 
Burgstaller, A. and Saavedra-Rivano, N. (1984). Capital mobility and growth in 
a north-south model, Journal of Development Economics, 15 (1-3), pp. 213-237.  
 
Caldwell, B. (1994 [1982]). Beyond Positivism: Economic Methodology in the 
Twentieth Century, (revised edition), London and New York: Routledge. 
 
Chamberlain, E (1933). The Theory of Monopolistic Competition, Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press.  
 
Chang, H-J. (2003). The failure of the trade talks: the future for trade, Challenge 
46 (6), pp. 6-15.  
 
Chang, H-J. (2007). Bad Samaritans: Rich Nations, Poor Policies and the 
Threat to the Developing World, London: Random House Business Books.  
 
 257 
Chang, H-J. (2009). Should industrial policy in developing countries conform to 
comparative advantage or defy it: A debate between Justin Lin and Ha-Joon 
Chang, Development Policy Review, 27 (5), pp. 483-502.  
 
Chipman, J. S. (1965). A survey of the theory of international trade: part 2, the 
neoclassical theory, Econometrica 33 (4), pp. 685-760. 
 
Chipman, J. (1965-66). A survey of the theory of international trade, 
Econometrica, 33 (3), pp. 477-519, 34 (1), pp. 18-76.  
 
Christaller, W. (1933). Central Places in Southern Germany, Jena: Fischer.  
 
Clerides, S. Lach, S. and Tybout, J. (1998). Is learning by exporting important? 
Micro-dynamic evidence from Columbia, Mexico and Morocco, Quarterly 
Journal of Economics, 113 (3), pp. 903-947.  
 
Coase, R.H. (1972). The appointment of Pigou as Marshall’s successor, Journal 
of Law and Economics, 15 (2), pp. 473-485. 
 
Coase, R.H. (1975). Marshall on method, Journal of Law and Economics, 18 
(1), pp. 25-31.  
 
Coats, A.W. (1968). Political economy and the tariff reform of 1903, Journal of 
Law and Economics, 11 (1) pp. 181-229. 
 
Coats, A.W. (1972). The appointment of Pigou as Marshall’s successor: 
Comment,  Journal of Law and Economics, 15 (2), pp. 487-495 
 
Coats, A.W. (1992). On the History of Economic Thought: British and 
American Essays, Volume I, London: Routledge. 
 
Colander, D., Holt, R.P.F. and Rosser, J.B. Jr. (2004). The Changing Face of 
Economics: Conversations with Cutting Edge Economists, Ann Arbor: 
University of Michigan Press.  
 258 
 
Colander, D., Holt, R.P.F. and Rosser, J.B. Jr. (2010). How to win friends and 
(possibly) influence mainstream economics, Journal of Post Keynesian 
Economics, 33 (3), pp. 397-408.  
 
Collie, D. (2005). State aid to investment and R&D, European Economy 
Economic Papers, 231, Brussels: European Commission.  
 
Collie, D. and Hviid, M. (1993). Export subsidies as signals of competitiveness, 
Scandanavian Journal of Economics, 95 (3), pp. 327-339.  
 
Cook, S. (2005). Late Victorian Visual Reasoning and Alfred Marshall’s 
Economic Science, British Society for the History of Science, 38 (2), pp. 179-
195. 
 
Cooper, R. and Riezman, R. (1989). Uncertainty and the choice of trade policy 
in oligopolistic industries, Review of Economic Studies, 56 (1), pp. 129-140.  
 
Corden, W. M. (1971). The effect of trade on the rate of growth, In: Bhagwati, 
J. Jones, R. W., Mundell, R. and Vanek, J. (eds) Trade, Balance of Payments 
and Growth: Essays in Honour of Charles P. Kindleberger. Amsterdam: North 
Holland, pp. 117-143.  
 
Corden, W. M. (1974). Trade Policy and Economic Welfare, Oxford: Clarendon 
Press. 
 
Corden, W. M. (1997). Trade Policy and Economic Welfare, 2nd edition, 
Oxford: Clarendon Press.  
 
Corden, W.M. and Findlay, R. (1975).Urban unemployment, intersectoral 
capital mobility and development policy, Economica, 42 (165), pp. 59-78.  
 
 259 
Cournot, A. (1971 [1838]). Researches into the Mathematical Principles of the 
Theory of Wealth, New York: Augustus Kelley (Reprints of Economic 
Classics).  
 
Creedy, J. (1990). Marshall and Edgeworth, Scottish Journal of Political 
Economy, 37 (1), pp. 18-39. 
 
Cunyghame, H. (1903). The effect of export and import duties on price and 
production examined by the graphic method, Economic Journal, 13 (51), pp. 
313-323.  
 
Darity, W. and Davis, L.S. (2005). Growth, trade and uneven development, 
Cambridge Journal of Economics, 29, pp. 141-170.  
 
Davis, D. and Weinstein, D. (1996). Does Economic Geography Matter for 
International Specialization, National Bureau of Economic Research Working 
Paper, 5706, Massachussets: NBER. 
 
Davis, D. and Weinstein, D. (1998). Market Access, Economic Geography and 
Comparative Advantage: An Empirical Assessment, National Bureau of 
Economic Research Working Paper, 6787, Massachussets: NBER. 
 
Deardorff, A. (1998). Determinants of bilateral trade: does gravity work in a 
neoclassical world? In: Frankel, J. (ed.) The Regionalization of the World 
Economy, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, pp. 7-28.  
 
De Marchi, N. (1976). Anomaly and the Development of Economics: The Case 
of the Leontief Paradox, In: Latsis, S. (ed.) Method and Appraisal in 
Economics, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 109-127.  
 
Dewit, G. and Leahy, D. (2004). Rivalry in uncertain export markets: 
Commitment verusus flexibility, Journal of International Economics, 64 (1), 
pp. 195-209.  
 
 260 
Dimand, R. W. (1998). Rae and international trade, In: Hamouda O.F., Lee, C. 
and Mair, D., eds. The Economics of John Rae. London and New York: 
Routledge Studies in the History of Economics, pp. 177-184.  
 
Dinopoulos, E. and Segerstrom, P. (2006). North-South trade and economic 
growth,  
Centre for Economic and Policy Research Discussion Paper 5887, London: 
CEPR. 
 
Dinopoulos, E. and Thompson, P. (1998). Schumpetarian growth without scale 
effects, Journal of Economic Growth, 3 (4), pp. 313-335.  
 
Dixit, A.K. (1984). International trade policy for oligopolistic industries, 
Economic Journal (Supplement Conference Papers), 94, pp. 1-16.  
 
Dixit, A.K. and Grossman, G. (1986). Targeted export promotion with several 
oligopolistic industries, Journal of International Economics, 21 (3-4), pp. 233-
249. 
 
Dixit, A.K. and Kyle, A. (1985). The use of protection and subsidies for entry 
promotion and deterrence, American Economic Review, 75 (1), pp. 139-152.  
 
Dixit, A.K. and Norman, V. (1980). Theory of International Trade, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press.  
Dollar, D. (1992). Outward oriented developing countries really do grow more 
rapidly: Evidence from 95 LDCs, 1976-1985, Economic Development and 
Cultural Change, 40 (3), pp. 523-544. 
 
Dow, S.C. (2001). The relevance of controversies for practice as well as 
teaching, Post-Autistic Economics Newsletter, Issue 6, article 5. 
http://www.btinternet.com/~pae_news/review/issue6.htm 
 
 261 
Dow, S.C. (2000). Prospects for the progress of heterodox economics, Journal 
of the History of Economic Thought, 22 (2), pp. 158-170.  
 
Eaton, J. and Grossman, G. (1986). Optimal trade and industrial policy under 
oligopoly, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 101 (2), pp. 383-406.  
 
Eaton, J. and Panagariya, A. (1979). Gains from trade under variable returns to 
scale, commodity taxation, tariffs and factor market distortions, Journal of 
International Economics, 9 (4), pp. 481-501.  
 
Edgeworth, F. (1894a). The theory of international values, Economic Journal, 4 
(13), pp. 35-50. 
 
Edgeworth, F. (1894b). Theory of international values, Economic Journal, 4 
(15), pp. 424-443. 
 
Edgeworth, F. (1894c). Theory of international values, Economic Journal, 4 
(16), pp. 606-638. 
 
Edgeworth, F. (1901). Disputed points in the theory of international trade, 
Economic  
Journal, 11 (44), pp. 582-595. 
 
Edgeworth, F. (1908a). Appreciations of mathematical theories, Economic  
Journal, 18 (71), pp. 392-403.  
 
Edgeworth, F. (1908b). Appreciations of mathematical theories, Economic  
Journal 18 (72), pp. 541-556. 
 
Edwards, S. (1998). Openness, productivity and growth: what do we really 
know?, Economic Journal, 108 (447), pp. 383-398. 
 
Eichengreen, B. (1984). Keynes and Protection, Journal of Economic History, 
44 (2), pp. 363-373.  
 262 
 
Ekelund, R. and Herbert, R. (1997). A History of Economic Theory and Method, 
Singapore: McGraw Hill.  
 
Ellsworth (1940). A Comparison of international trade theories, American 
Economic Review, 30 (2), pp. 285-89. 
 
Enke, S. (1946). Monopolistic output and international trade, Quarterly Journal 
of Economics, 60 (2), pp. 233-249. 
 
Ethier, W. (1974). Some of the theorems of international trade with many goods 
and factors, Journal of International Economics, 4 (2), pp. 199-206. 
 
Ethier, W. (1979). Internationally decreasing costs and world trade, Journal of 
International Economics, 9 (1), pp. 1-24.  
 
Ethier, W. (1982a). National and international returns to scale in the modern 
theory of international trade, American Economic Review, 72 (3), pp. 389-405. 
 
Ethier, W. (1982b). The general role of factor intensity in the theorems of 
international trade, Economic Letters,  10 (3/4), pp. 337-42. 
 
Ethier, W. (1984). Higher dimensional issues in trade theory, In: Jones, R. and 
Kenen, P. (eds), Handbook of International Economics, Vol. 1, Amsterdam: 
North-Holland, pp. 131-184. 
 
Feenstra, R. (1990). Trade and uneven growth, National Bureau of Economic 
Research Working Paper, 3276, Massachussets: NBER. 
 
Findlay, R. (1974). Relative prices, growth and trade in a simple ricardian 
system. Economica, New Series 41(161), pp. 1-13. 
 
Findlay, R. (1980). The terms of trade and equilibrium growth in the world 
economy, American Economic Review, 70 (3), pp. 291-299.  
 263 
 
Findlay, R. (1981). The fundamental determinants of the terms of trade, In: 
Grassman, S. and Lundberg, E. (eds) The World Economic Order: Past and 
Prospects, London: Macmillan, pp. 425-457.   
 
Findlay, R. (1984). Growth and development in trade models, In: Jones, R. and 
Kenen, P. (eds) Handbook of International Economics, Amsterdam: Elsevier 
Science, pp. 185-236.  
 
Findlay (1987). Comparative Advantage, In:  Eatwell, J. Milgate, M. and 
Newman, P. (eds) The New Palgrave: A Dictionary of Economics, Vol. 1, 
London: Macmillan, pp. 514-517. 
 
Findlay, R. (1995). Factor Proportions, Trade and Growth, Cambridge: MIT 
Press.  
 
Fine, B. (2008). Development as Zombieconomics in the Age of Neo-liberalism, 
Paper for 35th anniversary conference for the Centre for International 
Development Issues, CIDIN, Radboud University, Nijmegen, Netherlands.  
 
Finer, S. (1966). Vilfredo Pareto: Sociological Writings, London: Pall Mall 
Press.  
 
Fisher, I. (1898). Cournot and mathematical economics, Quarterly Journal of 
Economics, 12 (2), pp. 119-138 
 
Fisher, I. (1930). The Theory of Interest as determined by Impatience to Spend 
Income and Opportunity to Invest It, New York: Macmillan.  
 
Fujita, M., Krugman, P. and Venables, A. (1999). The Spatial Economy: Cities, 
Regions and International Trade, Cambridge, Massachussets: MIT Press.  
 
Galor, O. and Mountford, A. (2004). Trading population for productivity, 
Brown University Working Paper, 16.  
 264 
 
Galor, O. and Weil, D. (1999). From Malthusian stagnation to modern growth, 
American Economic Association, Paper and Proceedings, 89 (2), pp. 150-154.  
 
Gomes, L. (1990). Neoclassical International Economics: An Historical Survey. 
New York: St. Martin’s Press.  
 
Gomes, L. (2003). The Economics and Ideology of Free Trade: An Historical 
Review, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.  
 
Goodfriend, M. and McDermott, J. (1998). Industrial development and the 
convergence question, American Economic Review, 88 (5), pp. 1277-1289.  
 
Graham, F. (1923). Some aspects of protection further considered, Quarterly 
Journal of Economics, 37 (2), pp. 199-227.  
 
Graham, F.D. (1925). Some fallacies in the interpretation of social costs, 
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 39 (2), pp. 324-330. 
 
Greenaway, D. and Milner, C. (1987). Intra-Industry trade: Current perspectives 
and unresolved issues, Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv. 123 (1), pp. 39-57.  
 
Greenway, D. and Milner, C. (1993). Trade and Industrial Policy in Developing 
Countries, London: Macmillan.  
 
Grossman, G. (1992) (ed.) Imperfect Competition and International Trade, 
Cambridge: MIT Press.  
 
Grossman, G.  and Helpman, E. (1989). Product development and international 
trade, Journal of Political Economy, 97 (6), pp. 1261-1283.  
 
Grossman, G.  and Helpman, E. (1991a). Innovation and Growth in the Global 
Economy, Cambridge: MIT Press.  
 
 265 
Grossman, G.  and Helpman, E. (1991b). Quality ladders in the theory of 
economic growth, Review of Economic Studies, 58 (1), pp. 43-61.  
 
Grossman, G.  and Helpman, E. (1991c). Quality ladders and product cycles, 
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 106 (2) pp. 557-586.  
 
Grubel, H. (1967). Intra-industry specialization and the pattern of trade, 
Canadian Journal of Economics, 33 (3), pp. 374-388.  
 
Grubel, H. (1970). The Theory of Intra-Industry Trade, In: McDougall, A. and 
Snape, R. (eds) Studies in International Economics, Amsterdam: North-
Holland, pp. 35-51.    
 
Haaland, J. and Kind, H. J. (2006). Cooperative and non-cooperative R&D 
policy in an economic union, Review of World Economics, 142 (4), pp. 720-745.  
 
Haaland, J. and Kind, H. J. (2008). R&D policies, trade and process innovation, 
Journal of International Economics, 74 (1), pp. 170-187. 
 
Haberler, G. (1930), Die Theorie der komparativen Kosten und ihre Auswertung 
für die Begründung des Freihandels, Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv, 32, pp. 349-
370.  
 
Haberler, G. (1936), The Theory of International Trade, London: William 
Hodge & Co. Ltd.  
 
Haberler, G. (1950). Some problems in the pure theory of international trade, 
Economic Journal, 60 (238), pp. 223-240. 
 
Haberler, G. (1961). Terms of trade and economic development, In: Therberge, 
J., (ed.) (1968), Economics of Trade and Development, New York: John Wiley 
and Sons, Inc, pp. 323-343.  
 
 266 
Hagen, E.V. (1958). An economic justification of protectionism, Quarterly 
Journal of Economics, 72 (4), pp. 496-514. 
 
Hamilton, A (1827 [1791]). Report on the Subject of Manufactures. 6th edition, 
Philadephia: William Brown (Kessinger Publishing’s Legacy Reprints).  
 
Hamouda, O.F. (1998). On Rae’s methodology of economics, In: Hamouda 
O.F., Lee, C. and Mair, D. (eds) The Economics of John Rae, London and New 
York: Routledge Studies in the History of Economics, pp. 41-65.  
 
Hamouda O.F., Lee, C. and Mair, D. (eds) (1998). The Economics of John Rae, 
London and New York: Routledge Studies in the History of Economics.  
 
Hanson, G. H. (2012). The rise of middle kingdoms: emerging economies in 
global trade, Journal	  of	  Economic	  Perspectives,	  26	  (2),	  pp.	  41-­‐64.	  	  
 
Harrod, R. (1951). The Life of John Maynard Keynes, London: Macmillan.  
 
Hausman, D. (1994). The Philosophy of Economics: An Anthology, 2nd edition, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.  
 
Heckscher, E. (1919). The effect of foreign trade on the distribution of income, 
Ekonomisk Tidskrift, XXI, pp. 497-512, reprinted in, American Economic 
Association Committee (1966), Readings in the Theory of International Trade, 
London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd.  
 
Helpman, E. (1981). International trade in the presence of product 
differentiation, economies of scale and monopolistic competition: a 
Chamberlin-Heckscher-Ohlin approach, Journal of International Economics, 11 
(3), pp. 305-340.  
 
Helpman, E. (1987). Imperfect competition and international trade: evidence 
from fourteen industrial countries, Journal of the Japanese and International 
Economies, 1 (1), pp. 62-81.  
 267 
 
Helpman, E. (1999). The structure of foreign trade, Journal of Economic 
Perspectives, 13 (2), pp. 121-144. 
 
Helpman, E. and Krugman, P. (1985). Market Structure and Foreign 
Competition: Increasing Returns, Imperfect Competition and the International 
Economy. Cambridge, Massachusetts and London: MIT Press.  
 
Helpman, E., Melitz, M. and Rubenstein, Y. (2008). Estimating trade flows: 
trading partners and trading volumes, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 123 (2), 
pp. 441-487.  
 
Hendry, D. (1980). Econometrics-alchemy or science? Economica, New Series 
37 (188), pp. 387-406. 
 
Herberg, H. and Kemp, M. (1969). Some implications of variable returns to 
scale, Canadian Journal of Economics, 2 (3), pp. 403-415.  
 
Hicks, J. (1959). Free Trade and Modern Economics, In: Essays in World 
Economics, Oxford: Clarendon Press.   
 
Ho. P. Sai-Wing (2008). Arguing for policy space to promote development: 
Prebisch, Myrdal and Singer, Journal of Economic Issues, XLII (2), pp. 509-
516.  
 
Horstman, I. and Markusen, J. (1986). Up the average cost curve: inefficient 
entry and the new protectionism, Journal of International Economics, 20 (3-4), 
pp. 225-247.  
 
Hudson, M. (2000). The use and abuse of mathematical economics, Journal of 
Economic Studies, 27 (4/5), pp. 292-315.  
 
Hutchison, T.W. (1953). A Review of Economic Doctrines 1870-1929, London: 
Oxford University Press.  
 268 
 Hutchison,	  T.	  (1994).	  The	  Uses	  and	  Abuses	  of	  Economics,	  London and New 
York: Routledge.	  
 
Hummels, D. and Levinsohn, J. (1995). Monopolistic competition and 
international trade: reconsidering the evidence, Quarterly Journal of 
Economics, 110 (3), pp. 799-836.  
 
Irwin, D. (1996). Against the Tide: An Intellectual History of Free Trade, New 
Jersey: Princeton University Press.  
 
Irwin, D. (2009). Free Trade under Fire, 3rd Edition, Princeton and Oxford: 
Princeton University Press.  
 
Jha, N. (1973). The Age of Marshall: Aspects of British Economic Thought 
1890-1915, 2nd edition, London: Frank Cass and Co. Ltd.  
Johnson, H. (1964). Tariffs and economic development: some theoretical issues, 
In: Therberge, J. (ed.) (1968). Economics of Trade and Development, New 
York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc, pp. 351-375.  
 
Johnson, H. (1965). Optimal trade intervention in the presence of domestic 
distortions, In: Baldwin, R. (ed.) Trade, Growth and Balance of Payments: 
Essays in honour of Gottfried Haberler. Chicago: Rand McNally, pp. 3-34.  
 
Johnson, H. (1971). Trade and growth: A geometrical exposition, Journal of 
International Economics, 1 (1), pp. 81-101.  
 
Jones, R. (1965). The structure of simple general equilibrium models, Journal of 
Political Economy, 73 (6), pp. 557-572. 
 
Jones, R. (1968). Variable returns to scale in general equilibrium, International 
Economic Review, 9 (3), pp. 262-272.  
 
 269 
Jones, R. (1971). A three-factor model in theory, trade and history, In:  
Bhagwati, J., Jones, R.W., Mundell, R. and Vanek, J. (eds) Trade, Balance of 
Payments and Growth, Amsterdam: North-Holland, pp. 3-21.  
 
Jones, R. (1974). The small country in a many-commodity world, Australian 
Economic Papers, 13 (23), pp. 225-36. 
 
Jones, R. (1977). Two-ness in trade theory: costs and benefits, Special Papers in 
International Economics, Princeton University, number 12.  
 
Jones, T. (1979). The appointment of Pigou as Marshall’s successor: the other 
side of the coin, Journal of Law and Economics, 21 (1), pp. 235-243. 
 
Jones, C. (1995). R&D based models of economic growth, Journal of Political 
Economy, 103 (4), pp. 759-784. 
 
Keller, W. (1996). Absorptive capacity: On the creation and acquisition of 
technology in development, Journal of Development Economics, 49 (1), pp. 
199-227. 
 
Kemp, M (1955). The efficiency of competition as an allocator of resources: I. 
External economies of production, Canadian Journal of Economics and 
Political Science. 21 (1), pp. 30-42.  
 
Kemp, M. (1960). The Mill-Bastable infant industry dogma, Journal of Political 
Economy, 68 (1), pp. 65-67.  
 
Kemp, M. (1964). The Pure Theory of Trade and Investment, Englewood Cliffs, 
N.J.: Prentice Hall.  
 
Kemp, M. and Negishi, T. (1969). Domestic distortions, tariffs and the theory of 
the optimum subsidy, Journal of Political Economy, 77 (6), pp. 1011-1013. 
 
 270 
Kemp, M. and Negishi, T. (1970). Variable returns to scale, commodity taxes, 
factor market distortions and their implications for trade gains, Swedish Journal 
of Economics, 72, pp. 1-11.  
 
Kenen, P. (1965). Nature, capital and trade, Journal of Political Economy, 73 
(5), pp. 437-460.  
 
Keynes, J. M (1933). National Self-Sufficiency, The Yale Review, 22 (4), pp. 
755-769. 
 
Keynes, J. M. (1939). Professor Tinbergen’s method, Economic Journal, 49 
(195), pp. 558-568.  
 
Keynes, J. M. (1963 [1930]). Economic possibilities for our grandchildren, In: 
Keynes, J. M., Essays in Persuasion. New York: W.W. Norton and Co, pp. 358-
373.   
 
Keynes, J. M (2013 [1981]). The Collected Writings of John Maynard Keynes 
Volume XX, (ed.) Moggridge, D. (revised edition), Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press.  
 
Keynes, J. M. (1997 [1936]). The General Theory of Employment, Interest and 
Money, Amherst, New York: Prometheus Books.  
 
Kim, S. (1995). Expansion of markets and the geographic distribution of 
economic activities: the trends in US regional manufacturing structure 1860-
1987, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 110 (4), pp. 881-908.  
 
King, R. and Rebelo, S. (1990). Public policy and economic growth: developing 
neoclassical implications, Journal of Political Economy, 86 (5), part 2, pp. 
S126-S150.  
 
Knight, F. (1924). Some fallacies in the interpretation of social cost, Quarterly 
Journal of Economics, 38 (4), pp. 582-606. 
 271 
 
Knight, F. (1925). On decreasing cost and comparative cost, Quarterly Journal 
of Economics, 39 (2), pp. 331-333.  
 
Kortum, S. (1997). Research, patenting and technological change, 
Econometrica, 65 (6), pp. 1389-1419.  
 
Kravis, I. (1971). The current case for import limitations, In: Commission on 
International Trade and Investment Policy, United States Economic Policy in an 
Interdependent World. Washington: Government Printing Office, pp. 141-165.   
 
Kremer, M. and Chan, D. (1999). Income distribution dynamics with 
endogenous fertility, American Economic Association, Paper and Proceedings, 
89 (2), pp. 155-160.  
 
Krueger, A. (1978). Foreign Trade Regimes and Economic Development: 
Liberalisation Attempts and Consequences. New York: National Bureau of 
Economic Development.  
 
Krugman, P. (1979). Increasing returns, monopolistic competition and 
international trade, Journal of International Economics, 9 (4), pp. 469-479.  
 
Krugman, P. (1980). Scale economies, product differentiation and the pattern of 
trade, American Economic Review, 70 (5), pp. 950-959. 
 
Krugman, P. (1981). Intra-industry specialization and the gains from trade, 
Journal of Political Economy, 89 (5), pp. 959-973. 
 
Krugman, P. (1983). New theories of trade among industrial countries, 
American Economic Review, Papers and Proceedings), 73 (2), pp. 343-347.  
 
Krugman, P. (1984). Import competition as export promotion: International 
competition in the presence of oligopoly and economies of scale, In: 
 272 
Kierzkowski, H. (ed.) Monopolistic Competition and International Trade, 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp.  75-87.  
 
Krugman, P. (1987a). Increasing returns and the theory of international trade, 
In: Bewley, T. F. (ed.) Advances in Economic Theory, Fifth Wold Congress. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 301-328.  
 
Krugman, P. (1987b). Is free trade passé? Journal of Economic Perspectives, 1 
(2), pp. 131-144.  
 
Krugman, P. (1987c). The narrow moving band, the Dutch disease, and the 
competitive consequences of Mrs. Thatchers: notes on trade in the presence of 
dynamic scale economies, Journal of Development Economics, 27 (1-2), pp. 41-
55.  
 
Krugman, P. (1990). Rethinking International Trade, Cambridge 
Massachussets: MIT Press.  
 
Krugman, P. (1991). Increasing returns and economic geography, Journal of 
Political Economy, 99 (3), pp. 483-499.  
 
Krugman, P. (1995). Development, Geography and Economic Theory, 
Cambridge: MIT Press.  
 
Krugman, P. (1998), Ricardo’s Difficult Idea: Why Intellectuals don’t 
understand comparative advantage, In: Cook, G. (ed.) The Economics and 
Politics of International Trade: Freedom and Trade, Volume II, London, 
Routledge, pp. 22-36.  
 
Krugman, P. (1998). Space: the final frontier, Journal of Economic 
Perspectives, 12 (2), pp. 161-174.  
 
Krugman, P. (2009).The increasing returns revolution in trade and geography, 
American Economic Review, 99 (3), pp. 561-471.  
 273 
 
Krugman, P., Obstfeld, M and Melitz, M. (2012). International Economics: 
Theory and Policy, 9th edition, Boston and London: Pearson Education Ltd.  
 
Krugman, P. and Venables, A. (1995). Globalization and the inequality of 
nations, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 110 (4), pp. 857-880.  
 
Lancaster, K (1980). Intra-industry trade under perfect monopolistic 
competition, Journal of International Economics, 10 (2), pp. 151-175.  
 
Latsis, S. (1976). A research programme in economics, In: Latsis, S. (ed.) 
Method and Appraisal in Economics, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
pp. 1-41.  
 
Leahy, D. and Neary, J.P. (2001). Robust rules for industrial policy in open 
economies, Journal of International Trade and Economic Development, 10 (4), 
pp. 393-409.  
 
Leahy, D. and Neary, J.P. (2009). Multilateral subsidy games, Economic 
Theory, 41 (1), pp. 41-66.  
 
Leahy, D. and Neary, J.P. (2011). Oligopoly and Trade, In: Bernhofen, D. 
Falvey, R. Greenaway, D and Kreickemeier, U. (eds)  Palgrave Handbook of 
International Trade, London: Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 197-235.  
 
Lee, S. (1990). International equity markets and trade policy, Journal of 
International Economics, 29 (1-2), pp. 273-184.  
 
Leontief, W. (1933).  The use of indifference curves in the analysis of foreign 
trade, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 47 (3), pp. 493-503.  
 
Leontief, W. (1953). Domestic production and foreign trade: The American 
Capital Position Re-examined, Proceedings of the American Philosophical 
Society, 97, pp. 332-49.  
 274 
 
Leontief, W. (1971). Theoretical assumptions and non-observed facts, American 
Economic Review, 61 (1), pp. 1-7.  
 
Lerner, A. (1932). The diagrammatic representation of cost conditions in 
international trade, Economica, 12 (37), pp. 345-56.  
 
Lerner, A. (1934). The diagrammatic representation of demand conditions in 
international trade, Economica, New Series, 1 (3), pp. 319-34.  
 
Levi-Fauer, D. (1997). Friedrich List and the political economy of the nation 
state. International Political Economy, 4 (1), pp. 154-178.  
 
Lewis, W. A. (1954). Economic development with unlimited supplies of labour, 
Manchester School, 22, pp. 139-191.  
 
Lin, J. (2009). Should industrial policy in developing countries conform to 
comparative advantage or defy it: A debate between Justin Lin and Ha-Joon 
Chang, Development Policy Review, 27 (5), pp. 483-502.  
 
Linder, S. (1961). An Essay on Trade and Transformation, New York: Wiley.  
 
List, F. (1827). Outlines of American Political Economy. Translated, Matile, 
G.A. Philadelphia: Lippencott and Co.  
 
List, F. (2005a [1841]). National System of Political Economy-Volume 1: The 
History, New York: Cosimo Classics (originally published by Dry Bones Press, 
Inc).  
 
List, F. (2005b [1841]). National System of Political Economy-Volume 2: The 
Theory,New York: Cosimo Classics (originally published by Dry Bones Press, 
Inc).  
 
 275 
Little, M.D., Scitovsky, T. and Scott, M. (1970). Industry and Trade in some 
Developing Countries. Oxford: Oxford University Press.  
 
Losch, A. (1940). The Economics of Location, Jena: Fischer [English 
Translation New Haven: Yale University Press, 1954].  
 
Lovasy, G (1941). International trade under imperfect competition, Quarterly 
Journal of Economics, 55 (4), pp. 567-583. 
 
Lucas, R. (1988). On the mechanics of economic development, Journal of 
Monetary Economics, 22 (1), pp. 3-42.  
 
Magee, S. (1973). Factor market distortions, production and trade: A survey, 
Oxford Economic Papers, 25 (1), pp. 1-43.  
 
Magnusson, L. (2004). The Tradition of Free Trade, London: Routledge, Taylor 
and Francis Group. 
 
Maizels, A. (1998). New evidence on the North-South terms of trade. Mimeo, 
Queen Elizabeth House, University of Oxford.  
 
Maki, U. (2009). Realistic realism about unrealistic models, In: Kincaid, H. and 
Ross, D. (eds) The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Economics. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, Inc., pp. 68-98.   
 
Maloney, J. (1985). Marshall, Orthodoxy and the Professionalisation of 
Economics, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.  
 
Maneschi, A. (1998). Comparative Advantage in International Trade: A 
Historical Perspective, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.  
 
Maneschi, A. (2002). How new is the ‘new trade theory’ of the past two 
decades? In: Boehm, S., Gehrke, C. Kurz, H. D., and Sturn, R. (eds) Is there 
 276 
Progress in Economics? Knowledge, Truth and the History of Economic 
Thought, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, pp. 240-255.  
 
Maneschi, A. (2008). Mihail Manoilescu: An appreciation and critique, 
Romanian Journal of Economic Forecasting, 9 (2), pp. 130-133.  
 
Maneschi, A. and Thweattt, O. (1987). Barone’s 1908 representation of an 
economy’s trade equilibrium and the gains from trade, Journal of International 
Economics, 22 (3/4). pp. 375-82.  
 
Manoilescu, M. (1931). The Theory of Protection and International Trade, 
London: P.S. King.  
 
Markusen, J. and Venables, A. (1988). Trade policy with increasing returns and 
imperfect competition: contradictory results from competing assumptions, 
Journal of International Economics, 24 (3-4), pp. 299-316.  
 
Marshall, A. (1898). Distribution and exchange, Economic Journal, 8 (9), pp. 
37-59.  
 
Marshall, A. (1879). The Pure Theory of Foreign trade and the Pure Theory of 
Domestic Values, London: London School of Economics and Political Science, 
Series of Reprints of Scarce Tracts of Economics and Political Science.  
 
Marshall, A. (1920). Principles of Economics, 8th edition, London: Macmillan 
Press.  
 
Marshall, A. (2003 [1923]). Money Credit and Commerce, Amherst: 
Prometheus Books.  
 
Martin, R. (1999). The new geographical turn in economics: some critical 
reflections, Cambridge Journal of Economics, 23 (1), pp. 65-91.  
 
 277 
Matsuyama, K. (1992). Agricultural productivity, comparative advantage and 
economic growth, Journal of Economic Theory, 50 (2), pp. 317-334.  
 
Matthews, R. (1949/59). Reciprocal demand and increasing returns, Review of 
Economic Studies, 17 (2), pp. 149-158.  
 
Mayer, T. (1980). Economics as a hard science: realistic goal or wishful 
thinking? Economic Inquiry, 18 (2), pp. 165-178.  
 
Mayer, W. (1974). Variable returns to scale in general equilibrium theory: 
Comment. International Economic Review, 15 (1), pp. 225-235.  
 
McCloskey, D (1980). Magnanimous Albion: free trade and British National 
Income, 1841-1881, Explorations in Economic History, 17, pp. 302-320.  
 
Meade, J. (1952). External economies and diseconomies in a competitive 
situation, Economic Journal, 62 (245), pp. 54-67.  
 
Meade, J. E. (1955). The Theory of International Policy, Volume Two: Trade 
and Welfare, London: Oxford University Press.  
 
Meier, G. (1995). Leading Issues in Economic Development, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press.  
 
Melitz, M. (2003). The impact of trade on intra-industry reallocations and 
aggregate industry productivity, Econometrica, 71 (6), pp. 1695-1725.  
 
Melitz, M. and Trefler, D. (2012). Gains from trade when firms matter, Journal	  
of	  Economic	  Perspectives,	  26	  (2),	  pp.	  91-­‐118.	  	  
 
Melvin, J. (1969). Increasing returns to scale as a determinant of trade, 
Canadian Journal of Economics, 2 (3), pp. 389-402. 
 
 278 
Mill, J. S. (1844). Essays on Some Unsettled Questions of Political Economy, 
UK: Lightning Source UK Ltd. (Kessiger Publishing’s Rare Reprints).  
 
Mill, J. S. (2004 [1848]). Principles of Political Economy, Amherst, New York: 
Prometheus Books. 
 
Minabe, N. (1966). The Stolper-Samuelson theorem under conditions of 
variable returns to scale, Oxford Economic Papers, 18 (2), pp. 204-212. 
 
Mirowski, P. (1991). The when, the how and the why of mathematical 
expression in the history of economic analysis, Journal of Economic 
Perspectives, 5 (1), pp. 145-157.  
 
Mitchell, W.C. (1924). The prospect of economics, In: Tugwell, R.G. (ed.) The 
Trend in Economics, New York: F.S. Crofts, pp. 3-34.  
 
Morand, O. (1999). Endogenous fertility, income distribution and growth, 
Journal of Economic Growth, 4 (3), pp. 331-349.  
 
Morgan, M. (2001). The Formation of ‘Modern’ Economics: Engineering and 
Ideology, London School of Economics, Department of Economic History, 
Working Paper  6/012. 
 
Myint, H. (1958). The Classical theory of international trade and the 
underdeveloped countries, Economic Journal, 68 (270), pp. 317-337.  
 
Myint, H. (1977). Adam Smith’s theory of international trade in the perspective 
of economic development, Economica, New Series, 44 (175), pp. 231-48.  
 
Myrdal, G. (1956). An International Economy: Problems and Prospects, New 
York: Harper and Bros.  
 
Myrdal, G. (1957). Economic Theory and Undeveloped Regions, London: 
Duckworth. 
 279 
 
Nayyar, D. (2003). Globalization and development. In: Chang, H-J. (ed.) 
Rethinking Development Economics. London: Anthem Press, pp. 61-82.  
 
Neary, J. (1994). Cost asymmetries in international subsidy games: Should 
governments help winners or losers?, Journal of International Economics, 37 
(3-4), pp. 197-218.  
 
Neary, J. P. (ed.) (1995a). International Trade Volume I: Welfare and Trade 
Policy, Aldershot: Elgar. 
 
Neary, J. P. (ed.) (1995b). International Trade Volume II: Production Structure, 
Trade and Growth, Aldershot: Elgar.  
 
Neary, J. P. (2000). Monopolistic competition and international trade theory, 
Conference Presentation on The Monopolistic Competition Revolution after 
Twenty Five Years, University of Groningen.  
 
Neary, J. P. (2001). Of hype and hyperbolas: introducing the new economic 
geography, Journal of Economic Literature, 39 (2), pp. 536-561.  
 
Neary, J.P. (2003). International trade in general oligopolistic equilibrium, 
Mimeo, UCD.  
 
Neary, J.P. (2009). Two and a half theories of trade, Centre for Economic and 
Policy Research Discussion Paper 7600, London: CEPR. 
 
Nicholson, J.S. (1901). Principles of Political Economy, Volume III. London: 
Adam and Charles Black.  
 
Nicholson, J.S. (1903). Principles of Political Economy, Volume II, 2nd edition, 
London: Adam and Charles Black.  
 
 280 
Nobel Media AB 2008. "Paul Krugman – Documentary". Nobelprize.org. Nobel 
Media AB.  
http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/economic-
sciences/laureates/2008/krugman-docu.html 
 
Nobel Media AB/BBC World 2008, "Nobel Minds". Nobelprize.org. Nobel 
Media AB. 
http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_organizations/nobelmedia/tv_programs/nobel
minds.html 
 
O’Brien, D. P. (1990). Marshall’s work in relation to classical economics, In: 
Whitaker, J. (ed.) Centenary Essays on Alfred Marshall, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, pp. 127-163.  
 
Ohlin, B. (1931). Protection and non-competing groups, Weltwirtschaftliches 
Archiv, 33, pp. 30-45.  
 
Ohlin, B. (1935). Interregional and International Trade, Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press.  
 
Ohlin, B. (1967). Interregional and International Trade, (revised edition), 
London: Oxford University Press.  
 
Palma, G. (1990). Prebisch, Raul. In: Eatwell, J., Milgate, M. and Newman, P. 
(eds) The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economic Development. London: 
Macmillan, pp. 291-295.  
 
Panagariya, A. (1980). Variable returns to scale in general equilibrium theory 
once again, Journal of International Economics, 10 (4), pp. 499-526.  
 
Panagariya, A. (1981). Variable returns to scale in production and patterns of 
specialisation, American Economic Review, 71 (1), pp. 221-230. 
 
 281 
Papageorgiou, D.  Michaely, M. and Choski, A. (eds) (1991). Liberalising 
Foreign Trade, Oxford: Basil Blackwell.  
 
Pareto, V. (1966). Sociological Writings, Selected and introduced by Finer, S. 
E., London, Pall Mall Press  Ltd.  
 
Pareto, V. (1971). Manual of Political Economy. New York: Augustus M. 
Kelley.  
 
Parsons, (1931). Wants and activities in Marshall, Quarterly Journal of 
Economics 46 (1), pp. 101-140. 
 
Patinkin, D. (1976). Keynes and econometrics: on the interaction between 
macroeconomic revolutions of the interwar period, Econometrica, 44 (6), pp. 
1091-, 1123.  
 
Pattanaik, P. (1970). Domestic distortions and the gains from trade,  Economic 
Journal, 80 (319), pp. 638-649. 
 
Pavcnik, N. (2002). Trade liberalisation, exit and productivity improvements: 
Evidence from Chilean plants, Review of Economic Studies, 69 (1), pp. 245-276.  
 
PBS NEWSHOUR (2008). “Greenspan admits flaw to Congress, Predicts more 
Economic Problems”, Transcript.  http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/business/july-­‐dec08/crisishearing_10-­‐23.html	  
 
Perrotta, C. (1991). Is the mercantilist theory of the favourable balance of trade 
really erroneous?  History of Political Economy, 23 (2), pp. 301–336. 
 
Peretto, P. (1998). Technological change and population growth, Journal of 
Economic Growth, 3 (4), pp. 283-311.  
 
 282 
Pigou, A. C. (1906). Protective and Preferential Import Duties, London: 
Macmillan and Co.  
 
Pigou, A. C. and Robertson, D. H. (1931). Economic Essays and Addresses, 
London: King.  
 
Prebisch, R. (1950). The Economic Development of Latin America and its 
Principal Problems, New York: United Nations.  
 
Prebisch, R. (1951). Economic Survey of Latin America 1949, New York: 
United Nations Department of Economic Affairs.  
 
Prebisch, R. (1963). Development problems of the peripheral countries and the 
terms of trade. In: Therberge, J. (eds) (1968). Economics of Trade and 
Development. New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc, pp. 287-297.  
 
Prebisch, R. (1964). Towards a New Trade Policy for Development, New York: 
United Nations. 
 
Price, L.L. (1904). Economic theory and fiscal policy, Economic Journal 14 
(55), pp. 372-387. 
 
Puga, D. and Venables, A. (1996). The spread of industry: spatial agglomeration 
and economic development, Journal of Japanese International Economics, 10 
(4), pp. 440-464.  
 
Rae, J. (1964 [1834]). Statement of Some New Principles of Political Economy, 
New York: Augustus Kelley (Reprints of Economic Classics).  
 
Redding, S. (2010). Theories of heterogeneous firms and trade, Centre for 
Economic Performance  Discussion Paper 994. London: London School of 
Economics and Political Science (LSE).  
 
 283 
Ricardo, D. (1815). An Essay on The Influence of a low Price of Corn on the 
Profits of Stock; shewing the Inexpediency of Restrictions on Importation: with 
Remarks on Mr. Malthus' Two Last Publications: 'An Inquiry into the Nature 
and Progress of Rent;' and 'The Grounds of an Opinion on the Policy of 
restricting the Importation of Foreign Corn.', 2nd edition, London: John Murray. 
The Making Of The Modern World. Web. 20 Aug. 2013. 
 
Ricardo, D. (1996 [1817]). Principles of Political Economy and Taxation, 
Amherst, New York: Prometheus Books. 
 
Ricardo, D. (1822). On Protection to Agriculture, 2nd edition, London: John 
Murray. The Making Of The Modern World. Web. 20 Aug. 2013. 
 
Rivera-Batiz, L. and Romer, P. (1991). International trade with endogenous 
change, European Economic Review, 35 (4), pp. 971-1004.  
 
Robbins, L (1998). A History of Economic Thought: The LSE Lectures. 
Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press. 
 
Robinson, J. (1933). The Economics of Imperfect Competition, London: 
Macmillan.  
 
Robinson, J. (1946-47). The Pure theory of international trade, Review of 
Economic Studies, 14 (2), pp. 98-112.  
 
Robinson, J. (1962). Economic Philosophy, London: C.A. Watts and Co. Ltd.  
 
Rodrik, D. (1987), Policy targeting with endogenous distortions: theory of 
optimum subsidy revisited, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 102 (4), pp. 903-
911.  
 
Rodrik, D. (2001). Trading in Illusions, Foreign Policy, 123, pp. 54-62.  
 
 284 
Rodriguez, F. and Rodrik, D. (2000). Trade Policy and Economic Growth: A 
Skeptics’s Guide to the Cross-National Evidence, In: Bernanke, B. and Rogoff, 
K. (eds) NBER Macroeconomics Annual, 2000, Cambridge: MIT Press, pp. 261-
325.  
 
Roll, E. (1992). A History of Economic Thought, 5th edition, London: Faber and 
Faber. 
 
Romer, P. (1986). Increasing returns and long-run growth, Journal of Political 
Economy, 94 (5), pp. 1002-1037.  
 
Romer, P. (1990). Endogenous, technological change, Journal of Political 
Economy, 98 (5), pp. S71-S102.  
 
Rostow, W. (1960). The Stages of Economic Growth, a non-Communist 
Manifesto, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Ruffin, R. J. (2002). David Ricardo’s discovery of comparative advantage, 
History of Political Economy, 34 (4), pp. 727-748.  
 
Ruffin, R. J. (2005). Debunking a myth: Torrens on comparative advantage, 
History of Political Economy, 37 (4), pp. 711-722  
 
Rybczynski, T. (1955). Factor Endowment and Relative Commodity Prices, 
Economica, 22 (84), 336-41.  
 
Sachs, J. and Warner, A. (1995). Economic Reform and the Process of Global 
Integration, Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1, pp. 1-118. 
 
Samuelson, P. (1938). Welfare economics and international trade, American 
Economic Review, 28 (2), pp. 261-266. 
 
Samuelson, P. (1939). The gains from international trade, Canadian Journal of 
Economics and Political Science, 5(2), pp. 195-205.  
 285 
 
Samuelson, P. (1948). International trade and equalisation of factor prices, 
Economic Journal 58 (230), pp.163-184. 
 
Samuelson, P. (1949). International factor-price equalisation once again, 
Economic Journal 59 (234), pp. 181-197. 
 
Samuelson, P. (1969). The Way of an Economist, In:  Samuelson, P. (ed.) 
International Economic Relations: Proceedings of the Third Congress of the 
International Economics Association, London: Macmillan, pp. 1-11.  
 
Samuelson, P. (1981). Summing up the Australian case for protection, 
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 96 (1), pp. 147-60.  
 
Schuller, R. (1905). Effects of imports upon domestic production, In: Taussig, 
F.W. (ed) (1921), Selected Readings in International Trade and Tariff 
Problems, Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Library Digital Collections, 
pp. 371-391.  
 
Schumpeter, J. A. (1994 [1954]). History of Economic Analysis, London: 
Routledge.  
 
Screpanti, E. and Zamagni, S. (2005). An Outline of the History of Economic 
Thought, 2nd edition, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 
Segertstrom, P. (1998). Endogenous growth without scale effects, American 
Economic Review, 88 (5), pp. 1290-1310.  
 
Segerstrom, P., Anant, T. and Dinopolous, E. (1990). A Schumpetarian model 
of the product life cycle, American Economic Review, 80 (5), pp. 1077-1091.  
 
Sener, F. (2006). Intellectual Property Rights and Rent Protection in a North-
South-Product-Cycle Model”, Union College, mimeo.  
 
 286 
Shafaeddin M. (2000). What Did Frederick List Actually Say? Some 
clarifications on the infant industry argument. UNCTAD Discussion Paper No. 
149.  
 
Sidgwick, H. (1901). The Principles of Political Economy, 3rd edition, London: 
Macmillan and Co. Ltd.  
 
Singer, H. (1950). The distribution of the gains between investing and 
borrowing countries, American Economic Review, Papers and Proceedings), 40 
(2), pp. 473-485.  
 
Singer, H. (1975). The distribution of the gains from trade and investment 
revisited, Journal of Development Studies, 11 (4), pp. 376-382. 
 
Singer, H. (1990). Terms of trade and economic development, In: Eatwell, J., 
Milgate, M. and Newman, P. (eds) The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economic 
Development, London: Macmillan, pp. 291-295.  
 
Smith, A. (1999 [1776]). The Wealth of Nations, Books IV-V, London: Penguin 
Books.  
 
Smith, M.A.M. (1976). Trade, growth and consumption in alternative models of 
capital accumulation, Journal of International Economics, 6 (4), pp. 371-384.  
 
Smith, M.A.M. (1977). Capital accumulation in the open two-sector economy, 
Economic Journal, 87 (346), pp. 273-282.  
 
Sraffa, P. (1926). The laws of returns under competitive conditions, Economic 
Journal, 36 (144), pp. 535-550.  
 
Stolper, W. and Samuelson, P. (1941). Protection and real wages, Review of 
Economic Studies, 9 (1), pp. 58-73. 
 
 287 
Tett, G. (2009). Fools Gold: How Unrestrained Greed corrupted a Dream, 
shattered Global Markets and unleashed a Catastrophe, London: Little Brown.  
 
Trefler, D. (1995). The case of the missing trade and other mysteries, American 
Economic Review, 85 (5), pp. 1029-46.  
 
Trefler, D. (2004). The long and short of the Canada-US free trade agreement, 
American Economic Review, 94 (4), pp. 870-895.  
 
Tinbergen, J. (1945). Professor Graham’s case for protection. In: Tinbergen, J., 
International Economic Cooperation, Amsterdam: Elselvier, Appendix 2, pp. 
173-187.  
 
Vaggi, G. and Groenewegen, P. (2003). A Concise History of Economic 
Thought: From Mercantalism to Monetarism, London: Palgrave Macmillan. 
 
Vanek, J. (1971). Economic growth and international trade in pure theory, 
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 85 (3), pp. 377-390.  
 
Venables, A. (1985). Trade and trade policy with imperfect competition: The 
case of identical products and free entry, Journal of International Economics, 
19 (1-2), pp. 1-10.  
 
Venables, A. (1990). International capacity choice and national market games, 
Journal of International Economics, 29 (1-2), pp. 23-42.  
 
Venables, A. (1996). Equilibrium locations of vertically linked industries, 
International Economic Review, 372, pp. 341-359.  
 
Viner, J. (1932). Review of Mihail Manoilescu’s ‘The Theory of Protection and 
International Trade’, Journal of Political Economy, 40 (1), pp. 121-125.  
 
Viner, J. (1964 [1937]). Studies in the Theory of International Trade,  London: 
George Allen and Unwin Ltd.  
 288 
 
Von Bohm-Bawerk, E. (1959 [1884]). Capital and Interest, Vol. 1, History and 
Critique of Interest Theories. 4th edition, Translated Huncke, G. D. and 
Sennholz, H. F. South Holland: Libertarian Press.  
 
Weber, A. (1909). Theory of the Location of Industries, Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press.  
 
Whitaker, J. ed. (1975a). The Early Economic Writings of Alfred Marshall, 
1867-1890, Volume 1, London and Basingstoke: Macmillan Press Ltd.  
 
Whitaker, J. ed. (1975b). The Early Writings of Alfred Marshall, 1867-1890, 
Volume 2, London and Basingstoke: Macmillan Press Ltd.  
 
Williams, J. (1929). The theory of international trade reconsidered, Economic 
Journal, 39 (154), pp. 195-209.  
 
Winch, D. (1969). Economics and Policy: A Historical Study, London: Hodder 
and Stoughton.  
 
Young, A. (1991). Increasing returns and economic progress, Economic 
Journal, 38 (152), pp. 527-542.  
 
Young, A. (1991). Learning by doing and the dynamic effects of international 
trade, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 106 (2), pp. 369-405.  
 
Young, A. (1998). Growth without scale effects, Journal of Political Economy, 
106 (1), pp. 41-63.  
 
Young, A. A. (1928). Increasing returns and economic progress, Economic 
Journal, 38 (152), pp. 527-542.  
 
 
